MODERNIZATION AND ETHNIC MOBILIZATION AMONG THE NAGAS

AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERNIZATION PROCESS

AND

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION AMONG THE NAGAS OF NORTHEASTERN INDIA

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ABSTRACT

An Examination of the Modernization Process and Ethnic Mobilization among the Nagas of Northeastern India.

An important feature of politics in the hills of northeast India is the confrontation between tradition and modernity. Many relatively isolated groups of people have come into contact with powerful external forces of change, and have undergone fundamental social transformation. A key element in this process is the political mobilization of previously isolated groups, and the creation of new sources of friction between them. The aim of this thesis is:

(i) to examine the formation of an ethnic group known as the 'Nagas' from among the ill-defined and constantly warring linguistic and cultural groups which inhabited the Patkoi range of mountains during the nineteenth century, and,

(ii) to examine the sources and forms of ethnic cohesion and conflict.

The central theme employed in the development of the analysis is the process of social change. Various patterns and agents in the process are examined from a historical perspective, and the British colonial administration; the Protestant church; neighbouring ethnic groups; trade contacts; and foreign armies; is assessed in the extent to which they contribute to social change, and affect the formation of political orientations. The institutions, structures and organizations that help to maintain ethnic boundaries are investigated, and consideration is given to the agents of change, the so-called "new elite".

The thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter focuses upon a discussion of approaches to the questions of modernization and ethnicity, to establish the theoretical basis for the study.

A brief overview of traditional Naga society is presented in the second chapter with special emphasis given to an explanation of traditional socialization patterns.

Chapter three outlines the development of the early British relations with the Nagas, the gradual extension of British administration over the Naga Hills and, the reactions of Nagas to colonial administration. The development of opposition to British rule reveals the central role played by the village of Khonoma.

The fourth chapter seeks to identify the primary factors inducing social change in the pre-1967 period. These include, the impact of the British administration, the spread of Christianity, social conflict generated within Naga villages, the emergence of new Naga elites, and the impact of the Second World War.

The final two chapters focus on the post-war politics, with special emphasis given to the development of ethnic identities as a basis for political mobilization. The Naga National Council, demands secession from India and provide the importance of new organizational and propaganda methods used by the elite in crystallizing and maintaining ethnic boundaries.

Divisions within the elite, development of factionalism, peace politics, stop-go game with the Indian government. The account reveals how the Naga National Council became the vehicle for articulating Naga political demands, including the demand for secession from India. In the

political struggle with Indian authorities Naga elites utilized new techniques to crystallize ethnic boundaries. As the level of violence subsides, arising from various peace initiatives and the alternate policies of the Indian Government, internal political divisions within Naga society became manifest in elite factionalism. Ethnic identity is viewed as being derived in large measure from the political process with the salience of ethnicity being a function of the issues and cleavages of political struggle.

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

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In recent years increasing attention has been paid to the politics of ethnic groups. Recognition has been given to the salience of ethnic problems and ethnic political groupings not just as obstacles to successful national integration, but as powerful political expressions which call for a reconsideration of traditional ideas about political rights and duties. The upsurge of ethnic feeling and identity has been seen, moreover, as a form of political development which may be consistent with "modernity", whereas previously ethnic survival was seen by many social scientists as an obstacle to the successful "modernization"[1] of a society, and the harmonious development of the modern state. The central bureaucracies of new nations have often considered it a primary task to loosen and detach ethnic affiliations and to replace them with loyalty to the state. As justification for their actions they turned to a number of academic studies which encouraged the view that societies based on traditional values and ascriptive loyalties were obstacles to the achievement of the modern democratic polity, and its presumed economic and welfare advantages. According to a major trend of thought in the social sciences, social change was seen as a broadly unidirectional process leading to the formation of predominantly urban societies with a high degree of social mobility, a developed occupational structure based on merit rather than on inherited position, and a political and economic system based upon acquisitive values and universal legal norms.

This view emerged from two different schools of thought: that founded by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and the empirical school of social science which evolved in Europe and North America from the early foundations laid by Comte, and later, Durkheim. The theoretical claims of the latter group were based upon typologies constructed by Talcott Parsons,[2] F. Toennies,[3] Robert Redfield,[4] F. X. Sutton,[5] and others, which implied that modernization would lead to the abandonment of traditional customs, lifestyles, and forms of social and economic intercourse, and that "tradition" and "modernity" were incompatible. The heirs of Sir Henry Maine's distinction between societies based on status and those based on contract,[6] Durkheim's characterisation of mechanical and organic forms of solidarity,[7] and Weber's analytical distinction between traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational forms of authority,[8] were a series of typological constructions placing elements of "tradition" and "modernity" along a bipolar continuum. These included F. X. Sutton's discrimination between the agricultural and the industrial, Redfield's distinction between folk and urban culture societies, and Parson's and Shil's use of pattern variables in determining a theory of development and growing "systemness".[9] As yardsticks for comparison these typologies are indeed useful, but confusion is created because of the difference between various traditions and their varying degrees of adaptability to "modern" material conditions. Similarly the static nature of such classification systems, and the values which they may imply reduce their usefulness. The bipolar nature of most of these typologies therefore presents a limited picture of social change, and while we would not go so far as E. R. Leach as to describe those who create elaborate classification systems as "mere

anthropological butterfly collectors",[10] we recognize that this approach to the study of social change imposes many limitations.

Although with a different method and from an entirely different perspective, Marx's analysis of the material conditions of peasant groups, and the "Asiatic" economy, leads to a similarly unilinear conclusion that traditional societies give way to more individualistic, diffuse, "bourgeois" societies, in which capital plays a central economic role. While the employment of historical materialism as an analytical tool permits consideration of the important elements of "structure", and "process", historical materialism is a far more rigid method than the dialectical instrument that was polished and developed by Hegel. Similarly, the macro-societal emphasis of this approach is of limited use in a description of small-scale or "folk" societies in which movements of capital are restricted or almost completely absent.[11]

On the other hand, Marx's insights into the economic process of modernization, and of the impact of external colonial forces (the "westernizing" elements) are of great importance, and it is worthwhile considering some of those insights here. Firstly, Marx distinguished between the largely incremental nature of change in pre-colonial societies, and the explosive change set off by the sudden intrusion of exogeneous forces upon patterns of subsistence and exchange, which were often regulated by ascriptive considerations. In Das Kapital Marx describes the inertia in traditional societies:

> The simplicity of the organization for production in these self-sufficing communities that constantly reproduce themselves in the same form, and when accidentally destroyed spring up again on the same spot and with the same name -- this simplicity supplies the key to the secret of the unchangeableness

> of Asiatic societies, an unchangeableness in such striking contrast with the constant dissolution and refounding of Asiatic states, and the never-ceasing changes of dynasty.[12]

In contrast to this constant, unchanging, traditional economic structure Marx places the deep-rooted change wrought by colonial conquest and the forced inclusion within the international market economy. In The British Rule in India he describes the extrinsic, fundamental changes brought about by British rule:

> All the civil wars, in various, revolutions, conquests, famines, strangely complex, rapid and destructive as their successive action in Hindostan may appear, did not go deeper than its surface. England has broken down the whole framework of Indian society, yet without any symptoms of reconstruction yet appearing. This loss of his old world with no gain of a new one, imparts a particular kind of melancholy to the present misery of the Hindoo, and separates Hindostan, ruled by Britain, from all its ancient traditions and from the whole of its past history.[13]

Despite the failure of Marx's analysis to appreciate the pre-Asiatic historical period (although this is, to a certain extent, dealt with in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State), and his lack of knowledge of the mechanisms of ascriptive, non-reciprocal systems of economic interdependence, his scattered works on "Asiatic" and peasant production represent a valuable contribution to the study of modernization. Colonialism was an important agent of this process. For Marx the demolition of the old Asiatic order was part of the double mission which he saw British rule fulfilling in India. The other aspect was the laying of the material foundations of western society in Asia. While superstructural changes in political regimes and hierarchies continuously took place under the old order, a radical shift in the structure of social relations would only occur if fundamental change took place in the economic base of

society. According to Marx, a change in the form of political expression could not occur under the old Asiatic order, because, like his cousin in Europe, the peasant smallholder was tied to the land and restricted by economic necessity, ignorance, and a traditional pattern of social relations. Although objectively peasants form a class; that is, their culture and interests separate them from other classes and place their class in opposition to others, yet they have little notion of their interests in general, or of themselves as an effective and united group. In the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napolean Marx offers a detailed expression of their position:

> The smallholding peasants form a vast mass the members of which live in similar conditions, but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse.... Their field of production, the smallholding, admits of no division of labour in its cultivation, no application of science, and therefore, no diversity of development, no variety of talent, no wealth of social relationships. Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient; it itself directly produces the major part of its consumption and thus acquires its means of life more through exchange with nature than in intercourse with society.[14]

Marx argues that a change in the form of political organization could not occur under the old Asiatic order because the peasant smallholder in Asia was bound by a traditional pattern of social relations, and the constraints of subsistence production. Implicit in his argument is the idea (developed more recently by Karl Deutsch) that traditional society was characterized by low social mobility. Class society, on the other hand, displays a high degree of social mobility, and social interaction. Hence peasants do not form a class, for the:

> identity of their interests begets no unity, no natural union, and no political organization... (They) cannot represent themselves, they must be represented.... Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power that protects them against other classes, and sends them the rain and the sunshine from above. The political influence of the small peasant, therefore, finds its final expression in the executive power subordinating society to itself.[15]

Marx views the peasant in Napoleonic France as a conservative but politically disorganized element which looks to the power of the state for the security which was once provided by the prevailing social system:

> The Bonaparte dynasty represents not the revolutionary but the conservative peasant, not the peasant that strikes out beyond the condition of his social existence, the smallholding, but rather the peasant who wants to consolidate this holding... those who, in stupefied seclusion within this old order, want to see themselves, and their small holdings saved and favoured by the ghost of the empire. It represents not the enlightenment, but the superstitution of the peasant; not his judgment, but his prejudice; not his future but his past; not his modern Cevennes, but his modern Vendee.[16]

Many contemporary western social scientists have agreed with Marx's proposal that the early stages of economic development and social and political modernization (i.e. Marx's bourgeois transformation) in peasant societies are likely to result in popular authoritarian regimes that subordinate society to themselves. Yet there are alternatives to this outcome. In many developing nations the fragmented societies (or plural societies) that have come into being as a result of colonial rule have seen the development of ethnicity as a basis for political, as well as social and cultural, affiliation. Marx's unidimensional and unilineal model of social development failed to take into account the existence, and manipulation of, ascriptive identities as a basis for

political development, and in the competitive arena for the control of resources.[17]

In so far as it was historically possible in the second half of the nineteenth century Marx did indeed recognize the salience of ethnicity as a form of solidarity which confounded class consciousness. He was aware that ethnic heterogeneity was an obstacle to class mobilization, and singled out ethnic diversity as a factor undermining solidarity in the abortive revolution of 1848.[18] Similarly, Friedrich Engels acknowledged that ethnic divisiveness was one of the "very great peculiar difficulties for a steady development of a worker's party.... The bourgeoisie need only wait, passively, and the dissimilar elements of the working class fall apart again".[19] Yet the ethical foundations of the theories of Marx and Engels led them to view ethnicity as an obstacle to be overcome in the development of class-mobilized society, and not as a morally valid form of social expression.

Until recently, many European and North American social scientists also had difficulties in relating "ethnicity" to the categories of modernization and political development. Many of the typological constructions that emerged from the school of empirical social science assumed that ethnic categories belonged to the "traditional" end of the bipolar continuum, whereas it is probably more correct to define an ethnic group as a "modernizing" social unit in which categories of ascription and identification are maintained both by the group itself, and by others. In certain cases, it is argued, tradition may not be a hindrance to modernization, but will have a positive influence. The leadership of indigenous elites whose authority is confirmed and

legitimated by traditional values and associations, may develop a more effective form of political organization than that attempted by a distant central government whose rigid development policies may actually disorganize and demoralize the peasant groups in the destructive sense indicated by Marx. In such a situation the formation of ethnic political organization may be a defensive reaction, and a means of competing with the power of the centralized state.

Both in this century, and in that which preceded it, many isolated peasant societies have come into contact with powerful external forces of change, and have undergone various degrees of social transformation, evolving new political forms and structures. The aim of this thesis is to examine the impact of modernizing elements upon the Nagas of north-eastern India, and to analyze the extent and nature of political change that has occurred. It entails a concrete historical examination of the various factors which contributed to the development of ethnicity as a political force among the Nagas. The investigation focusses upon the formation of a well-defined and militant ethnic group, with aspirations towards separate nation-state status, from among the heterogeneous and constantly warring linguistic and cultural groups which inhabited the Patkoi range of mountains during the nineteenth century. As a corollary of this, an attempt is made to identify the influences that have given an ethnic dimension to Naga politics, and the saliency of issues that relate to ethnic-territorial aspirations. The thesis addresses a number of questions: (i) how is change in the dominant value-system related to change in political structures? (ii) What is the relation between the mobilization of new groups into politics and institutional

development? (iii) How does the elite act as the "cutting edge of societal change?[20] and (iv) how are politics within the ethnic group affected by relations with elements external to the group? These questions further involve an analysis of the relationship between the central variables, political socialization, political mobilization, and legitimacy, and the way in which they contribute towards political development in the Naga Hills.

(i) Modernization and Political Development

As the introductory argument emphasizes, "modernization", and "political development" are imprecise terms that have been given many different meanings, and are thus difficult to define. Political development is loosely used to describe the "process of organic change in the nature of political institutions".[21] A minimum definition is considered necessary because a more precise statement often brings connotations of a "higher stage" of development, and thus of notions of civilization and barbarism. Similarly the related concept of modernization may carry implications of a "higher" level, and thus impute a normative meaning to the term. Hence the great paradox of the debate over tradition and modernity in political science: in order to be more scientific it must strive for a greater conceptual and definitional precision, yet in struggling for that precision it may allow in normative connotations through the back door.[22]

During the 1960s at least three major schools of political development analysis emerged: (i) the system-function approach, which was largely derived from the work of Talcott Parsons, and combined elements of systems theory and structural functionalism; (ii) the social process

approach, which attempted to relate political behaviour and processes to social processes such as urbanization, industrialization and increasing media consumption; and (iii) the comparative history approach, representing the combination of a more traditional approach with greater efforts at maintaining a systematic rigour.[23]

For David Apter, and others who took the system-function approach, the test of political development is "system maintenance and capacity to achieve recognized goals".[24] The social-process school, on the other hand, pictured political development as an aspect of the broader process of economic and social development. Karl Deutsch, for instance, views social mobilization as an essential element of political development. He suggests that social mobilization deals with a recurrent cluster among the consequences of modernization. Thus he defines social mobilization as "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded and broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour".[25] This approach has obvious advantages for the study of societies experiencing rapid change. It takes into consideration the important social and economic variables, such as urbanization, the spread of education and literary, and economic development, which are important aspects of the modernization process. Similarly it permits the comparative quantification of data either within a particular society, or cross-nationally. The employment of the concept of social mobilization also opens up the questions of how (and by whom) a group of people are mobilized, by what methods, and with what objectives, if any. Since the central concern of this study is the relationship between modernization and ethnicity,

this approach is considered to be especially useful.

The comparative history approach also has many advantages for the study of political development. One interpretation in particular, stresses the historical dimension of modernization.[26] According to this version modernization refers to "a type of social change since the eighteenth century which consists in the economic or political advance of some pioneering society and subsequent changes in follower societies".[27] This conception therefore places modernization within a discrete and identifiable historical period, and traces the origins of what is considered to be "modern" to the industrial revolution, which occurred in Britain approximately between 1760 and 1860, and the political revolution, which occurred in France between 1789 and 1794. It considers "the industrialization and democratization of western Europe" to have been "a singular historic breakthrough, culminating a century-long and specifically European development.[28] The author of this study, Reinhard Bendix, does not however, equate "modernization" with "westernization", but, influenced by Alexander Gerschenkron's analysis of "pioneering" and "follower" economies, he emphasizes the imitation of certain aspects of modernity by transitional societies, and the role of the educated minority within such societies in deciding which aspects of modernity are imitated.

While this definition of modernization is perhaps less unidimensional than many, and permits the idea of adoption or rejection of values and institutions, it is of limited usefulness in the consideration of small-scale societies. It fails, moreover, to take into consideration the element of compulsion inherent in the modernizing process in many

colonial, and contemporary modernizing societies. On the other hand the dependency theorists[29] stress the degree to which the industrial metropolis is able to draw developing nations into its orbit through the intrusion of capital, captivity of markets, trade dependency, and the cooperation of indigenous economic elites. Similarly in most colonial societies modernization was initiated not through the volition of the indigenous inhabitants, but as a result of the command of the conquering colonial power. This was especially true at the early stages of modernization, when the colonial power was in a position to induce the "follower" society along a course which was later politically difficult to abandon.

More recently, concern with modernization and with political development has shifted to general theories of political change which may be used for the study of societies at any level of development. Such theories are sufficiently flexible to encompass sources and patterns of change in both the domestic and international environments of the political system.[30] This approach focusses upon a series of variables, and is concerned with "componential" change, that is, to identify what are or may be the components of a political system, and then to establish what, if any, relations exist in the changes among them.[31] To a certain extent this method is related to Smelser's view of modernization in terms of "structural differentiation",[32] but it is more flexible in that it allows for "political decay", and the decline of structures and institutions. From this perspective system breakdown is seen as an important generator of political change.[33] Huntington distinguishes five major components of a political system:

1. Culture, that is the values, attitudes, orientations, myths and beliefs relevant to political and dominant in the society.

2. Structure, that is, the formal organizations through which the society makes authoritative decisions, such as political parties, legislatures, executives and bureaucracies.

3. Groups, that is, the social and economic formations, formal and informal, which participate in politics, and make demands on the political structures.

4. Leadership, that is, the individuals in political institutions and groups who exercise more influence than others on the allocation of values.

5. Policies, that is, the patterns of governmental activity which are consciously designed to affect the distribution of benefits and penalties within the system.[34]

The componential approach, combined with that of social process, enables us to examine the modernization of Naga society and thus to relate the changing elements to the emergence of ethnicity as a political force.

(ii) Ethnicity

The question of "ethnicity" is a central concern of this thesis, but like "modernization" and "political development", the concept has not been given a conclusive definition. This is primarily because "ethnicity" encompasses a number of different aspects, which have received varying emphases by different authors according to the material with which they have dealt. As a minimal definition, the term "ethnicity" describes ethnic group identity. It "refers to a peculiar bond among persons that causes them to consider themselves a group distinguishable from others".[35] Other characteristics relating to ethnic group identity are that they are largely biologically self-perpetrating;[36] they make up a field of communication and interaction;[37] they possess communal institutions that

parallel those of a larger society;[38] they have a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order;[39] and, they share clusters of beliefs and values.[40]

A relatively recent writer on ethnicity has subdivided the category into tribal, nationality and racial types.[41] This creates unnecessary and imprecise notions which are of limited analytical significance. "Nationality" ethnic groups, such as the Thais or Malays, certainly exist, but even in their "own" nations they are merely majority ethnic groups, and thus it seems appropriate either to jettison the term or expand it to signify all ethnic groups that demand independent nation status. Similarly, to those to whom it has been applied, the term "tribal", like that of "native" often has perjorative connotations, implying a state of backwardness or even barbarity. It should therefore be used as sparingly as possible. In this study we are compelled to use it (i) because in the Indian context the epithets "scheduled tribe" (or adivasis) denote a group of people who have been given special constitutional and political status,[42] and (ii) because among the Nagas the word "tribe" has been used to signify a recognizable linguistic and cultural unit (such as the Angami tribe or the Sema tribe) which is structurally intermediate between the clan and the ethnic group as a whole.

A shared culture has been recognized as an important element in the definition of ethnic group identity. Cynthia Enloe defines culture as "a pattern of fundamental beliefs and values differentiating right from wrong, defining roles of interaction, setting priorities, expectations and goals".[43] By others, culture is regarded as the referential

element which enables one to define and distinguish one's social and political system from that of someone else. Walter Rosenbaum, for instance, perceives two elements of political culture. Firstly, it "entails all the important ways in which a person is subjectively oriented towards the elements in his political system".[44] And secondly, it refers to "the collective orientation of people towards the basic elements in their political system".[45] Almond and Verba retain the idea of reference. For them political culture "refers to the specifically political orientations -- attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of self in the system.[46] Sidney Verba on the other hand, also defines political culture as a "system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics".[47] In our study of the organization of political relations in the Naga hills the subjective appreciation of a common culture occupies a very important place.[48]

Yet although the sharing of cultural diacritica is a very important feature of ethnic groups, an approach to the study of ethnicity which primarily considers the morphological characteristic of a particular cultural group has a limited analytical application. In his seminal work on the study of ethnic groups Fredrik Barth points out that if one considers the culture bearing aspects of ethnic groups to be their main characteristic, the identification of ethnic groups becomes the task of distinguishing the morphological characteristics of which they are the bearers.[49] This therefore entails a prejudged viewpoint on both the nature and continuity in time of such units, and the locus of factors

which determine the form of the units.[50] Barth attempts to resolve this problem by viewing ethnicity as largely a subjective process of status identification. He shifts the focus of attention away from an emphasis on shared culture as the central category of an ethnic group towards a concern with ethnic boundaries and boundary maintenance. Thus Barth stresses the subjective aspect of inter-ethnic relations, and explores the different processes that seem to be involved in generating and maintaining ethnic groups.

The subjective emphasis of Barth's approach has come under criticism from a number of authors who maintain that he does not strike an adequate balance between the subjective and the objectivist or cultural aspects of ethnicity. This criticism is expressed, for example, by van den Berghe, who states that "Ethnic groups are defined BOTH by the objective cultural modalities of their behaviour (including most importantly their linguistic behaviour) and by their subjective views of themselves and each other".[51] In a like manner, Despres distinguishes between ethnic populations which are defined largely by objective cultural and categorical criteria, and ethnic groups which are organizational expressions based upon a common ethnic status.[52]

The debate over the concept of ethnicity in anthropology over the past decade has resulted in a number of useful theories which are also relevant to the related questions of separatism and ethnic conflict. One of the most important contributions is that of Joan Vincent, who urges that the study of ethnicity be placed within the framework of stratification and conflict theory.[53] Vincent stresses the nature of ethnic groups as organized collectivities of shifting political relations.

She maintains that: "Process, status, the impact of power upon the emergence and structuring of social relationships, and the manipulation of ideas by those in power to legitimize the existing order and their own domination are crucial to the analysis of ethnicity".[54] Although she recognizes the importance of the cultural dimensions of membership in a group and solidarity incorporation within it, the exclusivity of a group is often dependent upon the changing political situation. "Political actors", she maintains,..."when articulating ethnic status, are able to define and redefine the rules of interaction according to their changing interests. Thus ethnic identifications are broadened when greater political mobilization is required, and narrowed when exclusion is sought".[55] Ethnicity should therefore be viewed neither as a structure nor as a variable but as an aspect of political relations which is very akin to class.[56] As Vincent argues, "Ethnicity in operation is, like all else social, a tool in the hands of men; it is not a mystic force in itself...there are clearly times when ethnicity is politicized and there are times, perhaps more numerous, when it lies in no one's interest to admit ethnic distinctions into social and political encounters. Ethnicity is a mask of confrontation".[57]

For the purposes of this study, Vincent's approach complements that of Barth. It leads us to ask how ethnicity is politicised and institutionalized in Naga society, while Barth's analysis is instructive in demonstrating how the creation and maintenance of ethnic boundaries involves keeping alive forms of political conflict, and in sustaining a number of ethnically relevant issues. Since both Barth's and Vincent's approaches stress subjective aspects of ethnicity, however, we include

Despres' model (see Figure 1) which shows the interaction between categorical, cultural and status identities, and the organizational expressions which form the basis of ethnic political action. The model also emphasizes the impact of the external political environment, and the competition for resources (such as government positions, political power, control over land, or water rights) upon the organization and solidarity of ethnic groups.

This study examines the organization of political relations among the Nagas of northeastern India in relation to a presumed common origin and a number of shared cultural elements. It is shown, however, that awareness of an ethnic population (in Despres' sense) was absent before the conquest of a section of the Naga hills by British troops. The central chapters of the thesis attempt to show the modernizing and integrating impact upon Naga society of the colonial administration and the American Baptist missionaries, who began proselytizing in the hills after the establishment of a British outpost. Various elements of the modernization process are examined for their relevance to the integration of the tribes and the formation of an "ethnic population". An important result of the work of the missionaries is shown to be the creation of a small educated elite which was neither pro-British nor pro-Indian, but which possessed similar separatist aspirations and political objectives. This elite played a crucial role in defining Naga ethnic boundaries and in manipulating ethnic symbols and important issues in order to organize the Nagas as a political force.

The text continues by describing the changing political environment in Nagaland after several years of intense guerilla conflict.



Figure 1. Framework for the comparative study of ethnic phenomena

SOURCE: LEO A. DESPRES - Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural Societies, p. 197.

Although the average Naga village continues to identify with pan-Naga symbols and objectives as defined by the elite, peace becomes the overriding political goal. As a result of this there are shifts in political relations within the elite: some are prepared to cooperate with the Government of India, while others maintain the hardline, and demand recognition of Nagaland as an independent state. This leads to a complex web of political relationships, described in the final chapter, in which the original organizational solidarity of the ethnic group is demolished and the elite splits into shifting alignments and factions.

FOOTNOTES

1. An an initial definition we offer Lucian Pye's view of modernization as: "The process of profound social change in which tradition-bound villages or tribal-based societies are compelled to react to the pressures and demands of the modern industrialized and urban-centred world". Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, (Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1966), p. 8. Other definitions of "modernization" and "political development" will be given further on in the text.

2. see Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1966).

3. see Ferdinand Toennies, Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft), translated and edited by C. P. Loomis, (Harper, New York, 1963).

4. see Robert Redfield, The Folk Culture of Yucatan, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1948), and, The Primitive World and its Transformation, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1961).

5. see Francis Xavier Sutton, Representation and the Nature of Political Systems, (Moutan, The Hague, 1959).

6. Sir Henry J. S. Maine, Ancient Law: its connection with the early history of society, and its relation to modern ideas. (Dent & Co., London, 1965).

7. Emile Durkheim, Primitive Classification, (with Marcel Mauss), translated by R. Needham, (Cohen and West, London, 1963).

8. see S. N. Eisenstadt (ed.), Max Weber on Charisma and Institution-Building, selected papers, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968).

9. see Talcott Parsons, and Edward A. Shils (eds.), Towards a General Theory of Action, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1962).

10. E. R. Leach, as quoted in Aidan Southall, "A Critique of the Typology of States and Political Systems", p. 113, in Political Systems and the Distribution of Power (A. S. A. Monographs, Tavistock Publications, London, 1965).

11. see Gideon Sjoberg, "Folk and Feudal Societies", in J. L. Finkle and R. W. Gable, Political Development and Social Change, (2nd edition, John Wiley, New York, 1971), pp. 6-15.

12. Karl Marx, Das Kapital, volume 1, chapter 14, Section 4.

13. Karl Marx: Articles on India, (Peoples Publishing House Limited, Bombay, Second edition February, 1951), p.

14. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, (International Publishers, New York, 1963), p. 123.

15. Ibid., p. 124.

16. Ibid., p. 125.

17. A central thesis of this study, as it is argued later is that the bases of power are essentially fluid and changing, and in transitional societies in particular, either ascribed or achieved status relations (or both) may be manipulated according to the changing situation and changes in political relations.

18. Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), pp. 40-41, and see, Karl Marx, The Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850.

19. Letter from Friedrich Engels to Friedrich A. Sorge dated December 2nd, 1893; London, cited in C. Enloe, op. cit., p. 41.

20. Joan Vincent, "Anthropology and Political Development", in Colin Leys, (ed.), Politics and Change in Developing Countries, (Cambridge University Press, London, 1969), p. 51.

21. Michael B. Stein, and Robert J. Jackson (eds.), Issues in Comparative Politics, (MacMillan, Toronto, 1971), p. 20.

22. Among others, Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, argues that approaches to modernization, especially that of systems analysis, carry normative implications in favour of "order" and the maintenance of the status quo. See Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, "Nacimiento y muerte de los sistemas sociales", Uno mas uno, May 12th, 1979, pp. 2-8.

23. Samuel P. Huntingdon and Jorge I. Dominguez, "Political Development", in, F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby, (eds.), Macropolitical Theory, vol. 3 of Handbook of Political Science (Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1975), p. 3.

24. see David E. Apter, "System, Process and the Politics of Economic Development", in M. B. Stein, and R. J. Jackson, op. cit., pp. 79-92.

25. Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", American Political Science Review, vol. 55 (September 1961), p. 494.

26. Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered", Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 9, no. 3, (April 1967), pp. 292-346.

27. Ibid., p. 331.

28. Ibid., p. 329.

29. See works by A. G. Gunder Frank, F. H. Cardoso (e.g. A. Guneler Frank. Lumpenbourgeoisie, Lumpendevelopment: Dependence, Class and Politics in Latin America.

30. Samuel P. Huntingdon, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics", Comparative Politics, 3, no. 3, (April 1971), p. 314.

31. Ibid., p. 315.

32. See Neil J. Smelser, "Mechanisms of Change, and Adjustment to Change", in Political Development and Social Change, ed. J. L. Finkle and R. W. Gable, second edition (New York, John Wiley, 1971), pp. 27-42.

33. See, Samuel P. Huntingdon, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968).

34. Samuel P. Huntingdon, "The Change to Change: Modernization Development and Politics", op. cit., p. 316.

35. Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), p. 15.

36. Ibid.

37. Fredrik Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969), p. 11.

38. Cynthia H. Enloe, op. cit., p. 17.

39. Fredrik Barth, op. cit., p. 11.

40. Cynthia H. Enloe, op. cit., p. 17.

41. Ibid., p. 23.

42. See Steve Jones, "Tribal Underdevelopment in India", Development and Change, vol. 9, no. 1, (January 1978), p. 41.

43. Cynthia H. Enloe, op. cit., p. 15.

44. Walter A. Rosenbaum, Political Culture, (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1975), p. 4.

45. Ibid.

46. Gabriel Almond, and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 13.

47. Sidney Verba and Lucian Pye (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 513.

48. Political culture is the "content" of political socialization, which is used as a variable in this study. Gabriel Almond defines political socialization as "The Process of induction into the political culture. Its end product is a set of attitudes -- cognitions, value standards, feelings -- towards the political system, its various roles and role incumbents", The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 27-28, as cited in Gerald J. Bender, "Political Socialization and Political Change", Western Political Quarterly, vol. XX (June 1967), p. 391. Similarly F. W. Frey refers to political socialization as a "process by which a group, organization or society inculcates social attitudes and behaviours into its members.... 'Political Socialization' refers not only to the inculcation of information about and evaluations of formal government, but also includes more general attitudes towards the use and distribution of power", in F. W. Frey, Political Socialization in Developing Nations, paper presented at a seminar of the Interuniversity Consortium for Political Research, University of Michigan, August 1, 1964), as cited in G. J. Bender, op. cit., p. 291.

49. Fredrik Barth, op. cit., p. 12.

50. Ibid.

51. Pierre L. van den Berghe, in, Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural Societies, L. A. Despres (ed.), (The Hague: Monton, 1975), cited on pages 72, and 192.

52. Leo A. Despres, op. cit., p. 187. cf. Maurice Pinard, "Communal Segmentation and Communal Conflict: A Theoretical Statement" unpublished paper presented at a conference on "Political Integration/ Disintegration of states: Lessons for Canada", held at McMaster University, Hamilton (March 31st and April 1st, 1978). On page 11. Pinard concludes that latent divergent interests are sometines present in ethnic populations, but that the development of manifest conflict depends upon certain bases, such as the communal allocation of scarce resources, of power, of status, or around a disagreement over communal values (p. 14.).

53. Joan Vincent, "Brief Communications: The Structuring of Ethnicity", Human Organization, vol. 33, no.4, (Winter 1974), p. 376.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. In this context Despres (op. cit., p. 195) maintains that "If ethnicity is viewed as one form of social stratification, it needs to be emphasized that social class is quite another. Ethnic stratifications derive their structural feature from categorical status ascriptions. By way of contrast, class stratifications are more evidently based upon status identities which are achieved". In the case of the Nagas, however, as with most of the other adivasis, the picture is somewhat confused. When a man is born into a certain ethnic category it also follows that his achievement possibilities are limited within the Indian social and economic structure.

57. Joan Vincent, Ten African Elite: The Big Men of a Small Town, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 10. cited in J. Vincent, "Brief Communications: The Structuring of Ethnicity", op. cit., p. 377.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL SETTING

Any discerning study of the social and political changes taking place among the Naga people should include a discussion of traditional social arrangements as far as they may be ascertained from early ethnographical accounts.[1] The elements of change and contemporary social and political developments may thus be placed against the traditional backcloth. This outline is presented in a structural fashion as it is employed as a measure or yardstick against which the extent and nature of political change may be determined, but it should be remembered that traditional patterns of interaction were by no means static. On the contrary, they were dynamic and constantly changing, and at the time of the first British expeditions into the Naga hills the situation was in an extremely fluid state. Great pressure upon the Ao tribe from the more warlike Changs and Semas to the east had resulted in the destruction of villages and the dispersal of their inhabitants, creating turbulence and turmoil in the region. The content of this sketch is mainly derived from T. C. Hodson's monograph of the Nagas of Manipur;[2] J. H. Hutton's descriptions of the Angami and Sema Nagas;[3] and J. P. Mill's studies of the Ao, Lhotha and Rengma Nagas;[4] as well as C. von Furer-Haimendorf's various works on the Konyak Nagas;[5] and Mashangthei Horam's studies of his own people, the Tangkhul Nagas.[6]

A manifest feature of the Nagas in the nineteenth century was the lack of any sense of group solidarity, or of what might be termed 'ethnic

unity'. When the British East India Company became involved in the northeastern region of India in the 1830s they encountered a group of people called the "Nagas" by the Assamese and other outsiders, but who themselves shared none of the group identity or awareness that was found among other peoples of the region, such as the Khasis or the Meiteis,[7] during the same period. This was largely the result of the lack of a centralized political structure such as kingship, which existed in neighbouring Assam and Manipur, but rather, the existence of independent, sovereign, and constantly feuding villages, among which the practice of head-hunting prevailed. As the early British explorers into the Patkoi range of mountains soon discovered, the inhabitants of that area referred to themselves by the name of their clan or village, and a common 'Naga' identity was unknown. Captain John Butler, one of the early expeditionaries and an assiduous recorder of ethnographic detail commented on the use of the description 'Naga' that:

> The term is quite foreign to the people themselves: they have no generic term applicable to the whole race, but use specific names for each particular group of villages; thus the men of Mezoma, Khonoma, Kohima, Jotsoma and their allies call themselves Tengimas, whilst others (of the Angami) if asked who they are would simply reply that they were men of such a village and seem to be quite ignorant of any distinctive tribal name connecting them to any particular group of villages -- a strange fact, which I think is in great measure accounted for by the state of constant war, and consequent isolation in which they live.[8]

Similarly Dr. Hutton emphasized the diversity of cultural forms and physical attributes among the Nagas not only between tribes, but even from village to village. He noted that the conditions of perpetual violence or at least the threat of hostility isolated the villages from

each other to such an extent that local dialects developed which were often mutually unintelligible in villages separated by a distance of only a few miles. Correspondingly, a community often became noted for the physical peculiarities and distinctiveness of its inhabitants.[9] Stressing the difficulties of undertaking an accurate study of the Angami Nagas, Hutton observed that it was not "possible even to attempt to give in detail the manifold divergences of any given custom from village to village. Such an undertaking would necessitate a separate monograph for each Angami village".[10]

Nevertheless, there were sufficient similarities for both the Assamese, and the first Europeans who entered the area, to identify the people occupying the hills as 'Nagas'.[11] The exogamous patrilineal clan system, a common linguistic pattern within the Tibeto-Burman subgroup,[12] the practice of an animist religion, and of head-hunting, the cultivation of rice by means of either slash-and-burn (jhum) agriculture or paddy on terraced fields, the weaving of cotton cloth, and the employment of the dao, a single bladed handaxe, as an all-purpose tool, were all cultural features shared by the Nagas. A second important characteristic was that of a common territory, which separated the Nagas from both the culturally distinct people of the plains, and culturally similar hill peoples, such as the Garos, the Mikirs, and the Lushais.[13] This wild region, which had never been permanently conquered by either the Maharajahs of Manipur or the Ahom kings of Assam, contributed to the distinctiveness of the Nagas and therefore entitled them to consideration as a separate group. As Dr. Hutton stated, there were no great racial or cultural differences between the Nagas and neighbouring hill peoples,

and thus the sharing of a common territory was a significant definitional characteristic:

> It is generally assumed in a vague sort of way that these tribes which are spoken of as Nagas have something in common with each other which distinguishes them from the many other tribes found in Assam and entitles them to be regarded as a racial unit in themselves.... The truth is that, if not impossible, it is exceedingly difficult to propound any test by which a Naga tribe can be distinguished from other Assam or Burma tribes which are not Nagas.[14]

On the other hand there was recognition of a broader group, (the "tribe"), which shared a common bond based on three factors:

(i) that of linguistic similarity

(ii) the sharing of totemic symbols and a presumed common origin, and whose members held in common certain legends about the ancestry of the group.

(iii) a presumed, but distant blood relationship between the members of the group based on descent from a common origin.

