THE JAPANESE IN CANADA: SYMBOLIC POLITICS IN ACTION

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A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Master of Arts

McMaster University

1979

MASTER OF ARTS (1980)
(Political Science)

McMASTER UNIVERSITY
Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: The Japanese Canadians; Symbolic Politics In Action

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SUPERVISOR: Dr. T. J. Lewis

NUMBER OF PAGES: v, 126

The Japanese Canadians; Symbolic Politics In Action

In this thesis, the interaction between different participants is examined to determine how a particular political event was shaped. Canadian Japanese were discriminated against in an extremely severe fashion. In this thesis, the role of three major relationships is examined to determine the effect that they had on shaping and maintaining racial tensions. The three relationships are as follows; the relationship between the Japanese and their white competitors, the relationship between Canada and Japan, and the relationship between British Columbia and the rest of Canada. Using the work of Murray Edelman and Joseph Gusfield as a theoretical framework these three relationships are examined to see how they came to have effects far beyond their instrumental value.

Concern about the success of Japanese competition, fear of Japan's growing military power and anger about Canada's lack of concern about British Columbia's problems led to racial attacks and the eventual internment of the Japanese Canadian population.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My thanks to my Supervisor, Dr. T.J. Lewis and to Kay and Kunio Shimizu for their inspiration, assistance and advice.

Thanks also to my typist, Rachel Ferrington, who arranged this paper in a presentable form.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

In 1877, the first Japanese immigrants arrived in Canada. They arrived in British Columbia at a time when Oriental labour was vital to the development and growth of the province. To the industry of British Columbia they provided a cheap, available labour supply. To the Japanese, British Columbia provided an opportunity to escape from the traditional economic authority of their native land. Their history in Canada is in many ways a tragic one. In many other ways, it is a history of which their descendents can be extremely proud. It is the story of a proud people who struggled against adversity and prejudice and won.

I will be discussing the history of the Japanese-Canadians in an attempt to come to some understanding of why their history developed in the fashion in which it did. In many ways this is a study of the factors which give rise to the growth and development of racism. The intention of this paper is not to bemoan the fact of racism, but rather to understand the circumstances which cause a person of one race to feel animosity towards a person from another race. In essence, then, this is an attempt to describe how actions come to have symbolic importance beyond their immediate instrumental effects.

In his book, Politics as Symbolic Action, Murray Edelman demonstrates the reasons why we should study myths and symbols in our efforts to understand the political process. We all recognize the importance of symbols to a limited degree. We spoke of the charisma of Pierre Trudeau when he was first elected leader of his party and Prime Minister of Canada. An image of Pierre Trudeau was created which encouraged public opinion to coalesce around him. In the past people have organized themselves behind symbols like flags, monarchs, battle cries, religion and a variety of other symbols. All of these had the effect of encouraging people to ignore the ambivalences and ambiguities of their particular situation in favour of a strongly directed course of action. Unfortunately, this strongly directed course of action often brings one group of people into conflict with another. Such is the case with the Japanese-Canadians.

It is not enough to say that the Japanese were perceived as a symbol of different values which whites in British Columbia saw as threatening. The perceived threat must be examined in some detail if we are to determine the extent to which it was created by instrumental circumstances. We must examine the situation in an effort to determine how far the perception was created by unwarranted fears. We must also look at the roles played by politicians, press and other leaders of public opinion. A study of symbolic interactions in addition to instrumental relationships, can provide a more comprehensive view of a particular situation.

Economic relationships played an extremely important role in the way the situation developed. By bringing the symbolic aspects of the situation to light the intent is not to downplay the importance of economic questions, rather, it is an attempt to understand how and why these concerns became magnified out of proportion and come to represent concerns about the way status was allocated. In this way symbolic and instrumental values became closely related. It is virtually impossible to separate the two when status is allocated based on the amount of material goods a person controls.

By examining the interplay between symbolic and instrumental factors we can come to understand the effect they have in shaping our interpretation of a particular situation. To attempt to isolate one factor and rely on it to provide a causal explanation of events is to ignore the complexity of social phenomena. To simply bemoan the hardships experienced by the Japanese in the tradition of all good liberals would be to refuse to learn from history. If at times this work appears to be overly descriptive, it is for this reason. The intent of this work is not to create another scapegoat on which to cast the blame for the internment of the Japanese. Neither is it an attempt to simply lament a historic situation which no power on earth can change. Rather, it is an attempt to describe how various factors interrelate to cause the development of an ugly racism. Hopefully, by describing and trying to reach an understanding of why this happened, we will gain enough knowledge to prevent a recurrence of what happened to the Japanese-Canadians. Knowledge will serve as

a reply to those who assess the situation pessimistically or who make proclamations from insufficient evidence.