The first Europeans to explore the Naga hills came into contact with only a few of the western tribes, namely the Angamis, the Aos, the Lhothas, and the Konyaks, but there are at least 32 Naga tribes living in the present territorial arrangements of the state of Nagaland, the hills of Manipur state, the Tirap frontier in Arunachal Pradesh, parts of the Cachar hills, and on the western border of Burma (see map, next page). Among these are numbered the Angami, the Ao, Rengma, Konyak, Sema, Sangtam, Chakhesang, Chang, Tangkhul, Kabui, Maram, Maring, Zeliang, Lhotha, Mao, Anal, Mayao-Monsang, Phom, Uchonphok, Makaoro, Kalyo-Kenyu, Kharam, Nockte, Jeru, Jothe, Lamkang, and Namshik, with the Haimi, Htangan, Rangpan, Somra and Tsaplaw living in Burma.[15]

MAP TO SHOW THE LOCATION OF THE NAGA TRIBES



The tribes have been further arranged by Mashangthei Horam into 4 broad divisions based upon cultural affinities:

(i) The Southern Nagas -- Kachas, Zemis, Lyengmis, Marong-mais, Kabuis, and most of the Naga tribes of Manipur.

(ii) The Western Nagas -- the Angamis, and the Memi and Maram tribes of Manipur, the Semas, Lhothas and Rengmas.

(iii) The Central Nagas -- the Aos, Tangkhuls, Sangtams, Yachumis, and also the Changs and Phoms.

(iv) The Eastern Nagas -- the Konyaks of Tamlu and the area northeast of the Dikhu River, extending along the borders of the Sibsagar and Lakhimpur districts to the Patkoi range and southwards along the range to the east of the Phom and Chang countries.

Almost all the Naga tribes traced their origin to the area surrounding the village of Meikhel, ten miles southeast of the present town of Kohima. Both the Angami and the Sema legends spoke of the Kezkenoma stone near Meikhel as their place of origin,[16] while the Lhotas tell the story of having come from 6 Kotso (or Stones) in the region.[17] Despite the intriguing and colourful legends which surround the Stones of Meikhel,[18] it is difficult to determine the migration patterns which led to the present configuration of the tribes, and to discover their true origin and racial and cultural source.[19] The basic racial, and also linguistic, derivation of the Nagas is Tibeto-Mongoloid, but skin colour ranges from light to dark depending upon geographical situation, and physical features display both Aryan and Sino-mongoloid ancestry.[20] The configuration of the tribes encountered by the British during their first

expeditions into the hills was largely a result of extensive migration and miscegenation within the mountain region. Demographic pressures and land shortages were the main causes of migration, but the institution of head-hunting was also a contributing factor as it sometimes led to the destruction of a village and the dispersal of its population.[21] It is much more difficult to determine the exact, racial and cultural heritage of each group, and how the various tribes themselves became established in the hill region.[22] Dr. Hutton has traced the origin of the Nagas to a three-pronged immigration from the north-east, the north-west, and the south-east,[23] while M. Horam advanced the hypothesis that an overwhelming proportion of the population arrived in migrations from the south-east.[24] As evidence in support of this claim, it is pointed out that there are a number of cultural similarities between the Nagas and both the Dyaks of Borneo and the Igorot of the Phillipines,[25] while they exhibit many physical characteristics in common with the Thais, Karens, and other groups of Southeast Asia.

Social and Political Organization

Despite the recognition of a linguistic and historical identification based upon the tribe, there was no precise rule of tribal membership among the Nagas, and no social and political organization at the tribal level. Furthermore there was an extensive territory on the borders between two tribes in which tribal distinctions were blurred, and where clans from different tribes were sometimes found to coexist in the same village.

In traditional Naga society it was difficult to distinguish institutions of purely political significance, for the individual was

caught up in a complex web of ascriptive relationships and customary ritual duties, and there was no sharply defined border between the "political" and the "social".[26] Both social structure and traditional customs varied from tribe to tribe, and even from village to village, offering a spectrum of forms of government ranging from very democratic to autocratic. However, among all Nagas the two most politically significant social units in traditional society were the clan and the village.

I. The Clan

As J. H. Hutton remarked of the Angami Nagas, "Although the village may be regarded as the unit of the political and religious sides of Angami life, the real unit of the social side is the clan. So distinct is the clan from the village that it forms almost a village in itself, often fortified within the village inside its own boundaries, and not infrequently at variance amounting to war with other clans in the same village".[27] Every Naga was involved in a complex pattern of rights and obligations based upon the clan, and hence it was the clan which formed the main sphere of social interaction, acting as a unit and gaining or losing in fortune as a unit. The clan (chibu in Lhotha; kidong in Chongli Ao dialect, and pachar in Mongsen; thino in Angami; ayeh in Sema)[28] was a named patrilineal and exogamous descent group,[29] whose members considered themselves to be consanguineous kin although descent from the presumptive ancestor and founder of the clan could not be traced in detail.[30] In many cases the clans were grouped into related phratries[31] and were subdivided into kindred groups.[32] The rule of exogamy, and the existence of an incest taboo upon members of the same clan[33] were bound up with the Naga laws of property rights and inheritance. Only males

were able to inherit real property on a permanent basis, although among the Angamis, for example, a widow might be granted a temporary third of her husband's property (on her death it would pass to her sons), and a daughter might receive goods of a movable nature.[34] Similarly among the Angamis (though not among most other tribes) property was often divided up during a man's lifetime, with each son receiving a portion of the inheritance from his father upon his marriage. The property of any son dying without male children during his father's lifetime reverted to the latter, and after the father's death it went to the youngest son. In the case of the younger son himself dying without a male heir his brothers would share his property equally, and should there be neither father nor brother still living, uncles or first cousins would inherit and so on in the male line.[35] It was also possible for men to be adopted into a particular clan, and to receive property rights, but this involved a series of complex rituals and the abandonment of all rights in the biological kinship group.

Within a village each clan[36] inhabited a khel or "ward",[37] which was a definite area within the village, and was often fortified and separated from the other clans by breastworks and ramparts, or at least by a wall or stockade. While the village usually acted together as a military unit, the clans combining for headhunting raids upon other villages or for the defence of their own village, the clan itself was the primary unit of military, as well as social, solidarity. The individual clans would often take the initiative in making a raid. Related clans in different villages would sometimes combine against a common enemy, and in powerful villages the tribute system would be based upon protection or subjugation

by a powerful clan rather than by the village as a whole.[38] Upon occasions clans within the same village would be in a state of antagonism amounting to hostility; outbreaks of violence between them were not uncommon, and in very rare circumstances several of the clans might combine to eject a clan that had repeatedly infringed the rules of conduct of the village.[39]

II. The Morung

The central feature of the khel, and the most important institution contributing to the political socialization of the individual Naga, was the morung.[40] The morung was a microcosm of the village, having its own council, its own rules and regulations, and its own entitlements and corresponding duties.[41] The activities of the morung centred upon a large building (itself called the morung), which was constructed along the same lines as an ordinary house but with enough room to accommodate all the unmarried male members of the clan over the ages of from nine to fourteen years, depending upon the village. Frequently the morung was given a long protruding gabled roof, and was adorned with carvings, often of an erotic nature. An important part of the morung's equipment was an enormous xylophone carved from the trunk of a tree, which served both as an instrument during ceremonial dances, and as an alarum in time of war. The morung building served as a young men's dormitory,[42] a guardhouse, and a place of instruction, in which the young men were taught the arts of war, where they learnt traditional songs, ritual forms and the legends of famous warriors, and where they made their first acquaintance with love and sex. The morung was an important instrument in promoting the solidarity of the clan and of maintaining social control. Insofar as

morung activities were concerned, all the members of the same age-grade within the morung were equals, irrespective of class status. Boys who entered the morung at the same time formed an age-grade group whose members worked, danced, played and fought together until the time when the demands and obligations of family life loosened the close links between members.[43] There were several officials in every morung who acted on ceremonial occasions, but they had few privileges in daily life. All the members of a morung cooperated in many social, economic and ritual activities. The intimacy prevailing between the inmates of a men's house thus facilitated the smooth operation of joint enterprises and made it possible to dispense with an organization which would have given individuals the power to exercise authority over their fellow members.[44] Even the officials of the morung were not so much the administrators of morung affairs as representatives of the clan in its dealings with supernatural powers.

The corporateness of a morung community also found expression in the joint ownership of a common estate consisting of tangible property as well as a body of traditional rights. The morung building, the land owned by the morung, various paths leading to the morung, as well as stores of grain resulting from cooperative cultivation or received as tribute, were tangible possessions, but there were also a great many intangible rights in which all the members of a morung had a share. Among these were the right to wear special morung decorations; the right to dance certain dances and sing certain songs which were "part" of the morung; the right to sleep with girls of tributary villages, and to kill and eat a specified number of pigs of those same villages. These rights

were matched and complemented by certain obligations, such as the duty to defend, and if necessary, to avenge a morung member; to cooperate in the rebuilding of the morung and the cultivation of morung fields, and, in the case of tributary obligations incurred by a morung, to help in raising the annual payments.[45]

Familiarity with the morung occurred at an early age. Among the Konyaks, for example, children of either sex might have been seen in the morung crawling between the legs of their father, who often acted as baby-sitter while his wife was preoccupied with domestic chores. As soon as they started to run about by themselves, girls began to avoid the men's house, but the young boys continued to play in it, or sat on the lookout post near the morung building and watched the people entering the village. Yet these small boys continued to sleep in the house of their parents, and it was not until they had gone through a special ceremony, and had performed an elaborate sequence of rituals that they become real members of the morung.[46]

During the early part of their lives the young boys were given a great amount of freedom. Parents, especially those of the democratic Angami, were reluctant to reprimand or scold their sons, as this was thought to diminish their individuality and love of independence, two characteristics which were highly valued in traditional Naga society.[47] The girls, on the other hand, were much more strictly controlled, and from an early age they were compelled to assist their mothers with domestic tasks, and to learn unhesitating obedience.[48]

For the Naga boys, initiation into the morung fulfilled the important function of marking the entrance of a boy into the economic life

of the morung and of the larger clan and village communities. Up to that point he would have accompanied his parents to the fields and helped them by doing light work, but after becoming part of the men's house it was his duty to join the morung gang,[49] which would work on the fields of each of its members in rotation, and occasionally on the fields of rich men who would hire it for a number of days.[50]

Another important part of the socialization process was that of learning to accept the authority of senior boys. Just after initiation into the morung the young boys were compelled to work for the older boys, fetching them wood and water and doing other menial tasks. Among the Aos the performance of these duties and the necessity of doing what one was told for three years assisted in maintaining their acephalous form of political organization based on the age-grade system.[51]

III. The Village

While the clan was the most important social unit in Naga society, the traditional polity was based upon the village.[52] The village was a territorial unit claiming an exclusive right to a tract of land with clear boundaries. On occasions the village drew from its members a strong spirit of solidarity, and there was considerable local patriotism based upon a host of legends and colourful history of the village's past exploits.[53] Similarly the village was a unit of religious observation. Certain gennas, or taboos, were performed by the village as a whole, and the numerous festivals marking the seasons and the periods of cultivation were celebrated by the entire village community.

Another important aspect of the village was its function as a unit of defence. Most villages (or its member clans) were in a constant

state of feud, and there was a need for perpetual alertness and vigilance, as well as for strong defences that would enable the inhabitants to resist attack without inordinate difficulty or great loss of life. For this reason many villages were built on the summits of hills, while a convenient source of water enhanced the attractability of the site. The villages were permanent and in many areas they were encased in extensive and impressive circumvallations, which represented the efforts and innovations of many generations. Captain Butler described his early impressions of an Angami village in this manner:

> Stiff stockades, deep ditches bristling with panjiis, and massive stone walls, often loop-holed for musketry are their usual defences. In war-time, the hill sides and approaches are escarped and thickly studded over with panjiis.... The approaches of the village are often up through tortuous, narrow, covered ways or lanes, with high banks on either side, lined with an overhanging mass of prickly creepers and brushwood.... These paths lead up to gates, or rather doorways, closed by the strong, thick, and heavy wooden doors, hewn out of one piece of solid wood. The doors are fastened from the inside and admit of being easily barricaded, and thus rendered impregnable against all attack.[54]

Decision-making within the village community, whether concerning war, economic activities, or the observation of ritual, did not follow a uniform pattern, and varied from tribe to tribe. It is difficult to give a precise definition of the various types of Naga polity, for there is evidence that in some areas at least the social and political structures displayed the flexible and impermanent characteristics, which were first identified among the Kachin peoples of Burma and described by Edmund Leach.[55] It is probable that neither the 'aristocratic' nor the 'democratic' types were invariable and immutable categories, but there was movement from one to the other, and back again over an extended period of time.[56]

Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish three main types of government among the Nagas: a democratic form; a gerontocratic type; and an autocratic system based upon rule by either chiefs, or Angs.[57] Each form of government, however, was based upon the patrilineal clan system, and whereas under the democratic polity the clans were regarded as more or less equal, under the autocratic form certain clans had a higher inherited status, and it was from these that the chiefs were chosen. Hutton recognized a number of forms of government based on the three main categories. While he considered that the "Angami and Lhota tribes have the most absolute democracy in existence"..."the Tangkhuls and the Aos on the other hand run their village on a system of government by elders who usually represent the heads of families, hold office for a term of years, and are succeeded by others on a regular principle".[58] Of the autocratic system he maintains that: "The Semas have hereditary chiefs who have been known to exercise on occasion even powers of life and death and who administer their villages very much on the plan of a mediaeval manor". He adds that the "Changs and Konyaks also have hereditary chiefs, the Sangtams and Phoms have a very vague system of elected chiefs, the chief being usually the best warrior or the biggest bully".[59]

In all the diverse forms of polity, except that of the Sema, the village council was the important administrative unit, regulating religious matters and arranging the settlement of disputes, and, to a lesser extent, governing economic matters and deciding questions of war. The council was made up of leading members of the clans of the village. Amongst the democratic Angamis this ranged from an 'open' meeting to a congregation presided over by a Pehuma or chief.[60] Major Butler observed

that: "In most villages there are generally two chiefs,[61] but their authority is nominal. Their orders are obeyed so far only as they accord with the wishes and convenience of the community".[62] Captain Butler, his son, made a similar observation regarding the Angami chief. He noted that "The Naga Peuma is in fact simply primus inter pares, and often that only pro tem".[63] Among the Angamis there was a separate religious leader, the Kemovo, who usually occupied the original house of the village and whose office was hereditary. For raids and expeditions of war a temporary leader was usually chosen.

Among the Aos, on the other hand, a more rigid structure of organization prevailed, and was based upon the succession of members of age-groupings to the office of councillor (Tatar). As Mills observed: "The most striking feature of the Chongli system is that at the end of every generation all the councillors of a "khel" vacate office and a new body takes their place. Every Chongli village has a standardized generation of so many years, usually between twenty-five and thirty".[64] The 'gerontocratic' system of the Aos therefore involved the settlement of legal disputes, and decision-making mainly on a clan basis. Disputes were usually settled by a group of elders from the two clans involved in the litigation, with the elders of the entire village meeting together if the issue concerned the village as a whole.[65]

Among the Konyaks there were two main types of political organization: that of the Thenkoh villages in which there existed aristocratic clans but where the chief had little power; and the Thendu villages which were ruled by aristocratic chiefs who had command of life and death over their subjects and were said to possess magical powers.[66] In the Thenkoh

villages the village council, consisting of the chief and morung officials known (in Wakching)[67] as niengba, played a large part in village life, adjudicating disputes, and punishing offences and breaches of taboo concerning the community as a whole. The village council in Thenkoh villages also decided matters of ritual and ceremony, and fixed the dates for communal agricultural rites. The social and political life of the Thendu village, on the other hand, revolved around the chief and his kinsmen who made the important decisions concerning the village as a whole.

To a very limited extent, the polity of the Thendu Konyak villages approximated to that of the Semas, which was something of an anomaly vis-a-vis other Naga political systems. The Sema chief (Kekami) stood in relation to the villager (Mughemi) as a father to an adopted son.[68] An important aspect of this relationship was the Sema custom of establishing colonies, whereby the elder sons of a Sema chief left the paternal village to establish villages of their own.[69] A chief's son forming a colony of this sort was given by his father as many of the households willing to go with him as could be spared, and this nucleus was often augmented by thieves, debtors, or other refugees. Such communities occupied and held the village and the surrounding land by force, and in the face of opposition from some previously established and more numerous community. The land occupied by the new village was regarded as belonging not to the community but to the chief, and the rights and duties which formed the relationship between the chief and his subjects were at a stage between patriarchal and quasi-feudal.[70] The Sema polity was therefore based upon a combined system of family adoption and land tenure, the chief distributing his land among his villagers, (reserving portions for his own

cultivation) who were thereby obliged to give him obedience and certain rights to their labour. The chief's power was considerable, but in return for the homage and obligations due to him he was expected to provide his "orphans" with wives, with food in times of scarcity, and with general protection.[71] Under the chief, individuals were given the opportunity to improve their social status by becoming a village elder (chuchomi), and have "orphans" of their own. It was also possible to be selected for the office of Awou, the principal religious official, by the chuchomi and the Akekao.

Traditional Religion

Naga ideas about religion were essentially vague,[72] although there was definite body of ritual which surrounded everyday practices, and which covered every aspect of traditional life. A religious ethos pervaded every aspect of the community, and all important activities had their customary ritual actions and genna (taboo) periods without which the activity was considered to have little chance of success. Every day life was influenced by a multitude of spirits, mainly malicious, but occasionally benevolent, and these were bribed and propitiated as the necessity arose. Success in love and war and the production of a bountiful crop depended upon these deities, and ritual offerings were made to them at appropriate periods of the year. These terhoma[73] might take any form or represent either good or evil.

Besides particular terhoma which might inhabit a place, or alternatively might form the essence of a malignant disease or persistent illness, most Naga tribes also had an idea of a Creator of all living things. By the Angamis the supreme deity was called Ukepenopfu, the

Creator of all living beings. The Semas had a conception of two creators: a Creator of things called Alhou, and a creator of men whom they named Timilhou. The Aos called a similar deity Lichaba, and among the Konyaks he was known as Gawang, the "Sky God".[74]

In addition to the idea of deities and malicious spirits, the idea of human souls having the ability to promote prosperity was an important part of Naga religious life and ritual observance. As the Military Report on the Presidency and Assam District recorded: "Most tribes believe in a supreme deity of some sort, and in a cycle of life in which the souls of the dead enter the fruits of the earth to be consumed again by men, and so to continued life".[75]

The Practice of Head-Hunting

The successful procurement of an enemy's head was of great religious significance for the Nagas. Although head-hunting had an important social function relating to questions of martial prowess, the ability to find a wife, and general social status,[76] another important aspect of the practice was its religious or magical function. Traditionally, the Nagas believed that every village was a self-contained unit, and a reservoir of that soul-force which was called aren.[77] It was aren that made crops flourish, children increase in number, and livestock multiply; similarly, rich men were supposed to have large supplies of aren.[78] The aren was contained in the soul: it was the "soul matter" or substance of each individual, and hence it did not matter whether a head taken was that of a woman, child, or a tested warrior, for all contained aren.

There was a definite belief that the presence of captured heads

enhanced the fertility and prosperity of the village. Captured heads were carefully preserved in the morung or the chief's house, and were fed with rice-beer at feasts. The sex, age, and status of the victims were of little relevance, and all were valued for their aren.[79]

Yet not all parts of the head were equally valued. The most powerful forces were believed to adhere to parts around the eyes and the jaw, while the back of the head was considered to be of much less potency.[80] This seems to confirm that the connection between the skull and the soul substance was pictured in very concrete terms, and that a captured head was by no means regarded merely as a symbol of victory over an enemy. It was the beneficial power which emanated from a human head that the Naga was eager to acquire, and little thought was given to any connection between the head and the slain enemy except in the case of men killed in direct retaliation for the killing of a kinsmen or co-villager. For this reason, captured heads or portions of the skull were often hung from poles at the entrance to the village, or were placed in the fields, since in that way they were placed in more direct contact with the villagers and their crops, and the aren would be transmitted to them more easily.

Domestic Life

The smallest social unit of traditional life was the household. It usually consisted of a single nuclear family, but was often enlarged by the addition of a widowed parent, by the sister of either spouse, or by the orphaned children of a close kinsman. The household was the primary unit of production, as far as possible producing all that was required to maintain subsistence in the mountain environment, as well as

accumulating a small surplus for certain social payments or to obtain goods through trade. Within the household there existed a marked division of labour, with certain tasks the clear preserve of the husband and his sons, and others the exclusive duty and occupation of the female members of the household.

As with many other aspects of Naga life, the style of house construction varied from tribe to tribe. Whereas the Konyaks and other eastern tribes used a form of pile construction, raising the floor of the house off the ground, the western tribes built their houses on the earth, using it as a floor and laying bamboo matting upon it. Sema houses were established in a random, disorderly manner with no regard for the direction of sun or wind, but among the Angamis it was the custom to point the house towards the east in order to catch the rays of the morning sun for warmth and light. House construction was carried out by members of the family, often assisted by relatives. Each tribe, and even each village had its own architectural style, but the houses were always substantial structures, measuring from 25 to 70 feet in length, and 14 to 30 feet in width (depending upon the wealth of the inhabitant). Chiefs, and important members of the Ang class among the Konyaks had more impressive dwellings, some of which were as large as 200 feet by 50 feet, although among the Sema, at least, the chief's house also functioned as the morung, and was therefore built to accommodate a large number of people. The roof was thatched with palm-leaves, or with a special thatching-grass, and was an effective deterrent against the harsh winds and rain. The Angamis, like certain other tribes, were accustomed to decorate the house with 'house-horns' thereby giving each house its own individuality and distinctive feature.

The interior of an Angami house was divided into 3 compartments. The front room contained paddy stored in baskets, a special bench for rice pounding, and it was often also used to house livestock. The second compartment was separated from the first by a plank wall. It contained the hearth which was composed of 3 stones embedded in the earth so as to form a stand for a cooking pot, set over a fire which constantly smouldered between them. On the two inner sides of the fireplace rough planks were raised about two feet off the ground, and laid level so as to form beds. In the third compartment at the back of the house the family kept a liquor vat made from the hollowed section of a tree. In the front of the house wood was stored under a porch formed by the broad, projecting eaves of the gabled roof.[81]

The conditions in which the Nagas lived were not salubrious, and they were perhaps a little worse than those of a sixteenth century English town. Refuse was thrown onto the narrow lanes to be disposed of by pigs, dogs, chickens, and the cleansing rains. Various animals inhabited parts of the house, adding to the smell which seeped through the building from the log-vats full of fermenting Zu (rice-beer).

Agriculture

The main crops grown by the Nagas were rice and millet. Taro was also grown but was mainly fed to pigs. Other vegetables were cultivated on the edges of the fields, and a small herb garden was kept on a plot close to the house.

Two types of cultivation were practised by the Nagas. The majority of the tribes tilled the land by means of a system of shifting cultivation (jhum), but the Angamis grew paddy on irrigated terraces (or

panikhets), which surrounded the village, and were held as private property. Hutton described the Angami terraces thus:

> The method of preparing land for wet cultivation is to dig and build the side of the hills into terraces of from 2 to 20 feet broad to 200 feet broad if the ground is level enough. The stones taken out of the soil are used to bank up the walls of the terraces. These are irrigated by channels which carry water from some stream or torrent for a distance that may be measured in miles, many fields being fed on the way...water is also often carried from one terrace to another in a hollow bamboo passing over other terraces and channels in between.[82]

Under the jhum system on the other hand, land was cultivated on a rotated pattern, and a great deal of energy was expended upon the preparation of the fields. During the dry winter months selected areas of jungle would be felled, and the thicket would be burned, as far as possible leaving the tall trees undamaged. In the spring hillrice and millet would be sown by broadcasting the seed, and the fields would have to be weeded thoroughly a number of times before harvesting. A single crop was grown during the year, and the work was broken by a series of festivals marking the different activities.

In addition to crop cultivation the Nagas kept livestock, mainly pigs, chickens, goats, and half-wild cattle (the mithun) which were sacrificed upon ceremonial occasions, and during the Feasts of Merit.[83] Since the Nagas were extremely fond of meat, their diet was supplemented by hunting and fishing. The fish were usually stunned with a poison derived from the bark of a tree, and then gathered and cooked or smoked. Hunting, whether for deer, tiger, elephant or the many other animals which inhabited the region, was a cooperative enterprise undertaken by the clan

or morung, while individuals often sought out the bee and wasp larvae which were considered to be a special delicacy.

Domestic Manufactures

For almost all domestic necessities, the traditional Naga village was a self-contained community. Weaving, basket-making, pottery, the manufacture of iron tools, woodcarving, as well as the manufacture of a large variety of household implements from bamboo, and of various articles of display and ornamentation were known to the Nagas. While certain tribes, such as the Konyaks, were accustomed to wander about wearing little more than a cane belt, all Nagas used some clothing, such as blankets or thickly-woven shawls, as protection against the cold of winter. The cloth was made from cotton or bark-fibre, which was spun into thread on a spindle-whorl and then woven on a loin-loom into intricate traditional patterns, identifying the wearer's clan. Invariably the weaving was done by women who also made the clay pots used for cooking, while basket-making was a craft carried out by both sexes.[84]

Division of labour in a Naga village was therefore largely limited to a rigorous definition of tasks within the household, supported by communal labour organized within the clan, or the cleaning of the water supply. A few functions were exclusively performed by certain individuals. Many Naga villages, especially among the Konyaks, had a few people who were skilled in metal-working, in manufacturing spear points, dao blades, and other small implements on a locally-made wooden double-cylinder forge. Similarly there were a number of people, usually unmarried young men or the handicapped or incapacitated, who minded domestic animals, mainly cows and the mithun (bos frontalis) owned by individual members of

the village. In general, however, the division of labour was strictly limited to domestic production.

Trade

Since most essentials were produced within the village community trade was limited, except in the case of certain Konyak villages which lived almost exclusively from mining salt and exchanging it for goods on the plains, and also in cases of communities in which there were a few well-known blacksmiths. Salt, iron, and various articles which were used for decoration were the main items for which the Nagas traded,[85] and in order to obtain these articles periodic expeditions were made to the plains. Pots, livestock, and other small manufactured goods were offered in exchange by the Nagas. Since trade was usually conducted by bands of warriors who often conducted tribute or undertook a raid along the way if the opportunity presented itself, precautions were taken by the Assamese to distinguish raiders from traders. Naga traders were compelled to enter the plains through a number of passes (duars), and were only permitted to exchange their goods at frontier posts, or Hats. In addition, contacts were regulated by the definition of a security road between the hills and the plains known as the Naga Alli, and Nagas who intended to trade were forced to leave their weapons with an Assamese agent or Kataki who acted as their representative.

The Nagas thus had extensive contact with the people of the adjacent plains, and with the Meiteis of Manipur, but very little of that contact occurred within the Naga Hills, and there was very little disturbance of traditional social structure and custom by external agencies.

When the British appeared on the scene, however, the situation changed radically, and the Nagas were gradually exposed to the new outside influences.

FOOTNOTES

1. The author recognizes the inadequacy of this sketch, but a study of this nature cannot presume to describe all the elements of Naga traditional life. The interested reader is urged to consult the various works on the Nagas which are cited below and in the bibliography.

2. See T. C. Hodson, The Naga Tribes of Manipur, reprinted from the 1911 edition (B. R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1974).

3. See John Henry Hutton, The Angami Nagas, (MacMillan and Co., London, 1921); and J. H. Hutton, The Sema Nagas, (MacMillan and Co., London, 1921).

4. See J. P. Mills, The Lhotha Nagas, (MacMillan and Co., London, 1921); J. P. Mills, The Ao Nagas, (MacMillan and Co., London, 1926); and J. P. Mills, The Rengma Nagas, (MacMillan and Co., London, 1937).

5. See Christoph von Furer-Haimendorf, The Konyak Nagas: An Indian Frontier Tribe, (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Toronto, 1969).

6. See Mashangthei Horam, Naga Polity, (B. R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1975); and M. Horam, Social and Cultural Life of Nagas: The Tangkhul Nagas (B. R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1977).

7. The Meiteis were the inhabitants of Manipur, and were considered to be related to the Nagas although they had accepted the Hindu religion and culture. They were ruled by a Maharajah, and hence lived under a centralized political structure. The Khasis, on the other hand, were a matrilineal hill people ruled by chiefs. Both groups had a fairer idea of group identity than the Nagas.

8. John Butler, "Rough Notes on the Angami Nagas", Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal vol. XLIV (1975), pp. 307-327, cited in Verrier Elwin, Nagas in the Nineteenth Century (O. U. P., 1969), p. 294.

9. J. H. Hutton, The Angamis Nagas, p. 9.

10. Ibid., p. 11.

11. T. C. Hodson, "The Native Tribes of Manipur", Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute vol. IV (N. S. 1901), p. 300.

12. Grierson, G. A., Linguistic Survey of India, vol. III, Tibeto-Burman Family. (Calcutta, 1903).

13. The Garos, Mikirs and the Lushais are hill tribes inhabiting the mountain regions to the south and west of the Brahmaputra valley.

14. Verrier Elwin, Nagaland, (Assam Secretariat, Shillong, 1961), p. 5.

15. M. Horam, Naga Polity, p. 27.

16. J. H. Hutton, op. cit., p. 19.

17. M. Horam, op. cit., p. 31.

18. It is interesting to note that one legend predicted the unification of the Nagas. "It said that when two of the three Stones fell, all those who had departed from Meikhes would come together once again, and that with the fall of the last Stone the world would come to an end". M. Horam, op. cit., p. 31.

19. For the most comprehensive documentation of the pattern of migration of the Naga tribes see: Werner Hartwig, Wirtschaft and Gesellschaftsstruktur der Naga in der zweiten Halfte des 19 und zu Beginn des 20 Johrhunderts, Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1970.

20. T. C. Hodson, The Naga Tribes of Manipur, (B. R. Publishing House, Delhi, 1974), p. 6.

21. Gordon P. Means, "Political Disorders and Migration Patterns Along the Indian-Burma Border", unpublished paper prepared for delivery at the 1969 Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Boston, March 27-30, p. 2.

22. But see Werner Hartwig, op. cit..

23. J. H. Hutton, op. cit., p. 19.

24. M. Horam, op. cit., pp. 41-42.

25. Cultural features held in common by the Nagas, the Dyaks and the Igorot include the practice of head-hunting; platform-burial; body tatooing; the batchelors houses; and terrace cultivation.

26. The various forms of Naga polity approximate to what Lucy Mair describes as "diffused government" on her tripartite typology of "Minimal government","Diffused government" and "State government". See Lucy Mair, Primitive Government, (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1962), especially pp. 62 and 79.

27. J. H. Hutton, op. cit., p. 109.

28. The Aos and the Konyaks also referred to themselves as belonging to "such and such a Morung". J. P. Mills, The Ao Nagas, p. 162; C. von Furer-Haimendorf, The Konyak Nagas, p. 45

29. "A group is described as exogamous if its members are debarred from intermarriage, and must hence "Marry out". C. von Furer-Haimendorf, op. cit., p. 48.

30. Ibid..

31. A phratry is a subdivision of a clan. In ancient Athenian society the 'phyle' (or clan) was subdivided into three phratries.

32. These were called putsa. J. H. Jutton, op. cit., p. 115.

33. In Hutton's time the putsa rather than the clan was becoming the real exogamous unit. See J. H. Hutton, op. cit., p. 116.

34. Ibid., p. 135. All real property, except certain lands belonging to the Morung, and paths, water supplies etcetera, were owned on an individual basis. In many Angami villages water rights were also individually owned.

35. Ibid., p. 136.

36. Sometimes, for example, among the Konyaks, a Khel was occupied by a group of related clans.

37. J. H. Hutton, op. cit., p. 113. The "word 'Khel' is really an Assamese word signifying the exogamous division of the Ahoms.

The term "ward" is used by Furer-Haimendorf to describe the exogamous subdivision of the village. C. von Furer-Haimendorf, op. cit., p. 40.

38. C. von Furer-Haimendorf, op. cit., p. 42.

39. Furer-Haimendorf gives the example of the Oukheang, Thepong, Balang, and Ang-born morungs expelling the Bala morung in op cit., p. 62.

40. The morung is a difficult unit to define, for its meaning seems to have changed from tribe to tribe. Furer-Haimendorf notes that there were often several morungs in each khel or ward, whereas among the Angamis there was usually only one. Normally, however, each clan had its own morung.

41. J. P. Mills, The Ao Nagas, p. 180.

42. In some Naga tribes there were also separate girls' dormitories. These were usually constructed by the members of a clan from which the girls often found marriage partners.

43. C. von Furer-Haimendorf, op. cit., p. 48.

44. J. P. Mills, The Ao Nagas, p. 177.

45. C. von Furer-Haimendorf, "The Morung System of the Konyak Nagas, Assam", Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, vol. LXVIII (1938), p.

46. Ibid., p.

47. Private interview with Dr. Sekhose, an Angami Baptist Minister, by G. P. Means at St. Paul, Minnesota in the Summer of 1967.

48. Ibid., The Love of Freedom was considered to be necessary condition of Angami manhood and warrior status. It was not therefore thought necessary for a girl to be given the same liberal upbringing. On the other hand, women were by no means relegated to an inferior position in society.

49. The Semas, and many Angamis did not build the morung. The 'Angamis, however, had a similar organization based upon the age-grade system, and the Semas were organized into work "gangs" led by a commander or althou. See J. H. Hutton, The Sema Nagas, p. 153.

50. J. P. Mills, op. cit., p. 180.

51. Ibid., p. 177. Mills likens the life of the recent entrant into the morung to "that of a fag at an English Public School".

52. Text of a lecture given by Hutton on megaliths, in the Hutton collection.

53. A village was considered to be a receptacle of aren, or soul matter, and it was largely in order to obtain aren and thereby increase the prosperity of the village that men sought to capture heads. See J. P. Mills, "The Naga Headhunters of Assam", The Royal Central Asian Journal, vol. XXII (1935) p. 418.

54. J. H. Hutton, op. cit., p. 44. Captain Butler describes "panjies" as "sharp-pointed bamboo skewers or stakes, varying from six inches to three or four feet in length, some of them as thin as a pencil, others as thick as a good-sized cane".

55. See Edmund Leach, Political Systems of Highland Burma, Harvard, U. P., Cambridge, Massachussetts, p. 8. Leach observes an oscillation between two poles in Kachin society, between the "democratic type" (gumlao), and the "aristocratic type" (shan), or between the instability of the system and the variable adjustments of the culture, the socio-political structure, and the ecological environment. The most common system in Kachin society was in fact the gumsa, a form of compromise between the two ideal types.

56. Hutton was told that even among the democratic Angamis there had been periods when outstanding families had taken power for generations. See J. H. Hutton, op. cit., p. 142.

57. C. von Furer-Haimendorf, op. cit., p. 52. Konyak chiefs were only chosen from the Ang clans.

58. Text of a lecture given by Hutton on megaliths, in the Hutton collection.

59. Ibid., Hutton notes that hereditary chiefships were conspicuous by their presence where stone-using was not practised.

60. J. H. Hutton, The Angami Nagas, p. 142.

61. Ibid., Hutton notes that Butler was probably referring to both the Pehuma, and the Kemovo or religious leader.

62. Ibid., p. 142.

63. Ibid., p. 143.

64. The Ao language was divided into two very distinct groups, the chongli and the mongsen. The linguistic division was paralleled by cultural distinctions between the two groups.

65. J. P. Mills, The Ao Nagas, p. 181. The Age-group organization was also closely bound up with the complicated system of shares of meat. Ibid., p. 182.

66. C. von Furer-Haimendorf, op. cit., p. 52.

67. Ibid., p. 41.

68. J. H. Hutton, The Sema Nagas, p. 386. The meaning of Mughami is "orphan".

69. Ibid., p. 385. Whereas most Nagas were monogamous, the Semas were polygamous, with the chief always possessing the greatest number of wives.

70. Ibid..

71. c. f. Lucy Muir, Anthropology and Social Change, (The Athlore Press, London, 1969), p. 124 where she defines the institution of clientship in which the poor and weak attach themselves to the powerful as retainers in return for subsistence and welfare goods.

72. J. H. Hutton, The Angami Nagas, p. 177. The Nagas, for example, made no images of their deities.

73. The 'spirits' were called terhoma by the Angamis, teghami by the Semas, tsungrem by the Aos.

74. C. von Furer-Haimendorf, op. cit., p. 99.

75. Military Report on Presidency and Assam District. General Staff, India, 1929, vol. III Southern Hill Tracts, (Simla, Government of India Press, 1930), p. 42 (in the Hutton collection, India Office Library, Blackfriars, London).

76. Head-hunting also formed the basis for the elaborate display of ornaments and clothing by the warriors. Among the Angamis the wearing of rows of cowries upon the kilt signified prowess won on head-hunting expeditions.

77. Aren was an Ao word. See J. P. Mills "The Naga Headhunters of Assam", Royal Central Asian Journal, vol. XXII (1935), p. 419. See also J. H. Hutton, The Angami Nagas, pp. 160-164.

78. The belief in the power of aren seems to have formed the basis for the belief held by some Nagas that repeated copulation with a pregnant woman (by members of the clan) would produce a healthy, vigorous child.

79. J. P. Mills, "The Naga Headhunters of Assam", op. cit., p. 420.

80. C. von Furer-Haimendorf, op. cit., p. 97.

81. J. H. Hutton, The Angamis Nagas, p. 50.

82. Ibid., p. 72.

83. The years of merit were a series of ceremonies marked by deaths and sacrifices whereby a man who had accumulated wealth could gain in social status. See J. P. Mills, The Ao Nagas, p. 257.

84. C. von Furer-Haimendorf, op. cit., p. 17.

85. These included cowrie shells, ivory armlets, hornbill feathers, and other elements of the ornamentation of the Naga brave.

CHAPTER III

I. Initial Contacts with the West: Early British Relations with the Nagas

The early history of British interaction with the tribes inhabiting the Patkoi range of mountains presents a confused and tangled web of changing policies, of raids and expeditions, and the gradual but reluctant assumption of formal political control by the British administration of Assam. Although it is interesting in its own right as an example of imperial border policing, and as a special case of colonial administration, the period throws light upon later developments in the Naga hills. It also sets the scene for the external influences and internal conflicts that played a part in the development of new ideas and institutions in the region. A central theme in the early history of the Naga hills is the resistance offered by a number of Angami villages, especially that of Khonoma and its tributaries, to the imposition of British authority, and to the British challenge to their own predominance in the western Naga hills. The persistence of the power of Khonoma is an important element in Naga politics, and it is noteworthy that Khonoma both resisted conversion to Christianity until well into the twentieth century, and later provided leadership and support for the underground Naga separatist movement.

When the British arrived in the hills the area was in a state of turmoil for two major reasons. Firstly, the migration patterns in the hills had produced a state of conflict and the rearrangement of tribal

boundaries. As was mentioned in chapter II the Semas and the Changs were short of land, and were invading the territories of the Aos and the Sangtams, forcing them to give up their land, and even destroying and dispersing their villages. Secondly, the Angamis, especially those villages in league with the important villages of Kohima and Khonoma, had established a complex tribute and raiding system. With a heavily concentrated population because of the abundance of food provided by their intensive methods of cultivation, the Angamis had begun to accumulate wealth both through the collection of tribute, and by means of organized raids into the plains.[1]

For many years before the advent of the British the Nagas had maintained a pattern of relations with the peoples of the surrounding areas which varied from sporadic hostility to peaceful trade and occasionally to cooperation in warfare. Over the course of several centuries the Ahom kings, the descendants of the Shan conquerors of the indigenous inhabitants of Assam, had developed a relationship with the Naga tribes which involved enduring periods of truce and peaceful trading, interspersed with outbursts of violence and retribution.[2] The Ahoms evolved a policy of conciliation towards the hill people -- showing great brutality when provoked, but otherwise content to leave the tribes to themselves. Their main objective was to contain the Nagas in the forests and the highland areas, thereby preserving the population of the plains from the plundering incursions and savage head-hunting raids. During the eighteenth century, however, this pattern was disrupted. The kingdom of Assam was in a state of decline and the ability of the Ahom dynasty to protect its subjects was correspondingly reduced.[3] Taking advantage of

this weakness, the Angamis Nagas pressed their attacks with greater ferocity and regularity.

When the East India Company assumed control of Assam in 1838 therefore, it was discovered that a reassertion of overall political authority was required. Annexation of the Hills was not considered desirable, but it was deemed necessary to maintain at least a minimum presence in the area, in order to guarantee the safety of the people and properties of the adjoining plains. For several years the policy towards the Nagas broadly followed that of the Ahom kings: punitive expeditions were sent out to avenge raids, and contacts were established with the more powerful and belligerent villages. The greatest attention was paid to the Angamis, since they were seen to be the most persistent perpetrators of warlike incursions into the lowland areas. Sir Alexander MacKenzie devotes a section of his History of the Relations of the Government with the Hill Tribes of the Northeast Frontier of Bengal, the most comprehensive work dealing with relations with the Nagas before 1884, to the Nagas of the Patkoi range and a second to the tribes directly south of Seebsaugor (Sibsagar), yet the documentation of the uncertain and problematic relationship between the British administration and the Angami clans occupies by far the greatest amount of space.

The extension of influences over the Hill areas was a lengthy and protracted process, for there was a general unwillingness on the part of first the Company, and then the raj to assume duties and responsibilities which would provide little or no financial return. This reluctance constantly came into conflict with the overriding concern to protect the people inhabiting the lands bordering on the Naga Hills, particularly

after the rapid extension of tea cultivation along the frontier between 1869 and 1873 had increased the value of the area. The division over policy is noticeable in the documents of the period, with the local administrators often advocating the establishment of an outpost in Angami territory, while officials of the Bengal administration were adamant in their defence of a policy of only limited interference. This dual attitude was later summarised by one Indian Civil Service administrator:

> It should first be premised that for the annexation of their territory, the Nagas are themselves responsible. The cost of the administration of the district is out of all proportion to the revenue that is obtained, and we only occupied the hills after bitter experience, extending over many years, which clearly showed that annexation was the only way of preventing raids upon our villages. Had the Angami Nagas consented to respect our frontiers, they might have remained as independent as the tribes inhabiting the hills to the south of Sibsagar and Lakhimpur; it is impossible for any civilized power to acquiesce in the perpetual harrying of its border folk.[4]

Formal political control over Angami territory was only finally extended after several vacillations in policy, and after a number of different courses had been pursued. In the face of continuous hostility, or at least uncertainty of the mood of the Nagas, British policy fluctuated in responses to pressures from the Bengal administration, and the results of policies actually followed. At least four different attitudes towards the Angami tracts are discernible. Following a period of initial contacts and preliminary explorations, the attempts to control the predatory Naga excursions may be broadly divided into (i) a period of overall control by means of a show of force from outside (promenades/ expeditions 1839-46); (ii) an attempt at controlling the violence by establishing outposts within the hills, 1847-50; (iii) a period of

complete non-interference 1851-65; and finally (iv) a period of gradual annexation extending from 1866 onwards.

(i) Period of Exploration and Initial Contacts

The first encounters between British officers and the Naga tribes occurred not long after the conclusion of the Treaty of Yandabo in 1826, ending the first war with Burma.[5] At that time it was considered necessary to open up direct communications between the vassal states of Assam and Manipur, and with this purpose in mind a number of exploratory expeditions were sent out between 1832 and 1839. The first of these, which cut across the Naga Hills from the Manipur valley to Mohung Dijooa on the River Jumoona, met with serious opposition. Despite the fact that Captains Jenkins and Pemberton had assembled a large body of levies they were harrassed along the whole length of the route by both Kacha and Angami Nagas. Similarly an expedition led by Gumbeer Sing, the Raja of Manipur, and a British officer, Lieutenant Gordon, in the following cold season, was fiercely opposed at every point.[6]

Involvement in the Hills increased after the annexation of neighbouring Cachar to British territory in 1832, upon the death of its Raja, Govind Chunder. Although at first it was hoped that Naga raiders would be controlled by Tularam Senaputty, the principal chief in the Cachar Hills, and by the Raja of Manipur, it soon became apparent that their sporadic and brutal retaliation did nothing to guarantee the protection of the border villages, and even exacerbated their predicament. Therefore in 1837 a European officer was ordered to occupy a post near Naga territory and to attempt to bring the hostile Naga chiefs to terms.

(ii) Period of Control by Means of a Show of Force from Outside

Early policy towards the Nagas seems to have been similar in both the southern Angami areas, and the northeastern district south of Seebsaugor (Sibsagar). In the north Commissioner Brodie advocated contact with the Naga chiefs, backed up from time to time by a show of force. His attitude is succinctly summarised by Mackenzie:

> The plan that Brodie proposed for future management was that every village should be visited periodically by an officer with a strong escort to prove to the people that they could be easily got at. Then he meant uniformly to insist on their referring all quarrels to the Seebsauger officials, and he intended to punish contumacy by fine, occupation or otherwise.[7]

Yet whereas this policy had some success in the region to the south and east of Sibsagar, it was unable to control the larger and more bellicose Angami villages, such as Khonoma, Mozema and Kekrima. At first 'promenade' or exploratory expeditions were made into the hills with the objective of becoming more fully acquainted with the terrain and settlements of the central Angami area. In January 1839 the first expedition set out under the command of Mr. Grange, the sub-assistant at Nowgong, with the intention of punishing the chiefs of Mozema and Khonoma for their involvement in raiding parties. Although Grange's campaign was unsuccessful because of too poor commissariat, it marks the opening of a forty-year long war with Khonoma village and its vassals and allies, which frustrated British attempts to secure peace and order along the Assam frontier. It was only finally concluded upon the destruction of the fort of Khonoma and the dispersion of its members in 1879.

Grange's second expedition, which was embarked upon in 1840, employed harsh methods of repression, including the burning of five

villages. These measures seemed to have the effect of checking the Naga attacks, for in 1841 it was reported that there had been no raids into North Cachar over the preceeding year.[8] Nevertheless, the policy of maintaining contact with the chiefs was continued. In 1841 Lieutenant Bigge, the Principal Assistant in charge of Nowgong conducted a 'promenade' through the Hills and established a rapport with the 'gaon burras'[9] of the leading communities. At the same time Bigge set up a supply depot for salt at Dimapur, thereby hoping to use trade to pacify the tribes.

With the success of Bigge's expedition, policy was firmly established along similar lines, although the other experiences of the preceding years were also taken into consideration. The Government directed that: "a repetition of these friendly visits should be made from time to time, mainly with a view to the suppression of the slave traffic carried on by the Nagas with the Bengalis of Sylhet".[10] In addition, the boundary between the Angamis and Manipur was to be drawn in order to prevent aggravation in that region and a road to Samaguting[11] from the plains was to be opened. A tribute was to be extracted from the Naga headmen as soon as they could be brought to agree to the terms of its payment.

For several years this policy seemed to be effective, but in 1844 large-scale violence broke out once again. The Angami village chiefs refused to pay the first year's tribute to the Assistant Commissioner, Captain Eld, and engaged in a number of hostile actions, killing many sepoys. Villages were burnt in retribution, and the troops withdrew once more from the Hills. The expedition which followed was seemingly more successful; Captain Butler, the Principal Assistant at Nowgong led

a body of men through Angami territory, conciliating the tribes, surveying the topography, and collecting the tribute. However, as soon as the expedition departed from the Hills, the clans returned to their habit of constant raiding and eternal feuds. The persistence of the traditional pattern of internecine warfare convinced Butler that the only feasible policy was to establish a strong permanent post in the hills in the middle of the fueding areas, but at this time he was unable to persuade the Bengal Government of its necessity, and the plan of annual expeditions was maintained.

In 1846-47 Captain Butler embarked on a second expedition through Naga territory, finally establishing a road from Mohung Dijoa to Samaguting, setting up a market in the latter location, and erecting a stockade and grain go-downs at Demapore (Dimapur), several miles inside Naga territory.[12] The post at Samaguting was placed under the command of a Sezawal named Bhogchand, who soon became involved in local disputes, notably that between the villages of Mozema and Khonoma. The two khels of the village were feuding over a stretch of land; one section, of which Jubili was the clan leader, was being given assistance by a number of Cacharis, while Nilholi, the chief of the other clan, was aided by allies from Khonoma. A member of Jubili's party had been killed, and impervious to the vulnerability of his position, Bhogchand arrested both the culprits, and the Cachari troublemakers. Hoping to escort his captives to Samaguting, he set out from Mozema but was attacked and killed by the two feuding groups who had combined against him.[13]

(iii) Attempt to Control the Violence from Within the Hills

The murder of Bhogchand prompted a reconsideration of policy

towards the Hill tribes. The Government reverted to the idea of a punitive expedition, urging that crops and stores of grain be burnt if necessary, in order to compel the surrender of the Sezawal's murderers. It recognized the failure of the present policy towards the tribes and recommended changes:

> For some years a policy, entirely conciliatory in its character, has been adopted towards them; unceasing efforts have been made to induce them to live on terms of amity with each other, and to refrain from committing those hostile acts of cruelty to which they were known to be addicted. These efforts, however, seem unhappily to have been quite unproductive of any good result; and the recent murder of one of our police officers in the execution of his duty, followed up as it has been by a deliberate attack of one of our frontier posts, in which two police sepoys have been killed, has rendered it imperatively necessary, in the opinion of the President in Council, that immediate and severe measures should be resorted to, in order to convince the tribes that such acts of outrages cannot be committed with impunity.[4]

In order to implement this determination upon more stringent measures, an expedition under the command of a Lieutenant Vincent was ordered into the Hills. Yet because of the illness of the commanding officer it was forced to beat a retreat, and the Angamis took advantage of this temporary setback to increase the number of raids upon the border. A feeling of uneasiness and concern over the situation began to spread amongst the local officers, prompting the idea that only by locating one of their number in the hills with a large body of men, supported by a chain of posts across the country, would what was seen as an incipient border rising be quelled.[15]

It was considered that a demonstration of force was again necessary and in March 1850 Lieutenant Vincent re-entered the hills, erecting

a stockade at Mozema, where he remained over the monsoon period. Although a part of Khonoma was burnt, and several other villages were intimidated, Vincent discovered that the major part of the trouble stemmed from the fact that the Nagas did not recognize the British as the paramount power to which deference should be given, but merely as the "Assamese faction" which was struggling with Manipur for influence in the area.

The attempt to control the Nagas by maintaining a presence in the hills was less successful and more costly than had been hoped, for Vincent was being very hard-pressed by the Angamis of Khonoma and its allies, and movement was very restricted. Consequently the tenth Naga expedition was sent off under the command of a Major Foquett to relieve Vincent and capture the fort of Khonoma.[16] The defences were extremely well-built, and the troops were unable to take the place by direct assault, although Khonoma was finally abandoned by its defenders. Since the primary objective, that of the capture of Khonoma had been accomplished, the officer in command reduced the force in the area and made over the command to Captain Reid, who proceeded to reduce the villages friendly to Khonoma. Part of Keguema and Saphema were burnt, while Kekrima foolishly fought an open battle against the sepoy muskets, resulting in the destruction of the village, and the slaughter of a large number of its warriors.[17]

(iv) Period of Non-Interference

In 1851 there was further discussion about the relation of the Naga Hills to the areas controlled by the East India Company, and a policy of non-interference was finally decided upon by the Governor General, Lord Dalhousie, following the urgings of Captain Butler. Dalhousie's Minute of 20th February 1851 lays down the new directives:

> I dissent entirely from the policy which is recommended of what is called obtaining a control, that is to say, of taking possession of these hills, and of establishing our sovereignty over their savage inhabitants. Our possession could bring no profit to us, and would be as costly to us as it would be unproductive. The only advantage which is expected from our having possession of the country by those who advocate the measure is the termination of the plundering inroads which the tribes now make from the hills on our subjects at the foot of them. But this advantage may more easily, more cheaply, and more justly be obtained by refraining from all seizure of the territory of these Nagas, and by confining ourselves to the establishment of effective means of defence on the line of our own frontier.... Hereafter we should confine ourselves to our own ground; protect it as it can and must be protected; not meddle in the fueds or fights of these savages; encourage trade with them as long as they are peaceful towards us; and rigidly exclude them from all communication either to sell what they have got, or to buy what they want, if they should become turbulent or troublesome.[18]

Although considered both sound and desirable at the time the new policy was difficult to maintain, and since the protection of the long and vulnerable border proved to be impossible, the idea of non-interference was gradually eroded. Less than a year after the implementation of the new directives 22 raids had occurred, 55 persons had been killed, 10 wounded and 113 taken captive.[19] As a result the Government consented in 1853 to appoint an officer to the North Cachar Hills, Lord Dalhousie reluctantly conceding that in this instance it was better to intervene. Even so, the new policy persisted and Dimapur was abandoned. The raids continued, however, and in 1862 the Commissioner reported that:

> It is quite certain that our relations with the Nagas could not possibly be on a worse footing than they are now. The non-interference policy is excellent in theory, but Government will probably be inclined to think that it must be abandoned.[20]

With the succession to office of a new Lieutenant Governor, the question of the relationship with the Nagas did indeed come under review. The new Lieutenant Governor, Sir Cecil Beadon, ordered that an officer subordinate to the Deputy Commissioner of Nowgong should be placed in immediate communication with the Nagas, and he was directed to decide any disputes voluntarily referred to him, but not to interfere in internal affairs. Furthermore, he advised that the Chiefs on the border were to be informed that the Government considered them responsible for the good behaviour of their villages.

(v) Period of Gradual Annexation, Extending from 1866 Onwards

No fundamental change in policy was made for over two years, until finally, raids in March and April 1866 compelled the Government to settle the question properly. Sir Cecil Beadon turned to the problem once more, and concluded that it was not possible to recede from the border areas, since the effect of this might be that "in the course of a few years Assam would be divided amongst the Bhutias, Abors, Nagas, Garos, Mishmis, and other wild tribes".[21]

Thereupon, the Commissioner, Colonel Hopkinson, elaborated a proposal to post an officer in the hills, observing that the democratic nature of the Angami village polity, together with the multiplicity of feuds and divisions within a single village, meant that it would be impossible to impose a policy of conciliation from outside. In consequence, the Bengal administration recognized in a letter to the Government of India that:

> The abandonment of the position we held previously to 1854, and the withdrawal of our line of frontier posts to the left bank of the Dhunsiri is proved, by

> the events which have since occurred, to have been a grave mistake, and that the only course left us consistently with the duty we owe to the inhabitants of the adjoining frontier districts as well as to the Angami Nagas themselves, who are torn by intestine fueds for want of a government, and unable to exercise any general self control, or to restrain independent action on the part of any village or even of a section of any of the numerous villages inhabited by the tribe.[22]

In reply to this letter, the Government of India ordered the transfer of the post held by Lieutenant Gregory at Asaloo in North Cachar, to Samaguting. While the establishment of a strong central station lay within the framework of the new policy, the Government was still unwilling to sanction annexation of the Naga Hills. However, the central administration was slow to recognize the significance of the new policy, whereby involvement in the politics of the tribes would gradually but inevitably lead towards political supervision. In Samaguting the signs of colonial administration were visible not long after its occupation: a school and a dispensary were opened, trade was extended, and roads to the plains were constructed. The reception of residentiary delegates from the various communities was encouraged, and they were given allowances for acting as "dobashis" or interpreters, and messengers to their respective clans.[23]

For a time the attentions of the British representatives in the hill areas were devoted to settling the question of the boundary with Manipur, and to undertaking survey operations. Several of the local officers considered the extension of political influence over the villages to be a necessity, for feuding was still rife, and violence between the different clans was contributing to the instability of the border areas. In January 1866 a band of Nagas from Razepema had devastated a

Mikir village in North Cachar. Lieutenant Gregory responded by razing Razepema to the ground, but violent incidents continued, and in 1871 Captain Butler, the political Agent, pressed for a more forward policy, requesting that he be permitted to arbitrate between the clans. In this he was supported by the Commissioner, Colonel Hopkinson, who saw no reason:

> to doubt the feasibility of the occupation and thorough reduction to our control of the whole of the country by the same means as were successfully employed under the same circumstances in the Khasi Hills some forty years ago.[24]

Having received these reports, however, Sir George Campbell, the Lieutenant Governor, decided that the only satisfactory approach to the Naga problem was to establish some form of political control, without any actual government. He saw the role of the local officer as that of carrying out police action, without attempting to interfere in the day-to-day customs and functions of the village.

On the other hand, the protection of certain villages from the attacks of others was likely to lead to a political association of some form, and indeed this likelihood became increasingly more obvious. In the Spring of 1874 Captain Johnstone, who was officiating for Captain Butler at Samaguting, took under British protection two Naga villages which were in danger of attack, on the condition that they paid an annual revenue. Although the Supreme Government was still reluctant to assume direct administration of the hills, it was apparent that events were forcing the local officers towards that conclusion; Captain Johnstone soon took a third village under his protection, and indicated in his yearly report that in his opinion this was the beginning of a general

voluntary submission on the part of the Nagas.

Colonel Keatinge, the Chief Commissioner at this time, appeared to be sympathetic to this view, for in March 1875 he recommended a continuation of the survey as a measure prior to the occupation of the hills. A few months later he advocated the transfer of the district headquarters from Samaguting to Wokha, which was in a more convenient location for control of the Lhota and Ao tribes. In November Colonel Keatinge submitted an additional report which stated that an increasing number of Naga villages were paying revenue, and he had ordered the political officers to accept the submission of the villages within the proximity of Samaguting.

Despite the apparent trend towards peace in certain areas of the hills, however, this camouflaged a growing hostility on the part of the more powerful villages, upon whose sphere of influence the British were encroaching. There had indeed been many incidents of violence -- Captain Butler, for instance, was ambushed and killed in December 1875 by a band of Lhothas not far from Wokha, but a potentially more explosive situation was building up, since the British were taking villages under their protection which had traditionally been part of the tribute system of Khonoma and its allies. Mozema, which had carried out a series of raids on villages in North Cachar, was attacked and burnt on 8th December 1877, but the rival power of Khonoma had not been destroyed, and the possibility of violence was very strong.[25]

The situation was further exacerbated when, in July 1878 the British established a fortified post at Kohima so as to control the central Angami area, and the approaches to the frontier with Manipur.

Deputations of Nagas from all the surrounding villages presented themselves before the political Officer, offering their submission, and promising to keep the peace; at the same time it was reported that the village of Khonoma was acquiring arms and ammunition. The tension seemed to ease somewhat over the next few months, and, unaware of the belligerent mood of the clans Mr. Damant, the officer in charge at Kohima, approached Khonoma with the intention of speaking with the village headmen. Damant was shot dead at the foot of the village walls, while his escort was dispersed by the Khonoma men, who were later joined by the warriors of Jotsoma, and the Chetonoma clan of Kohima.[26] The British garrison was besieged, and the situation soon became desperate, even though Mr. Hinde, the Extra Assistant Commissioner at Wokha marched directly to Kohima with his entire force, as soon as he heard of the rebellion. In the nick of time, Colonel Johnson appeared with a force of 2000 Manipuris, thereby bringing the siege to an end. It was recognized that the destruction of the power of Khonoma and its allies was a necessary precondition of the entrenchment of British authority in the hill areas, and a large force was assembled for that purpose. Before the attach on Khonoma, Piphima, Merrama, Sachima, Sephama, and Puchama were destroyed, and later Jotsoma was captured, and a portion of it burned. Khonoma itself was unsuccessfully assaulted, but the defenders retreated to a fortress on the crest of a hill, and were slowly starved into submission. As punishment, the village was destroyed, a fine was imposed, the fertile terraces were confiscated, and the clans were dispersed among other villages.[27]

Although the people of Khonoma were later allowed to return to

their homes, their powerful position amongst the Angamis had been reduced and they could no longer act as a serious challenge to British authority in the hills.

II. The Beginning of Effective Administration in the Naga Hills

With the western Angami area finally subdued the British position in the Naga Hills was consolidated, and new administrative arrangements were devised to govern the region. These arrangements were tailored to suit the main British concern for the maintenance of law and order, and the prevention of the hill tribes from raiding the tea plantations and rubber interests that were being developed in the plains.[28] In 1872-73 the statute 32 and Vic. cap. 3, which gave a power of summary legislation for backward tracts to the executive government, had been extended to Assam. The first use of the power given by the Act was to pass a regulation for the frontier districts, which became known as the "Inner Line" regulation, since it enabled the Lieutenant-Governor to prescribe a line beyond which no British subject of certain classes, or foreign residents, could pass without a licence.[29] By defining the boundaries between Assam and the border regions, and restricting access, it was hoped to keep personal contact between the inhabitants of the two areas to a minimum, and thereby to remove potential causes of friction. In the same vein, it was envisaged as a means of separating the administration of the two areas, and of treating the "tribal" people in a different manner from the Assamese, whose social system was based upon the use of currency, an incipient capitalist economy, and more universal legal norms. Whereas the Assamese were to be ruled according to British law, the Nagas were to

be left to themselves, provided that they did not interfere with the maintenance of order. Mackenzie writes that:

> Under the orders of the Government of India the "Inner Line" is defined merely for the purposes of jurisdiction. It does not decide the sovereignty of the territory beyond.... Beyond the line the tribes are left to manage their own affairs with only such interference on the part of the frontier officers in their political capacity as may be considered advisable with the view of establishing a personal influence for good amongst the chiefs and Tribes.... No European planter is to be allowed to accept any grant beyond the line, or under a tenure derived from any chief or tribe.[30]

The second important piece of legislation which related to the hills was the Scheduled District Act of 1874. This Statute, as amended by the frontier tracts regulation II of 1880, empowered the government to ratify what laws would apply in the scheduled districts. It recognized that a simpler, more personal administration was needed in the hill areas, and therefore exempted the hill people from prosecution under both the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Civil Procedure Code.[31] In their place, simpler regulations concerning stamps, court fees, registration and transfer of property, and techniques of administering justice in civil and criminal matters were devised.

In 1881 the final decision to make the Naga Hills a British district was taken, but the district consisted only of outposts at Kohima and Wokha, which controlled the surrounding Angami and Lhota villages.[32] However, the policy of curbing the violence continuously involved the local officers in the disputes between villages which lay outside the administered area, and as had occurred before over the question of whether or not to maintain a permanent presence in the hills, after 1881 a debate

raged as to whether or not to extend the area of British influence outside the District.[33] The Government of India was unwilling to condone any policy that would involve extra expenditure, and was therefore against extending British authority outside the defined area of responsibility. Nevertheless the process of penetration went on, for it was impossible to draw a line as the area of control, and ignore everything that happened just across it.[34] Trouble amongst the Aos, and attacks by the Semas upon villages under British protection prompted the despatch of expeditions to their territories, leading to interference in the settlement of disputes and legal wrangles between them.

In 1884 the Government of India sanctioned development of political control areas beyond the Naga Hills district frontier, in preference to the policy of periodical promenades through disturbed areas, supported by the conclusion of agreement with village chiefs and headmen.[35] This revised policy led slowly, and sporadically towards the extension of control over the majority of Naga tribes, so that by 1937 even the Eastern Konyaks and Kalyo-Kengnyu tribes had come within the compass of the control area, even though effective control in these regions was slight. A number of stages in the process may be noted.

Firstly, in 1886 the Indian administration agreed to the proposal of the Chief Commissioner of Assam that the area of control in the Naga Hills should be extended to cover the whole of the Ao country west of the Dikhu River, together with the Sema villages to the east of Wokha village.[36]

Secondly, in 1887 it was proposed by Mr. McCabe, the Deputy Commissioner in the hills at that time, to take the Ao area into the

district, because of their willingness to accept British administration, and their debility and disorder in the face of hostility and expansionist pressure from the Semas and the Changs. In 1888 the Ao villages of Mongsemdi and Lungkung were burnt by a combination of Chang villages from across the River Dikhu, and the slaughter of 148 people from Mongsamdi, 103 of which were said to have been children, together with the slaughter of 40 people at Lungkung, 35 of which were women and children, roused the compassion of some of the hill administrators. Partly for humanitarian reasons, therefore, but mainly because of the proximity of the devastated and migrating villages to the plains and the growing concern for the economically important tea plantations, in November 1888 (letter 14th Nov., 1888) it was decided to include the Aos within the Naga Hills district.[37] As a consequence of the administrative rearrangement a new subdivisional headquarters was set up near the Ao village of Mokokchung at the end of that year.

Yet the debate continued, and the process of incorporation received a setback. In 1896 Sir William Ward of the Government of India made the following criticism of the conduct of his officers in the hills district:

> I have always been opposed to extending our area of political control, which is always followed by annexation, as in the case of the Mokochung subdivision. To annexation succeeds a further area of political control, and further annexation, etc. All this annexation means further expenditure.... The object of political control areas is, I have always held, to keep people immediately outside annexed territories from taking heads etc., on our borders.[38]

Similarly the Deputy Commissioner was strictured by the Chief Commissioner Cotton for his involvement with the Semas of Yachumi which

had led to a considerable exercise of force and the burning of the village. The Commissioner's secretary wrote that the Commissioner:

> cannot understand that there was any necessity on your part to visit this unfriendly village, and he does not look with favour on any part of your protracted tour over a tract of country where the British government possess and claim no political control, and where there is obvious risk of your coming into conflict with the savage tribes who inhabit it...he wishes you now to understand distinctly that he cannot approve of such expeditions unless some special reason exists for them, and that you must not in future organize or make an expedition or promenade through independent territory outside the area of your political control without obtaining the previous sanction of the local Administration.[39]

Despite these objections, requests for the extension of the political area continued, and pressure on the central administration increased. In 1901 Mr. Kennedy, one of the officers in the hills district complained about the prohibition of interference of disputes in the Sema border area. He maintained that the area had been largely pacified, but would soon revert to its previous turbulent state if they did not interfere regularly in the settlement of disputes.[40]

At this point a new stage was entered upon, mainly because an economic interest in the form of the discovery of coal in the area. The advent of a new chief Commissioner, Mr. J. B. Fuller brought a more sympathetic attitude towards the claims of the local officers; in 1904 the GOI agreed to the extension of the eastern boundary of the district along the line of the Tizo River.[41]

Economic interests finally prompted a markedly less hostile attitude to British intervention in areas outside the district, and to extension of the district itself. This change in attitude seems to have

resulted from the profit to be obtained from the exploitation of natural resources of the region.[42] In addition to the large forestry reserves, in 1908 a large coal-bearing area was discovered near the village of Kongan (Kongnyn) to the east of the R. Dikhu. In July 1908, as a result of pressure from business interests wishing to exploit the coal reserves, the Administration decided to include an extended tract of territory lying between the Dikhu and the 1941 Trensang border.[43] This included a number of Konyak villages such as Borjan, Wakching, Wanching and Longkhai.[44]

From this point onwards, and especially after the first world war, there was a change in the attitude of the British administration towards the Nagas: they were no longer a border problem, but a conquered people to be administered. Coinciding with the administration of concerned parties such as J. H. Hutton, J. P. Mills, Keith Canthie and Charles Pawsey the government became more concerned with the effects of its administration (good and bad), rather than with the question of whether or not to administrate.

A major concern remained that of policing the area. There were still numerous cases of head-hunting and outbreaks of violence, two of the most important of which were the burning of the Kalyo -- Kengnyu village of Pangsha in 1936, suppression of the Kuki rebellion of 1917. But after circa 1920 greater concern was given as to how to administer the hill people, and not whether or not to do so.[45]

This concern was apparent in the debates surrounding a number of statutes affecting the constitutional status of the hills. Following on from the Scheduled District Act of 1874, the Government of India Act of 1919 empowered the Governor-General in Council to declare any territory

in India to be a "backward tract", within which the Governor-General could direct that any Act of the Indian Legislature should not apply, or should only apply with modifications.[46] Furthermore, he could empower the Provincial Governors to give similar directions in respect of Acts passed by the local legislatures.[47] Since the Naga Hills district was included as a "backward tract", the Nagas were effectively excluded from their neighbours in terms of administration. The system was continued and extended in the Government of India Act of 1935 according to which the Naga Hills district (along with the North Eastern Frontier Tract, the Lushai Hills, and the North Cachar Hills) became Excluded Areas within the Province of Assam.[48]

The exclusion of the Nagas, reinforced by the effects of the Inner Line regulation, meant that social and political changes which occurred in the hills happened in isolation from Assam and the rest of the Indian subcontinent. This had two major consequences that were of great importance in defining social and political boundaries in the post-independence period. Firstly, it meant that Naga society was essentially inward-looking. Administrative and social isolation, and a lack of an extensive network of transaction (both social and economic) between the Naga Hills and Assam, perpetuated a long history of minimal contact and increased the traditional mutual suspicion. This is illustrated by the reaction of two groups of Naga leaders to the Simon Commission which prepared the way for the Government of India Act of 1935.[49] When the Simon Commission visited Kohima in January 1929, members of the Naga Club, a sports and drinking fraternity,[50] submitted a memorandum demanding that the Nagas should be excluded from the proposed reforms and

and kept under direct administration to save them from being overwhelmed by the people of the plains. They argued that: "You are the only people who have ever conquered us, and, when you go we should be as we were".[51] The second group was a gathering of tribal chiefs and headmen who approached the Simon Commission. The Honourable Edward Cadogan, M.P., recalled that they declared through interpreters: "We hear that a black king is going to come to rule over India. If that is so, for goodness' sake, do not let it be a Bengali".[52]

A second important consequence of the constitutional arrangements in the Naga Hills was that they provided for a system of government and administration specifically designed for the Nagas, and associated with a definite territorial area. In combination with the effects of modernization, such as the development of trade and communications, the expansion of literacy, and greater social mobility, which are the subject of the next chapter, the territorial system of government led to what Duchachek has defined as a "territorial community" or a "geographically delineated social communication system".[53] While a Pan-Naga ethnic awareness was gradually emerging as a result of greater inter-tribal communication and the development of inter tribal Christian institutions, the political boundaries imposed by the British administration gave the ethnic identity a territorial dimension. Many Nagas were not encompassed within the Naga Hills district, and this created an issue which became salient in the post-independence period. Nevertheless, the provision of a territorial system of government for a "core area" of the Nagas moulded and shaped the political aspirations of the Naga people, giving rise to a new political identity based on ethnicity. As in the other hill

areas of Assam it led to the creation of a territorial interest group with strong political ambitions, and disastrous consequences for the once composite administrative state of Assam.[54]

FOOTNOTES

1. G. P. Means, op. cit., p. 2.

2. A. MacKenzie, History of the Relations of the Government with the Hill Tribes of the North-East Frontier of Bengal (Calcutta, 1884), p. 84.

3. E. A. Gait, A History of Assam, (Calcutta, Thacker, Spink & Co., 1933), p.

4. R. C. Allen, I.C.S. Assam District Gazetteer vol. IX. Naga Hills and Manipur. (Printed at Baptist Mission Press, Calcutta, 1905), p. 2.

5. E. A. Gait, op. cit., p.

6. A. MacKenzie, op. cit., p. 2.

7. Ibid., p. 95.

8. Ibid., p. 106.

9. The "gaon burras" were local headmen or clan leaders whom the British chose to act as middlemen in their dealings with the Naga villagers. As a symbol of office they were given red blankets by the British administrators.

10. A. MacKenzie, op. cit., p. 107.

11. Samaguting was the main village on the duar leading to the plains area near Dimapur, and thus it was the village easiest for the British to protect and use as an early base for control.

12. A. MacKenzie, op. cit., p. 109.

13. Ibid., p. 110.

14. Ibid., p. 111.

15. Ibid.

16. A. J. Moffat Mills, Report on the Province of Assam, 1854, pp. cxlv-clxii, cited in V. Elwin, The Nagas in the Nineteenth Century, (O.U.P. London, 1969), p. 137.

17. Ibid., p. 142.

18. A. MacKenzie, op. cit., p. 114.

19. Ibid., p. 112.

20. Ibid., p. 116.

21. Ibid., p. 117.

22. Ibid., p. 119.

23. In addition to the 'gaonburras', the British administration employed 'dobashis', or interpreters, as go-betweens in their dealings with the local populations.

24. A. MacKenzie, op. cit., p. 124.

25. Ibid., p. 131.

26. Ibid., p. 135.

27. Ibid., p. 140.

28. "The English government commenced cultivation of Thea Assamica at Jaipur in 1835, and in 1836 the first pound of Assam tea was sent to London. Later the Assam Tea Co. was organized, and it reported in 1886 an annual export of tea amounting to 30 million rupees". Victor Sword, Baptists in Assam. A Century of Missionary Service, 1836-1936, (American Baptist Publication Society, Chicago, 1935), p. 18.

29. A. MacKenzie, op. cit., p. 55.

30. Ibid., p. 89.

31. Verrier Elwin, Nagaland, (Assam Secretariat, Shillong, 1961), p. 34.

32. Sir Robert Niel Reid, History of the Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam, from 1883-1941, (Shillong, 1948), p. 99.

33. Ibid., p. 100.

34. Ibid..

35. Letter no. 2789-E of Mr. Grant, dated 20th October 1884, and quoted as a "locus classicus" of policy for years afterwards. Cited in Sir Robert Reid, op. cit., p. 103.

36. Ibid., p. 109.

37. Ibid., p. 120. Letter No. 3298, Assam Secretariat, 1888, File No. 676 J., dated 14th November 1888.

38. Letter of Sir William Ward to the Naga Hills District administration, dated 25th November 1896, Ibid., p. 126.

39. Ibid., p. 129, letter no. 199-For/1338-P 11th April 1900.

40. Ibid., p. 130, letter 1st June, 1901.

41. Ibid., p. 135, letter no. 291-E-B dated 26th January 1904.

42. See Sir Robert Reid, op. cit., pp. 149-151.

43. In the District Report for 1914-1915 (see Sir Robert Reid, op. cit., p. 142). The Nazira Coal company worked the Borjan colliery throughout the year, the output being 778 tons.

44. Wakching, Wanching, and Longkhai were some of the villages studied by C. von Furer-Haimendorf in 1936, and which formed the basis for his classic monograph, The Naked Nagas.

45. The letters and documents dealing with the period after the Great War pay more attention to questions of land rights (Reid p. 165), and administration (Reid p. 160) that to general questions of policy or descriptions of punitive expeditions.

46. Verrier Elwin, Nagaland, (Assam Secretariat, Shillong, 1961), p. 35.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., p. 39.

49. The two groups were broadly representative of the traditional elite of chiefs and clan leaders, and the "new elite" of dobashis, educated Nagas, schoolteachers, and government clerks, etcetera.

50. The membership of the Naga club was mainly made up of dobashis and educated Nagas. One of the founders was Hrisale the first educated Angami Naga clerk in the Deputy Commissioners office. Phizo was also a member at one time, according to Sir Charles Pawsey.

51. V. Elwin, op. cit., p. 49.

52. Speech made by the Honourable E. Cadogan before a special committee of the House of Commons in May 1935, cited in V. Elwin, op. cit., p. 50.

53. Ivo D. Duchachek, Comparative Federalism: The territorial dimension of Politics, (Holt, Rinehart, Winston, N. Y., 1970), p. 20.

54. S. K. Chaube "Interethnic Politics in India", Paper submitted to the VIIIth World Congress of Sociology, Toronto, August, 1974, p. 8.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE NAGA HILLS BEFORE 1947

The establishment of British authority in the Naga Hills had a profound and far-reaching impact upon the structure and fabric of Naga society. Important changes in roles and status followed the intrusion of foreign influences into what had been a number of relatively autonomous and isolated social units. The changing situation widened the range of choice in lifestyle open to the individual Naga, and increased the range of options through which to pursue social advancement.