Economic forces did play a role in the growth of anti-Japanese feeling. Job insecurity did lead to incidents of racism. The economic situation was interpreted by politicians and newspapers in a fashion which portrayed the Japanese-Canadians as a threat to the welfare of the people of British Columbia. Anxiety and the lack of cross-cultural experiences allowed the general public to be manipulated in a way that operated to the detriment of Japanese-Canadians. The interrelationship between public policy and public opinion is so complex that only by careful analysis can we come to understand how the situation developed.

Murray Edelman, in his books, Politics as Symbolic Action, and Symbolic Politics suggests how one group of people can manipulate political myths and symbols to the disadvantage of another group. He suggests that people relate to their world symbolically and that political interaction can be understood by examining the symbols around which public opinion can be mobilized. His description of the political process allows us to understand the relationship between the immediate instrumental goals of public policy and their broader symbolic effects.

> Political forms thus come to symbolize what large masses of men need to believe about the state to reassure themselves. But political forms also convey goods, services, and powers to specific groups of men. There is accordingly no reason to expect that the meanings will be limited to instrumental functions the political forms serve. The capacity of political forms both to serve as a powerful means of expression for mass publics and to convey benefits to particular groups is a central theme of this book. [2]

Edelman, parallels the discussion of status concerns we find in Joseph Gusfield's discussion of status conflicts in the Symbolic Crusade. Status groups manifest their discontent symbolically through political action. Gusfield describes prohibition as a manifestation of the discontent of middle class protestant Americans. He points out that although prohibition legislation had instrumental effects, its major effect was to confirm the position of rural protestant American's as the definers of social values.

> If status depends on the act of the prestige givers in relation to prestige receivers, then efforts to redistribute prestige against the reluctance of the prestige givers to grant it. Only in this sense can social status be a subject of political conflict. In our usage class politics is political conflict over the allocation of material resources. Status politics is political conflict over the allocation of prestige. In specific cases the two processes overlap and affect each other. [3]

To ignore the symbolic side of political action in favour of purely economic analysis is to forfeit the possibility of arriving at a holistic explanation. Similarly to confine oneself to an examination of the symbolic is to avoid coming to a complete understanding of the situation because of the lack of an explanation of the economic concerns. In this thesis I will attempt to describe the interplay between the two to develop a more complete understanding of the underlying reasons which shaped the development of Japanese-Canadian history.

Edelman describes two types of symbols which can be derived from the analysis of political action. One type of symbol is what he terms the "referential symbol". Referential symbols should be interpreted in the same fashion by everyone because they refer to objective data

accumulated about a particular subject. Statistics are one type of referential symbols.[4] Condensation symbols refer to symbols which evoke emotional concerns among the participants involved in a particular situation. One of our concerns in this study is to examine the way that supposedly neutral referential symbols can be manipulated to condense public opinion. For example, immigration data was often used incorrectly to prove that British Columbians were in danger of being swallowed by the 'yellow horde'.

Legislation serves as a legitimizing agent supporting the values of one group over another. It forces other groups in society to emulate the beliefs of that legitimized group. This emulation leads to a sanction, at least symbolically of that group's status as leaders and definers of public behaviour.[5] When we examine Japanese-Canadian history, we will see that British Columbians expected Asian immigrants to accept white superiority and to defer to their position in society. When the Japanese refused to do this conflict arose and legislation affirming the white position in society was inacted.[6]

Any action taken by the Japanese to adapt to the culture of the white community was taken as further sign of their attempt to subvert the province for their own purposes. Considering the impossibility of changing the colour of their skins we can see the untenable situation the Japanese found themselves in. Any attempt to assimilate was firmly rejected. Any attempt not to assimilate resulted in cries that they were impossible to assimilate. Gusfield points out that in the case of prohibition the successful passage of

legislation brought with it the end of open conflict. In the case of the Japanese-Canadians this was not possible, they could never change the colour of their skin or their cultural background. Thus, white workers felt that these 'foreigners' threatened their whole way of life. Feelings tended to condense around economic issues. Japanese success was viewed as an attempt to obtain status at the cost of the white population.

Within this whole situation information and the dissemination of information played an extremely important role. Shibutani in his book Improvised News describes the role that various political figures play in disseminating information and directing the way it is to be interpreted. Edelman supports this idea of the interpretive character of information reception. According to him, non empirical observations of the situation leads individuals to choose which empirical observations they will take into consideration. Things like status and self interest will result in the individual accepting some information while rejecting other material.[7]

Politicians, labour leaders, and newspapers in British Columbia were able to manipulate public opinion to create an atmosphere of anti-Japanese hatred because of the anxiety present about the nature of the Japanese role in the province.