Before we embark upon a discussion of the changes and developments which occurred in Naga society before 1947, it is helpful to have an outline of some of the categories which have been used in the analysis of social change. Social change itself has been seen by anthropologists and some political scientists as primarily structural change, rather than in terms of the acceptance or rejection of cultural traits.[1] It is "the process by which alteration occurs in the structure and function of a social system".[2] This process may be broken down into three stages: (i) invention, the means by which new ideas are created or developed; (ii) diffusion, the process by which these ideas are communicated throughout a given social system; and (iii) consequence, change occurring within the system as a result of the adoption (or rejection) of the innovations. Social change involves an extension of the range of options, and it is through the adoption (or rejection) of a new idea that the structure and

function of a social system are altered.[3] This does not preclude the idea of compulsion, for it is possible for ideas to be accepted under constraint. Following the work of Talcott Parsons it is also possible to develop a dual categorization of social change, based on its source or origin, which distinguishes between: (i) endogeneous (or immanent) change; and (ii) endogeneous (or contact) change.[4] Exogeneous change may be of two types, a) "selective" (when outsiders unintentionally or spontaneously communicate a new idea to members of a social system), and, b) "directed", caused by outsiders, who, on their own, or as representatives of planned change, seek to introduce new ideas in order to achieve definite goals. Whether selective or directed, communication is an essential element in the process of change, for it is the growth of communication that permits the development of new socialization patterns and the mobilization of new groups. Communication does not necessarily lead to acceptance, but it does lead to a greater range of choice.

Other important and related variables of the social change process are the level of contact, the rate of change and the degree of conflict induced by change. Among the Nagas both the level of contact and the rate of change were limited as a result of British policies and enactments, such as the Inner Line regulation. Direct limitations upon the rate of change slowed the formation of a new elite, and contributed towards a greater homogeneity in outlook and occupation than was found in other hill areas of Assam, for example in the Khasi-Jaintia Hills. Restrictions upon the rate of change, it is argued, were a partial cause of the slow formation of an educated Naga elite until the 1930s when both education and Christianity (the two were linked) spread more rapidly.

Similarly, economic and social restrictions helped form the social and political ambitions of the new elite, who, towards the end of the Second World War, possessed many similar goals and aspirations.

In the Naga Hills, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the main sources of change were exogeneous, comprising an amalgam of selective and directed elements, but they also included the adaptation of indigenous customs and institutions to the new social and political context. "Contact" change was caused by four major external elements: the British colonial administration; the American Baptist missionaries, who were given passes and permission to work in the hills; a small number of Marwari and Bengali businessmen who were given permission to trade; and the Japanese and British armies which stormed into the region in the Spring of 1944.

I. The Impact of British Administration

(i) Changes in Power and Authority

Although committed to a policy of allowing the tribal people to govern themselves according to their own rules and customs as far as possible, the establishment of British colonial administration in the hills brought with it attendant consequences which had a great impact on the structure of Naga society. The prevention of head-hunting and the enforcement of the Pax Britannica within the political control area brought a previously unknown situation of peace to those villages which had been brought under British jurisdiction.[5] This, in turn, caused a number of changes in social custom, patterns of deference and methods of social control. For instance, those customs and institutions which were related to the practice of head-hunting, as well as the paraphernalia of display

associated with it, were either lost or changed their meaning. Hutton noted the loss of the martial spirit, which the constant state of feud had previously kept alive in the Angamis,[6] and many features of dress lost their traditional significance. The wearing of rows of cowries on the Angami Kilt, for example, no longer signified the young warrior's prowess in battle, and his having collected a certain number of enemy heads, but were frequently worn either if the wearer had plunged his spear into an enemy corpse, or later, merely upon the attainment of manhood.[7] For a time there were interesting substitutes for the practice of head-hunting, such as nocturnal excursions to enemy villages, in which the aggressors would pull thatch from the roof of a house, thrust spears into the wall, and then act out the ceremonial cleansing of weapongs and persons.[8] The seizure of hair from individuals, and "rioting" between opposing clans, as occurred upon a number of occasions at Khonoma, were other alternatives.[9] Similarly the decline of the practice led to the decay of village fortifications, and the dismantling of the "khel" defences. More significantly, the establishment of peace had important consequences for the traditional structure of authority and social control. The suppression of head-hunting removed one of the most potent arguments in support of the authority of chiefs or elders. The existence of an enduring external threat had been a major factor contributing to the social cohesion and solidarity of both the clan and the village. As was described in Chapter II, the morung and the age-grade groupings were the main instruments of political socialization and social control in the traditional Naga village. Part of the raison d'etre of the morung, however, was its function as a guardhouse, and as a military institution

which would produce stalwart warriors to maintain the position of the clan and the village. Once head-hunting had been suppressed the morung declined, and its disciplinary effect weakened. The authority of the elders had been based largely upon decisions concerning the morung, or matters related to the conduct of war, and with the establishment of law and order it became easier for young men to question their influence.

On the other hand, the policy of administering the villages in the scheduled district through the mediation of traditional institutions tended to preserve certain social and political structures, although it also changed their context and significance. As in other colonial societies governed by a system of indirect rule the British imposed a two-tier system of authority upon the local population. At the village level traditional institutions were allowed to function according to the tenets of customary law. In the Naga Hills, the village councils retained a large measure of their importance, for despite the loss of sovereignty, they retained the right to deal with petty legal cases, both civil and criminal, and were encouraged to follow a procedure which approximated to traditional proceedings.[10] As Hutton observed:

> The policy of segregation, and of administration by tribal custom, has worked wonders, and in the Lhota Naga tribe at any rate, it has proved possible recently to obtain the election or selection by villages of a representative council, which, without any specific criminal or revenue powers, has become an instrument by which the tribe deals with many social questions, and has been enabled to tax itself...for the improvement of its internal communications and the education of members of the tribe.[11]

At the district, and subdivisional levels, political power remained with the District Commissioner and the Deputies, whose authority

was maintained by sepoy batallions stationed at the outposts of Kohima, Wokha and Mokokchung. The colonial officers would make periodical tours of the administered villages, collecting the hearth tax, settling disputes, and deciding important legal cases. Occasionally, as for example when Mills led an expedition against Pangsha in November and December 1936,[12] the District Commissioner would mount a punitive expedition against a village or group of villages that had broken the peace.

In general, however, direct intervention in village affairs by the British administrators was limited, and they preferred to work through local representatives or "middle men". In accordance with the general imperial policy of employing a "responsible" native as the main instrument of indirect rule, the administration engaged the services of the chief, or the clan headman (the gaonbura), depending upon the traditional local polity. J. P. Mills summarised the attitude of the colonial authorities:

> A chief has a duty towards his people, and a duty towards the government. By leading the one and advising the other he can prove himself a strong link in the chain of administration.[13]

Although these local luminaries were definitely seen by the British as a "bridge"[14] between the colonial and indigeneous systems, it is difficult to define them as true middlemen or brokers, for their position was circumscribed by the political system and their own status prior to the advent of the British. Among the Semas and the Changs the system of relying on chiefs worked efficiently, because it conformed to the traditional structure of power. Among the Aos and the democratic Angamis, on the other hand, since the status of the gaonbura was a creation of the colonial administration his position was much more ambiguous.

As a symbol of office the gaonbura was given a red blanket to wear, and he was expected to preside over the local councils and act as a go-between in the government's dealings with the population. One of the gaonbura's most significant duties was the collection of the hearth tax,[15] for which he was entitled to a 12½ per cent commission. The limits to the gaonbura's authority, however, are illustrated by a story of a former District Commissioner, Sir Charles Pawsey, who recalled that on numerous occasions the gaonbura of an Angami village would collect the hearth tax, deliver it to the British authorities and receive his commission, only to be told that it belonged to the village, and that he had better hand it back.[16] Among the democratic Angamis, therefore, the gaonbura remained a spokesman of the village, and little more. His position as the "Keeper of the Gap"[17] between the colonial and indigenous systems often worked to his disadvantage. Despite, and possibly because of, government attempts to raise the prestige of the gaonbura,[18] he was frequently viewed by his co-villagers as a colonial tool, and was treated accordingly. Being dependent upon the goodwill of both the colonial administration and the village population, the gaonbura was placed in an insecure and ambiguous position, especially when a conflict of interest developed between the local and district levels.

On the other hand, a definite increase in status accrued to the government interpreters, or "dobashis", who more exactly fulfilled the function of middlemen or brokers. Swartz observes that "it is only through the political middleman that articulation between incongruent political cultures can take place".[19] The dobashis acted as a bridge between the villages and the British colonial administrators, who were

unable to speak the local dialects. Their functions were more than those of mere interpreters, for the colonial administrators had a limited knowledge of traditional Naga law, and were compelled to rely upon the dobashis to settle the majority of disputes. Thus the dobashis acted as itinerant magistrates who would establish temporary courts in the villages, and settle minor cases through the "shouting matches" between the two parties.[20]

Since both the local population and the government were compelled to rely heavily upon the dobashis, they, rather than the chiefs, acted as the "Keepers of the Gap" between the two systems, often using their position to their own advantage. Thus they acted both as "bridges" between the two cultures in the integrative sense indicated by Barth, and also sustained, to their own advantage, the gaps between the two levels of administration in the sense indicated by Paine.[21] There is conflicting evidence as to the social origin of the dobashis, but it seems probable that they were of the second order ranking in traditional society, being for the most part the second, third, or forth sons of village notables.[22] By the 1920s they had to be literate as they were required to write reports on the cases they had judged, and thus they were more likely to be those who were from influential families and had distinguished themselves in the missionary school system.[23] The dobashis were very closely associated with British rule, as their status depended upon it, and after 1947 they lost all their former influence.[24]

(ii) Changes in the Economy

Although the Naga Hills were not subjected to the influx of white landowners and the imposition of the plantation system as occurred in

Assam, and in other parts of the Empire as widely spread as East Africa and New Guinea, nevertheless there were important disruptions and changes in the economy of the hills. Colonial conquest resulted in a new economic system based on a money currency[25] and the slow development of markets in the administrative centres. The infrastructure for greater contact between the villages and the tribes was created through the improvement of the means of communications. Bridlepaths were established, and later, roads were constructed, while bridges were built across streams and rivers where previously none had existed. Money currency was brought into use mainly because of the necessity of paying the tax on hearths which the colonial administration demanded. In addition, the existence of "bazaars" or market places at the principal outposts (Kohima and Mokokchung), created a rising demand for imported goods. These demands led to the formation of a wage labour force engaged in work of a temporary nature such as road building, maintenance and repair, and supply portering. Many Nagas sought employment as cooks, porters, houseboys, or road workers, in order to earn enough to fulfill their new fiscal obligations, while others worked on the tea gardens in Assam, and often became involved in disputes with the local overseers who were sometimes inclined to take advantage of the Nagas' difficulties in maintaining a law suit.[26] It is noteworthy that even though the development of the tea plantations in the plains led to more frequent labour migration and economic contact between the Nagas and the Assamese, there was no corresponding development of social interaction between the two groups, as the plains inhabitants regarded the Nagas as barbaric and socially inferior.

The demand for wage labour had an important effect upon migration

patterns within the hills,[27] and contributed towards the slow growth of an urban population (see Table 1). While the movement of whole villages

Table 1: Growth of Urban Population in the Naga Hills since 1901

	Kohima	Mokokokchung	Dimapur
1901	3,093	-	-
1911	2,423	-	-
1921	2,790	-	-
1931	2,759	-	-
1941	3,507	-	-
1951	4,125	-	-
1961	7,246	6,158	5,753

Calculated from Census of India, 1961, vol. XXIII Nagaland, Part II-A, General Population Tables, p. 61.

and the migration of whole groups of the population was prohibited, the pattern of migration shifted towards Kohima and the subdivisional headquarters. Not only were the towns the source of employment and a wage income, but they were important Christian centres, and the only places in which pupils from outlying villages could receive a secondary education. The statistics shown in Table 1 do not reveal the extent of the migration because the movements were of a temporary nature, and for the Census the migrants' village of origin was recorded. The census figures record mainly the administrative and military personnel, and do not show the existence of cooks, supply porters, and school children, who formed the temporary, shifting population. An important result of this new pattern of migration was the development of inter-tribal communication, contributing towards the recognition of a Naga identity vis-a-vis the British

administrators, the Gurkha battalion and foreign traders, who took up residence in the subdivisional headquarters.

Trade also played a large part in breaking down the boundaries between tribes, and in ameliorating the former feud-relationships which had existed between the villages. The existence of government officials and a large number of troops created a demand for supplies that was filled by both Naga and foreign traders. A number of Marwari and Bengali from the plains were allowed to conduct business at the bazaars in Kohima and Mokokchung, and later permanent businesses were opened there, and at Dimapur near the border with Assam.[28] The presence of Marwaris and Bengalis caused a great deal of tension, partly because of their skill and experience in business matters, and partly also because they did not acknowledge Naga customs and traditional ways of conducting trade and exchange agreements. As a result, a number of them found it convenient to employ Nagas as their salesmen, while others operated almost exclusively as money-lenders.

The frustrations endured by the small number of Nagas who became active in trade encouraged an unfavourable and even hostile attitude towards traders from Assam and Calcutta. Although the number of Nagas extensively engaged in trade was small they were, however, of crucial importance in the traditional hierarchy of power and influence in the hills. The two villages which participated most actively in trade were Kohima and Khonoma, the two most powerful groups in the western Naga hills prior to the British, both of which had established far-reaching tribute and raiding patterns. Khonoma, in particular, hoped to regain through trade much of the former wealth and influence it had lost as a

result of its defeat by the British.[29] It was notable for establishing the first still in the area, and its members carried on trade in a wide range of articles over an extensive territory. The father of A. Z. Phizo, the leader of the Naga separatist movement after 1950, was active as a commercial traveller and often travelled on foot along the Angami trade routes to Burma, and Assam, occasionally venturing as far as Calcutta.[30] Phizo himself was known in the 1930s as an enterprising and imaginative, if somewhat unsuccessful trader. At one time he was an agent of the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, and sold many policies which were never honoured, causing a great deal of resentment.[31] Upon another occasion Phizo set up a tyre-retreading store in Kohima, but was compelled to close the operation before it had become established as a result of Bengali merchants calling in their loans. Following the bankruptcy Phizo and his younger brother Keviyallay travelled to Burma, selling bibles and later managing groups of workers on the Rangoon docks before joining the invading Japanese armies.[32]

II. Changes Brought About by the Spread of Christianity

Whereas the policy of the British administration was both to minimize the effects of the exercise of their authority upon Naga society as far as possible, and to prevent the assimilation of the hill peoples by the culture of the plains, the mission societies which came into the hills were consciously determined to change the Naga way of life. Their aim was to "civilize" the tribes, and persuade them to abandon their animist beliefs. Confrontation with a different value-system led many Nagas to question the traditional way of life, their mode of existence, norms and values. Many of the important aspects of their belief system

were considered by the Baptist ministers to be either the trappings of "demon" worship, or evidence of "vice" and "immorality". Drinking Zu, laziness, the use of opium, promiscuity, Sabbath-breaking and the neglect of worship all came under the condemnation of the American evangelists, while at the same time a whole new pattern of ideas about their society was instilled into the early Christian Nagas. In effect, the Baptist missionaries were determined to induce the Nagas to give up their traditional pattern of cognition and belief, and transfer their loyalties to the service of the church. In place of the old ethical standards they meant to introduce a new socialization pattern based upon low-church Christianity with its stress upon the Protestant ethic of personal effort and individual responsibility in the eyes of God.

It is difficult to relate the spread of a puritan form of Christianity in the Naga Hills to a corresponding development of capitalism, for both the market economy and capital development in Nagaland were, and still remain, limited. Nevertheless, many of the transformative tendencies of the ethical structure of the Protestant religion had a telling impact upon the modernization process, and ultimately, political development in the Naga Hills. While they did not directly introduce the spirit of entrepreneurship, the missionaries tended on the other hand to emphasize the "ethic of austerity" and the notion of self-reliance which were important components of Weber's analysis of the social effects of the Protestant Transformation.[33] Eisenstadt emphasizes the broader transformative tendencies of the Protestant religion, and points out their relevance to the modernization process in countries which lack the institutional and economic developments that occurred in Western Europe prior

to the triumph of capitalism. Thus the Protestant ethic had an important structural impact, in a sense other than directly related to capitalism, and similarly the Protestant religion was an important source for new bases of the legitimation of authority, and for the development of institutions. Protestant Christianity was an extremely significant element in the modernization process in the Naga hills. It prompted changes in personal and collective motivation, the development of new roles, organizations and institutions, and the transformation of central symbols and spheres in society.

(i) Early Mission Policy

The first attempts to set up a mission in the hills occurred many years before the British had subdued the Angami territory. In 1838-39 the Reverend Miles Bronson made a tour of the Naga country to the east of Sibsagar, and in the spring of 1840 he and his wife established a mission at Namsang, a Konyak village which lived off the production and trade of salt.[35] Bronson hoped to convert the villagers by means of a combination of education both in reading and writing and by simultaneously preaching the message of the gospels. His writings anticipate the later missionary strategy in the Naga hills. "If they will receive books" he reported, "and allow their children to be gathered into schools and instructed in the Christian religion, the brahmins will be able to do very little, and the gospel will work its way into the very midst of the country. A successful beginning here will open the door to 21 other dependent villages near at hand, where the same dialect is spoken".[36] Bronson also demonstrated another aspect of missionary activity -- that of introducing the indigenous population to the technical advantages of western

civilization, when he assisted the Namsang Nagas in constructing a more efficient way of excavating salt from the local brine wells. As far as the Nagas themselves were concerned, he saw in them a more fruitful matrix in which the seeds of Christianity could be sown than in the caste-bound population of the plains. In March 1837 he had noted that: "I doubt not, the gospel will be found on trial to be eminently adapted to these people. In fact I regard them as much more promising than caste-bound opium-eating Assamese".[37] Later he completed his assessment of the Nagas, remarking that: "Among the Hill tribes surrounding the valley of Assam, the Nagas occupy the most conspicuous and important place...in their religious belief, which though rude and simple, comprehends the doctrines of a Supreme Divinity, of the existence of other spiritual beings, and of a future state".[38]

Lamentably for the mission cause Bronson and his family were stricken with sickness, and suffering from constant fevers they were compelled to abandon the mission after only eight months in the village.[39]

For a long period no further evangelical work was done in the hills, but in 1851 an Ao Naga was converted by the Reverend S. W. Whiting at the Sibsagar mission in Assam. Following this success, Godhula, an Assamese worker of the Rev. E. W. Clark, who was stationed at Amguri, was persuaded to learn the vernacular of the Aos, and in November 1872 he brought 9 more members of that tribe to be converted at the church in Sibsagar. This sudden explosion of interest encouraged Reverend Clark to enter the hills and set up a mission at Molungyimchen in the Ao country, and a few years later, in 1878, the Reverend C. D. King was persuaded to set up a mission in the Angami area, initially establishing himself at

Chumukedima, but moving to Kohima once the British had set up their headquarters there.[40]

The Baptist mission reports and British government documents reflect a variance between the early policy of the church ministers towards the task of bringing Christianity to the hills, and its development around the turn of the century.[41] The attitude of the church became less fundamentalist, and more that of a provider of social benefits, while the whole emphasis of the missionary effort shifted towards the entrenchment of Christian culture and values. At first to be sure, the attempts of the missionaries to convert the Nagas had centred upon education as part of the evangelistic effort. Their efforts were engaged, however, in claiming as many true converts to the faith as possible[42] and were characterized by a high level of intolerance of "pagan" customs by both the American missionaries, and the first Naga evangelists.[43] Later firmer emphasis was placed upon planting Christian culture more solidly and more permanently in the hills, and to this end greater stress was given to education, both primary, secondary, and technical, and to medical services.

From the beginning, as Bronson indicated, education was seen as the means by which to win converts, for it was considered that until the Nagas could read the gospels for themselves, no lasting and sincere conversions would take place. In this they were liberally aided by the British administration which desired the spread of education amongst some of the Nagas, and probably recognized its beneficial effect upon the maintenance of law and order. Bronson himself had been given 500 rupees by Captain Jenkins for the benefit of schools among the Nagas.[44] Similarly,

in 1881 the Rev. C. D. King reported that:

> The inspector of schools, the highest educational officer in Assam, suggests that the mission, as soon as they are able to undertake the work, should be liberally aided. He proposes that stipends be paid to Naga lads who it may be hoped, will in time become schoolmasters, who can be sent to outlying villages to establish schools. The great difficulty, he thinks will be to obtain the services of teachers who know Naga.[45]

In the same letter King recognizes the vital importance of education in the work of converting the Nagas. "Preach the gospel is the first requirement of our commission", he maintains, "and in this the government cannot be our ally; but whoever controls the educational work among the Nagas will have it in his power greatly to help or hinder all evangelistic work".[46]

(ii) The Creation of Naga Tribal Languages

Since the Nagas had no written language it was necessary to create one, and because of the lack of similarity between each tribal language the missionaries were compelled to devote a considerable portion of their efforts to reducing each language to writing. The first Naga group to receive a literature were the Aos. Of their two languages the Chongli dialect was chosen, and was written with the Roman letter rather than the Bengali script which was used for a time at Impur.[47] The reasons for choosing the European form were outlined by Rev. Clark:

> The English alphabet with the Italian sound of the letters is best (I) The use of it helps in acquiring English (2) The missionary needs to learn only the language of the people among whom he labors; he is not forced to acquire at least a smattering of another Indian language namely, that from which the alphabet was taken. For several years my mind has been settling down to the conviction that the English alphabet, with the Italian sound of the letters is the

> best we can give these hill tribes who have no such alphabet of their own. Have schools in such villages as will help to maintain them; the teachers preach the gospel, and teach children (and others who may wish) to read the gospel in their own tongue. Take the best out of these village schools, and teach them English. Many of these English-educated boys will become teachers and preachers. These preachers will talk to their people in their own language, and they will be able to draw from the whole English Bible, and from the best of English sacred literature, to enrich their discourses and educate their people.[48]

The missionaries worked assiduously at the translations, and their output was prolific. During the first nine years of his stay at the Ao village of Molung, the Rev. Clark wrote a Dictionary, a Primer, a Catechism, a Life of Joseph, a scripture book of about 116 pages, a Hymn Book, and a translation of the gospels of Matthew and John.[49] This long and difficult task was continued, notably by Dr. Rivenburg who moved to Kohima in 1887, and by the Rev. Perrine in Wokha and Ukhrul, in the Lhota and Tangkhul Naga areas. By 1930 the Angamis had received a New Testament, a number of school books, and an extensive secondary literature. The Lhotas had received a grammar and a vocabulary from Dr. Witter, and a primer from Mr. Perrine, two Gospels, several school books and religious pamphlets, and the Tangkhuls had received a complete translation of the New Testament.[50]

At first the education given in the tribal languages was limited in scope and narrow in content. As in many other mission situations education was viewed as a means of transmitting dogma and gaining converts, often resulting in the formation of narrow and inflexible Naga Christians whose attitudes exacerbated conflict within the villages.[51] In the long run, however, the creation of written tribal languages had an enormous

impact upon socialization patterns in the Naga hills. It not only formed the basis for the spread of literacy, and hence exposed the young Naga to socialization patterns that were not based almost exclusively on the extended family, but it also assisted the breakdown of linguistic barriers between villages, and the formation of pan-tribal identification. A single dialect had to be chosen by the missionaries as the foundation of the new literature. Often this was not the most appropriate dialect,[52] nor was it always linguistically correct,[53] but it did facilitate the growth of communication between people from distant villages, and made them more accessible to new ideas and values.[54]

Concomitant with the creation of Naga tribal languages was the teaching of English at an early age for use as a universal language among all the tribes. Before the arrival of the British "nagamese", a pidgin Assamese, had been used as the lingua franca amongst people trading in the hills, but it constituted a jumble of Assamese and Naga words, and was unintelligible outside the hills and the immediate border areas. Literacy in English, on the other hand, enabled those few who received an education to absorb large amounts of information and a great assortment of ideas and values. Although the tribal languages were used in primary education, and, in part, at the Middle-English schools, instruction in English was part of the curriculum from a very early age, and at the secondary schools, as well as at the Christian colleges at Jorhat and Calcutta, English was the only medium of instruction.[55] Education, as in the language of the authorities was highly sought after, particularly after the 1920s when the social advantages of modernization had become more apparent. Literacy in English was seen as the means to obtain a

government post (a "sitting and eating job" as it was called), which entailed an increase in the status of the occupier.

(iii) The Development of Christianity

Yet both Christianity and the spread of education were slow in taking root in the Naga hills in comparison with other tribal areas of Assam, such as in particular the Khasi-Jaintia hills and the Lushai hills (see Table 2). For many years the traditional culture and beliefs were

Table 2: Progress of Literacy 1881-1931

Males of all ages, 10 and over.

	No. of literate per mille.					
Year	1931	1921	1911	1901	1891	1881
District						
Naga Hills	43	35	22	34	22	14
Garo Hills	62	43	30	21	19	8
Khasi and Jaintia	169	149	113	108	63	34
Lushai	283	166	110	71	--	--

Calculated from Census of India 1931, Assam, Subsidiary Table VI, p. 164.

stoutly adhered to even by many Nagas who held no particular antipathy towards the missionaries or the Christian religion. This was especially the case among the Angamis, the majority of whom resolutely resisted the new religion until the late 1930s (see Table 3). The Angamis were noted for their conservatism as well as their opposition to any form of interference in their lives, and while it seems that many were not adverse to Christian beliefs, most were reluctant to give up traditional habits which the American Baptist Ministers regarded as sinful. Abstention from Zu drinking and greater fidelity in marriage were two conditions that

Table 3: Differential Spread of Religious Belief Among the Naga Tribes, Naga population of Naga Hills District, Manipur, and Cacher Hills. 1931.

Tribe	Hindu	Tribal (Animist)	Christian
Naga Total	2,355	239,265	26,682
Angamis	-	48,655	584
Ao	-	20,517	12,258
Chang	-	588	86
Kabui	-	18,571	260
Kacha*	-	7,178	18
Kalyo-Kengyn	-	580	-
Konyak	-	8,491	2
Khoirao	-	2,665	147
Lhota	-	17,329	909
Memi (Mao)	-	16,706	51
Zemi	1,463	8,541	264
Phom	-	136	70
Rengma	-	6,096	233
Sangtam	-	4,533	75
Sema	17	29,068	8,360
Tangkhul	-	25,631	3,100
Yimsunger	-	104	14

Calculated from Census of India 1931, Assam, Appendix III, p. 264.

many Angamis, and many Nagas from other tribes, were not willing to commit themselves to. In the case of Nagas who had already been converted to the new religion, this also led to a great deal of hypocrisy.

It has also been suggested that the Angamis resisted conversion for the following reasons: because they were rich; because they possessed a very close-knit, democratic social organization; because of the unwillingness to give up Zu; because of a higher intensity of anti-foreign attitudes; and because the Angamis possessed a very high degree of self-respect which included a pride in those customs and traditional institutions that the missionaries were condemning as "pagan".[56] Even among the Aos, who were the first to accept Christianity in large numbers, Christian "revivals" were often temporary, and reversion to traditional customs and religious practices was common. In his report of 1896 the Reverend E. W. Clark hinted at the transient effect of religious revivals in the Ao Christian area before the turn of the century:

> I have remained at Molung the past year rather than move up to Impur, partly because trained pundits are obtainable at Molung, and partly to render some assistance to the Assamese preacher in trying to revive the church here. The Lord has visited his people at Molung, and it is hoped they have learned that they must walk carefully before Him, if they would have His presence and blessing. There was a similar revival in 1885 during the time the Rivenburgs were here, when twenty five or thirty were baptized.[57]

Among the many difficulties which the missionaries faced was that of being associated with the foreign conquerors and tax collectors. From Ukrul in the Tangkhul Naga area, where a mission was established in 1894, the Reverend Pettigrew reported that:

> It has been no small task during the past-year to make these village people, and Ukrul in

> particular, understand that it was for their good the missionary had come amongst them. They had only been used to European officials passing through the country collecting revenue, and they naturally thought that we may have come for the same purpose, and for a long time confidence was hard to gain, and is even so now.[58]

(iv) The Creation of a New Elite

The social advantages of Christianity, such as the opportunity to receive an education and access to medical services, were of decisive importance in persuading many Nagas to be converted.[59] The rapid conversion of the Semas, for example, was clearly related to their perception of the benefits to be received from Christianity (see Table 3. Serious work among the Semas did not begin until the mid-1920s). This did not conflict with the missionaries' policy of employing education as the primary method of converting the Nagas. An important aspect of this policy was the implantation of an 'ethic of austerity' and an attitude of self-reliance in the Christian population. As the Reverend Perrine argued:

> What we want to do is simply prepare the Christians for the performance of duties that must fall to them. Another thing we desire to impress (a vital principle), both by our educational system and otherwise, is, that in the truest sense this is not our work, but their own, and that they must do the work not for us, but for the Master. We have tried, therefore, to make the school self-supporting so far as possible, not only in the matter of money, but in everything else. We placed in their hands, so far as it was wise, all the work. Their decisions of policy were right. They disciplined themselves, and did it with much better effect than if the Sahib had rendered the punishment. This was the easier to do, however, inasmuch as without exception the scholars sought the school, and not the school the scholars. ...They did their own business, and looked after the interest of the school. Thus their interest was aroused and sustained. I provided them with work, so they attended school in the forenoon, and in the

> afternoon worked for their living. Thus they were independent; the unworthy ones were kept out, and the evils of the stipend system were avoided.[60]

As the above passage indicates, the schools were the means by which the Christian pastors were able to inculcate new motivational factors, and new attitudes to work and discipline. In this restricted sense Weber's "Protestant ethic" was relevant to the modernization process in the Naga hills.

It was also by means of education that the missionaries were able to mould and fashion a small elite of Naga preachers, who acted as a bridge between traditional Naga society and 'modern' Christian values, beliefs and ideas about the structure of society. As the missionaries foresaw, the transmission of new ideas and Christian ways of thinking to a small body of educated Nagas was the most effective way of passing them on to the population as a whole. Once the church had begun to collect members the young evangelists were also able to provide leadership, and they were consciously trained by the Baptist minister so that they might continue the evangelical work among their own people with as little assistance from the missionaries as possible. Thus they were educated in Christian doctrine, and given the task of preaching, and organizing services and church meetings. As early as February 1897 Mrs. M. M. Clark noted that at the Mohung mission "we listen to our young Naga pastor Kilep conducting the Sunday morning services".[61] A few years later there were glowing reports of "Bennie", a young Naga preacher who obtained a degree in 1913, and became one of the first Naga doctors.[62] Yet while the first generation of young Naga evangelists formed the basis for more extensive proselytization, it was largely from the 1920s onwards that the

Naga pastors began to assume part of the leadership of the church.

(v) The Introduction of New Forms of Organization

From the early years the church had offered training in "western" forms of organization and leadership, while at the same time traditional Naga institutions were utilized and given new meaning. The morung, for instance, was transformed into Christian dormitories for both boys and girls, and new patterns of socialization were inculcated into the young Christian through neo-traditional and therefore familiar institutions.

Experience was given in the organization of people on a tribal basis at the "Mundangs" or Church Associational Meetings. In formal participation on church committees, the missions both offered new ideas about human organization (invention), and provided the means by which these ideas became part of the community (diffusion). As part of their Christian education Naga Christians learnt to devise programmes for continuing the evangelical work, for the regulation of services, and for the Tribal Associational meetings. In 1900 Mrs. Clark sent back to the United States the following report of:

> our Naga Associational meeting of a few weeks ago. I wish you could have seen and heard. They did just as well as people at home in presiding, discussing topics, and in their behaviour generally. There were 190 delegates from different villages. At one session, not an unusual one, no one was expecting to be counted, there were 385 present.[63]

By 1914 the situation had changed enormously. The 100th Annual report records the meeting of the Ao Naga churches on December 13-16th, 1913, at Jabu:

> Ten hundred and fifty visitors came from the other villages, and when 84 members of the local church were added to this number, there was a total of

> more than 1,100 souls.... (The writer of the report says that) he was agreeably surprised to see the methodical way in which the Nagas carried on their deliberations.... To prepare for the large company of 1,135 the local church performed 720 days' labour and paid out about 700 rupees. One half this amount was reimbursed the church by the Association. The Meetings were all presided over by the Nagas themselves, and were dignified and helpful.[64]

Besides exposing the Nagas to new forms of organization and management at the tribal level, the Christian institution also represented new instruments of social control. The Christian dormitories and committees, and the schools at the village level, and the 'Mundangs' at the tribal level replaced the morung as the main unit of socialization. They imposed "Christian" discipline but also exposed the Naga to contact with a greater number of people and a wider range of influences.

Although success had only really been gained among the Aos, (and to a lesser extent the Lhothas and Tangkhuls) by 1914, the period just before the war was a turning point in the work of the missionaries. Despite the tribal bias of Naga Christians they had nevertheless gained a firm foothold in the hills and were training many young Nagas, who would be able to continue the work. In 1915 the Rev. W. Dowd wrote that:

> After 7 years' absence from the field we reached Impur Jan. 22nd, 1915. These years of absence were filled with changes. The churches have increased greatly in number and influence. The membership has more than doubled. Now there are Christians in more than two thirds of the Ao villages, and in several Lhota villages. The schools have kept up, and the number of village schools under the mission greatly increased. Many have learned to read in the village schools, and some have been prepared as evangelists and teachers in the training school.[65]

The role of the young Aos was of great importance in providing teaching and leadership, and spreading Christianity into the hills. In

1926 they were given the entire territory of the Sema tribe as their field of work,[66] and were so successful in the area that by 1930 about 3,500 Semas had been baptized[67] (see Table 3).

Once a strong membership had been formed amongst the Semas, the evangelical work was handed over to them, but as only the younger men had received an education, it was to them that the task of organizing the church was given. In the 1934 Annual Report it was noted that "the leadership is totally in the hands of the young men, as they are the ones who have received a small amount of education".

As soon as the Semas were able to take the responsibility for evangelizing upon themselves, the young Ao Naga pastors moved on to other tribes. In the 1937 Annual Report it was recorded that: "The work among the Konyaks and the Sangtams is missionary work carried on by Ao Naga evangelists who are reaching out into the regions beyond the border".[68] Similarly they began the work among the Changs and were also successful amongst the members of that tribe.[69]

Once the evangelical work had been taken over by the Nagas themselves the increase in the number of conversions was tremendous. While the Census of 1941 indicates that 34,000 had been baptized, by 1951 that number had increased to 98,068 or 45% of the population of the western tribes (to which the figures appertain). The construction of the church from within Naga society, and by Nagas themselves meant that there was less of a conflict between tradition and modernity, "alien" and local. Christianity became a dynamic force in the Naga hills, bringing experience of new forms of organization along with new values and aspirations. It is notable that Christianity became one of the pillars of ethnic identification in the period after the II World War, and continues to define the

Naga's relationship with his neighbours. The gradual adoption of Christianity into Naga was not without its difficulties, however, and the early evangelical period was rent by the tensions and difficulties of contact with the new religion.

III. Social Conflict and Opposition to Change

(i) Conflict within the Villages

During the early evangelical period the gradual spread of Christianity through the hills led to severe conflict within Naga society, for the acceptance of the new faith by sections or portions of a village population led to a serious undermining of village solidarity. Not only were the Christians challenging the authority of traditional leaders, replacing it in many cases with deference to the missionary on their guide in spiritual affairs, but many early Christians aggressively attacked time-honoured values, and the traditional system of beliefs and ritual. The early intolerance of both the American Baptist Missionaries and the first Naga evangelists played a large part in aggravating the schism between old and new beliefs and patterns of thought.[70] Similarly, the refusal of the two antagonistic groups to cooperate had the effect of undermining institutions which were essential to the social and economic survival of the village. The Christians, for instance, refused to support the stone-dragging and megalithic ceremonials, and in some instances even destroyed religiously important existing monuments, regarding them as "sinful" and "idolatrous".[71] At the same time they refused to contribute towards the "pagan" feasts of merit, or to observe the village gennas, and pay the gennaburas for their services.[72] Moreover the traditional pride in the territorial integrity and physical structure

of the village was undermined: instead of the megalithic stones and other traditionally important monuments, the church buildings became the pride of the Christian sector of the village,[73] and there was greater intercourse and social identification with Christians of neighbouring villages than with pagan members of the same clan.

In most instances, the non-Christians perceived that the outcome of such attitudes would be catastrophic; the "spirits would get angry" and bring death or sickness to the village. Such a hostile attitude led in many cases to outbursts of violence, to attacks upon Christians, to their expulsion and even murder.[74] This resulted in several instances in the disintegration of villages and the formation of "Christian" villages by the expelled or oppressed Christian population.

On the other hand, in many cases the Christians were tolerated, especially after the early 1920s when the government published a list of traditional activities to which the Christians were supposed to contribute, as well as those for which they could not be compelled to make an offering.[75]

(ii) Attitude of the Chiefs -- Effects Upon Traditional Status and Power

The size of a village greatly affected its power and wealth, and hence in many villages especially those in the Sema area where the chiefs were constantly looking to augment their patrimony, Christians were accepted. In some cases, especially where the authority of the chiefs and headmen came into conflict with that of the Baptist Ministers, it happened that the chiefs themselves adopted Christianity as a means of maintaining the traditional power structure.