As we develop this topic further, we will be looking for examples of the way status conflict influenced government policy in British Columbia. We begin with an examination of Japanese immigration to Canada and the role that it played in developing the economy of

British Columbia. This will include an examination of some Japanese cultural characteristics which shaped peoples' perceptions of them. Once the cultural differences between the Japanese and other British Columbians are established the development of their historical situation will be examined. We will look at economic competition between whites and Japanese in British Columbia. Japanese success tended to create a great deal of anxiety among the members of the larger community. The relationship between the Province of British Columbia and the Dominion government will also be looked at to determine the effect that the strained relationship between the two had upon the development of the situation. We will also look at the role of the Imperial Japanese government in the shaping of Canadian history. The status of Canada in international politics had a great effect on the situation in British Columbia. As the government of Japan grew more and more powerful, it created more and more anxiety among Canada's Pacific coast residents. This further undermined the position of that province's Japanese population.

To accomplish the task we have set the role of various community leaders will be examined. Their manipulation of political public opinion by dramaturgical means had an enormous effect on the way the situation developed.

In the end, we will come to understand the complex patterns and interrelationships which combined to cause the Japanese population of British Columbia to be interned at the beginning of World War Two.

Notes to Pages 1 - 9

1. F. Laviolette, The Canadian Japanese and World War II, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948, p.28 for a discussion of these particular points.

2. Joseph Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969, p.18.

3. Ibid., p.19.

4. "Referential symbols are economical ways of referring to the objective elements in objects or situations: these elements identified in the same way by different people. Such symbols are useful because they help in logical thinking about the situation and in manipulating it. Industrial accidents statistics and cost figures in cost plus contracts are referential political symbols though they may also be condensation symbols."

5. Joseph Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969, p.27.

6. "It was not an effort to reform the habits and behaviour of those who made up its membership. The lowly, the small farmer, the wage earner, the craftsman - these were the objects of reform. This is not to maintain that there was no conviction of sin among the responsible citizens who made up the Temperance Associations. What it implies is that such associations sought to disseminate and strengthen the norms of life which were part of the style of the old elite."

7. Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action, New York: Academic Press, 1971, p.41.

I

THE JAPANESE CANADIANS

Japanese immigrants came to Canada to escape from a rigidly controlled heirarchical system which impeded their economic development. [1] In 1854, the intervention of Commodore Perry of the United States Navy, ended two and one half centuries of self imposed isolation for Japan. In 1871, the first Japanese passports were issued to allow students and tourists to visit other parts of the world. The Japanese government was extremely cautious in its emigration policy. Although some emigrants were allowed to go to other Asian countries, it was not until 1884 that any large scale emigration to the West was allowed. This emigration took the form of contract labourers to work in the plantations of Hawaii. This movement spelled the beginning of major emigration to Western countries.

In 1877, the first Japanese citizen is rumoured to have arrived in Canada. However, it was not until 1885 that immigration to Canada began on any sort of large scale. [2] Most of the early immigrants came from the peasant classes, the group most limited by the superstructure of Japanese society. They were also the most discontented group. [3]

Modernization caused fear among the peasants because they saw the meager value of their property dwindling. They were afraid of increases in the already heavy taxes. The Japanese immigrant came to Canada, like most other immigrant groups, because of a desire for an improved economic position. They came to Canada with the express purpose of making enough money to afford them economic security and an acceptable standard of living. Wages for labourers in Canada were high compared to wages in Japan.[4]

The feelings expressed by Japanese questioned by William Lyon Mackenzie King during the proceedings of the Royal Commission Inquiring into why Orientals were emigrating to Canada[5], agreed on one thing: Canada was the land of opportunity and this opportunity was the factor which drew them to Canada. The desire for wages and improved status was the prime motivation which later moved the main stream of Japanese emigration from Hawaii to Canada.

Hawaii was the most common destination of emigrants from Japan. However working conditions were bad and any opportunities for advancement were limited by the powerful Planter's Association. As a result many Japanese left Hawaii to come to Canada and the United States.[6]

The Japanese immigrant was highly motivated by his desire for economic wealth which would guarantee him an improved position in the community.

> Emigration was often the only way he could hope to attain personal prestige, wealth and power - even to a limited degree. One of the most striking aspects of the early immigration of the Japanese, then, was that nearly all of

> them came to Canada with no other thought than to make enough money to return to the ancestral village.[7]

This enormous drive for economic success explains the sacrifices they were willing to make. Generally, they were willing to work harder and longer to achieve this success.

Canada provided what appeared to be an ideal home for Japanese emigrants. It was fairly close to Japan. Immigrants had plently of opportunity to earn high (comparatively), wages and jobs were plentiful. Canada needed labour to develop the provinces' growing economy. Sir Wilfred Laurier specifically points to this need for labour(in a letter)to R. G. MacPherson in a letter dated August 8th, 1907.

> The question is simply this. You have a scarcity of labour in British Columbia and there are parties in the Province, with the tacit approbation of a large section of the population, who are making constant efforts to bring in Asiatics to work in your lumber mills, your fisheries and your mines, and also as domestic servants.[8]

The same sentiment was later echoed in a letter from MacPherson to Laurier.[9] Coupled with the dependence of the British Columbian industry on Oriental labour was the difficulty that employers had in getting white labourers to accept certain jobs.[10]

To the industry of British Columbia, the Japanese were a source of labour. When these immigrant groups became upwardly mobile economically, white British Columbians began to react with increasing hostility.

The Japanese who came to Canada brought with them many aspects of their culture. This cultural heritage manifested itself in the various cultural and social organizations that were formed in the Japanese-Canadian community. Gradual assimilation of the Japanese

community became noticeable as the number of second generation Japanese grew. The Nissei, (the second generation), found themselves caught between two opposing cultural traditions. Trained in Anglo-Saxon schools, they rejected some of the more traditional customs of their parents but their colour prevented their acceptance by the white community.

In Japan life was organized into closely knit family units. Each family group was registered at a central government office under the name of one family member. This man retained complete control over the affairs of the family until the son or daughter married, or until he died. In Canada, Japanese tradition maintained the closeness of the family. Immigrants brought other family members to Canada to work with them. Community bath houses, common business ventures and other social organizations all served to maintain the closeness of the community.[11]

The cohesiveness of the community was maintained by internal organizations. These organizations were a direct transfer from the prefectural system of Japan. Ken-jin-kai prefectural associations served as mutual aid organizations.

> Assistance of a more formal nature comes from the "ken-jin-kai" or the prefectural associations. A member of the prefectural associations informed us: "We do not wish to see our own "ken" people starving or committing a crime for in either case it reflects disgrace on us. If he is starving, we should take the responsibility of helping him, and if he displays any criminal tendencies, we should restrain him and lead him back to proper conduct, for he is one of the 'doken-jin' (fellow prefecture men)." Still more formal is the assistance rendered by the Canadian-Japanese association, the Camp and Mill Worker's Union, and the Japanese Welfare Federation and other

> Japanese community associations outside of Vancouver. Many of these associations have as a major objective the mutual welfare of their members. [12]

The number of these associations are evidence of the closeness of the Japanese-Canadian community. There were over two hundred religious and secular organizations in British Columbia before the advent of World War II. [13] The Japanese people were particularly concerned for the welfare of their community members as well as the way that the community was seen by the outside community. Formal and informal organizations were involved in every aspect of the Japanese community. The combination of these organizations made the Japanese community virtually self-sufficient.

> Whether in Canada or in the United States, the Japanese are noted for the aid they give the more unfortunate members of their race, either the unemployed or the unemployable. The social workers in British Columbia almost uniformly stated in interviews that the "Japanese look after their own; we have had very few on our lists." Assistance of an informal nature is given by relatives and friends and is very important in a group as closely knit together by familial and kinship ties as are the Japanese. The conception of the family as including more than those in the immediate household, together with the devotion of the members of the family to one another, guarantee a certain security for relatives whether in Canada or Japan. [14]

This mutual assistance is interesting because it explains why the Japanese community resisted attempts to integrate it into an inferior position in society. The Japanese conviction that their own culture was equal if not superior to the culture of the white community prevented the conversion of the Japanese to a new lifestyle or their integration as second class citizens subservient to the white population. Although the Japanese were willing to operate harmoniously

with the white community, they had no intention of giving up their own cultural heritage.