Hutton writes that:

> The presence of officials and missionaries has reduced the prestige of the natural leaders of the people. Often we may see the pastor supplanting the chief and encroaching on his prerogatives and power, while we may observe, as the unedifying result of this, chiefs becoming pastors in order to get the power spiritual and so regain their power temporal.[76]

He advances a number of reasons for this accommodation:

> The missionary, too, has contributed to this (disintegration of the village community), and although he has often had much to give in exchange which has not been without its material and economic value to the primitive tribes, his influence has certainly tended to destroy the social unity of the whole.... A Breakdown of the communal life of any tribe, of course, rendered it far weaker in its struggle against such adverse influences as, for instance, forest laws interfering with its method of life.[77]

Thus there was an ambiguity in certain aspects of the modernizing process in the hills. Rather than involving a complete rejection of old ideas and standards it became a means to an end. For many of the Aos and poorer Nagas (such as the Semas) it offered a new chance, while for many chiefs and headmen it became a means to maintain the traditional structure of power, and pattern of authority, and to maintain the position of the more influential clans.

On the other hand, the adoption of Christianity did involve the rejection of many of the traditional lifestyles, much to the annoyance of anthropologists like Hutton and Mills. In their lifestyle and mannerisms the early Christians imitated the missionaries as far as possible, responding to the exhortation, often proclaimed from the pulpit, that they must "put aside the old man, put on the new". Dress and appearance were the most conspicuous aspects of the change, often resulting in an

unconscious parody of western fashions.[78] For the Christians, frock, coats and long dresses were a symbol of modernization and of adherence to the new religion; they indicated changing values and standards of achievement motivation.

(iii) Conflict Between Missionaries and Administrators

J. P. Mills and Dr. Hutton often expressed their regrets and aired their criticisms over the abandonment of traditional articles of clothing and the adoption of western dress by Christian Nagas, but it was a symptom, a secondary characteristic, of the attitudinal changes that were occurring among sectors of the population at the time. The reasons for their condemnation of changes that involved shifting ideas of status and achievement, as much as the exhortations of the missionaries, are perhaps to be found in the conservatism prevalent among anthropologists at the time, and the desire to conserve the unique aspects of traditional cultures. At one point J. P. Mills even prohibited the wearing of western dress, and upon one occasion came close to throwing the young A. Z. Phizo in gaol for his wearing of western dress in Kohima.[79] Sir Charles Pawsey rather scathingly put Mills' conflict with the Baptist missionaries and their influence in the hills down to his Anglican upbringing, and his dislike of "long-nosed Psalm singers".[80] To a certain extent, the conflict between the British administrators and the missionaries in their policies towards the tribes added to the confusion of the Nagas, and exacerbated the tensions between Christians and non-Christians. With the political authorities supporting one view of the world, and the Christian authorities supporting another, it is likely that many Nagas viewed the situation with considerable bewilderment and suspicion.

(iv) The Effects of Economic Change

Along with the spread of Christianity, the changing economic system had important effects upon the structure of Naga society. Firstly, it led to a concentration of wealth, and to the growth of a landless class in some areas, although the restraining ties of kinship, and the legal isolation of the Naga Hills district tended to reduce its impact. J. H. Hutton noted that "on the economic side...the introduction of coin into the Naga Hills in Assam and its greatly increased circulation has led not only to much indebtedness, but to the growth of a landless class, and the concentration of wealth".[81]

Much of the early "individual" wealth, however, was derived from clan resources, and those (such as Phizo) who became entrepreneurs generated intra-clan jealousies, rivalries, and debts, thus increasing social conflict and eroding traditional social solidarity.

Whether derived from clan or individual resources, those with control over wealth began to employ money in a new fashion, which conformed to more generalized ideas of usury: "Loans in former days were given in grain or in cattle and to repay them the debtor must till the land and grow rice or breed cattle, but to repay a loan in cash he must sell something -- and it is generally his land, and after the sale of that -- he can rarely if ever recover his old independence".[82]

This was not a problem confined to the Nagas, but a problem which affected most adivasis in India, and which indeed left the Nagas less scathed than other groups.[83] In defence of his argument in favour of greater protection for the tribal people, for example, Hutton cites a quotation from an Indian lawyer defending the adivasis in Bihar:

> The British system of law and administration has further tended to impair the social solidarity of the tribes and has weakened the authority of the social heads...and the respect they formerly commanded.... Until recently, when rules against alienation of ancestral lands were promulgated by Government, the ancient tribal custom against such alienation, alien Hindus and Mohammedans were admitted to the villages, resulting in the further disintegration of the old village community.[84]

While the Inner Line regulation prevented the influx of Hindus and Mohammedans, the introduction of a new economic system had other results in the Naga hills. For instance, Hutton noted the impact upon marriage customs:

> In the Lhota Naga tribe, for instance, marriage in the old days implied the payment for a wife in kind. The suitor started by working in the fields of his father-in-law to be, and after marriage completed payment for the wife gradually in the form of cattle or of grain set aside from his annual harvest. A large quantity of grain at one time is much less acceptable since it involves storage room and the probability of its deterioration before consumption...but the possibility of getting final payment in a single sum of cash appeals to both parties, the parent because he can conveniently thus hypothecate the future without risk of his daughter dying before all is paid, the suitor because he can avoid the restrictions of personal service and receives possession of the girl whom he can take off to his own house, often in another village, at once. The result has been a steadily growing change from the practice of marrying adult towards that of marrying immature brides. At the same time an excess of males over females in the tribe, combined with the practice of polygamy it is possible for the richer men to secure more than their share of the younger women, thus causing a competitive race on potential brides.[85]

Both Hutton and Mills condemned other consequences of economic changes in the hills. They observed the destructive impact of the rising level of wants and expectations upon social cohesion and traditional patterns of status and authority. Hutton remarked that "tailored clothes,

bicycles, sewing machines, lamps, and the minor gadgets of civilization which, once familiar, soon become necessities, but cannot be made at home like the household utensils and the agricultural implements of primitive life. Money is needed to buy these gadgets, and the way of living must be changed to earn it".[86] Similarly J. P. Mills noticed the more socially mutilating effects of external influences upon Naga society. The spread of disease and outbreaks of decimating epidemics, prostitution and addiction to foreign-made alcohol were seen as socially disastrous.[87] "Wherever there is a motorable road" -- commented Hutton, "the imports include diseases, gambling and prostitution".

(v) The Zeliangrong "Messianic" Movement

Such strains and tensions produced by the relatively sudden impact of exogeneous sources of change on Naga society were underlined by the Zeliangrong Naga areas of Manipur state. The movement was based upon the "Heraka cult", a derivative of the traditional religion, employing "western" symbols and forms, developed by Jadonang, a Rongmei Naga from the village of Kambiron.[89] Constraints of time and space do not permit us to explore the ramifications of the Jadonang movement (and no study has been made of it as a millenarian cult, before), but for the Naga Hills it was an unusual and unprecedented reaction to the intrusion of external, modernizing forces. The movement begun by Jadonang was both political and religio-social in content. It was partly motivated by the relative oppression and feeling of insecurity of the Zeliangrong Nagas, as well as their isolation from many of the social and material benefits of Christianity.

On the other hand there are indications that the movement was

also partly a reaction against the challenge of westernization in the form of Christianity, demonstrating the ambiguity of the conflict between primordial ties and the desire for material and social advancement that arises in traditional societies exposed to rapid influences of exogeneous change.[90]

The Zeliangrong Nagas, who are made up of the Zemi, Liangmei and Rongmei tribes (also known as the Kabui and Kacha Nagas), were first brought under British rule in 1891 following the annexation of Manipur. Because of the Hindu Manipuris antagonism to Christianity there was no missionary activity in Manipur until after 1891, and even then Christianity did not reach the Zeliangrong area until a few years before the "Jadonang" movement. In the 1925 Annual Baptist Mission Reports, Reverend Pettigrew recounted that "The North-west area has given us the first fruits among the Kabui Nagas this year. Half of a large, important village came over last year during the revival, and this year 58 baptisms, a separation from the heathen village, and an organized church have resulted".[91]

The villages around Kambiron, Jadonang's native village and therefore the centre of the movement, had seen no construction of schools, nor a corresponding "westernization" and development of their language and culture. They had not been exposed to many of the material improvements (such as education and medical services) that had accompanied the evangelical work at Impur, Kohima, and Ukhrul. Yet there are indications that they were beginning to feel threatened by evangelical work in the area. In their contact with traders, the British authorities, and on trips to Imphal, by the late 1920s the Zeliangrong had come into contact

with many foreign influences, and many had begun to realize their relative impoverishment. When the hardships brought about by a number of bad harvests, the state of tension induced by Kuki attacks and raids during the rebellion of 1915-1917, as well as the afflictions of having to pay house-tax, and having to suffer the excesses committed by the Lambus (tax-collectors) are added to this, there is little wonder that the Zeliangrong were seething with discontent, and looking for relief.[92]

The bulk of the appeal of Jadonang's movement was thus to be found in the attempt to resacralize traditional political power. Thus he promised to establish a Zeliangrong Raj, a "millenium" on earth where the Zeliangrong would live in complete independence in a kingdom of plenty.[93] Many of Jadonang's actions involved an ambivalent attitude towards change. He promised to throw off the shackles of British domination and establish a Zeliangrong kingdom, and pledged to revive the traditional Zeliangrong religion and culture, but at the same time many of the insignia and symbols of the new movement were derived from western civilization and the very forms of modernization which the Zeliangrong seemed to be rejecting. Jadonang himself, for example, often wore western dress, an overcoat and a hat or Balaclava cap, and, in imitation of the British, he used to ride upon a brown pony. On one occasion he was arrested for refusing to dismount or remove his cap in the presence of the S.D.O., Mr. Booth, in Tamenlong.[94] Similarly, Jadonang's attempts to revive the Zeliangrong culture resulted in a trimming and improvement on the traditional religion and customs.[95] It involved indeed an attempt to "modernize" the indigenous culture from within and to adapt it to cope with the pressure of external sources of change. In an obvious parallel

with the Christian mission's development of written languages, Jadonang developed his own "scripts", and later his followers were taught from the Jadonang "Lairik" (Book). Large assemblies of people were gathered together and prayers were held, while pilgrimages were made to traditional shrines and holy places.[96]

Throughout this discontent and social conflict generated by the processes of change occurring in the surrounding hills there was a thread of political dissatisfaction, and a desire to throw off the new authority and return to the old. This was apparent among the Angamis, whose power had, however, been reduced, but amongst the Zeliangrong the desire for independence from exogeneous forces found a shortlived expression in Jadonang's movement.

A central objective of the movement was to achieve the political integration of the Zeliangrong people into a unified kingdom, once social unity had been achieved through the "modernization" of the traditional religion. A common expression at the time was that "The Meiteis have their king, the white men have a king, the Indians also have kings of their own: why should we not have our own king?"[97]

The movement, however, was suppressed even before it had been converted into actual revolt. In 1930 Jadonang decreed that house-tax was to be paid to the British authorities in that year, but that in 1931-1932 it was to be paid to him, and that an attack was to be made upon the Kukis in that year.[98] Before that time, however, he was arrested by the British authorities for the murder of four Manipuri traders, in March 1930. He was summarily tried and sentenced to death on 13th June 1931.[99] For some years the movement was continued by his disciple, the young girl

Gaidiliu who was renowned for her singing and dancing, as well as by a number of other "mediums". On 17th October 1932 Gaidiliu was captured at the village of Pulomi, and imprisoned, and while the movement continued there was no open opposition to the colonial authorities.[100]

IV. Impact of the Second World War

Although the consequences of change brought about by the exogeneous sources of the British administration, and the work of the American Baptist Missionaries, were important and far-reaching, the diffusion of such changes was slow, and many regions had been affected but little. In contrast the Second World War brought enormous and cataclysmic changes within the space of a very short time period. The war brought home to the vast majority of the inhabitants of the hills the terrors and devastation, as well as the material wealth and organizational possibilities of modern civilization. From their isolated position, separated not only from Assam but also from events in the rest of the subcontinent, the Nagas were thrust into the conflict between two powerful armies. Their homes and fields were destroyed, and they were suddenly compelled to relate to a new social and political environment.

The most immediate effects upon the lives of the Nagas were the dissolution of the structure of administration in the hills, and its replacement by a military command and supply commisariat, and the complete disruption of all normal life in many areas. In Kohima not one house was left standing after the Japanese invasion, and in the district as a whole over 12,000 houses were destroyed.[101] Furthermore all the timber and thatch normally available for replacing a proportion of the house accommodation each year, was destroyed. All the pigs and most of

the cattle in the hills were destroyed, and as the spring invasion prevented the people from planting rice, there was no crop in 1944. Altogether it was calculated that over 100,000 Nagas were in need of urgent relief.[102]

(i) Acceleration of Changes in the Economic Structure

Even before the Japanese attack in the spring of 1944 and the sieges of Kohima and Imphal, great changes occurred as a result of the global conflict. Since the supply routes to Field-Marshal Alexander's retreating armies passed through the hills, many Nagas were employed as porters and labourers. In the spring of 1942 Naga labourers played the major role in keeping the Tamu road open for the armies falling back to the Indian defence perimeter, while many other Nagas joined the Assam Rifles and the Assam Regiment.[103] The intense military activity and the conveyance of supplies involved a local pouring out of large sums of money over a period of years in the form of payments to labourers and the purchase of produce. This disbursement accelerated the introduction of money currency, led to a huge increase in the wage labour force, and hastened the changes in indigeneous standards of wealth, shifting the enjoyment of wealth away from those with plenty of land and cattle towards those in receipt or earnings in cash.[104] Like the periods following the Abor expedition of 1912, when a number of Nagas worked as carriers, and the return of the Naga Labour Corps from France in 1918, there was a rapid increase in expenditure and wild inflation. This time, however, it was on a far greater scale.

(ii) Changes in the Structure of Deference and Status

During the war the first signs of an appearance of social classes, and the conflicts between the poor and the wealthy, became apparent. There occurred a permanent change in the relative positions of the wage-earner and the producer, resulting in a shift of influence and social leadership even in the remote villages, from the elders towards a younger generation of leaders.[105] Not only the educated, but also those who were able to undertake hard physical labour discovered that they could choose their means of livelihood, and it was no longer dependent upon the clan or the village. Others found their livestock destroyed and their fields razed and devastated. For their subsistence they were not able to rely upon their clan or fellow villagers, as in some areas the entire surrounding region was laid waste. Instead they were dependent upon the distribution of goods by the administration, which increasingly came to be viewed as a replacement for the clan as a source of aid and assistance. This became clear in the rising demands and expectations which emerged in the Naga population at the end of the war. The British administration had decided to construct a modern hospital at Kohima in return for their service to the Allied cause during the conflict. The Nagas themselves, however, declared that this was not enough, and demanded that they should at least be given a college of higher education, or some such institution.[106]

(iii) Attitudinal Changes

The war had important moral and psychological effects upon the Nagas. One of the most important of these was the effect upon attitudes to violence. The conflict between the two major powers heightened the Nagas' awareness of the potential of violence and the power that could be

obtained through a knowledge of modern military skills and technology. Indeed, during and after the war many Nagas began to view modernization in terms of military capability,[107] and a number collected the large number of arms left behind by the Japanese and stashed them away in secret dumps in the Jungle.

(iv) Towards Partition

Another important consequence of the war was that it compelled the Nagas to consider their position with regard to external affairs. Now they were forced to conceive of themselves as part of a larger whole, and to reflect upon their position, and the direction in which the raj was heading. At this time many Nagas were aware that the British were likely to leave India at the end of the war. During the conflict members of the Naga Club had formed an organization, known at first as the Naga Hills District Tribal Council,[108] which included a number of important chiefs and headmen representing the various tribes, but also a number of dobashis, and educated Nagas. Its initial aim was to foster the welfare and social aspirations of the Nagas,[109] and to this extent it was assisted and encouraged by the District Commissioner, Mr. C. R. Pawsey. The question of the political objectives of the Naga people was considered, and before the independence of India its main aims were to achieve local autonomy for the hills within the Province of Assam, and to train the people for self-government. Thus it encouraged the Tribal Councils already set up by individual tribes, and assisted others in the administration of their own local affairs, initiating discussions about possible reforms. In order to publicize its objectives it published a newsheet, the Naga Nation.[110] By the end of the war, therefore, the small

elite had begun to appreciate an "ethnic" Naga identity, and had also begun to transmit that idea to the Naga population as a whole. Politics was seen in ethnic terms, but it had not yet developed into the virulent ethnicity that formed the bases for the separatist demands after 1947.

When it became clear that the British would not remain in India for much longer, there was a considerable debate within the Naga National Council over the future of the Nagas. A number of proposals were bandied about: some moderates favoured the continuation of governmental relations with India in some modified form until they were sufficiently schooled to be able to run their own state, while a greater number of Nagas favoured the immediate formation of a sovereign Naga state. Two other proposals were suggested. The first was that the Naga Hills district should remain a Crown Colony separated from the rest of India, while the second, advanced by Sir Reginald Coupland, recommended the formation of a hill state, regulated by treaties between India, Burma, and Britain, with each country taking its share of responsibility for the area. The Naga National Council, however, was strongly opposed to the idea, for it had no desire for colonialism or outside hegemony of any kind. Before any compromise solution had been reached, the Partition of the sub-continent occurred, and the independence of India and Pakistan was declared. A few days before, a number of young Naga leaders, including A. Z. Phizo, had sent a telegram to Delhi proclaiming the formation of an independent Naga state.[111] It was to be seen what the reaction of independent India would be.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lucy Mair, Anthropology and Social Change, (London: The Athlone Press, 1969), p. 3.

2. Everett M. Rogers, Modernization Among Peasants, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1969), p. 3.

3. Ibid., p. 5.

4. c.f. Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, (Glencoe, Illinois, Free Press, 1960).

5. Those villages which remained outside British jurisdiction maintained the traditional social structure and customs. Thus, while the Nagas in the administered district were subjected to exogeneous forces of change, those that remained outside it were isolated from the effects of modernization. M. Franda cites the Konyaks, the Kalyo-Kengyns, and the other tribes outside the district as a "test case" for the tribes within the district. However, there was a great differential in the rate of social change even within the district. The Nagas living in and around the outposts at Wokha, Mokokchung and Kohima were exposed to 'contact' change to a much greater extent than those of the outlying villages. Similarly the spread of Christianity and of mission schools was limited by mission resources, and thus the attentions of the Baptist Ministers were concentrated in certain regions, to the exclusion of others. Only after the Nagas themselves took charge of evangelical work did education spread into remoter areas, and those included villages both inside and outside the administered district.

6. J. H. Hutton, The Angami Nagas, op. cit., p. 28.

7. Ibid., p. 168.

8. Captain William Kennedy, Tour Diary (March 1907), Extract from the same, in the Hutton Collection, India office Library, Orbit House, Blackfriars, London.

9. J. H. Hutton, Tour Diary, (copy), (November 1917), in the Hutton Collection.

10. Verrier Elwin, Nagaland, op. cit., p. 35.

11. J. H. Hutton, "Typescript Account of the Effects of Western Contacts upon the Primitive Tribes of India", in Modern India and the West, (ed.), L. S. S. O'Malley (London, 1941) chapter 12. Copy also found in Hutton Collection.

12. Sir Robert Reid, op. cit., p. 175.

13. James Philip Mills, officiating Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills District, Assam, Tour Diary, (March 1927), p. 21, in the Hutton Collection.

14. The term "bridge" first came into common use as a metaphor employed to describe the activities of political middlemen and brokers after Fredrik Barth, Models of Social Organization, Occasional Paper No. 23 (London: Royal Anthropological Institute Publication, 1966).

15. This amounted to 3 rupees per annum for the Angamis, and 2 rupees for the other tribes.

16. G. P. Means, recorded private interview with Sir Charles Pawsey, (London, May 1968), c.f. the remarks of a Solomon islander to a native official: "You think you're a leader just because the District Officer made you an Elder?...Remember he chose you, we didn't. Who are you anyway? Are you different from me? Of course you aren't. You never gave a feast in your life. If you want our respect you'd better start giving them quick". Cited in P. Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound (New York: Schocken Books, 1961), p. 41.

17. H. Tinker, "Local Government and Politics, and Political and Social Theory in India", in Local Level Politics, ed. Marc. Swartz, (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), p. 218.

18. J. P. Mills, Tour Diary, (March 1927), p. 21, in the Hutton Collection.

19. Marc Swartz, "The Political Middlemen", in Local Level Politics, op. cit., p. 200.

20. G. P. Means, recorded private interview with Sir Charles Pawsey, (London, May 1968).

21. See, R. Paine (ed.), Second Thoughts About Barth's Models, Royal Anthropological Institute Occasional Paper No. 32, (Royal Anthropological Institute of G. B. and Ireland, London, 1974).

22. G. P. Means, recorded private interview with Dr. Sekhose, Sekhose maintains that the dobashis were not of high social rank, but c.f. Sir R. Reid, op. cit., p. 160 where he says that "family character and influence (of the dobashis) are regarded as of Supreme importance".

23. G. P. Means, recorded private interview with Sir Charles Pawsey, loc. cit.

24. G. P. Means, recorded private interview with Dr. Sekhose, loc. cit.

25. Previously, the Nagas had used various articles such as salt, metal bars, spearheads, and ceremonial daos as forms of currency.

26. T. C. Hodson, "The Native Tribe of Manipur", Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, vol. IV, (N.S. 1901), p. 301.

27. G. P. Means, "Political Disorders and Migration Patterns", op. cit., p. 8.

28. G. P. Means, private interview with Sir Charles Pawsey, loc. cit.

29. In spite of its defeat, Khonoma continued to dominate the central Angamis area. Both Hutton and Mills record instances of villages continuing to pay tribute to Khonoma.

30. G. P. Means, private recorded interview with V. Iralu, Phizo's nephew, December 10th, 1968.

31. Ibid.

32. It has been pointed out (Chaube, op. cit.) that Phizo's experience with Bengali merchants was unlikely to persuade him to adopt a compromising attitude towards the all-India politicians.

33. Robert N. Bellah, "Reflection on the Protestant Ethic Analogy in Asia", in, The Protestant Ethic and Modernization, (New York: Basic Books, 1968). Bellah emphasizes the relevance of the historical and institutional setting for the development of capitalism.

34. S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Protestant Ethic Thesis in an Analytical and Comparative Framework", in S. N. Eisenstadt, (ed.), op. cit., p. 10.

35. Victor Hugo Sword, Baptists in Assam: A Century of Missionary Services, 1836-1936, (American Baptist Publication Society, Conference Press, Chicago, 1935), p. 61.

36. Reverend Miles Bronson, "Report on the Nagas", Baptist Missionary Magazine, (December 1939).

37. Baptist Missionary Magazine, (March 1937).

38. "Assam Mission Papers", Baptist Missionary Magazine, vol. xxxv, no. 3. (March 1855), p. 69.

39. V. H. Sword, op. cit., p. 61.

40. The Reverend C. D. King moved to Kohima in 1878. See V. H. Sword, op. cit., p. 61.

41. W. A. Cosgrave, Chief Secretary to the Governor of Assam to the Secretary of the Government of India, Reforms Office, (Political Department No. 4533 A.P., Shillong, 29th July 1931), pp. 49-52. In the Hutton Collection.

42. G. P. Means, private recorded interview with Reverend J. F. Tanquist, St. Pauls, Minnesota, summer 1967.

43. G. P. Means, private recorded interview with Sir Charles Pawsey, loc. cit.

44. Rev. Miles Bronson, letter from Jaipur dated 1st December 1839, Baptist Missionary Magazine, September 1840, p. 218.

45. Reverend C. D. King, letter dated June 14th 1881, p. 2., Baptist Missionary Magazine, (1882) pp. 322-323.

46. Ibid.

47. G. P. Means, private recorded interview with Reverend J. F. Tanquist, loc. cit.

48. Reverend Clark, "The Naga Tribes of Assam", Baptist Missionary Magazine, (October 1893), p. 460.

49. Victor H. Sword, op. cit., p. 109.

50. Ibid., p. 139.

51. c.f. quotation by Read (1952: 233) of New Guinea society: "The education given by the mission is largely an adjunct of its primary aim to secure converts to the Christian faith...the instruction received aims little higher than a sufficient literacy to increase the pupil's understanding of the Scriptures". Cited in P. Worsley, op. cit., p. 42.

52. Both Pawsey and Tanquist held that the Kohima dialect was chosen by Rev. Dr. Rivenburg rather than the Khonoma dialect, even though the latter was easier to learn, and was already spoken by a higher proportion of Angamis. G. P. Means, private recorded interviews with Sir Charles Pawsey, and Reverend J. F. Tanquist, loc. cit.

53. G. P. Means, private recorded interview with Sir Charles Pawsey, loc. cit.

54. J. H. Hutton, "Typescript Account of the Effects of Western Contacts upon the Primitive Tribes of India", op. cit., p. 34. Hutton notes the beneficial effects of the development of tribal languages, counterbalancing, to a certain extent, the effects of acculturation: "The general result of this is likely to help to perpetuate the tribal language and so to counterbalance to some extent the speeding up of the process of assimilation".

55. Assam Mission, Annual Report of 1926, Baptist Missionary Magazine, (1926), p. 107.

56. G. P. Means, private recorded interview with Dr. Sekhose, loc. cit.

57. Assam Mission, 83rd Annual Report, Baptist Missionary Magazine, (1896), p. 90.

58. Ibid., p. 96.

59. G. P. Means, private recorded interview with Sir Charles Pawsey, loc. cit.

60. Reverend Perrine, 83rd Annual Report, Baptist Missionary Magazine, (1896), p. 90.

61. Report of February 24th 1897, Baptist Missionary Magazine, (1847), p. 3.

62. Reverend Dowd of Impur, 'Report', in Baptist Missionary Magazine (1905), p. 19.

63. Baptist Missionary Magazine, vol. LXXX, no. 4, (April 1900), p. 215.

64. 100th Annual Report, Baptist Missionary Magazine, p. 93.

65. 101st Annual Report, Baptist Missionary Magazine, (1915), p. 134. On p. 135 it is noted that "At Jorhat are concentrated the Christian schools for higher education under Reverend S. A. D. Boggs and Reverend C. H. Tilden. These schools include a middle English high school, a Bible School, and an industrial school".

66. Annual Report of 1927, Baptist Missionary Magazine (1927), p. 95. In the same report the Reverend J. F. Tanquist records that: "I have the joy of reporting the highest number of baptisms for any one year in the Kohima field. The high mark this year is due to the movement of the Semas toward Christianity".

67. Annual Report of 1931, Baptist Missionary Magazine (1931), p. 91. It is reported that there were about 3,500 Sema Christians -- an attendance of 3036 was reported for the Second Annual Association held at Lumitsami.

68. 123rd Annual Report, Baptist Missionary Magazine, (1937), pp. 75-76.

69. 124th Annual Report, Baptist Missionary Magazine, (1938), p. 57.

70. G. P. Means, private recorded interview with Sir Keith Canthie, ex subdivisional officer in the Naga hills, (Longon, 1968).

71. J. P. Mills records the incident of a Baptist Minister breaking a sacred stone at Natsimi, see J. P. Mills, The Ao Nagas, op. cit., p. 7.

72. G. P. Means, private recorded interview with Dr. Sekhose, loc. cit.

73. V. H. Sword, op. cit., p. 116.

74. Eric Lambert, subdivisional officer, Letter to J. H. Hutton, Chehokrigima, Kohima, (dated 21st March 1938), in Hutton Collection.

75. G. P. Means, private recorded interview with Sir Charles Pawsey, loc. cit.

76. J. H. Hutton, "Anthropology as an Imperial Study", (unpublished lecture delivered by Hutton in February, 1938), in Hutton Collection.

77. J. H. Hutton, "Typescript Account of the Effects of Western Contacts Upon the Primitive Tribes of India", in ed., L. S. S. O'Malley, op. cit.

78. Hutton discouraged the adoption of western dress by the Nagas as he thought it led to the spread of disease. Similarly J. P. Mills disliked the "drab appearance" of Christian, westernized Nagas. See J. P. Mills, The Ao Nagas, op. cit., p. 421.

79. G. P. Means, private recorded interview with V. Irahn, loc. cit.

80. J. P. Mills, Tour Diary, (March 1927), p. 4, "They (the Welsh Mission) objected to the Roman Catholics, or Papists as they doubtless term them, owning a house outside, but near their compound, lest their converts be corrupted by the wiles of the Scarlet Woman. Yet they expect villages to receive and accommodate within their boundary fences their own long-nosed Psalm singers". Pawsey sardonically characterized Mills as being "a bit Winchester and New College Oxford", too much "the quintescence of the English Public Schoolboy" to appreciate any qualities in the missionaries.

81. J. H. Hutton, "Anthropology as an Imperial Study", op. cit.

82. Ibid.

83. See Steve Jones, "Tribal Underdevelopment in India", Development and Change, vol. 9, no. 1 (January 1978), p. 41.

84. Quotation from an Indian lawyer practising in the Bihar courts, as cited in J. H. Hutton, "Anthropology as an Imperial Study" (Unpublished lecture given by J. H. Hutton, February 1938), p. 10.

85. J. H. Hutton, "Typescript Account of the Effects of Western Contacts upon the Primitive Tribes of India", op. cit., p. 39a.

86. Ibid., p. 37.

87. J. P. Mills, Census of India, 1931 vol. III, Assam part I Report, Appendix A, p. iii.

88. J. H. Hutton, "Typescript Account of the Effects of Western Contacts upon the Primitive Tribes of India", op. cit., p. 39.

89. P. Gangmei, Secretary of the Jadonang Death Anniversary Committee, (ed.) Jadonang: A Freedom Fighter of Manipur, (Imphal, Paradise Publishing House, 1971), p. ii.

90. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States", in, Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Africa and Asia (ed.), Clifford Geertz, (London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1963), p. 110. See also P. Worsley, op. cit.

91. 1925 Annual Report, Baptist Missionary Magazine, (1925), p. 120.

92. P. Gangmei (ed.), op. cit.

93. See P. Worsley, op. cit., and P. Gangmei, op. cit.

94. P. Gangmei, op. cit.

95. J. H. Hutton, The Angami Nagas, op. cit., p. 252.

96. P. Gangmei, op. cit.

97. Ibid., p. vii.

98. Assam Secretariat, Political A. September 1931 nos. 20-94, as cited in Sir R. Reid, op. cit., p. 167.

99. Sir Robert Reid, op. cit., p. 170.

100. The Heraka cult founded by Jadonang continues today, and has a strong following in the Zeliangrong area. Rani Gaidiliu was made a heroine of the Indian independence movement after 1947, and was granted a life pension by the Indian government.

101. J. H. Hutton, "Problems of Reconstruction in the Assam Hills", Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, vol. LXV (1945), p. 1.

102. Ibid.

103. "In the Naga Hills: Relief Work After Invasion: Loyalty of Tribesmen", Times (London) Friday December 29th, 1944, p. 3.

104. J. H. Hutton, "Problems of Reconstruction in the Assam Hills", op. cit., p. 2.

105. Ibid., p. 4.

106. Ibid., p. 3.

107. G. P. Means, private recorded interview with Dr. Sekhose, loc. cit.

108. Verrier Elwin, Nagaland, op. cit., p. 51.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid.

111. Raymond Hutchinson, "The Nagas" (Unpublished paper presented in London, England, November 1968), p. 3.

CHAPTER V

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION OF THE NAGAS

(i) The formation of Ethnic Organizations

It was only after the Second World War that ethnicity was converted into a powerful political force in the Naga Hills. This was a result of the transformation of the Naga National Council into a more "modern" political body with a more extensive and sophisticated structure, and an organizational network capable of penetrating and influencing even the most remote Naga villages. After 1947 there was a power vacuum in the Naga Hills, created by the withdrawal of British authority, and the Naga National Council was able to fill the vacuum by creating a political organization that was seen to be legitimate, since it purported to represent the interests of all Nagas. Thus the Council presented many of the old issues and antagonisms of the Naga ethnic population within a new framework and with a new purpose. Cultural symbols were manipulated and given a modern context, and the virtues of the distinctive Naga way of life were repeatedly extolled. Instead of relations with Assam or conflict with outside forces affecting each Naga individually, the same issues were broadcasted as pan-Naga problems, and each cleavage was used, in turn, to support the claim for Naga unity. By this means the N.N.C. organized ethnicity as an instrument of political power, educating the tribes in new political forms and methods, and exposing them them to new issues and cleavages. It represented a new agent of political socialization, a channel through which the ideas and aspirations of the new elite

could be transmitted to the population at large.

The new organizational and bureaucratic structure was introduced into the Naga National Council mainly by Angami Zapu Phizo, T. N. Sakhrie, and other young, mission-educated Nagas who gained control of the organization not long after the British left India. As has been noted, Phizo had an ancestry and a long personal history of struggle for political independence from colonial rule. Many of the innovations introduced into the N.N.C. after the ascendancy of Phizo and the younger group of educated Nagas were derived from Phizo's experience in the Japanese camp, while many of their tactics were learnt from the Indian National Congress. The organizational influence of both the British armies which had endured the sieges of Kohima and Imphal, and the Baptist Church (upon many organizations of which the N.N.C. built) was also apparent.

The ability to spread the organization to the local villages had begun before the younger elite took control of the organization, and it was indeed of some importance in assisting Phizo himself to gain ascendancy. Although his merits as an orator, and his qualities as a leader could not be called into question, Phizo also built a reservoir of support in the many villages where he had conducted his "walking tours", or campaigns on behalf of the N.N.C. These walking tours involved conferences with leading members of the village: the tribal chiefs, gaonburas, and the leaders of Christian Student and Women's Associations who would be informed about the policies and activities of the N.N.C., and if willing, they were given a post in the N.N.C. organization.[1]

If there was any difficulty in recruiting the important villagers to the Council Phizo then resorted to the second method of recruitment.

This was to call upon a 50-member travelling group of N.N.C. members, large enough to include representatives of all the major tribes, who could be sent to any village where a Council representative was encountering difficulties in rallying the people to the support of the organization. This group was an extremely effective organ in extending the reach of the N.N.C., and in unifying the people behind its political policies, and pan-Naga political identification. The 50-member group proved invaluable, for example, when the N.N.C. resorted to actions against the State government of Assam during the early 1950s, such as refusing to pay taxes, and boycotting elections.[2]

Phizo and other members of the Naga elite, who took control of the N.N.C. after the independence of India, seemed to have envisaged the organization mainly as a broad policy-making unit and as a mechanism for inculcating propaganda and political education. It was paralleled in its organization by the Naga Baptist Church which by the mid-1950s had an almost exclusively indigenous leadership as a result of the expulsion of the foreign missionaries.[3] The Church continued to expand its organization and increase its membership, particularly in those areas (Konyak and Zeliangrong) which had received little attention before the Second World War.[4] During the early period of opposition to India the Church supported the N.N.C., with which it shared many views and aims, and there was an extensive overlapping membership between the two organizations.[5]

For several years the N.N.C. was employed as an instrument for governing the Naga Hills, but it seemed that the leaders of the organization viewed it more as a mechanism for propaganda and political education,

than as an administrative organ. In 1956, following three years of turbulence and sporadic outbursts of violence, a second administrative structure was set up independently. This comprised two major elements. Firstly the "Naga Home Guard" was created to function "in the dual capacity as police and soldiers".[6] The Home Guard absorbed many of the Nagas who had fought against the Japanese, and also recruited a large number of young men. It took over many of the functions of the "morung", reviving the martial spirit, comradeship, and disciplinary functions of the traditional institution. Moreover since violence, or at least the threat of violence was the effective social boundary between two villages in the traditional system, it is argued that the creation of a pan-Naga force shifted the boundary definition to an ethnic or "pan-Naga" level, coinciding with the development of institutions at an ethnic level.[7]

The second element in the new structure was the Naga Federal Government (N.F.G.) (see Figure 2). At the head of the government was a Kedaghe (or president), and below him on the pyramidal arrangement were the Kilonsers (or ministers) chosen from the elected representatives or Tatars, who met in the Tatar Hoho (Naga parliament). In addition there were a number of Angs or governors for the various regions. The designation of the various offices in the N.F.G. in terms derived from the main Naga tribal languages again shows the concern to promote Naga ethnic unity, and to mobilize the population by means of an 'ethnic' political structure. The function of the central all-Naga government was to collect taxes, pay the army, maintain essential services, and carry out various development tasks. At the local level the N.F.G. was supported by tribal councils, and by the traditional village councils. The local



Figure 2.

SOURCE: P. D. Stracey, Nagaland Nightmare, p. 189.

village was given as much autonomy as possible, thereby allowing for tribal and regional deviation in laws and customs but an overlay of 'national' government was provided which would coordinate the villages and provide the financial structure and organization necessary for the extension of medical and social services, and development of the economy.[8] Above all, the authority pattern was considered to resemble that of the traditional polity, incorporating Naga ideas of democracy and the concensual decision-making process, and with considerable respect and importance being given to the representatives of individual clans.[9] Through the manipulation of traditional symbols and the employment of traditional political forms, therefore, the N.N.C. sought to maintain its legitimacy among the Naga populace.