One of the other factors which reinforced the closeness of the Japanese community was the obvious hostility of the white community. This factor was probably the most influential in restricting the entrance of the Nissei to the white community. One Nissei told me a story of how, after obtaining a university degree, he could only get a job as a cook on a boat. While I do not want to deny the possible importance of higher knowledge in the culinary arts, he felt that his talents were being wasted. The only place he could obtain employment commensurate with his qualifications and training was in Japan or in the Japanese-Canadian community. The period between the two wars saw many Nissei return to Japan or emigrate to the United States where restrictions on the types of employment they could obtain were less severe. These restrictions only served to ensure the cohesiveness of the Japanese community in Canada. [15]

Another important fact to note about the Japanese community was the extent of their education and the value they placed on educating their children. Japan instituted universal education in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Most Japanese who came to Canada were literate in their own language. Most Issei, (first generation), never bothered to become literate in English. They had three Japanese languages newspapers, and for the most part were able to meet most of their needs in the Japanese community. Their lack of English language skills served to further isolate them from the white Canadian community. It also encouraged them to develop Japanese

language schools for their children. There were fifty-nine of these schools in British Columbia, and while their children must have found it tedious, every day after English school was over, they trekked to a language school where they learned Japanese. This education served to bring the Japanese-Canadian community closer together and although Nissei chafed under the restrictions of their parents, they remained fairly obedient, giving them a tradition to fall back on when they were rejected by the larger white community.

Through all their struggles the Japanese retained their pride in their cultural heritage. This pride helped them to retain a sense of confidence in themselves and their community.

> Also pervasive in the Japanese group and individual mentality was the overwhelming belief in the superiority of Japanese values and ethical codes which were certainly intensified by - perhaps accentuated in defence against - the overt hostility of the dominant group, but nonetheless ingrained in their character. The outer society attempted to impose an inferior status upon them, but the average Japanese felt himself to be a person of dignity, part of one of the old cultures of the world, and so could consciously resist such efforts and feel himself to be worthy, able and beyond disrespect. Like most insular peoples, the Japanese regarded themselves as a race apart, unique in origin and achievement.[16]

Above all else this pride in their culture led to strong community support for individual Japanese-Canadians. The Japanese-Canadians lobbied against laws which discriminated against them, first by themselves through their own organizations, and later in cooperation with Co-Operative Commonwealth Federation members like Angus and Grace McInnes. The CCF was the first political party to openly support the Japanese struggle for equal rights. Through all these confrontations, even after several defeats, Japanese-Canadians persevered.

The Japanese-Canadians brought the same sense of determination and the same strong community organization to their involvement in the British Columbian economy. Their community organizations often supported and prevented the failure of their economic ventures. The close knit community encouraged cooperative ventures. It also encouraged the development of mutual aid societies in branches of industry. These mutual aid societies brought strength and unity to workers whose nationality was Japanese. They also protected Japanese-Canadians from the frequent attacks of the white community. In their efforts to become successful Japanese immigrants made a very important economic contribution to the growth of British Columbia and to Canada as a whole.

It is important to note the economic contribution of Japanese-Canadians to the development of British Columbia not only because of its enormous effect, but also as a contrast to the shameful treatment they received from their white neighbours. Immigrant populations, in this case the Japanese, made an important contribution to the development of British Columbia in two ways. They provided a source of labour in a time when the labour necessary for development was in short supply. They also brought innovations to fishing, agriculture and commerce. These innovations led to increased production, expanded markets, as well as a wider diversity in both the products produced and the markets supplied.

Japanese-Canadians had an enormous effect on the fishing industry of British Columbia. Early immigrants concentrated in this industry for several reasons. Fishing was one of the easiest industries

in which to establish themselves because of the relatively low capital expenditure required. The fishing industry, at least in the early years, provided the immigrant with a relatively large profit in a fairly short time. For the early immigrants whose main intention was to earn enough money to return home in style, the industry was extremely attractive. Combined with this factor was the limited access Japanese immigrants had to other occupations as well as the experience they had already obtained in Japan's fisheries.

The Japanese-Canadian brought many new innovations to the fishing industry of British Columbia. These include new markets, new fishing techniques, as well as the discovery and development of new fishing grounds. As in other industries, their activities were characterized by a high degree of organization with extensive mutual help organizations, which were designed to help white and Japanese fishermen.

In 1888, the first Japanese immigrant was granted a fishing license. By 1896, there were already four hundred and fifty-two Japanese-Canadian fishermen licensed to fish in British Columbia. By 1901 the number had swelled to one thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight, (1,958) out of the four thousand seven hundred licenses issued. It was estimated that by this time there were some four thousand Japanese involved in the fishing industry. This figure includes men with licenses, their helpers and men employed by the canneries. The number of licenses issued fluctuated considerably, however, the percentage of Japanese licenses remained at approximately thirty-five

percent of the total number of licenses issued. By the end of the first world war, this number had grown to almost fifty per cent of the licenses issued.

Japanese-Canadian involvement in the fishing industry was characterized by well-organized fishermen's associations. The first association was formed in 1897 and was incorporated as the Steveston Benevolent Society in 1900. Japanese-Canadians were also responsible for the formation of the West Coast Fisherman's Association. This association was an economic cooperative open to fishermen of any race and had several white members. The Japanese also had a number of informal cooperative associations.[17]

The early part of this century was characterized by several confrontations between different fishing organizations which resulted in open violence among Japanese and white fishermen. The labour organizations of different racial groupings were played off against one another by the cannery owners. Each group seems to have taken turns holding out for more money while the other group worked. There were a number of instances of violence, net cutting, and other types of sabotage. It should be noted that both groups seemed equally willing to do harm to each other and it is difficult to determine which party was originally the instigator. Racial lines were not rigidly drawn during these conflicts. There were a number of Japanese members of otherwise predominantly white unions and white members of unions which were predominantly Japanese.[18] Although membership was integrated only to a small extent, it is significant

because it suggests that the conflict was more between different unions than between different racial groups. Management was particularly adept at manipulating the unions to keep the labour costs at fish processing plants and canneries as low as possible.

Despite the legal harassment, prejudice and discrimination, Japanese-Canadian fishermen were subjected to, they went on to make an extremely important contribution to the development of the fishing industry.

In the lumbering industry, Japanese-Canadians provided an important source of labour. Often lumbering was a source of off-season employment for fishermen. As in fishing, legal and de facto discrimination nearly forced them out of the industry.

> The same kind of restrictive pattern persisted in the lumbering industry in which hostility had been endemic since the turn of the century. Once the demand for lumber and the shortage of labour engendered by the war were over, the Japanese in lumbering like their compatriots in fishing were deemed expendible. [19]

The Japanese first started working in the British Columbian forest industry in 1890 but it was not until 1900 that there was a significant number of them employed in the industry. The demand for labour brought about by the advent of World War I, brought Japanese labour to a position of prominence in the industry. By the end of the war, about thirteen per cent of the labour force in the industry were of Japanese origin.

Disenfranchisement, loss of the right to vote, meant that the Japanese-Canadians were prevented from holding a hand logging license.

Employers who held government contracts were also barred from employing Asiatic labour.

> ...the contractor was bound to give preference to British subjects and not to employ any Asiatics "directly or indirectly, upon, about or in any connection with the works." If the clause was violated, the Minister could forfeit all the money due to the contractor. [20]

The Japanese organized several associations in the logging industry. These associations were unable to obtain many concessions from white businessmen and owners due to two factors. They were in an extremely weak bargaining position because of the opposition of white labour unions. They took a more moderate position than the fishermen, and no violent confrontations took place. In 1920, the Camp and Mill Worker's Union was formed among the Japanese labour force in the logging industry. It was one of the major Japanese organizations in British Columbia. At one time it was involved in a struggle to take the place of the Japanese-Canadian Citizen's Association as the representative body of the Japanese-Canadian community. In 1927, the Camp and Mill Worker's Union affiliated with the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada. This signalled the end of organized labour's active participation in the anti-Asiatic crusade. In 1937, most of the other Japanese labouring associations in the forest industry joined with the International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphide and Paper Mill Workers.

By the 1930's Japanese-Canadians had established fourteen logging companies of their own in British Columbia. These companies had gross receipts of slightly over one million dollars. As in other

industries, Japanese success brought with it bitterness and animosity from their white competitors.

The pressure placed on the Japanese-Canadians in the logging industry eventually forced many of them to look for work in other areas of the British Columbian economy.

The many Japanese employed in the mining industry in British Columbia were used mainly as a source of cheap labour. A fact, which, as in other industries, increased racial animosity. De facto restrictions prevented Japanese-Canadians from holding certain jobs and disenfranchisement prevented them from holding their own mining licenses.

One of the more interesting stories surrounding the participation of the Japanese in this industry was the involvement of the Lieutenant-Governor of British Columbia, James Dunsmuir. Dunsmuir was one of the largest owners of coal mines in the province. His mines were particularly dependent on cheap Japanese labour. In fact, it appears he was so dependent on Japanese labour that he refused to sign exclusion bills passed in the British Columbia legislature on no less than four occassions. His refusal on the fourth bill provided much of the impetus for the anti-Asiatic riot in Vancouver in 1907 and earned him the opportunity of being burned in effigy. In case anyone should believe his motives were altruistic, it should be noted that shortly after the riot the Japanese employed in his mine went on strike and soon after left his employ. By the 1930's, most Japanese-Canadians had left the mining industry.