(ii) Manifestation of Cleavages

These new political formations were employed to express the aspirations of the Naga educated elite, and to define their political relationship with Assam and the rest of India. Through the formation of an institutional structure, they were able to continue the process of social mobilization, begun by the missions and Christian organizations, and which had resulted in a politically aware population, even if it was still largely illiterate. With the removal of their special constitutional status following the promulgation of the India constitution, the Nagas were forced into closer contact with Assam and Manipur. At the same time the political activities of the Council brought a new awareness of the situation and a sharper definition of the issues. A number of these cleavages were given great importance in the new definition of Naga "nationality". The most important of these was the

fundamental question of authority, that is who was to have control over the Nagas, and their territory. At first the bulk of Naga opinion was in favour of secession, which was conceived of by the N.N.C. in terms of a sovereign Naga State which would effectively remove all political influence over the Nagas by non-Nagas. This claim to self-determination and of ultimate authority resting amongst themselves was put forward as being partly based upon territorial and historical, and partly upon related claims of ethnic identity. It was notable that the argument of the N.N.C. for separate statehood, later reiterated by Phizo, was founded in the idea that the Naga territory had been "temporarily occupied" but never completely conquered by the British (meaning that most of the area east of the River Dikhu did not come within the administered area), and therefore the Nagaland was not part of the Indian Union attempting to secede, but an independent state in its own right.[10]

When it became apparent that the Indian Government would employ force to compel the Nagas to remain in the Indian Union, other issues became salient as the contending groups grasped for political resources, and these helped to define Naga ethnic boundaries vis-a-vis the other political and social groups in the region. A number of cleavages were continuously revived and aroused as a means of crystallizing ethnic boundaries and maintaining a high level of hostility and conflict between the Nagas and surrounding groups. The most significant cleavages arose over (i) The territorial (and boundary) conflict; (ii) The question of the inclusion of all Nagas within an extended ethnic territory (including parts of Burma, Manipur, N.E.F.A. and the N. Cachar Hills); (iii) control over the economy; (iv) control over education; (v) control

over religion; (vi) control over language. While the N.N.C. itself brought these issues into the limelight as often as possible in order to define Naga interests and promote ethnic unity, the approach to such issues by Assamese and Indian politicians had a clear influence upon the sequence of events and the development of the movement for autonomy.

In June 1947 the Council had demanded separation from India when that country obtained independence. Nevertheless many of the Naga leaders were sceptical of India's willingness to accede to this request, and a Naga delegation therefore went to Delhi to press for Naga sovereignty. The Mahatma Gandhi expressed his sympathy and acknowledged the justice of the Naga claims. "Nagas have every right to be independent", he declared, "we did not want to live under the domination of the British and they are now leaving us. I want you to feel that India is yours. I feel that the Naga Hills are mine just as much as they are yours. But if you say that they are not mine, the matter must stop there. I believe in the brotherhood of man, but I do not believe in force or forced unions. If you do not wish to join the union of India, nobody will force you to do that". When the Naga delegates (amongst whom was Phizo) pointed out that Sir Akbar Hydari, the Governor of Assam, with whom they were negotiating, was precisely threatening to use force, Gandhi responded: "Sir Akbar is wrong! He cannot do that!...I will come to the Naga Hills; I will ask them to shoot me first before one Naga is shot".[11] Gandhi urged the Naga leaders to follow the path of non-violence, and a month later on August 14th, 1947 a group of them declared Nagaland's independence a day before the formal declaration of the Independence of India itself.[12]

The great majority of Indian leaders however, did not react to the

N.N.C.'s political aims and aspirations in the manner of Gandhi. Politicians from Sir Akbar Hydari to Jawaharlal Nehru perceived the separation of Nagaland as a threat to the security and stability of India, and were prepared to maintain the regional integrity of the North eastern area, by consent and compromise, if possible but certainly by force if compliance could not be obtained without it.

The discussions with Sir Akbar Hydari resulted in a temporary compromise. An agreement (which became known as the "Hydari Agreement" (see Appendix I) was reached on June 22nd, 1948. It called for "an interim government of the Naga people..." under the protection of a "guardian power" which would provide funds for development and defence for a period of ten years "at the end of this period, the Naga National Council will be asked whether they require the (above) agreement to be extended for a further period or a new agreement regarding the future of the Naga people be arrived at".[13] The ambiguity of the latter statement led to serious conflict and Naga charges of deviousness and foul play on the part of the Assamese politicians. Most of the Nagas interpreted article 9 of the memorandum to mean that after a period of ten years they would have the liberty to demand complete separation, while the Assamese negotiators asserted that they had meant that the Nagas were merely free to suggest changes in the pattern of administration.[14] Repeated attempts to extract a clear statement about the fate of the 1947 Agreement ended in 1949 when Gopinath Bardoloi, the Chief Minister of Assam, admitted to a group of Naga leaders that the Agreement was no longer considered by the Indian Government to be in force.[15]

As a result, the N.N.C. began a non-violent protest movement

against the newly-written Indian constitution, employing tactics that demonstrated a degree of sophistication as great as that which had been employed against the British by the Congress itself. Most of the actions focused upon issues such as religion, language, local administration which had an ethnic importance. They were employed to inflame conflict along ethnic lines, and thus to employ that conflict to reaffirm the definition of the N.N.C. as an ethnic political force. In a number of matters the N.N.C. contended openly with the authority of the Assam government. For example, the Council urged each tribe to depose village headmen approved by the Indian or Assamese governments in favour of those who supported the N.N.C. Furthermore the Council set itself up as an economic administrator and fiscal controller in opposition to the Government of India. It urged all Nagas to refuse to pay the house-tax, and instigated a "miss-a-meal-a-week" campaign in an effort to preserve food, and thus show the self-sufficiency of the Naga Hills.[16] Correspondingly, the N.N.C. attempted to consolidate all the Naga tribes, and called for the economic development of the hills. It undertook the construction of roads and introduced new crops in an attempt to diversify the agricultural produce. A Naga Hills Central Trading Cooperative was set up in order to procure rice and paddy from the rural areas and those villages with a surplus, and redistribute it to the urban areas, and those with a shortage.[17] In these actions the N.N.C. emphasized the "ethnic" character of economic activity in the hills: that is, it was concerned to promote fair play and economic cooperation among Nagas, to the exclusion of those foreign elements such as the Marwaris and Bengalis, who were seen as the economic exploiters of the Naga people.

The Council was careful, in its campaign for a separate Naga state, to emphasize the uniformity of ethnic and territorial boundaries. In 1948 support was given to Athiko Daiho, a Manipuri Naga who was attempting to organize the Nagas of Manipur and consolidate them with the Nagas of the hills district.[18] And, in the same year a 25 member delegation was sent on a goodwill mission to establish friendly relations and negotiate with the Naga tribes in Burma.[19]

(iii) Towards Conflict

After the promulgation of the Indian constitution in 1950 the situation was put into a new perspective. Following the independence of India in 1947 only one important change had occurred in the constitutional provisions covering Nagaland and the other "excluded areas". Discretionary powers were no longer allocated to the governor alone, but now he was compelled to act on the advice of the ministers of the State.[20] In 1950 "excluded areas" were replaced by "tribal areas" which were subject to the laws and provision of the Union or State governments unless the governor of the state specifically directed that such laws and provisions should not apply. Under this system exclusion was therefore the exception rather than the rule. In general appearance however, the Sixth Schedule providing for the administration of the Assam hill tribes was not very different from similar provisions in the Government of India Act of 1935. Tribal territories were divided into "Part A" and "Part B" Tribal areas with the "part B" areas similar to the old excluded areas, administered by the governor acting as the agent of the President of India. "Part A" areas included the more developed and less remote tribal regions, and these were placed under the mixed supervision of the governor and the

state's ministers.[22] A system of District Councils was constituted in order to allow a certain measure of autonomy for the "Part A" areas and seats were reserved for District Council members in the state legislature.

Under the Sixth Schedule, therefore, the Naga Hills District was incorporated into the State of Assam as a "Part A Tribal Area", while the Tuensang District was designated a "Part B" area and remained under the control of the central government (but was administered by the state governor and his agents). The Nagas of the Hills District were entitled to representation in the Legislative Assembly of Assam, and to a district Council of their own,[23] but this was precisely what the Naga leaders did not want. Firstly, it brought them under the effective control of Assamese politicians who were in a strong position to put pressure on the governor. And secondly, it opened the Naga Hills to the possibility of a flood of immigrants many of whom would offer strong economic opposition to the small Naga businesses and local cottage industries, and over whom the Nagas had no control.[24] Similarly it was based upon a system of administration that was based in Assam and employed Assamese bureaucrats, aggravating those Nagas who hoped for administrative positions.

The new Constitution dashed all hopes of a solution on the basis of the Hydari Agreement (as the N.N.C. saw it), and Phizo, was able to attack the Sixth Schedule as a "breach of faith", mobilizing the support of the Naga elite behind him. Whereas during the years since independence the Assam government had been unable to administer the hills effectively, and had therefore relied upon the N.N.C., now the state administration was intent upon implementing a policy of "detribalisation". In the words of Bishnuram Mehdi, the governor of Assam, this was meant "to bring the

people of the hills to the same level of the plainspeople within as short a period as possible".[25] Such statements of intent understandably rankled the pride of all Nagas, even those who may have been cool in their support of Phizo's aims. To make things worse, it was reported that the policy meant, among other things, the teaching of Assamese in place of English in all tribal schools. Several inflammatory and tactless statements made by Assamese officials aggravated the situation even further. One is reported to have said that: "to ask the hill people to learn the Assamese language is not to impose Assamese on them, but to seek their goodwill and cooperation in giving the future Assam the shape she deserves in conformity with her history and tradition".[26]

It was in this tense and hostile atmosphere that the N.N.C. (of which Phizo had become president in November, 1949)[27] decided to hold a plebiscite in order to reaffirm to the Government of India the wishes of the Nagas with respect to their position vis-a-vis the rest of the subcontinent. It stated that:

> This plebiscite shall be a voluntary plebiscite on the part of the Naga people and the purposes of holding the same on a voluntary basis are expressly to remove from the minds of the people and the Government of India any possible difficulty to accept and recognize the genuinely representative function of the Naga National Council for its nationals in Nagaland, to remove any possible element of doubt as to the passionate desire in the hearts of the Naga people for freedom and independence from India, and lastly but with a genuine feeling of goodwill, to avoid any possible injury that may otherwise be done to the reputation of India in the event of a plebiscite held under international auspices should such a reference to the people result in 100 per cent Nagas being in favour of severing Governmental connection with India".[28]

An extensive propaganda campaign was conducted in the Naga villages,

and on May 16th, 1951, the plebiscite was held. The result was a clear victory for the N.N.C., and an affirmation of the idea of a "national" ethnic status as the Council defined it. The post-referendum report issued by the N.N.C. stated that: "The verdict of the people has been for the constitution of the Nagaland into a separate sovereign state in which they can live their own lives, and guide their own destiny".[29]

When the Government of India refused to acknowledge the plebiscite, the N.N.C. increased its political activity in opposition to the Assam administration. No taxes were paid, and there were strikes and student demonstrations in favour of the Council.[30] At the same time the N.N.C. attempted to put the Naga case to the world. Whereas J. H. Hutton and others were still writing about the Naga "tribes" in terms that made them seem very unsophisticated politically,[31] The Council began to present its demands for recognition to several foreign governments. They started to publish press releases which they would send to Nehru, Indian members of the Legislative Assembly, foreign newspapers and governments, and important individuals. Appeals were also made to the United Nations to intervene, and when this failed, emissaries were sent to Pakistan and Burma in an attempt to obtain support in the U.N. When this failed the Council tried to send representatives to the U.S.A. and Britain, but these were intercepted by Indian troops.[32]

On the home front a demonstration of solidarity and opposition to integration within northeastern India was effected when the N.N.C. carried out a total boycott of the 1952 General and District Council elections. The Nagas of the Hills District were to have elected three members to the Assam parliament as well as the officers of their own Regional

Council. No candidates came forward, however, and no voting took place.[33]

The extent of the support for the N.N.C. and those who aspired towards a separate Naga state was now unmistakably apparent. After several years of hard work in raising the political consciousness of the Nagas by means of new forms of political socialization and propaganda such as discussions and walking tours, the N.N.C. had defined politics in ethnic terms, and had contributed to the creation of a political organization formed along ethnic lines. At that time no Naga was willing to allow Assamese or Bengali traders to establish commercial enterprises in their country, no Naga would take up a seat in the Assam parliament, and there was no support for an administrative and political establishment that would favour the process of assimilation into Assamese, Bengali, or a general form of Hindu culture.

The question of the Naga attitude had been hotly debated amongst Indian politicians over a long period. From early on Jawaharlal Nehru and others had put the Naga demand for independence down to missionary policies, and to the influence of the foreign missionaries who had urged the Nagas to resist Hindu culture.[34] Many Nagas took offence at this criticism, for it implied that they were not capable of thinking and acting for themselves, but merely responded like children to the admonishments of the American Baptist missionaries.[35] Religion did indeed play a large part in prompting the Nagas desire for autonomy, and many Naga Christians and pastors were active in the N.N.C. It was, however, not a cause in itself, but one of many cleavages upon which an "ethnic" identity was built. Nor was it the foreign missionaries who were urging the people to press for independence, but many local Naga preachers, who, like

Phizo, played upon the differences between the Nagas and the rest of Assam. With the religious distinctions there were a great number of differences in values and social norms. One Naga complained that "when anything we touch gets polluted, how can we expect to be received as honourable men".[36] Indissolvable barriers of caste and creed were firmly raised against the Nagas, and partly, it must be presumed, in defence, but also because of their own conflicting social attitudes Nagas came to realize the limits of their social situation, and to confine themselves, within their own ethnic identity.

Among the Nagas the manipulation of ethnic symbols for political ends was relatively easy to accomplish. The fact that Christianity had come to the Nagas later than either the Khasis and the Garos while Hinduism and Islam had gained very little influence, meant that youth and a Christian education were important characteristics of the Naga elite. Since the services of those who had been educated by the missionaries after the 1870s were immediately required either as schoolmasters or Baptist preachers the educated elite had few opportunities for professional contact with the plainspeople. On the other hand, employment within the hills had given them an introspective vision, and had maintained their ties with the local communities, in comparison with other transitional societies where education has led to the divorce of the educated from the traditional community. What contacts the Nagas did have with the Assamese were neither the most pleasant nor the most conducive to acceptance of the social system of the plains. Those who attended the college at Jorhat in Assam were often subjected to caste distinctions and they often found themselves taunted with the stigma that

they were "savage" head-hunters. Moreover, as at Kohima, so on the plains the Naga youth were housed together in dormitories. This had the effect both of isolating them from the community at large, and of instilling a sense of solidarity, or at least of the recognition of belonging, whatever the differences between separate clans and tribes. Such feelings, compounded by problems of language, removed any social incentive for educated Nagas to work in Assam. The Naga student was forced to learn 3 or 4 of his dialects in order to matriculate, and moreover his secondary school education was conducted in English. As a result it was natural for him to seek employment either in his own territory or in some office which involved the use of English.

The boycott of the 1952 General and District Council Elections had brought the political situation to a boiling point. In March 1952 Phizo went to New Delhi to meet Nehru and discuss the question of independence, having had brief talks with him at Tezpur in Assam in December 1951.[37] It is reported that at the Delhi meeting Nehru became enraged and furiously declared that "whether heaven falls, or India goes to pieces and blood runs red in the country, whether I am here or any other person comes in, Nagas will not be allowed to become independent".[38] Four months later Phizo and Nehru met again, but Nehru repeated his contention that it was not possible for the Nagas to separate from India.[39] Not long after this meeting Phizo was arrested for entering Burma illegally, but other Naga leaders promoted a civil disobedience campaign against the Indian government. A statement published by the N.N.C. at the time declared that:

> Now therefore it is resolved that the Nagas shall, either by election or nomination, have no association

> with, and no representation in the parliament of India, the State Legislature of Assam, the district, regional or local councils, town committees, municipal boards or boards which may be required to function in any executive capacity or which may, in any way be required at any time to act in any advisory capacity to the Government".[40]

This statement of policy was backed up by strikes, student demonstrations, and noncooperation with the administration, while the Government of India responded to these actions by reinforcing the Assam Rifles.

Both sides were still reluctant to engage in open warfare and during the next eight months two more attempts were made by the N.N.C. to reach an agreement with Nehru. On October 24th, 1952 the Prime Minister visited Mao, a border station on the boundary between the Naga Hills District and Manipur. There he was presented with a memorandum by Imkongmeren Ao, the vice-president of the N.N.C., who complained about the murder of a Naga (Dr. Haralu) in Kohima, and then reiterated the Naga demand for freedom from Indian authority.[41] The growing sensitivity of the border area caused a further visit by Nehru, this time accompanied by the Burmese president, U Nu, in the Spring of 1953. On March 30th the two heads of state came to Kohima, and Nehru was supposed to speak at a meeting in which he intended to convince the Nagas that a separate nation status was impossible. When a N.N.C. spokesman attempted to hand the Prime Minister a petition the Assamese officials who were present behaved with great indiscretion, and prohibited the presentation. On a signal from T. Sakhrie, the General Secretary of the N.N.C. all 3000 Nagas walked out of the meeting. Local Assamese officials then exacerbated the situation by bringing in reinforcements of the Assam rifles, and arresting 80 of the Nagas involved in the walkout.[42]

(iv) The Conflict Erupts

Disappointment with the strategy of civil disobedience grew as the Indian government resorted to punitive measures against Nagas engaging in non-cooperation.[43] In September the Naga Students organized a boycott of the Indian Independence Day celebrations. A number of the Naga leaders went underground. Several others, however, made a last minute attempt to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. A mutual exchange of goodwill missions was arranged between the N.N.C., and the political parties of Assam. The A.P.C.C. initiated the exchange by sending a mission led by its President, Bimala Prasad Chaliha, who was accompanied by a team from the Assam unit of the Praja Socialist Party led by its President, Hareswar Goswami, into the Naga Hills.[44] In return, a Naga goodwill mission, led by Miss Rano M. Iralu, Phizo's niece, and the President of the Naga Women's Federation, visited Assam from November 30th, to December 15th, 1953.[45] At least part of the mission's purpose was to circulate information about the Nagas' apprehension concerning recent actions such as the President's Regulation proclaiming compulsory labour in certain circumstances in the Naga Hills, the Government of Assam's decision to ban the Tribal Councils and Tribal Courts, and the alleged rape of women by the Indian troops in the Naga Hills.

Bisnuram Mehdi, the Congress Christian Minister of Assam responded to the Naga mission with a violent public attack and, denounciation of them.[46] Mehdi's attitudes had a great deal to do with the worsening of the situation; not only was he not able to communicate with any of the Naga leaders in anything other than invective, but his tactless use of the Assam police in a series of actions meant to intimidate the Naga public,

persuaded many Nagas to support the course of guerilla warfare and a terrorist campaign.[47] In the Summer of 1954 the Government of India mounted a combined political and military campaign aimed at discrediting the N.N.C. and splitting the independence movement. The government forces attempted to put pressure on people to declare themselves against the Council by means of intensive propaganda, armed police threats, and selective arrests. Such actions, however, had the opposite effect of that intended, and the Naga villages closed ranks behind the N.N.C. leaders.

In September 1954 Phizo and the Council formed the People's Sovereign Republic of Free Nagaland with the support of the Chang chiefs of the Tuensang area.[48] Members of the N.N.C. had for some time been working amongst the Nagas of the Tuensang area in an attempt to mobilize them in support of the Council. The Indian government recognized the challenge, and in 1955 the Indian administration was extended to the Tuensang district (formerly a Naga "Part B" Tribal area) through the introduction of the Assam Frontier Tracts (Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945, and the promulgation of the Tuensang Frontier Division (Assimilation of Laws) Regulation, 1955.[49] By means of the Tuensang Frontier Division (Undesirable Persons) Regulation of 1955 the political officer in the area was given Indian Government authority to check the intrusion of Nagas from outside the Division, and to this effect, in the Spring of 1955 the Indian army was able to contain the violence in that area.

The fighting soon spread into the Naga Hills District, and the small number of regular troops in support of the Assam Rifles proved inadequate to deal with the situation. In July 1955 the Government of

Assam declared the Naga Hills District a "disturbed area", and the restraint which had been maintained during the early months of fighting in Tuensang quickly disappeared.[50]

The violence exploded, and acts of brutality were committed by both the Indian army and the Naga Home Guards. It is true that the General orders given to the Indian troops were very explicit, stating categorically that:

> You must remember that all the people of the area in which you are operating are fellow Indians. They may have a different religion, they may pursue a different way of life, but they are Indians, and the very fact that they are different and yet part of India is a reflection of India's greatness. Some of these people are misguided, and have taken to arms against their own people, and are disrupting the peace of this area. You are to protect the mass of the people from these disruptive elements. You are not there to fight the people in the area, but to protect them. You are fighting only those who threaten the people and who are a danger to the lives and properties of the people.[51]

On the other hand the orders given by Indian company commanders were very different from those issued at a superior level. A blind eye was turned to many wanton acts of brutality, and it is likely that most of the allegations made by the N.N.C. against the Indian troops were true. The tactical aim of the army at this time was to isolate the Home Guards from the general population by severing the main lines of communication, garrisoning key population centres, and patrolling contested areas in force. The Home Guards reacted by ambushing Indian columns, sabotaging road and rail links, and attacking government administrative centres.[53] They too were not above employing terrorist tactics, both against Indian troops, and against those Nagas who would not assist in the struggle. Their methods were, however, more selective and did less to antagonize

the general population on whom they depended for supplies, information and new recruits.

(v) Division within the Ranks

Nevertheless, the escalation of violence did lead to serious dissension within the ranks of the N.N.C. In 1955 the Council held a meeting at the village of Khonoma, where a number of Naga leaders including two members of Phizo's clan, T. Sakhrie, Secretary of the N.N.C. from its inception, and J. B. Jasokie, later a State Minister, resigned because of Phizo's extremist policies, and being persuaded of the need to end the violence. A split in the N.N.C. was impending, but in January 1956 Sakhrie was tortured and murdered by an unknown group of Naga Home Guards. It was said that Phizo himself was responsible for ordering the assassination (and Nehru repeated the accusation in August 1960), but Phizo denied any involvement, maintaining that "we were cousins, and there is a complete taboo in our country on the idea of kinsmen killing each other".[54]

Whoever was indeed behind Sakhrie's death, for a time the assassination removed the direct confrontation between the most important elements in the Naga leadership, but it confirmed a number of "moderates" in their conviction that the violence must end.[55] When the "moderates" saw that continued support for the aggressive separation of the N.F.G. would mean an indefinite war, dedication to the cause of nationalism waned.[56] This did not result in an exodus of educated Nagas to join the Indian administration, or to offer their assistance in integrating the Naga Hills District into the Indian Union. On the contrary they rigidly maintained the limits to cooperation which had been maintained since the Second World War. While there was no longer the same kind of cooperation with

Phizo and other extremists as there had been in the early 1950s, neither was there any surrender to the Indian point of view. Among the Nagas differences over political tactics did not mean that there would suddenly be cooperation with "foreign" and antagonistic elements. Several members of the underground surrendered[57] but few would cooperate with the Indian government. One former N.N.C. officer who had surrendered explained his non-cooperation as follows: "Let them (the N.N.C.) carry on. We are not joining the movement. We are not going to be treated well even though we form a rival political party. If they (the N.N.C.) can achieve something, that is well and good".[58]

As it was demonstrated later, splits and factions might occur among the Naga leaders, but there was no compromise over the main boundary definition of Naga ethnicity. There was no willingness to submit to incorporation into Assam, or to abandon the pan-Naga aims of a separate Naga administrative unit, the formation of traditional legal and political institutions, the consolidation of all Nagas into a single state, return of land which had been transferred to Assam by the British, and Naga control over religion, language and education. In April 1956, a member of the Lok Sabha was able to state that: "Regarding the popularity of the N.N.C., so far there is no other political party in the Naga Hills. Whether it is for good or evil, somehow it became a popular organization in the Naga Hills".[59]

By mid-1956 the government of India's attempts to gain support from the Nagas had failed, despite the death of Sakhrie and the withdrawal of support by a number of "moderates". It had been impossible to set up an indigenous administration, and the Indian National Congress

had failed to establish a Naga branch of the Congress Party. The situation had developed into a fruitless pattern of violent actions followed by counter-terrorism, and it was finally recognized by the Indian leaders that the Nagas were not being misled by a group of foreigners and Christian missionaries (all of whom had been expelled) nor by an isolated group of Naga extremists, but had a clear idea of their position vis-a-vis Assam and the rest of India. Jawaharlal Nehru and General Thimayya, the chief military officer in the Naga Hills, were therefore ready to agree that: "if the Nagas are ever going to be effectively consolidated into the Indian Union...violence will have to cease, and steps will have to be taken to gradually win over the Naga population".[60]

The India government did manage, however, to call together a number of moderate Nagas for a series of political discussions. On July 1st, 1956 the "Reform Committee" of the N.N.C. was formed at Gauhati in Assam. Even though it had assembled at the instigation of the central government it still refused to alter the independence demand. Its declared objectives were: "to reform the N.N.C., to adhere to the policy of non-violence, establish peace, and also to find an agreed solution to the Naga problem".[61]

Despite its lack of popular support, Indian government officials began to negotiate with the Reform Committee, while at the same time inaugurating a policy of "grouping villages" in the hills, in a manner similar to that employed by the British in their campaign against the Chinese communist insurgents in Malaya. Similarly, material rewards were offered to the Naga population in order to win them over to the idea of a peaceful solution within the Indian union. The government

began a number of welfare projects,[62] and granted scholarships to Naga students that promised to co-operate.[63] Yet there was no slackening of the violence, and the Indian forces endeavoured to set up a number of "self-defence societies" in 3 Naga villages that were known to be lukewarm towards the N.F.G.[64]

These attempts at obtaining cooperation by means of a combination of persuasion and bribery only achieved very limited success until the early part of 1957 when the Naga Baptist Church officially came out against the violence. A church meeting at Kohima in the first quarter of 1957 sent out an appeal for peace, and this was soon followed by a similar appeal from the church at Impur.[65] The new mood had political results, for when the 1957 elections were held, the government was able to find 3 Nagas who would serve as members of the Assam Vidhan Sabha (State Legislature), and who were elected by a small number of votes.[66] In August 1957, moreover, the Reform Committee was converted into the Naga Peoples' Convention, described as being"unique in the history of the Naga People for its representative character", but which could only be brought together with the financial and military assistance of the Government of India. The Secretariat of the Assam Socialist Party later revealed that the central government had spent 400,000 Rupees upon convening the first N.P.C. conference in Kohima, which was attended by 2,000 delegates representing all the various Naga tribes.[67]

The early resolutions passed by the N.P.C. included one which called for a negotiated settlement of the Naga problem within the framework of the Indian Constitution, and another which urged the creation of the Naga Hills Tuensang Area (N.H.T.A.) as a separate administrative unit.

Yet the separatist sentiment continued even in the N.P.C. In the Assam Tribune of August 31st, 1957, it was revealed that "on receipt of an urgent message from the Governor of Assam, conveyed through a high central government official, the Convention held further prolonged discussions... (and) it was only after these discussions that the Convention voted to seek a solution 'within the Indian Union'".[68] Thus the N.P.C. was the reluctant Rump of the Central and Assamese governments. The Indian administration maintained its financial support to the N.P.C. and provided a safe passage for any N.P.C. member to any village in the Naga Hills.[69] There were further meetings between N.P.C. officers and government officials, which finally resulted in a number of constitutional amendments. On December 1st, 1957 the Naga Hills-Tuensang Area was formed as a Part B Tribal Area within Assam.[70] The new area, created from a combination of the Naga Hills District and Tuensang, was centrally administered by the Union President through the Ministry of External Affairs, with the Governor of Assam acting as the President's agent.[71] Local administration was carried out by Deputy-Commissioners for each District, under a commissioner for the whole region.[72]

(vi) Towards a Nagaland

The formation of the N.H.T.A. as a result of bargaining and compromise by the N.P.C. represents a change in the approach to the question of an ethnic state. Many of those who formed the N.P.C. and later participated within the Indian political system were willing to accept a position within the Union as a realistic adjustment to the fact that the Indian government possessed superior forces, and that even with political autonomy a Naga state would be completely dependent upon India for

financial aid and economic development. The political rationality of the "moderate" leaders contrasts strikingly with the emotive nationalism of Phizo, who combined an ethereal vagueness about the economic means to maintain the social benefits which Nagaland has recently enjoyed.[73]

On the other hand, the choice of a different course by many of the Naga leaders did not signify a radical and deep division among the Nagas themselves. For many Nagas the attitude towards the N.F.G. continued to be one of ambivalence; one of pride for their stalwart resistance to the central government, combined with a sense of disquietude at their intractability, and fear of their terrorist activities and acts of sabotage.[74] Most Nagas continue to aspire towards a sovereign nation and they acknowledge the prestige that the N.F.G. and the Home Guards have given to all Nagas.[75] Following the claims of Phizo himself they maintain that had it not been for the nationalists insistence upon independence, the Indian Government would not have considered any Constitutional amendments.[76]

Thus the N.P.C. saw the creation of the N.H.T.A. as a temporary measure, and stated that a "lasting satisfactory solution" could later be "worked out with the Indian government".[77] In conformity with this approach it began a series of manoeuvres designed to amend the constitution further. As yet the Nagas were not free from outside control and interference, and they had not achieved a territorial status that accorded with ethnic identity. Since the Governor of Assam, in consultation with the State assembly, was the administrative agent for the External Affairs Ministry, the Nagas were still not free from administrative control by the

Assam State government. Similarly a provision had been made for Naga representation on the Assam assembly, and the civil servants assigned to the Naga Hills were drawn from the civil service of the Assam State administration.[78] The situation had therefore changed very little, and the contentious question of Assamese politicians having authority over the Nagas was still unresolved. Furthermore, although the Tuensang Nagas had been joined with the people of the Hills District, the Naga areas of the North Cachar Hills, the Sibsagar District and Manipur State (not to mention the Naga areas of Burma) remained to be integrated within a Naga State.

In response to the creation of the N.H.T.A. the N.N.C. intensified its guerilla operations against government outposts and villages loyal to the government.[79] This was combined with a mass campaign of political education in the Naga Hills District. High-ranking N.N.C. leaders made speeches in all the major villages, airing grievances, and telling of the injustices of the new arrangements. At the same time private trucks moved surreptitiously through the area, distributing anti-government pamphlets.[80] In response to these activities the N.P.C. did not adopt an opposing stance, but instead began pursuing a policy designed "to accommodate as much of the rebel's viewpoint as possible within the framework of Indian constitution".[81] The N.P.C. called for a second Convention conference at Ungma village in May 1958, in order to press for further changes. The main outcome of the conference was that an 8-member committee was formed to contact the N.N.C. in order to present a united set of proposals to the Indian Government. In October 1959 the 3rd Convention of the N.P.C. was held at Mokokchung, and was attended by both N.P.C.

and N.N.C. Naga leaders.[82] The result of the Conference was a 16-Point Memorandum (see Appendix II), known also as the "draft constitution of Nagaland". The emphasis of the demands made in the memorandum had some bearing upon the issues outlined earlier in this chapter, which related to definitions of Naga ethnicity, with the difference that this was to be a solution within the Indian Union.

Under the terms of the 16-Point Memorandum the other Naga tribes inhabiting areas contiguous to the N.H.T.A. would be allowed to join the Nagaland if they wished, involving the transfer of large tracts of territory from Assam, Manipur and N.E.F.A. Secondly, all the reserved forests and other Naga areas that had been transferred out of Naga territorial boundaries were to be returned to the Nagaland with a clearly defined border. The Nagaland was to be under the authority of the Union External Affairs Ministry with executive powers exercised by a Governor appointed by the President of India, and having its headquarters within the Naga territory. Moreover two seats were to be reserved for Nagaland in the Lok Sabha (lower house of the Union Parliament), and one seat in the Rajya Sabha (the Upper House). There was to be a State Legislative Assembly and only this could approve the application of Union Parliament law in Nagaland. Other requests included the right to draft a state constitution; the declaration of the new state as a restricted area under the old "Inner Line" regulation; and the raising of a Naga regiment in the Indian army. The Memorandum also requested that after 15 years a Commission be appointed to report on the working of the constitution. In effect, the N.P.C. was demanding a "State within a State" as the next best thing to independence.

The Mokokchung Convention set up a working Committee to see to the implementation of the recommendations. It was composed of 3 representatives from each tribe, whose initial instructions contained the exhortation that they should "by all means (be) taking representatives of the underground people".[83] Similarly there were delays in the actions of the working committee which did not set up a negotiating body for 6 months, claiming that it did so "pending consultation with underground leaders, with a view to including some of them".[84]

Finally in April 1960, the 16-Point Memorandum was formally presented to the Governor of Assam in Shillong. Later a second N.P.C. delegation led by Dr. Imkongliba Ao went to New Delhi (in July) to meet with Nehru. At this meeting the Indian Prime Minister accepted the 16-Point Memorandum in principle and announced his willingness to create a separate state of Nagaland within the Indian Union.[85]

An acceptance in principle did not mean, however, that the Indian Government was willing to implement the 16-Point Memorandum as it stood, and the N.P.C. was compelled to accept a number of compromises.[86] Chief among them was the territorial question: whereas the N.P.C. had wanted the new state to include a "Greater Nagaland", as well as the Naga Hills Tuensang Area, the spokesmen for the Government of India maintained that for constitutional reasons it was impossible to rearrange boundaries to include any of the Nagas living outside the N.H.T.A. in the new State.[87] Similarly a decision was deferred concerning section 12 of the 16-Point Memorandum, referring to certain Reserved Forests which had formed part of the Sibsagar and Nowgong Districts of Assam since 1903.[88] Another issue which was of great importance to the N.P.C. and N.N.C. alike, was

the question of the administration of the Tuensang area. Eventually the N.P.C. conceded to pressure from the Indian government negotiators and agreed that the area would be administered by the Governor for a period of ten years until the Tuensang Naga tribes were capable of shouldering the "heavier responsibilities of an advanced system of administration".[89] The Tuensang administration was to be supported by a Regional Council consisting of both elected, and nominated, representatives, and would in turn elect representatives from among its members to the Naga Legislative Assembly. The Regional Council was to approve or reject all Acts passed by the main state Assembly which might apply within the region.

In other areas, however, the central government made a number of concessions to the Naga demands. Firstly, the traditional system of Tribal Councils was to continue. Secondly, an agreement was made concerning the financial assistance the proposed new state was to receive from the central government. Section 11 of the agreement stated that "To supplement the revenues of Nagaland, there will be need for the Government of India, to pay out of the Consolidated Fund of India a) a lump sum each year for the development programme in Nagaland, and b) a grant-in-aid towards meeting the cost of administration. Proposals for these grants will be prepared and submitted by the Government of Nagaland to the Government of Indian for its approval. The Governor will have general responsibility for ensuring that these funds are expended for the purpose for which they have been approved".[90]

In order to prepare the path for statehood, an Interim Body was elected which had the "right to discuss and make recommendations", to the Executive Council on (i) matters of administration involving general

policy and schemes of development, and (ii) any matter referred to it by the Executive Council. Yet many of the Nagas in the N.P.C. could not reconcile themselves to compromise with the Indian Government, and tensions developed within the Interim Body.[91] The N.F.G. began to increase the tempo of their attacks putting pressure on the Indian administration and the N.P.C. to acknowledge that a solution was impossible without their participation and consent.[92] Even before the acceptance of the 16-Point Memorandum the Naga Home Guard had launched attacks in the Naga areas of Manipur, and broadened its sphere of activities to include sabotage and terrorism in the plains of Assam. Reprisals were taken against N.P.C. members, and against villages which refused to supply the Home Guards with victuals and recruits.

The Government of India countered not only with armed force, but with an expansion of economic and financial aid to the District. Under the first Five Year Plan a modest effort was made to improve basic social services, such as schools, hospitals and dispensaries.[93] Nearly a thousand miles of roads were constructed, the number of hospitals and dispensaries was increased, and the number of schools more than doubled.[94] In 1958 a special Three-Year-Plan was inaugurated to attempt to make up for the fact that little had been done during the years following the outbreak of hostilities.[95]

Responding to these tactics, the N.F.G. began a vigorous propaganda campaign against the Indian Government, charging the Indian army of having committed war crimes and atrocities in Nagaland. Phizo opened the attack in July 1960 with a booklet entitled The Fate of the Naga People in which he listed 72 different crimes allegedly committed by the troops.[96]

Evidently stung by the criticisms the Government of India invited a number of foreign correspondents to Nagaland to see the situation in person. They were guided along a strictly controlled route, but were amazed by the way in which members of the Underground mingled with the population and slipped them propaganda leaflets. Gavin Young, a correspondent from the Observer newspaper met Home Guard leaders and toured a number of Naga military camps. According to his estimation the Home Guard army numbered about 2,000 men on active service, in comparison with about 30,000 Indian troops stationed in the Hills.[97]

While the propaganda battle continued to be fought the terrorist campaign was carried to new extremes, and on August 22nd, 1961, the underground assassinated Dr. Imkongliba Ao, the Chairman of the Interim Body.[98] The murder of Dr. Ao led to a temporary crisis within the N.P.C; all attempts to include the N.F.G. in the new State administration were now abandoned, and on September 21st, T. N. Angami, a former Civil Servant, was elected to fill the position of Chairman of the Interim Body. On April 11th, 1962, President Radhakrishnan of India issued the Nagaland Security Regulation, 1962, for the suppression of subversive activities, maintenance of essential supplies and services, and the control of military requirements.[99] Subsequently, in August 1962 Nehru passed the Bills amending the Constitution (13th Amendment), and on December 1st, 1963, in an atmosphere that was still very tense, the State of Nagaland was inaugurated by President Radhakrishnan in Kohima.[100]

FOOTNOTES

1. Assam Tribune (Gauhati), August 16th, 1953, as cited in M. F. Franda, "The Naga National Council: A Study in Group Politics", (Chicago, unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Chicago, December 1960), p. 52.