Japanese were also employed in railroading during the early stages of their migration to Canada. They were used mainly as a cheap source of available labour. After the building period was over the number of Japanese employed in the industry shrank to a negligible number.

The pressure forcing Japanese-Canadians out of the primary industries gradually forced them into farming and small scale commercial operations where few sanctions could be brought to bear on them. These enterprises gave them some protection from the legal harassment that went on in other industries. It also allowed them to close ranks and rely on the protection of their own traditional community associations.

> Kagetsu's scale of success was uncommon but the drive for independence, freedom and security from economic harassment was shared by many Japanese who were making a smaller livelihood off the land. The exodus to farming was not voluntary but enforced, for the net effect of economic discrimination was mainly to shove the Japanese from one occupation to another. In most cases it shoved them a little further up the scale. [21]

The number of Japanese who transferred themselves from primary industries to farming and commercial enterprises in the cities caused new concentrations of Japanese economic endeavour. These new occupations brought success to many Japanese-Canadians. It also brought the Japanese into competition with different economic groups in society. The 1930's saw the end of any concerted attack by the labour movement on the Japanese population. It also saw the development of the White Canada Movement, a group of small businessmen and farmers who were against the Japanese presence in Canada. Whether or not the conflict

could have been resolved over time, we shall never know. The outbreak of World War II ended the conflict and brought about monumental changes which altered the structure of Japanese-Canadian society forever.

Japanese-Canadians played a major part in developing agriculture in British Columbia. The Japanese were the first to develop intensive farming in the Fraser and Okanogan Valleys. They became heavily involved in market gardening and had virtual control of the berry industry.[22] They were noted for their hard work and were regarded with some astonishment and a great deal of antagonism by their neighbours and competitors.

As in other industries, the Japanese-Canadian farming effort was characterized by organized associations for mutual assistance as well as several marketing cooperatives. In 1927, the Surry Berry Cooperative Association was formed to improve berry marketing practices for both Japanese and white farmers in the Surry region. The Japanese also organized the Pacific Cooperative Union, the Associated Berry Grower's Association, and the Maple Ridge Growers Cooperative Exchange. These associations were open to white farmers as well as Japanese. In 1928, they all joined the Consolidated Farmers' Association as member associations. Although these organizations were largely organized and controlled by Japanese farmers, a few white farmers joined as well. Those that did not, however, had a difficult time competing with the organized cooperatives and resentment and animosity grew as Japanese success became more and more pronounced.

Many Japanese were involved in commercial activities, particu-

larly in the area of import and export from the East. The development of Japanese commercial activity was largely the result of two factors. One of these factors was the relative freedom that they had to operate under. Unlike the logging and mining industry and some professional occupations where legal restrictions prevented entry by Japanese immigrants, there were no legal sanctions in the commercial arena. De facto sanction proved ineffective thus providing the second incentive for the development of Japanese enterprises. Japanese businesses had a virtually guaranteed market within the Japanese community.[23] This provided them with a stable base from which to expand their business. In many cases they provided goods and services which were not readily available in the white community either because of the lack of whites operating in the business, (gardening, laundry), or because they provided goods not available from the white businesses, (imported goods from the Orient). In many cases the use of family labour appears to have put the cost of operating Japanese businesses below the cost of operating white businesses, thus lowering the cost of their goods.

By 1931, Japanese-Canadians held eight hundred and fifty business licenses in the city of Vancouver. This represents one license for every ten Japanese residents in Vancouver compared to one license for every twenty British residents in Vancouver. Many of the Japanese businesses only served the Japanese community and could only survive because of the unpaid labour of family members.[24]

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The highly concentrated pattern of Japanese settlement in densely populated areas of British Columbia made them a highly visible minority. As some Japanese businesses grew larger and more successful, they began to compete in the white community which resulted in increased antagonism towards them.

> The majority of the Japanese-operated establishments continued for some years to cater exclusively to their own group, but a considerable number attempted to broaden their base of operation to serve a wide public, opening stores outside the ghetto. To the worriers then, the Japanese along with the Chinese, were well on their way to becoming "the Jews of the Orient" on the verge of swamping the city. [25]

Japanese efforts in industry indicate some movement towards assimilation. It indicated a clear refusal to accept second-class status economically, and this must be viewed, to a certain degree, as an attempt to be placed on equal footing with the white community. Early Japanese attempts at assimilation may almost be viewed as an attempt by the Japanese to assimilate to the white community. Assimilation was severly retarded by the discrimination and prejudice. This was especially true of the Nissei. The denial of equal rights to second generation Japanese-Canadians increased their reliance on their own community and probably prevented the spread of the Japanese population to the rest of Canada. Second generation Japanese made several fairly aggressive attempts to obtain legal assimilation in the form of equal rights legislation. They were unsuccessful. Economically, Japanese-Canadians became an important part of the British Columbian economy. Legally, they were to be kept apart until after the second world war. Culturally, they exhibited all of the qualities that were

most admired by other Canadians.