2. Ibid.

3. For the reasons given for the expulsion of the foreign missionaries, see Verrier Elwin, Nagaland, op. cit., p. 63.

4. From a Christian population of 98,068 in 1951, by 1961 the number of Naga Christians had risen to 195,588, representing a + 99.44 per cent variation, Statistical Handbook of Nagaland, (Planning and Coordination Department, Government of Nagaland, 1966), p. 28. For the development of Christianity in the Zeliangrong area (largely a post-war phenomenon), see Mpamei Namthiurei, The Great Awakening: The Coming of Christianity in the Zeliangrong Area 1915-1971, (Tamenlong, Manipur: Golden Jubilee Publication, 1972).

5. Verrier Elwin notes that: "Orders were early issued by the Naga Military organization that every Company should have a pastor, and it is said that most of the marching songs had a Christian motif. In 1956, an order was circulated, by the Chief of the 'Country Guard Government of Nagaland' that "God ought to be included in every practical field of Nagas, and therefore, as many pastors as possible should be appointed to prepare the war affairs". Services were regularly held in the various hide-outs and there was a great deal of propaganda that since Nagaland was to be the first completely Christian State in Asia...it was the duty of Christians to fight the 'Hindu Government' in order to preserve their religion". V. Elwin, Nagaland, op. cit., pp. 62-63. Several leading members of the Naga Federal Government were associated with the Church. A later president, Mhiasiu was a former Baptist Minister, while Isak Swu, the 'hardline' foreign Minister had considered training for the Ministry before the Indian army began its operations in Nagaland.

6. The author's private interview with A. Z. Phizo, at 56 Landsdowne Road, Bromley, Kent, on 23rd September, 1977.

7. This, at least, appears in statements about the charter of the Naga Home Guard. It does not mean that there was no conflict between the Nagas themselves.

8. Author's interview with Phizo, loc. cit.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Raymond Hutchinson, "The Nagas" (Unpublished paper presented in London, November 1968), p. 3.

12. Gordon P. and Ingunn N. Means, "Nagaland -- the Agony of Ending a Guerrilla War", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXIX, nos. 3 and 4, (Fall and Winter, 1966-67), p. 292.

13. V. Elwin, op. cit., p. 52. Also see Appendix I.

14. Ibid., p. 53.

15. Raymond Hutchinson, op. cit., p. 3.

16. Assam Tribune (Gauhati), February 7th 1950, in M. F. Franda, op. cit., p. 8.

17. Assam Tribune (Gauhati), October 23rd, 1949, in M. F. Franda, op. cit., p. 8.

18. Assam Tribune (Gauhati), August 30th, 1948, in M. F. Franda, ibid.

19. Assam Tribune (Gauhati), July 6th 1948, in M. F. Franda, ibid.

20. Gordon P. and Ingunn N. Means, op. cit., p. 291.

21. Ibid.

22. V. Elwin, op. cit., p. 41.

23. Gordon P. and Ingunn N. Means, op. cit., p. 292.

24. M. F. Franda, op. cit., p. 86.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Gordon P. and Ingunn N. Means, op. cit., p. 293.

29. Ibid.

30. Jon Gibney, "Nagaland: India's Unknown Guerrilla War, A Case Study", (University of Pennsylvania, unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1971), p. 17.

31. J. H. Hutton, "A Plea for Naga Hillmen", letter to the Times (London), May 29th, 1956, p. 11.

32. M. F. Franda, op. cit., p. 7. The N.N.C. also made use of other unifying symbols such as a Naga flag, a national anthem, ("eerie and beautiful" according to the Rev. Michael Scott), and even the issuing of the stamps of the 'Republic of Nagaland'.

33. M. F. Franda, op. cit., p. 6.

34. Ibid., p. 69 c.f. V. Elwin, op. cit., p. 62, where he plays down the Indian government's antagonism to Christian missionaries.

35. G. P. Means, private recorded interview with Dr. Sekhose, loc. cit.

36. M. F. Franda, op. cit., p. 75.

37. Shibani Kinkar Chaube, Hill Politics in North East India, (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1973), p. 145.

38. J. Gibney, op. cit., p. 18.

39. S. K. Chaube, op. cit., p. 145.

40. J. Gibney, op. cit., p. 19.

41. S. K. Chaube, op. cit., p. 146.

42. Ibid., p. 145.

43. See S. K. Chaube, ibid., p. 146. These actions included raids on the house of Sakhrie, and on the village of Khonoma, and the creation of 9 new police outposts.

44. Ibid., p. 146.

45. V. Elwin, op. cit., p. 54.

46. J. Gibney, op. cit., p. 21.

47. Statement by Achilla Imlong, who was present at recorded interview with Sir Charles Pawsey, loc. cit.

48. S. K. Chaube, op. cit., p. 147.

49. Ibid.

50. See Narendra Goyal, Political History of Himalayan States -- Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nagaland since 1947, (2nd ed. New Delhi: Cambridge Book and Stationery Stores, 1966).

51. V. Elwin, op. cit., p. 60.

52. This was confirmed by a former Sikh soldier, who was stationed in the Naga Hills, and now resides in Hamilton, Ontario.

53. J. Gibney, op. cit., p. 25.

54. "Naga Leader Orders No Reprisals", Observer, (London), Sunday, August 7th, 1960.

55. S. K. Datta, "Plea for Naga Hillmen" letter to Times (London), (reply to Hutton's letter of May 29th 1956), June 8th, 1956, p. 11.

56. G. P. and I. N. Means, op. cit., p. 296.

57. These included Vilhoume, Phizo's secretary, and Pukhalu another member of the N.N.C. M. F. Franda, op. cit., p. 51.

58. Ibid., p. 93.

59. Speech made by Rishang Keishing in the Lok Sabha debates, cited in ibid., p. 93.

60. Ibid.

61. Assam Tribune (Gauhati), July 2nd 1956, cited in M. F. Franda, Ibid., p. 15.

62. Assam Tribune (Gauhati), June 13th, 1957, as cited in M. F. Franda, ibid.

63. Assam Tribune (Gauhati), October 25th, 1956, as cited in M. F. Franda, ibid., p. 16.

64. Assam Tribune (Gauhati), September 19th, 1956, as cited in M. F. Franda, ibid.

65. V. Elwin, op. cit., p. 65.

66. Assam Tribune (Gauhati), May 9th, 1957, as cited in M. F. Franda, op. cit., p. 94.

67. Gordon P. and Ingunn N. Means, op. cit., p. 297.

68. Assam Tribune (Gauhati), August 31st, 1957, as cited in M. F. Franda, op. cit., p. 95.

69. Ibid.

70. S. K. Chaube, op. cit., p. 149.

71. V. Elwin, op. cit., p. 66.

72. S. K. Chaube, op. cit., p. 149.

73. Author's interview with A. Z. Phizo, loc. cit., Phizo does not put

forward any practical, long-range goals or economic policies for an independent Nagaland. He ambiguously states that there would be return to the "old system of self-help and independence", and also that developmental efforts would parallel those of the Indian government.

74. Gordon P. and Ingunn N. Means, op. cit., p. 291.

75. Ibid.

76. Nirmal Nibedon, Nagaland: The Right of the Guerillas, (New Delhi: Lancers Publishers, 1978), p. 28.

77. A. M. Rosenthal, "Nagas see Nehru in Attempt to End Long Guerrilla Warfare" New York Times, September 25th, 1957, p. 11.

78. Statesman (Calcutta), September 12th, 1957, as cited in M. F. Franda, op. cit., p. 16.

79. Statesman (Calcutta), June 9th, 1958, as cited in M. Franda, op. cit., p. 18.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. B. G. Gokhale, "Nagaland -- India's Sixteenth State", Asian Survey, vol. I (June 1961), p. 37.

83. Statesman, (Calcutta), January 19th, 1960, as cited in M. Franda, op. cit., p. 19.

84. Ibid.

85. B. G. Gokhale, op. cit., p. 39.

86. V. Elwin, op. cit., p. 83.

87. N. Goyal, op. cit., p. 173.

88. V. Elwin, p. 87. The problem of the Reserved Forests is a key issue in Naga politics, and resulted largely from the conflict between traditional Naga ideas about land ownership and their territorial boundaries and a series of British administrative decisions. Between 1898 and 1925 the British transferred large areas of the foothills from the Naga Hills District to the plains districts of Assam in order to increase the administrative control in areas designed for the Assam Railway, and for tea estates or mining areas. The colonial authorities also created a belt of reserved forests along the foothills to reduce conflicts by keeping Nagas and Assamese apart, and placed these forests within the jurisdiction of the plains districts in order to facilitate administration. The State of

Assam now controls these forests and prohibited their use by Naga cultivators. Thus the Reserved Forest question is an inflammatory issue in which the Nagas demand their traditional rights, and that the traditional "Ladai Garh" boundary is respected, while the Assam government insists upon the 1925 boundary. See G. P. Means, "Cease-fire politics in Nagaland", Asian Survey, Vol. Xi, no. 10, (October 1971), pp. 1015-1016.

89. V. Elwin, op. cit., p. 86.

90. Ibid., p. 87.

91. S. K. Chaube, op. cit., pp. 149-50.

92. J. Gibney, op. cit, p. 36.

93. V. Elwin, op. cit., p. 93.

94. Ibid. Unknown to the army, which supervised road construction, the labour was often supplied by Home Guard and N.F.G. members who used their wages to maintain the guerilla campaign.

95. Ibid. A total of 380 lakhs of rupees were spent.

96. See N.G.A. Maxwell, India and the Nagas, (London: Minority Rights Group Report no. 17).

97. For Gavin Young's Report see Observer (London) April 30th, 1961, p. 8; May 7th, 1961, p. 7; and May 14th, 1961, p. 7.

98. J. Gibney, op. cit., p. 42.

99. S. K. Chaube, op. cit., p. 151.

100. Y. D. Gundevia, War and Peace in Nagaland (New Delhi: Palit and Palit, 1975), p. 73.

CHAPTER VI

PEACE AND CONFLICT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF FACTIONS IN NAGA POLITICS

Whereas during the early 1950s the leadership of the Naga National Council had been a relatively cohesive group, a decade later fissiparous tendencies began to appear in the Naga elite. While the early post-colonial history of Naga politics was noteworthy for the development of a coherent political organization, which was able to mobilize the Nagas along ethnic lines, the period following the formation of the state of Nagaland was characterized by the appearance of a complex lattice of political factions.[1] These shifted constantly in relation to both the internal political situation and the actions of the Government of India.

The inauguration of Nagaland as a state of the Indian Union, corresponding to a territorially defined ethnic population of Nagas, altered the conditions of the conflict in the hills. Firstly, it signified a shift in political relationships within the ethnic group. The broad front of Naga unity which had cracked with the splintering off of the Naga People's Convention was now finally demolished, and it was evident that a number of Naga leaders were prepared to cooperate with the Indian Government. As a result of the violent activities of the Indian army against not only the underground forces, but also against Naga villagers, the weight of public opinion had moved against continuation of the guerilla war. Leadership for the movement for peace through a compromise solution was provided by the Baptist Church, dissident members of the N.N.C. such as J. B. Jasokie and S. C. Jamir, and others such as Vizol Angami, and

Kevichusa, who participated in "overground" politics yet had close connections with the underground. The existence of two centres of power within the State played an important part in defining factional relationships. Following Bujra[2] we argue that factional action permitted the temporary resolution of the central, conflicting issues, of peace and others of ethnic importance, of which the Naga National Council was judged to be the final moral arbiter.

Secondly, in creating the State of Nagaland the Government of India imposed a new political and administrative structure, which brought with it the possibility of new rewards, and new channels for improving individual status. In accordance with the 16-Point Memorandum (see Appendix II), the State of Nagaland was to have an executive government based upon a democratically elected state legislature. To the political structures which had developed during the post-war period was added a further structure along the lines of the Indian States reorganization. With the new structure came new posts in the executive and administration, as well as the possibility of influencing the distribution of the large resources which the Indian Government was investing in the new State. Thus the blandishments offered by the Government of India were a further incentive to political cooperation, even if this was of an impermanent nature, as it was not accompanied by a firm commitment to Indian nationalism.

As a result of this changed situation, elite conflict developed within the ethnic group, commonly taking the form of informal political groupings around a particular leader, but also including more permanent associations.[3] The conflict revolved around three central issues:

(i) willingness to advocate violent actions against Indian troops and Naga "collaborators"; (ii) attachment or hostility to India,[4] and (iii) the possibility of personal and/or clan advancement through political activity. It is difficult to discern, however, when actions were taken for personal or clan advancement or for other reasons.[5]

The first election to the State Legislative Assembly were conducted in January 1964. Two parties and a number of independent candidates contested the election. The Naga National Organization (N.N.O.) led by Shilu Ao was essentially formed from a number of members of the Naga People's Convention who were considered to be sympathetic to the Indian viewpoint. They were opposed by the Democratic Party led by A. Kevichusa, an Angami from Phizo's own village of Khonoma, and Vizol Angami the Secretary of the N.P.C. who was also a close friend of Zashei Huire a prominent member of the N.F.G., and of Phizo himself.[6] There were no official ties, and no known plan of cooperation between the Democratic Party and the N.F.G., but it was reported that they were sympathetic to the N.F.G. views, and lukewarm in their approach to India.[7] When the results were announced on January 22nd, 1964, the N.N.O. had won 34 of the 46 seats, while 11 were taken by the Democratic Party (Kevichusa lost his contest), and one seat went to an Independent (see Table 4, p. 204)

The motives of the Democratic Party in fighting the election are hard to determine. Since it fielded only 17 candidates its goal was evidently not that of winning a majority.[8] Instead, it is likely that participation in the election was partly viewed as a means of demonstrating the lack of support for the N.N.O. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that on December 8th, 1964 the 12 opposition members of the

Legislative Assembly resigned en bloc, since they felt that after the opening of peace talks, "The continued existence of the State Government was 'superfluous'".[9]

The conclusion of the state elections brought the questions of a cease-fire and ultimate peace to the fore once again. After many years of war the hills had been devastated by violence, and with organizational improvements in the Indian army following the debacle of the border war with China in 1962, the Naga Home Guards were having a much more difficult time.[10]

(i) Moves Towards Peace

In early 1963, following a series of meetings in London between Phizo and several members of the N.F.G., including General Kaito and General Mowu Angami, the N.F.G. informed the Government of India that it was interested in a ceasefire.[11] Phizo asked his friend, the Reverend Michael Scott, (who had arranged for him to be given a British Passport) to go to India and convey the message of the N.F.G. to Nehru. Scott agreed to assist and made two trips to see Nehru in the Spring of 1963.[12] At the second meeting, Nehru backed away from an agreement and suggested that Scott meet with Shilu Ao who was then the Chairman of the Executive Council of Nagaland, and S. C. Jamir, the recently appointed temporary Nagaland member of the Lok Sabha, so that he might understand the position of the Interim Government concerning the cease-fire proposal.[13] Within a short time Scott arranged a meeting with the two Naga leaders, and was told by them that they would only negotiate with the N.F.G. on the basis of the surrender of the underground forces, and

acceptance by the N.F.G. of the Indian Constitution. They were reluctant to consider any other negotiations at that time, as they were concerned with the progress towards the creation of the State of Nagaland.[14]

A year later, however, the situation had changed radically, and immediately after the elections peace talks were initiated by the Nagaland Baptist Church Council. The third Nagaland Baptist Convention which was held at Wokha from 31st January to 2nd February 1964, resolved to promote the cause of peace, and appealed to the Nagaland Government to explore "ways and means for the speedy restoration of peace and normalcy in Nagaland".[15] The Church leaders suggested that Jayaprakash Narayan, the Director of the Sarvodaya movement of Vinobha Bhave; Bimala Prasad Chaliha, the Chief Minister of Assam; Shankar Dev;[16] and Reverend Michael Scott be approached to act as representatives of a Peace Mission, and a special committee consisting of Rev. Longi Ao, Rev. Shihoto, Mr. Kenneth Kerhuo and Mr. Toniho Chishi was appointed to do the follow-up work.[17]

(ii) The Politics of Statemate

The move made by the Baptist Church was endorsed by a unanimous resolution passed in the State Assembly on March 13th. On April 5th, 1964, the Peace Mission formally commenced its work with a public meeting in Kohima.[18] After several weeks of bargaining and discussions a ceasefire agreement was signed on May 24th, 1964 at Sakraba village in the Chakhesand area and its details were ratified in two letters from the underground dated August 10th and August 14th.[19]

On September 6th, 1964 amidst special public meetings and church services the ceasefire took effect.[20] In his address at the public meeting in Kohima, the Nagaland Chief Minister, Mr. Shilu Ao appealed for

reconciliation among all Nagas. He extended a "warm welcome back home to our Naga brothers in the underground" so that there might be a "free exchange of views among ourselves...to end this trouble once and for all".[21]

A few weeks later, on 23rd September 1964, the first conference of peace talks took place at the Chedema peace camp, about 5 miles from Kohima.[22] The Government of India was represented by Y. D. Gundevia, the Foreign Secretary to the Minister of External Affairs; Shilu Ao, Chief Minister of the State of Nagaland; Brigadier D. M. Sen, Advocate-General of Nagaland; N. F. Santoke, Deputy-Secretary in the Indian Government; and Uma Nath Sharma, Chief Secretary of the Nagaland Government. On the opposing side the N. F.G. delegation was composed of Isak Swu, the Foreign Secretary; Brigadier-General Thinoselie of the Naga Home Guard; and Zashei Huire.

The talks were opened with prayers and a general optimism. Mr. Gundevia welcomed the peace talks in his opening speech, yet maintained that the political settlement should be within the framework of the Indian constitution. However, the optimistic atmosphere was soon dispelled when Zashei Huire reiterated the N.F.G.'s often pronounced position with regard to the constitutional status of the Nagaland.[23] He insisted that India and Nagaland were two separate nations, and maintained that India would never be able to subjugate the Nagas.[24] In conclusion he called upon India to contribute to the establishment of peace in "this part of South-East Asia".[25] This inauspicious start, emphasizing the very point which India was not willing to concede, was followed by a further move which rammed home the N.F.G. intransigence. Once the meeting <u>in camera</u> had begun Mr. Isak Swu challenged the presence of Mr. Shilu Ao as

a member of the Indian Government delegation on the grounds that his inclusion would imply recognition of his government on the part of the N.F.G. Thus there was immediate deadlock, and the meeting was adjourned. After a few days, however, a compromise was arrived at with the assistance of the Peace Mission, and Shilu Ao was accepted as a delegate of the Government of India.

The continuation of talks in October and November perpetuated the stalemate, as neither side was prepared to concede on the issue of sovereignty. At the meeting of 12th October, however, some progress was made towards a broad declaration renouncing the use of force, even if it was not accompanied by concrete agreements on the constitutional and administrative questions.[26]

Following long discussions, the delegations pledged themselves to the renunciation of the use of force "as a means of achieving the political settlement of the questions that have disturbed Nagaland for the past 10 or 15 years", and a practical plan was drawn up by the Peace Mission "whereby disarmament on the part of the Federal Army and withdrawal of the India Security Forces from the functions of peace preservation in Nagaland can be effected".[27]

Again, however, there was an impasse, for although both sides accepted the plan of disarmament "in principle", they were unable to agree upon the implementation of the plan. Faced with a deadlock, both over the question of disarmament and over the questions of Naga sovereignty, the Peace Mission attempted to break it with a series of proposals submitted on 20th December 1964.[28] These comprised a long and embracing statement

of the positions by both parties, with evident concern to avoid a bias in favour of one side or the other. This was followed by an attempt to bridge the two opposing positions: "Though the two positions appear to be far apart, the Peace Mission believes that, with goodwill and understanding on both sides, a solution acceptable to both can be found".[29] In paragraph 13 of the proposals, it was suggested that the N.F.G. might accept a solution within the Indian Constitution, and the Government of India might revise the terms, and constitutional connection with India:

> On the one hand, the N.F.G. could of their own volition decide to participate in the Union of India and mutually settle the terms and conditions for that purpose. On the other hand, the Government of India could consider to what extent the pattern and structure of the relationship between Nagaland and the Government of India should be adapted and recast so as to satisfy the political aspirations of all sections of Naga opinion and to make it possible for the ideals of peace as expressed in the Naga Peace Declaration to be substantially realised.[30]

This very generalized set of proposals created few concrete recommendations that could serve as the basis for future negotiations. Yet, on the other hand, it broke the impasse and permitted the continuation of the talks, thereby making possible the goal of peace, even though at the same time it seemed remote and even unattainable. Discussion of the proposals took place in January 1965. The Government of India's contention was that while it did not accept the line of reasoning and a series of postulates on which the Peace Mission's proposals were based, the Government welcomed the conclusion that a peaceful solution of the problem

in Nagaland could only be found within the Indian Union. Furthermore, it was prepared "to consider what alterations, if any, are necessary towards the existing autonomy of the State of Nagaland to fully satisfy the aspirations of all sections of Naga opinion".[31]

The N.F.G. had placed the proposals before their Tatar Hoho (parliament) for discussion, and a special plenary session of the assembly was held at Wokha on March 24th 1965.[32] The response was communicated to the Peace Mission at the Khensa Peace camp on 6th April 1965. It was not likely to lead to a solution:

> The Tatar Hoho feels that only through the Peace Mission's undaunted efforts the Nagas for the first time in the history of their national struggle have been able to feel and taste the essence of human dignity and worth of human personality so preciously valued by mankind and for that in our hearts and in our history their names will be always honoured and respected.
>
> The Tatar Hoho is also thankful to the Peace Mission for its kindness to come to give interpretation of its last proposal. It is always the desire of Tatar Hoho to settle our problem through peaceful means within the Government of India and once our right to self-determination is recognized, we shall seek friendly relationship with India.
>
> India must also be aware of the spirit of Bandung Conference and the right of self-determination recognized by Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference and the Non-aligned Conference of which she and is one of the leading nations, and politically it will be a wonder of wonders if India does not abide by the guiding principle which she thinks must be binding to all other nations for settling any political dispute that may arise between two peoples.[33]

At the same time, the Federal delegation delivered a communique to the Peace Mission which alleged serious violations of the ceasefire terms by Indian troops. The document contained 23 "gross and blatant" violations and drew attention to the most serious and most recent.[34]

As a result, a Peace observer team was organized, initially consisting of Dr. M. Aram, and Miss Marjorie Sykes, and while the talks continued without moving any closer towards an agreement on the central issues, the ceasefire period was regularly extended.[35]

It is clear that the N.F.G. had very little intention of coming to an acceptance of a constitutional position within the Indian Union. Instead the ceasefire period and the peace talks were employed as a means of strengthening and retrenching the position of the underground vis-a-vis the alternative postures taken up by other sections of the Naga elite. While there was an obvious desire for peace and an end to the devastation of the hills and its population, nevertheless the peace talks were also employed by the N.F.G. to reassert the rigid social and political boundaries defined by the N.N.C. in the early 1950s and to maintain their dominant position in Naga politics. Whereas they were prepared to palliate their position with regard to the use of violence they were not prepared to concede on the point of their adamant refusal to recognize the sovereign jurisdiction of the Union of India.[36] The peace talks became a very effective means of broadcasting their goals and aspirations, of portraying the N.N.O. as the stool pigeon of the Indian Government, and of giving their cause "international" status. With the publication of statements condemning those Nagas who had accepted statehood within the Indian Union, and who were not "the proper rightful party to make any settlement on behalf of the Nagas",[37] they were attempting to legitimize their authority to their own people. In the frequent demands for an "internationalization" of the question, and in being seen to be bargaining with the Indian Government at an equal level they were further

enhancing and strengthening their status.

This strategy was further pursued throughout the peace talks by N.F.G. representatives who argued that the negotiation "should be raised to a higher level".[38] They based their argument on the fact that the Naga problem was political not administrative, and that therefore they should attempt to reach an agreement with the Union politicians after which the administrators could thrash out the details.

In June 1965 Michael Scott wrote to Delhi on behalf of the N.F.G., requesting that the Indian delegation be headed by a Union Minister, and this was followed by another letter written in July by J. Kughato Sukhai, the Ato Kilonser of the N.F.G., repeating the request. Progress with these talks was held up by the War between India and Pakistan which broke out in September 1965.[39] During the war the Nagas had maintained the ceasefire despite the occasion for a successful offensive brought about by the withdrawal of Indian troops to fight against Pakistan in Kashmir.[40]

In November, however, the Minister of State in the External Affairs Ministry announced in the Lok Sabha that Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri was ready to receive a delegation from the N.F.G. without any preconditions.[41] In January 1966, however, Shastri died at Tashkent during the negotiations with Pakistan.

Only after the new Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was sworn in on January 19th, 1966 was it revealed that she had consented to negotiate directly with representatives of the N.F.G.[42] In February a 5-man delegation headed by Kughato Sukhai, the Ato Kilonser of the N.F.G. (and including Imkongmeren Ao, Vice-President; and Scato Swu, Foreign Secretary) arrived in Delhi. Chaliha and Michael Scott were also present.[43] Yet

again, however, hopes of a solution were soon dashed: Isak Swu vehemently restated the "two-nation" theory maintaining that the Nagas had always been independent and wished to remain so, and to the Indian press he even rejected the idea of a status for Nagaland similar to that of Sikkim and Bhutan.[44] He also hinted that if the Indian Government failed to accept the N.F.G. position they might be persuaded to turn to other countries for assistance: "It would be very unfortunate if that were to be the Indian stand. We would be forced to adopt other methods and seen an unknown destiny.... We may also be forced to seek the assistance of foreign countries to achieve our objective".[45]

On the other hand, in a statement in the Lok Sabha on February 21st, 1966 the new Prime Minister maintained that there was still a possibility of "some real progress" emerging from the next round of talks, which had been scheduled for April. She said that the main subject discussed so far had been the question of the prevention of the "many ugly incidents which still take place", but she hoped that "a certain amount of unnecessary distrust and suspicion which had developed on both sides had been dispelled".[46]

The second round of talks between N.F.G. representatives and Indira Gandhi seemed to presage a more hopeful future. Mrs. Gandhi expressed satisfaction with the progress of the talks and it was officially announced that constructive proposals had been made and that the underground leaders were considering them. It was also suggested that proposals to strengthen the peace-keeping machinery had been accepted.[47] Not long after the talks the Prime Minister participated in a debate in the Lok Sabha. There she asserted that talks were going "in

the right direction, although she added that it would not be correct to say that the N.F.G. had accepted that they were part of the Indian Union. Nevertheless she emphasized that this time the Government had made it absolutely clear to them that a solution of the Naga problem would have to be in the Indian Union.

The talks, and indeed, the whole peace process were complicated and even jeopardized by a series of terrorist actions by the Naga guerillas on April 20th and 23rd. Two bomb explosions at the railway stations of Lumding and Diphu in Assam had killed 54 and 56 persons respectively.[48] Following the explosions a violent debate erupted in the Lok Sabha and the Government was criticised for attempting to placate the Nagas while they were continuing their campaign of terror and violence. B. P. Chaliha's position as a member of the Peace Mission had become absolutely untenable after the slaughter in his own state, and following the example of Jayaprakash Narayan who had resigned from the mission in February because he felt that the N.F.G. lacked confidence in him,[49] Chaliha also withdrew. Michael Scott was now the only remaining member, and for some time his position had been called into question, as many Indians felt that he was not impartial but acted on behalf of the N.F.G.[50] On 4th May the Indian Government issued a deportation order against Reverend Scott, and the peace mission was thus completely defunct. The immediate issue leading to Scott's deportation was his attempt to "internationalize" the Naga question. Indian public opinion was incensed at his communication with the Secretary General of the United Nations, and his efforts in support of Phizo's idea of constituting a third party Commission.[51] Moreover, resentment over Scott's participation in the Peace Mission had been building

up among India's chauvinists since his arrival, and this had been incited further by the irritation of many Indian army commanders at the way in which he probed into N.F.G. allegations of excesses, and publicised the claims.

Scott's expulsion from India, however, did not result in the complete demise of the peace efforts on behalf of the Naga Baptist Church and the corps of peace observers. The Nagaland Baptist Church Council met in an emergency session on 7th May 1966. As an obituary to the Peace Mission they declared in a resolution passed unanimously that:

> The Members of the Council unanimously resolved to express their deep appreciation to the three members of the Nagaland Peace Mission, Mr. B. P. Chaliha, Mr. J. P. Narayan, and Rev. M. Scott for the contribution they have unreservedly rendered to bring to an end and bringing the two contending parties to a round table conference for peaceful settlement of the Naga political problem.[52]

In place of the dissolved organization the Baptist Church Council to set up another Peace Commission "in order to strengthen and carry on the peace work,[53] and they were supported by the corps of Peace observers and the Sarvodaya Peace Centre which was continued in Kohima by Dr. Aram.

Following the demise of the Peace Commission, a series of high-level talks were held between the N.F.G. and Indira Gandhi. The Peace Mission had served as a useful vessel for N.F.G. propaganda, and for their stalling and delaying tactics. Talks with the Indian Prime Minister, however, could not serve the same purpose, and when Indira Gandhi finally came round to suggesting that the solution could be within the union, but not necessarily within the Constitution, the N.F.G. leaders were forced to make a decision.[54]

At this point the N.F.G. leaders fell back upon the convenient

strategy of requesting that Phizo be included in the talks before an agreement was made. In the first week of January 1967, the underground leaders informed Mrs. Gandhi that they would like to send a number of representatives to London for consultations with Phizo.[55] The project was delayed because a number of N.F.G. leaders did not want to travel on Indian passports (thereby committing themselves to Indian citizenship), but finally a team, including Mr. Vizol, Mr. Lungshim Shaiza, and Mr. R. Suisa, left for London. At that time Phizo himself had departed for the United States, where he was seeking assistance for the Naga cause with both United States and United Nations officials, and from the American Baptist Church. Learning of the arrival of the Naga delegation he returned to London at once, and prolonged discussions were held about strategy and the N.F.G. position. A written message was sent from Phizo to the Indian Government. It contained the following 4 points:

> 1. I agree to meet the Indian Government's representative with our Naga delegation if necessary. Of course I do not say that my presence is necessary, this must be clear. Since the "Peace talks" started, I have remained silent, knowing the delicate nature of the situation.
>
> 2. I believe it is best both for Nagaland as well as for India to settle their differences by discussion, and since discussion has already begun it is only a question of process, how best to bring about the talks to a final settlement.
>
> 3. If the Indians will resort to force again, then we shall continue to defend our national right and sovereignty. We shall fight back and do all that we can. There will be no submission. We shall not surrender our national right out of fear or helplessness. We shall continue to struggle on till we are free again as a sovereign people.
>
> 4. The basis of discussion, since talk has already started, it is only a matter to carry on and bring it round to an end.[56]

The final round of talks in Delhi between the Prime Minister and the N.F.G. leadership were scheduled for October 5th and 6th, 1967. Mrs. Gandhi was compelled to postpone the talks, and the underground reaction was not well-disposed.[57] They sent an unfriendly note condemning the attitude of the Indian Government, accusing it of duplicity.

(iii) The China Connection

The talks had again broken down, and this time events within Nagaland were having a great deal of influence upon the situation. Since the spring of 1966 rumours had been circulating that representatives of the N.F.G. had held talks with the Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi in the presence of Pakistani Foreign Minister Z. A. Bhutto in Pakistan, and it was claimed that Phizo and Naga rebels had established close contacts with the "Pindi-Peking axis".[58] In April 1967 the Indian Government announced for the first time that Naga Home Guard units had crossed the border into China for training and supplies.[59]

The move towards China and Pakistan for training and material assistance was largely caused by Phizo's failure to attract an international audience for the Naga cause, and the wish to be ready for the Indian army should the peace talks disintegrate. The effects of this ploy upon the solidarity of the N.F.G., and indeed of the legitimacy of the N.F.G. in the eyes of all Nagas, were however, extremely significant. Prominent members of the Nagaland Baptist Church were not willing to condone a policy of association with an "atheist" nation, especially when it became clear that a part of the price to be paid for Chinese assistance was greater ideological uniformity and an influx of Chinese propaganda. The Baptist Church still retained tremendous influence in Naga society in

general, and in the N.F.G. in particular. Other opposition to the China strategy came from those N.F.G. members who had worked consistently for a solution with India and considered that seeking aid from China would harden the Indian attitude against them and make peace more difficult to achieve.

(iv) Divisions within the N.F. G.

A rift in the N.F.G. first appeared when General Kaito Sukhai, commander-in-chief of the N.F.G. between 1953 and 1963,[60] challenged the leadership of Phizo, and that of the N.F.G. structure as a whole. Following the enunciation and development of the China strategy, Kaito moved into open opposition. In July 1967 guerillas loyal to Kaito seized the N.F.G. treasury,[61] all 16 military radio transmitters and the bulk of the guerilla arms caches.[62] Kaito was also reported to favour a peaceful settlement with the Indian Government and in order to accomplish this he apparently hoped to strengthen his forces to the point where he could take over the rebel movement and compel the N.F.G. to accept a settlement in the Indian Union.[63] Kughato Sukhai, Kaito's brother, was Ato Kilonser of the N.F.G. at the time, yet he remained loyal to Phizo, representing the pro-Phizo faction in the protracted negotiations with Kaito which followed the coup.[64] The immediate effect of Kaito's anti-Phizo coup was to place the more extreme pro-Phizo faction of the N.F.G. and the Home Guard in a more desperate situation and make them even more eager than before to replenish their empty armouries with foreign weapons.[65] Thus guerilla excursions through Burma to China were intensified, and over the following 16 months several hundred pro-Phizo guerillas received new weapons and training in guerilla warfare in China.[66]

It was at this time that talks between Kughato Sukhai and Indira Gandhi in Delhi were beginning to break down. With a stalemate position at the peace table, the N.F.G. leaders had to choose between continued intransigence and the acceptance of some compromise political settlement as the basis for more permanent peace. The Tatar Hoho was convened in October to settle the factional differences, and this proceeded to elect the pro-Phizo G. Mhiasiu Angami to the office of President, and Imkongmeren Ao to that of Vice-President. At Chedema on October 26th, 1967 Mhiasiu announced that both the Tatar Hoho and the powers of the Kilonsers had been suspended, and he declared a "presidential" form of government.[67] He maintained, however, that the "basic policies" would remain unchanged and he would still work for peace in Nagaland.[68] This reshuffling of offices and alteration in the political power situation removed from office the mild critics of Phizo's strategy.[69] As an adjunct to the new measures, a 5-member "consultative body" was set up with Z. Ramuyo as secretary, and including Kughato Sukhai, Chumitsemo Murry, Makhen and Tsalese, all of whom, except C. Murry, had been members of the N.F.G. delegation that had conducted the final and absolute round of talks in New Delhi with Indira Gandhi. In disgust at his exclusion, the deflated N.F.G. president, Scato Swu announced that he was taking a "two years holiday from politics" and added "Let Mr. Phizo and others try if they can to have better terms from the Government of India than what Mr. Kunghato Sukhai and I were obtaining".[70]

After the breakdown of peace talks, a series of All-Party Naga Leaders Conference were held to try to resolve the situation. The first such meeting, again sponsored by the Nagaland Baptist Church Council in

conformity with its role as mediator, was held on November 11th, 1967, with the avowed intention of discovering "ways of bringing about a peaceful solution of the Naga problem".[71] In defence of President Mhasiu's instructions Mowu Angami, and General Zuheto, declared that they would attend the Conference, thereby indicating that a breach had occurred between the political and armed wings of the underground.

The assumption of authoritarian powers in the N.F.G. by President Mhasiu led to further rifts and divisions in the underground. Some guerilla units defected to General Kaito's faction, while others declared that they had "seceded" from the N.F.G.[72] A struggle for power developed within the N.F.G. itself. Kughato Sukhai and Isak Swu launched a campaign to bring an end to Mhasiu's powers by "constitutional means". Following a series of open campaigns in the villages by the opposition in the N.F.G. President Mhasiu agreed to convene the N.F.G. Council to consider Kughato's demand for a return to "parliamentary government". The opposition's demand was rejected by 15 votes to 16, but in order to dampen criticism G. Mhasiu promised a new N.F.G. constitution.[73] This however, merely granted "parliamentary government with presidential rule"; it restored elements of the old structure while strengthening the control of the pro-Phizo group. Kughato's annoyance was evident in a statement he made after the series of meetings: "when there is a change", he declared "I will definitely try to see that the talks are resumed and that the initiative for resumption will be taken by the new leaders themselves".[74] Yet the ambivalence and awkwardness of Kughato's position was revealed when he added a criticism of the Government of India, condemning it for "lack of genuine efforts" to solve the Naga problem.

The schism in the N.F.G. widened further when Kaito's followers initiated an energetic "recruiting" campaign, which degenerated into a series of skirmishes between his troops and those of the N.F.G. Furthermore, on June 9th, 1968 in a sudden move Kaito's forces kidnapped General Zuheto Sema who had been appointed acting Commander-in-Chief of the Naga Home Guard while Mowu Angami was away in China. It was reported that Kaito had accused Zuheto of planning to assassinate him, but he was released soon afterwards. Two months later, on August 3rd, 1968, Kaito was assassinated while he was walking unaccompanied and unarmed along the main road in Kohima.[75]

Kaito's murder only exacerbated the divisions within the underground. Kughato and the group who had controlled the N.F.G. before the assumption of 'presidential' powers called a meeting of the "Council of the Naga People" at Satakha village. Mhiasiu refused to attend, and in November 1968 the anti-Phizo group raided the N.F.G. camp at Chedema, "arresting" the N.F.G. President, Home Secretary Ramyo, and a third N.F.G. leader. Following the arrests, Kughato Sukhai announced that the Naga Federal Government had been dissolved, and declared that a new government called the Revolutionary Government of Nagaland (R.G.N.) had been formed in its place.[76]

This action, however, did not result in the demise of the N.F.G., and its absorption into the R. G. N. The Federal Vice-President, Chumbemo Murry reacted to the news of the arrests by declaring a state of emergency and putting all loyal Home Guards on alert.[77] Murry declared himself President of the N.F.G., denouncing the Revolutionary Government of Kughato Sukhai, but at first there were no skirmishes or armed clashes

between the two groups. It was evident that Murry was waiting for N.F.G. batallions to return from China with new weapons before attempting to rescue the N.F.G. leaders from the Zungti headquarters of the R.G.N.

As a result of personal differences, and divisions over the distribution of power, the underground Nagas had finally split into two irreconciliable factions. The Indian administration evidently viewed the developments as advantageous to their cause, and hoped to exacerbate the conflict. Following the kidnappings, Indian officials reported that the divisions in the Naga underground ranks were not over the issue of peace or war, but rather the result of a conflict of personalities, and a reflection of tensions between Angamis and Semas.[78] At the same time the factional split had weakened the bargaining position of the underground as a whole, and Indian officials made it clear that there was no point in considering negotiations with Mr. Sukhai until he could show that he was able to exercise authority over the China-trained troops.[79] As a further measure calculated to deepen the division between the two groups, the Indian army intensified its operations against suspected N.F.G. camps, and made extensive preparations to intercept the guerilla bands as they returned from China, while observing a form of ceasefire with the R.G.N.

The rift in the underground had disastrous consequences for the band of N.F.G. guerillas, led by General Mowu Angami, Phizo's nephew, who had just returned from China. Attempting to enter Nagaland, the guerillas found the border effectively sealed off by the Indian army.[80] In an apparent display of reconciliation, R.G.N. scouts contacted General Mowu's forces and led them to the "safety" of an R.G.N. camp which was still

under the cease-fire agreement. Indian troops quickly surrounded the camp, and demanded the surrender of General Mowu. Placed in a difficult position, Mowu and his 162 men surrendered without a fight. Later 83 other China-trained guerillas were intercepted, but Isak Swu, and about 100 guerillas escaped into the Naga areas of Manipur.[81]

The defeat of Mowu shifted the balance of military power back in favour of the R.G.N., and led to a series of factional realignments. One of the most important apparent defections from the N.F.G. was that of Zashei Huire, Vice-President of the Federal Government who was reported to have crossed over into the R.G.N. camp in April 1969.[82] Over the subsequent two years, however, there was a constant movement of members, shifting from one faction to the other. There were also sporadic attempts at reconciliation, as a result of the Indian Government's hardening line, and the weak bargaining position of the divided groups. In September 1969 Scato Swu held extensive discussions about the merger of the two rival camps with G. Mhiasiu and Z. Ramyuo. The two N.F.G. leaders issued a statement, which sounded like an apologia for the factionalism in the Underground:

> As things stand today, there is, of course not much to say about our sudden disappearance or re-appearance, as we may put it, but it is quite natural that in a trying situation as this a player who is in the field may sometimes hit upon a plan in collusion with like-minded companions, which he considers can bring about an expected result from another angle. However, the only lesson to be learnt is that there are set rules in all spheres of human activities.... There have been a lot of wild speculations as to the nature of understanding that might have possibly been arrived at between an establishment (the N.F.G.) and a faction (the R.G.N.). It should not be overemphasized to say in this connection that Mr. Scato Swu and other friends had a series of talks with us on a number of issues. It must of course be said that

> Mr. Scato made a clean confession that he and his other friends had created a new group with a view to bringing about peaceful political overtures with the Government of India, but, as time wore on, it became clear that the Government of India was not going to respond to their approach on the ground that the Naga people were not united. He therefore came forward with the pointed suggestion that the only way to rebuff this challenge of the Indian Government is to be united under the banner of the Federal Government of Nagaland.[83]

Speculation about the possible ramification of the two factions persisted for about another year. In July 1970, however, the first move of moderate "Kaito men" back into the ranks of the N.F.G. occurred. An apathetic attitude towards the scattered jungle units on the part of the R.G.N. leaders was the apparent cause of the defection of Lieutenant Colonel Salumo and a batallion of R.G.N. troops.[84] The Naga press reported that the leadership had already lost its grip on its junior ranks following a squabble among the senior leadership and the R.G.N. had ceased to be a cohesive unit.[85]

Those China-trained troops under Generals Muivah and Thinoselie, who had escaped the Indian army dragnet, continued to maintain the hostilities. In May 1970 there were reports of raids in Manipur and the inauguration of a conscription campaign in the Angami, Chakhesang, Rengma and Mao areas.[86] This was followed by a series of reports in December of extensive guerilla operations in the Mao areas of Manipur State.[87] By this time the Underground had crystalised into 2 groups. They included those, such as Isak Swu and General Muivah, who supported links with China and were not prepared to compromise with the Indian Government. The second major group was composed of the "Revolutionary Government of Nagaland", an incohesive group of former N.F.G. leaders, who mainly came from the Sema tribal area, and opposed both Phizo's pro-China policy and

his uncompromising attitude.

The factions within the underground continued to maintain hostile postures towards each other, and despite occasional overtures towards a reunification, there was a continuing process of movement and defections While the N.F.G. maintained its militant stance, and sporadically increased the level of violence, the R.G.N. still hoped for a peaceful agreement with the Government of India. Yet although talks continued, they were no longer directly with the central administration, but instead, Kughato Sukhai and Scato Swu were compelled to maintain the dialogue with the representatives of the Nagaland State government.[88] The lack of cohesion within the underground gave the R.G.N. a very weak bargaining position, and the "peace" talks increasingly came to resemble a series of bargains struck between the Nagaland State Government and the leading personalities in the dissident underground groups. In 1971, for instance, Thungti Chang, resurrected the 'Hongkin' government purporting to represent the people of the Tuensang District, and he announced his intention of negotiating with the Indian government independently of the R.G.N.[89]

At the same time there appeared to be a strengthening of the N.F.G. Zashei Huire, who had earlier been reported as being about to cross over to the R.G.N. was elected president of the Naga Federal Government at the 23rd session of the Tatar Hoho on November 11th, 1971.[90] It is probable that the regaining of its former strength enhanced the position of the N.F.G. vis-a-vis the other factions and contributed to the disintegration of the dissident groups. For two more years, the R.G.N. remained in an ambiguous position, neither coming overground and participating in 'state' politics, nor rejoining the N.F.G. During this

period, however, continuous negotiations were conducted between R.G.N. leaders and the State Government, and finally, in August, 1973, Scato Swu, the President of the R.G.N., dissolved the Revolutionary Government and surrendered to Governor B. K. Nehru at Zunheboto.[91] Earlier in the year it had been reported that a large section of the R.G.N. grouping had crossed over to the Federal side and Scato Swu, General Zuheto, and other R.G.N. leaders had evidently come to the conclusion that it was better to strike a bargain with the Indian Government while there was still a possibility of a reasonable settlement. The deal involved a comprehensive resettlement plan for former R.G.N. guerillas, including specialised training in various trades, liberal offers of financial assistance in setting up piggeries and poultry farms, and guarantees of government jobs.[92] Others were recruited into a newly-formed Border Security Force battalion.[93]

Despite the material advantages offered by the Indian government to those who surrendered, there were few defections from the N.F.G., and the underground maintained a constant level of violence.[94] This was stepped up during periods of intense political activity, such as before elections to the legislative assembly,[95] and there were a few assassination attempts at prominent 'overground' politicians.[96] Throughout the early 1970s the question of a permanent solution to the hostilities between the N.F.G. and the Indian army was of paramount importance in both 'underground' and 'overground' politics, and it was indeed largely over this issue that the opposition U.D.F. was elected to power in place of the ruling, pro-Indian N.N.O. In September 1975, following the proclamation of the Emergency by Indira Gandhi, it seemed that a resolution to the conflict had been achieved, when leading members of the underground began

to negotiate an agreement with the Governor, L. P. Singh. On November 11th, 1975 representatives of the underground signed an agreement, known as the Shillong Accord, with the Governor at Shillong in Assam.[97] In the document, the participation of Nagaland in the Indian Union was completely accepted, and it seemed as though the N.F.G. was finally prepared to lay down its arms and accept the Indian constitution. Subsequent events proved, however, that this was an agreement arrived at by only a section of the N.F.G., and 'hardcore' elements continued to represent the moral and physical opposition to the presence of Indians in the State.

(v) 'Overground Politics'

Among the more moderate leaders, those who had decided to compromise with India, and accept a constitutional position within the Indian Union, there were many shades of opinion as to the degree of cooperation with the central government, and the nature of the relationship with the underground. These fundamental issues affected the configuration of groups within the Legislative Assembly.

Realignments occurred in the assembly not only on the basis of these issues, however, but also over the question of the distribution of the large sums of grants-in-aid conferred by the Indian Government. Political activity also revolved around the disbursement of ministerial positions in the new government, and over the central post of State Chief Minister. Constellations of supporters often clustered around a key figure on this basis.[98]

Until 1969 the Nagaland Nationalist Organization held a position of unchallenged supremacy in the State assembly, since the Democratic Party members had resigned as a group on December 8th, 1964, over the issue

of the Nagaland State government's participation on the "Indian side" in the peace negotiations.[99] In 1969, however, Vizol Angami, Tajen Ao and others, founded the Nagaland United Front (N.U.F.) as the main opposition party. The N.U.F. recruited former members of the Democratic Party and also a few members of the N.N.O. who had lost their former ministerial positions, or who had left the government.

During the campaigns leading up to the elections to the State assembly in February 1969, the N.N.O. took the 16-Point Memorandum as its manifesto, and called for a full implementation of the 16-Points. The N.U.F., on the other hand, based its appeal on reconciliation with the underground. In its pre-election manifesto it declared:

> Our stand for peace includes everyone, even those "hardcore" who have gone over to China. We do not advocate their total annihilation because we know that peace cannot be obtained by such means.... We know that the spirit of nationalism once aroused can never be suppressed by the use of force. Violence only breeds more violence.[100]

In response to questions about reports that the N.U.F. was pro-Phizo a spokesman for the party declared: "It is unnecessary to deny this. We are pro-Phizo. Anyone who is for peace such as we, are against anyone who endangers it".[101] Demonstrating a keener interest in 'over-ground' politics, the pre-election campaigning in Nagaland was unprecedented by anything except the early organizational activities of the N.N.C.[102]

The result of the election was another clear win for the N.N.O. (see table, p. 204). Of the 30 candidates fielded by the N.U.F., only 10 had gained seats while 27 (out of 40) N.N.O. candidates were elected, and they were joined by 12 members indirectly elected by the Tuensang Regional Council. Each of the 3 independents joined the N.N.O.[103]

Elections to the Nagaland Legislative Assembly

	1964		1969	1974
	Uncontested Seats	Elected Seats	Elected Seats	Elected Seats
N.N.O.	14	33	38	23
Democratic Party		11		
Nagaland United Front			10	
Independents		2	3	11
United Democratic Front				25

Almost immediately after the election there was a spectacular shake-up in the N.N.O. leadership. Hokishe Sema, the former Minister of Finance, was elected the new leader of the N.N.O.,[104] and this was subsequently followed by the announcement that T. N. Angami, the former Chief Minister, had been demoted to a very minor post, in an expanded Ministry.[105] Although precise information is not forthcoming it is evident that there had been some form of power struggle within the N.N.O. leadership. In September 1971, following N.N.O. victories in the mid-term bye-elections which were held as a result of the deaths of three members, there was a widening rift in the N.N.O. leadership.[106] A small but determined opposition group appeared within the N.N.O. which sought to bring about a change in the party's policies. It was rumoured that the House might be dissolved, and the State placed under President's rule, but instead there was a reshuffling of the N.N.O. Ministry. T. N. Angami, and Akum Imlong, Kapfo and S. Sangtam who led the dissident group, were ousted from their Cabinet positions.[107] Similarly, in November the N.N.O. General Secretary was directed to submit his resignation.[108]

Thus the exclusion of key personalities in the N.N.O. from the decision making process led to a deep factional division. In February 1972, 16 N.N.O. members of the Legislative Assembly crossed the floor to join the N.U.F.,[109] and less than a week later 8 N.N.O. members were expelled from the party.[110] Over the next few months there were continuous realignments, and the situation remained fluid. Events came to a head in August 1972 when an attempt was apparently made on the life of the Chief Minister, Hokishe Sema.[111] A number of N.N.O. members of the

Legislative Assembly were arrested for alleged complicity in the plot to kill the Chief Minister. T. N. Angami, Jamir, and three others were eventually released,[112] but Akum Imlong, who suffered from a weak heart, died in gaol.

In the months following the assassination attempt it was apparent that Hokishe Sema had once more gained control of his party. During this period, conflict with the Assam government arose over the question of the definition of the state borders and the Reserved Forests,[113] and there were discussions between the Chief Ministers of the two states in an attempt to resolve the problem.[114] Similarly, the government, under pressure from the N.U.F. (it changed its name to the United Democratic Front in July 1972), frequently brought up the question of the integration of all Nagas within a single state, and urged the full implementation of the 16-Point Memorandum.

With the third state elections coming up in February 1974, the underground army increased the level of violence.[115] It was thought that the election would be a close contest, and there was considerable fear among Indian politicians that if the U.D.F. won, they would attempt to further the separatist cause.[116] A much greater number of candidates came forward to contest the 1974 election.[117] According to newspaper reports, the voter turnout was high,[118] and throughout the voting period the underground kept up an intensive campaign of violence.[119] The U.D.F. gained the greatest number of seats, and with the inclusion of 7 of the 12 Independent members it formed an absolute majority (see Table p. 204). The Government of India had serious misgivings about the intentions of the U.D.F. and its affiliations with the underground, and the Governor,

L. P. Singh was unwilling to accept Vizol Angami as the new Chief Minister until he had discussed with him a number of fundamental issues, such as security, integrity, and the protection of all citizens of Nagaland, irrespective of caste creed, religious and party affiliations. "I have to think about the national interest," he told reporters.[120]

Although Vizol assured the Governor that the U.D.F. would uphold and work within the framework of the Constitution, and the new Ministry was sworn in on 24th February, 1974,[121] the U.D.F. did not complete its term of office. In March 1975, 14 U.D.F. Assembly members crossed the floor during debates over the budget, precipitating the fall of the government. A few days later, the leader of the opposition N. N. O., John Bosko Jasokie hastily formed a new government,[122] but it too was plagued by temporary alignments, and following the defection of 10 N.N.O. members to the U.D.F., the Assembly was dissolved and the State was placed under President's rule.[123]

Concluding Remarks

The abolition of representative government in Nagaland and the reversion to President's rule illustrate the complexity of political arrangements and the problems caused by rapid social change in the north eastern corner of India. As in the neighbouring states of the region, "ethnic" political demands and aspirations have confounded orderly administration, and institutions imposed from outside often show a lack of permanence that reflects their failure to gain acceptance as the forum in which the contest for political power occurs.

This thesis has attempted to examine the development of political relations within a society that has been exposed to rapid and far reaching

forces of change. In order to observe these developments in a clear light, we examined the elements contributing to the recent Naga political scene from a historical perspective. We asked how changes in the dominant value-system related to changes in political structures, and we attempted to relate those changing values and patterns of socialization to the corresponding emergence of new institutions, groups, leaders and policies. The central sections of the thesis described how the modernizing and integrative effects of a number of exogeneous sources of social change were of great importance in promoting the mobilization of Naga society along broadly ethnic lines. Chief among these were the Protestant missions which brought education and a written language, along with a new ethical system and elaborate forms of organization. Similarly, the colonial administration introduced a new economic system, and brought about a number of important changes in political relations, in notions of power, and in ideas about social status. Both of these elements had the effect of integrating the diverse and disparate Naga villages, and extending lines of communication to the tribal, and also the pan-Naga, levels.

It was this slow modernization of Naga society, accelerated during the upheavels of the Second World War, which permitted the political organization of Naga society on an ethnic basis, and with ethnic leaders, rather than upon a tribal or more traditional clan basis. In the north-eastern region of India colonial rule tended to create geographically delineated social communication systems, giving the centrally administered state of Assam a number of different social groups, among whom political power and the control of resources was unequally distributed. While the communal upheavels which occurred just before Partition tended to obscure

the deep ethnic divisions, since that time ethnic cleavages have been pushed to the forefront of regional politics.

Other questions posed in the introduction to the thesis revolved around the problems of the relation between the mobilization of new groups into politics and institutional development, and that of the role played by the indigenous elite as the "cutting edge of societal change". From the Christian missions there emerged a small educated Naga elite, which possessed political aspirations, and was capable both of voicing demands and of organizing support for them. At the forefront of this group stood Phizo and a small number of Nagas from the different tribes who espoused anti-colonial and anti-Indian attitudes; from their ranks came the motivation to transform the Naga National Council into an all-embracing "ethnic" political organization. By employing the Council as a modernizing instrument, by extending the organization, and by relating the new institutions to traditional political and social arrangements, the small Naga elite was able to take the initiative and unite a majority of the population behind their political aims and aspirations.

In reaction to these developments the Government of India at first acted clumsily, and even foolishly. The hostility of Bisnuram Mehdi in particular, aggravated the situation, affecting the nature of Naga demands and the political dynamics within the hills. Similarly the oppressive measures taken by the army in the first stages of the conflict merely hardened the opposition, and confirmed many waverers in support of the separatist movement. On the other hand, later more tolerant attitudes, and the concession of statehood persuaded many of the Naga leaders to adopt a more compromising position. Although the blandishments

offered by the Indian Government, together with a general desire for a cessation to the hostilities, have contributed to a stalemate position, the situation in the hills remains fluid. A serious disturbance in Indian national, or regional, politics might easily lead to an intensification of the Naga separatist demands.

As a form of political expression ethnicity is in need of further analysis from both the theoretical and case-study methods of approach. The modest aim of this thesis has been to examine ethnicity as a form of political identification and expression among a single people only. However, the proper arena for a more penetrating analysis must be the regional and cross-national fields. Constraints of time and space have compelled us to limit ourselves to a study of the Nagas, but the politics of that hill people is closely interwoven with that of the other ethnic groups of the northeastern corner of India, and the regional structure of political relationships must be understood in order to appreciate the mobilization of ethnic populations. For the many groups of people forcibly contained within the boundaries of former imperial administered territories, ethnic mobilization represents not the resuscitation of primordial sentiments, but an effective means of advancing local interests. Ethnicity should be viewed, therefore, not as a resurgence of traditional political arrangements, but in the context of the problem of acute social stratification and the resulting political conflict, which are an unwelcome legacy from the colonial period.

FOOTNOTES

1. Factions are understood to be "politically oriented quasi-groups, whose members are recruited on diverse social principles by a leader". Cited in Janet Bujra, "The Dynamics of Political Action: A New Look at Factionalism", American Anthropologist, vol. 75, (1973), p. 133.

2. Ibid., p. 141.

3. Bujra advances the argument that factions and parties can be viewed as forms of political association along the same line-continuum. She believes that "what is required is a recognition that we are dealing...with a range of possible groupings, from the least solidary to the most corporate". J. Bujra, op. cit., p. 133. An important aspect of the faction (as opposed to the party) is the relative impermanence of the grouping. Thus in Nagaland we see the transformation of the Naga Nationalist Organization into the Congress Party of Nagaland, and then splitting into two groups, the Naga National Party, and the (Indira) Congress Party, all within the space of fifteen years. Similarly the Democratic Party transforms itself into the United Democratic Front, then splits into the U.D.F. and the U.D.F. Progressive Party.

4. G. P. Means, "Cease-fire Politics in Nagaland", Asian Survey, Vol. XI, no. 10 (October 1971), p. 1006.

5. An analysis of the motives for factional alignments would depend upon extensive field research. On the other hand, the statements of underground members surrendering to the Indian Army (as cited in the Citizens Voice, and the Nagaland Times), indicate that a primary motive for surrendering was the inducement of money for the development of the village, or area, of those who came overground.

6. S. K. Chaube, op. cit., p. 151. The United Front pledged peace, and a "lasting good relationship with the Government of India".

7. J. Gibney, op. cit., p. 48.

8. On the other hand, the N.N.O. interpreted the election victory as a repudiation by the people of Phizo's plebiscite of 1951. See Gibney, op. cit., p. 51.

9. G. P. and I. N. Means, op. cit., p. 298. By-elections to the vacant seats were not held until May 28th, 1966, resulting in complete control of the Assembly by the N.N.O.

10. J. Gibney, op. cit, p. 46.

11. Ibid.

12. Reverend Michael Scott, The Nagas: India's Problem or the World's -- The Search for Peace, (Chatham, Kent: W. J. MacKay and Co., 1966), p. 8.

13. Ibid.

14. G. P. and I. N. Means, op. cit., p. 299.

15. Y. D. Gundevia, War and Peace in Nagaland (New Delhi: Palit and Palit, 1975), p. 107.

16. Shankar Dev was unable to participate because of illness.

17. M. Aram, Peace in Nagaland: eight year story, 1964-72, (New Delhi: Arnold-Heinemann Publishers, 1974), p. 22.

18. Y. D. Gundevia, op. cit., p. 107.

19. Ibid., p. 116.

20. M. Aram, op. cit., p. 27.

21. Ibid., p. 29.

22. Ibid., p. 32.

23. Y. D. Gundevia, op. cit., p. 131.

24. G. P. and I. N. Means, op. cit., p. 300.

25. M. Aram, op. cit., p. 33.

26. Ibid., p. 34, Zashei Huire issued a manifesto condemning "concentration" camps in Nagaland.

27. Ibid., p. 35.

28. G. P. and I. N. Means, op. cit., p. 301.

29. Y. D. Gundevia, op. cit., pp. 144-145.

30. G. P. and I. N. Means, op. cit., p. 301.

31. Y. D. Gundevia, op. cit., p. 149.

32. M. Aram, op. cit, p. 41.

33. Ibid., p. 53.

34. G. P. and I. N. Means, op. cit., p. 302.

35. Ibid., p. 303.

36. M. Scott, as cited in P. D. Stracey, Nagaland Nightmare, (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1968), p. 299.

37. G. P. and I. N. Means, op. cit., p. 302.

38. Ibid., p. 303, and see Y. D. Gundevia, op. cit., p. 164, where he quotes a letter from J. K. Sukhai, the Ato Kilonser of the N.F.G.

39. Y. D. Gundevia, op. cit., p. 164.

40. Ibid.

41. G. P. and I. N. Means, op. cit., p. 303.

42. New York Times, February 20th 1966, p. 9.

43. Y. D. Gundevia, op. cit., p. 172.

44. M. Aram, op. cit., p. 93.

45. Y. D. Gundevia, op. cit., p. 175.

46. Ibid., p. 174.

47. M. Aram, op. cit., p. 105.

48. Y. D. Gundevia, op. cit., p. 176.

49. M. Aram. op. cit., p. 94. This was because of a speech made by Jayaprakash Narayan in Assam which the N.F.G. interpreted as supporting the activities of the Indian army in suppressing the Nagas.

50. Y. D. Gundevia, op. cit., p. 177.

51. Ibid., p. 179.

52. M. Aram, op. cit., p. 113.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., p. 117. "Autonomous Status" within the Indian Union was held out as a possibility.

55. Ibid., p. 123. Phizo had been in London, whence he arrived from East Pakistan in 1960 (with a British passport obtained for him by the Reverend Michael Scott).

56. Ibid., pp. 123-124.

57. Y. D. Gundevia, op. cit., pp. 154-155.

58. G. P. and I. N. Means, op. cit., p. 310.

59. Ibid.

60. Shortly afterwards Kaito was removed from office at Phizo's command, and replaced by Phizo's nephew, Mowu Angami.

61. The N.F.G. treasury was reported to have contained Rs.110,000.

62. G. P. Means, op. cit., p. 1009.

63. The author's private interview with Phizo, loc. cit., Phizo maintained that Kaito was receiving large amounts of money from the Indian Government, and therefore he was shot as a traitor.

64. S. K. Chaube, op. cit., p. 153.

65. G. P. Means, op. cit., p. 1010. It was reported that between 550 and 1,650 Naga guerillas had received training in China.

66. Ibid.

67. "Mhiasiu announces President's Rule", Citizens Voice, (Kohima), November 1st, 1967, p. 1.

68. G. P. Means, op. cit., p. 1010.

70. Ibid.

71. Y. D. Gundevia, op. cit., p. 187.

72. Assam Tribune (Gauhati), April 23rd, 1968, p. 1.

73. G. P. Means, op. cit., p. 1011.

74. J. Gibney, op. cit., p. 71.

75. Assam Tribune (Gauhati), April 23rd, 1968, p. 1. as cited in G. P. Means, op. cit.

76. Assam Tribune (Gauhati), November 27th, 1968, p. 1, as cited in G. P. Means, op. cit.

77. "Murry: New Federal President Proclaims State-of-Emergency", Citizens Voice , (Kohima), November 14th, 1968, p. 1.

78. New York Times, Sunday, November 17th, 1968, p. 27.

79. Ibid.

80. G. P. Means, op. cit., p. 1013.

81. Ibid.

82. "Report on Swu's Arrest Denied: Huire joins Sukhai Group", Citizens Voice (Kohima), April 10th, 1969, p. 1. It is probable that this report was untrue, as Zashei Huire later became the President of the N.F.G.

83. "More for Merger of Revolutionary Camp with Federal Set-up Afoot", Citizens Voice, (Kohima), September 18th, 1969, pp. 1 and 6.

84. "Moderate Nagas join Federals en bloc", Citizens Voice (Kohima), July 24th, 1970, p.1.

85. Ibid., and see also "Fresh talks with Underground ruled out: Hokishe Sema", Citizens Voice, (Kohima), October 23rd, 1969, p. 1.

86. "Naga Rebels Start Conscription", Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 16th May 1970, p. 6.

87. Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 21st December, 1970, pp. 1, and 4, and 23rd December, 1970, p. 6.

88. "Sema Talks with Nagas", Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 23rd April, 1970, p. 6.

89. "Thungti Chang Clarifies Hongkin Government's Stand", Citizens Voice, (Kohima), October 22nd, 1971, pp. 1, and 3.

90. "Zushei Huire elected President", Citizens Voice, (Kohima), November 19th, 1971, p. 1.

91. "'Revolutionary Government' dissolved, Surrenders all arms", Citizens Voice, (Kohima), August 23rd, 1973, p. 1.

92. "Erstwhile Naga Rebels to be Given Government Jobs", Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 30th September, 1973, p. 1.

93. "Border Security Force Battalion Raised to Rehabilitate 1,000 Underground Nagas: Part"

94. E.g. "Security Force Men Killed by Rebel Nagas", Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 11th October, 1975, p. 1.

95. "Naga Rebels Step Up Activities", Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 16th November, 1973, p. 1.

96. An attempt was made on the life of J. B. Jasokie, "Nagaland Minister, wife shot at", Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 29th October, 1973, p. 1. This was the 7th attempt on the life of Jasokie. In August 1972 there had been an attempt on the life of the Chief Minister, Hokishe Sema, in which three men were killed. "Ambushers gang on Chief Minister; Providence Intervenes", Citizens Voice, (Kohima), August 11th, 1972, p. 1.

97. "U.G.'s Unconditional Acceptance of Indian Constitution", Nagaland Times (Dimapur), December 3rd, 1975, pp. 1 and 8.

98. In this year (1980), for instance, S. C. Jamir, formed the U.D.F. Progressive party following his expulsion from the U.D.F., and J. B. Jasokie left the Congress (formerly the N.N.O.) Party and set up the Naga National Party.

99. G. P. Means, op. cit., p. 1017.

100. Ibid. p. 108. These included Shilu Ao, who, for a time, was president of the newly-formed N.U.F.

101. "United Front Does Not Favour 'Total Annihilation' of Naga Hostiles", Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 28th January, 1969, p. 1.

102. "Unprecedented Poll Preparations in Nagaland", Assam Tribune (Gauhati), Jaunary 17th, 1969, p. 1.

103. Citizens Voice, (Kohima), February 20th, 1969, p. 1.

104. "Hokishe Sema Elected N.N.O. Party Leader Unopposed", Citizens Voice, (Kohima), February 20th, 1969, p. 1.

105. T. N. Angami was placed in charge of Electricity, "Bigger Cabinet Born After Spectacular Shake-up", Citizens Voice, (Kohima), February 27th, 1969, p. 1.

106. "N.N.O. Rift Widens", Citizens Voice, (Kohima), September 17th, 1971, p. 1.

107. Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 6th October 1971, p. 1. and Citizens Voice, (Kohima), October 15th, 1971, p.1.

108. Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), November 13th, 1971, p. 5.

109. "16 N. N. O. Move to Join Opposition United Front", Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 15th February, 1972,p. 1.

110. Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 20th February, 1972, p. 1.

111. It was rumoured that the plot had been engineered by Hokishe himself as a means of getting rid of the dissidents in his party, and of justifying a 'no-compromise' attitude towards the underground.

112. Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 31st October, 1972, p. 1.

113. Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 8th May, 1973, p.1.

114. Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 8th March, 1973, p.1.

115. "Naga Rebels Step up Activities", Assam Tribune, 16th November, 1973, p. 1.

116. Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 29th December, 1973, p. 4.

117. Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 18th January 1974, p. 5. There were 55 N.N.O., 47 U.D.F., and 108 Independent Candidates.

118. In the Assam Tribune of 15th February, 1974, p. 1. It was reported that the voter turn-out was 70-80%.

119. Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 18th February, 1974, p. 1.

120. Assam Tribune, (Gauhati), 1974, p. 1.

121. Citizens Voice, (Kohima), February 26th, 1974, p. 1.

122. Nagaland Times, (Dimapur), March 12th, 1975, p. 1.

123. "Nagaland Comes Under President's Rule", Nagaland Times, (Dimapur), March 26th, 1975, p. 1.

APPENDIX I

The Nine Point Agreement (The Hydari Agreement) arrived at between the Naga National Council and the Governor of Assam in June, 1947.

The right of the Nagas to develop themselves according to their freely expressed wishes is recognised.

1. Judicial

All cases whether civil or criminal arising between Nagas in the Naga Hills will be disposed of by duly constituted Naga courts according to Naga customary law, or such law as may be introduced with the consent of duly recognised Naga representative organisations, save that where a sentence of transportation or death has been passed there will be right of appeal to the Governor.

In cases arising between Nagas and non-Nagas in (a) Kohima and Mokokchung town areas, and (b) in the neighbouring plains districts, the judge if not a Naga, will be assisted by a Naga assessor.

2. Executive

The general principle is accepted that what the Naga National Council is prepared to pay for the Naga National Council should control. This principle will apply to the work done as well as the staff employed.

While the District Officer will be appointed at the discretion of the Governor, Sub-division of the Naga Hills should be administered by a Sub-divisional Council with a full time executive President, paid by the Naga National Council, who would be responsible to the District

Officer, for all matters falling within the latter's responsibility, and to the Naga National Council for all matters falling within their responsibility.

In regard to:

(a) Agriculture--The Naga National Council will exercise all the powers now vested in the District Officer.

(b) P.W.D.--The Naga National Council will take over full control.

(c) Education and Forest Department--The Naga National Council is prepared to pay for all the services and staff.

3. Legislative

That no laws passed by the Provincial or Central Legislature which would materially affect the terms of this agreement of the religious practices of the Nagas shall have legal force in the Naga Hills without the consent of the Naga National Council.

In cases of dispute as to whether any law did so affect this agreement, the matter would be referred by the Naga National Council to the Governor who would then direct that the law in question should not have legal force in the Naga Hills pending the decision of the Central Government.

4. Land

That land with all its resources in the Naga Hills should not be alienated to a non-Naga without the consent of the Naga National Council.

5. Taxation

That the Naga National Council will be responsible for the

imposition, collection, and expenditure of land revenue and house tax, and of such other taxes as may be imposed by the Naga National Council.

6. Boundaries

That present administrative divisions should be modified so as (1) to bring back into the Naga Hills District all the Forests transferred to the Sibsagar and Nowgong Districts in the past, and (2) to bring under one unified administrative unit, as far as possible, all Nagas. All the areas so included would be within the scope of the present proposed agreement.

No areas should be transferred out of the Naga Hills without the consent of the Naga National Council.

7. Arms Act

The District Officer will act on the advice of the Naga National Council in accordance with the provisions of the Arms Act.

8. Regulations

The Chin Hills Regulations, and the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulations will remain in force.

9. Period of Agreement

The Governor of Assam as the agent of the Government of Indian Union will have a special responsibility for a period of 10 years to ensure the due observance of this agreement; at the end of this period the Naga National Council will be asked whether they require the above agreement to be extended for a further period, or a new agreement regarding the future of the Naga people arrived at.

APPENDIX II

TEXT OF THE SIXTEEN POINT MEMORANDUM

1. The Name

The territories that were heretofore known as the Naga Hills-Tuensang Area under the Naga Hills-Tuensang Area Act 1957, and any other Naga area, which may hereafter come under it, shall form a state within the Indian Union and be hereafter known as the Nagaland.

2. The Ministry-in-Charge

The Nagaland shall be under the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India.

3. The Governor of Nagaland

(1) The President of India shall appoint a Governor for Nagaland, and he will be vested with the Executive Powers of the Government of Nagaland, and he will function from the Headquarters of the Nagaland.

(2) His administrative secretariat will be headed by a Chief Secretary stationed at the Headquarters with other Secretariat Staff as necessary.

(3) The Governor shall have special responsibility with regard to Law Order and Police during transitional period only.

4. Council of Ministers

(1) There shall be a Council of Ministers (viz. Six Ministers and Three Deputy Ministers) with a Chief Minister at the head to assist and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions.

(2) The Council of Ministers shall be responsible to the Naga Legislative Assembly.

5. The Legislature

There shall be constituted a Legislative Assembly consisting of elected and nominated members as may be deemed necessary representing different Tribes. (Further, a duly constituted body of Experts may be formed to examine and determine the principles of representation on a democratic basis).

6. Representation in the Parliament

Three elected members shall represent the Nagaland in the Union Parliament, i.e. Two in the Lok Sabha and One in the Rajya Sabha.

7. Acts of Parliament

No Act or Law passed by the Union Parliament affecting the following provisions shall have legal force in the Nagaland unless specifically applied to it by a majority vote of the Naga Legislative Assembly:

(1) The Religious or Social practices of the Nagas.

(2) Naga Customary Laws and Procedure.

(3) Civil and Criminal Justice so far as these concern decisions according to Naga Customary Law.

(4) The ownership and transfer of land and its resources.

8. Local Self-Government

Each tribe shall have the following Units of Law-making and Administrative Local Bodies to deal with matters concerning the respective tribes and areas:

(1) The Village Council.

(2) The Range Council.

(3) The Tribal Council.

9. Administration of Justice

(a) Each tribe shall have the following Courts of Justice:

(1) The Village Court.

(2) The Range Court.

(3) The Tribal Court.

(b) Appelate Courts:

(1) The District Court-cum-Sessions Court (for each District), and Supreme Court of India.

(2) The Naga Tribunal (for the whole of the Nagaland) in respect of cases decided according to Customary Law.

10. Administration of Tuensang District

(1) The Governor shall carry on the administration of the Tuensang District for a period of ten years until such time when the tribes in the Tuensang District are capable of shouldering more responsibilities of the advance system of administration.

The commencement of ten-year period of administration will start simultaneously with the enforcement of detailed workings of the Constitution in other parts of the Nagaland.

(2) Provided further that a Regional Council shall be formed for Tuensang District by elected representatives from all the tribes in Tuensang District, and the Governor may nominate representatives to the Regional Council as well. The Deputy Commissioner will be the Ex-Officio Chairman

of the Council. This Regional Council will elect members to the Naga Legislative Assembly to represent Tuensang District.

(3) Provided further that on the advice of the Regional Council, steps will be taken to start various Councils and Courts, in those areas where the people feel themselves capable of establishing such institutions.

(4) Provided further that no Act or Law passed by the Naga Legislative Assembly shall be applicable to Tuensang District unless specifically recommended by the Regional Council.

(5) Provided further that the Regional Council shall supervise and guide the working of the various Councils and Courts within Tuensang District and wherever deem necessary depute the Local Officers to act as Chairman thereof.

(6) Provided further that Councils of such areas inhabited by a mixed population or which have not as yet decided to which specific tribal Council to be affiliated to, shall be directly under the Regional Council for the time being.

~~And at the end of ten years the situation will be reviewed and if~~ the people so desired the period will be further extended.

11. Financial Assistance from the Government of India

To supplement the revenues of the Nagaland, there will be a need for the Government of India to pay out of the consolidated fund of India such Grants-in aid as follows:

(1) Lump-sums as may be necessary each year for the development programmes in the Nagaland.

(2) A fixed recurring sum (Annual Subvention) for meeting the cost of the administration of Nagaland.

12. Re-transfer of Reserved Forests

All the Reserved Forests and other Naga areas that were transferred out of Naga area will be returned to the Nagaland with a clearly defined boundary under the present settlement.

13. Consolidation of Contiguous Naga Area

The other Naga Tribes inhabiting the areas contiguous to the present Nagaland should be allowed to join the Nagaland if they so desire.

14. Formation of Separate Naga Regiment

In order that the Naga people can fulfill their desire of playing a full role in the defence forces of India, the question of raising a separate Naga regiment should be duly examined for action.

15. Transitional Period

(a) On reaching the political settlement with the Government of India, the Naga People's Convention shall appoint a Body to draft the details of the Constitution for the Nagaland on the basis of the settlement.

(b) There shall be constituted an Interim Body with elected representatives from every tribe, to assist and advise the Governor in the administration of the Nagaland during the transitional period. The tenure of office of the members of the Interim Body will be three years subject to re-election.

16. Inner Line Regulation

The Rules embodied in the Protected Area Act 1958 shall remain in force in the Nagaland.

Signed: Dr. Imkongliba Ao, President, Naga People's Convention

Signed: Vizol Angami, Vice-President
Jasokie, Secretary
S. Chubatoshi Jamir, Joint Secretary

Dated Mokokchung, the 26th October, 1959.

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