> In the economic field they have shown enterprise and efficiency. Educationally, they make use of schools as much as any other racial group, and their children are second to none in scholarship and deportment. Socially and politically they appear to be willing to cooperate where ever and in so far as circumstances permit. With regard to problems of dependency, delinquency, and insanity, in which so many other immigrant groups have proven conspicously inadequate, the Japanese appear to have an unimpeachable record.[26]

Japanese appeared to be model citizens with only their colour preventing their assimilation. I think that although colour was undoubtedly a factor in identification, the actual roots of the problem lie elsewhere. What seems to have drawn out anti-Japanese feeling was the rate in which they obtained economic success. A portion of British Columbians could not accept the fact that this group of people whom they considered inferior, could become so materially successful. This placed the Japanese in a curious and untenable situation. They were hated for being racially inferior and at the same time, hated for being materially successful. They were doomed to live a life of poverty or to face the hatred of their neighbours. The Japanese refused to accept second class citizenship and were forced to bear the brunt of their neighbours animosity.

The legal and <u>de facto</u> discrimination resulting from this attitude of the white community prevented the Japanese from entering into different areas of the British Columbian economy. This served to concentrate their endeavours in a very small number of industries. This added fuel to the fire and increased the hostility of white workers. Discrimination prevented any extensive assimilation and

forced the Japanese to rely on the strength and support of their own communities.

Notes to Pages 11 - 29

1. Wm. L. M. King, Royal Commission to Inquire Into the Methods By Which Oriental Labourers have been induced to come to Canada, Ottawa: Kings Printer, 1908.

2. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.412 (See Appendix I as well).

3. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.14.

4. "How much would you make a day fishing in Japan?
A. Well in one year I would make about 140 yen, equal to about $70 a year.
Q. How much do you expect to make in Canada fishing?
A. Well I expect to make about $400 a year."

Testimony of Enosuke Nakotani, unpublished testimony taken from the Inquiries of the Royal Commission to Inquire into the Methods By Which Oriental Labourers have been induced to come to Canada, Ottawa: Kings Printer, 1908. Testimony dated November 26, 1907 and included as page C29833 of the Public Archives collection of the MacKenzie King Papers. It should be noted that this testimony exemplifies the general attitude of the immigrants interviewed by King.

5. Wm. L. M. King, Royal Commission to Inquire Into the Methods By Which Oriental Labourers have been induced to come to Canada, Ottawa: Kings Printers, 1908.

6. "But all these hungry and bewildered immigrants had one thing in common: they were all from Hawaii; they were part of a massive exodus from these islands prompted by the efforts of the powerful Planters' Association of Honolulu to lower the wages of some 60,000 Japanese."

K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.67.

7. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.17.

8. Sir Wilfred Laurier to R. G. MacPherson, unpublished letter, dated Ottawa, August 8, 1907, p.177063 in the Public Archives collection of the Laurier Papers.

9. "They make good citizens at present and if they were all suddenly withdrawn many of our industries would close down for want of labour."

R. G. MacPherson to Sir Wilfred Laurier, March 8, 1909, p.153071 of the Laurier Papers.

10. "...we prefer white labour any day.
Q75: Mr. Wilson: If you can get it at the proper rate?
A: If you can get it at all..."

Mr. David Hayes, British Columbia General Contracting Co., unpublished testimony of the Royal Commission to Inquire Into the Methods by which Oriental Labourers have been induced to come to Canada, p.C29295, MacKenzie King Papers.

11. M. Miyazaki, unpublished manuscript of his book My 60 Years in Canada, published at his own expense in 1970.

12. Young, Reid, Carrothers, The Japanese Canadians, ed. H. Innes, Toronto: Toronto Press, 1939, pp.79 and 80.

13. The Japanese Contribution to Canada, unpublished manuscript, prepared by the Japanese Canadian Citizens Association, 1940, p.29.

14. Young, Reid, Carrothers, The Japanese Canadians, ed. H. Innes, Toronto: Toronto Press 1939, p.79

15. "They did not see that the Japanese were bound to cohere in the face of restrictive laws, exclusion from citizenship rights, from many occupations from many neighbourhoods."

K. Adachi, op.cit. p.132

16. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.109.

17. "They work in cooperation one with the other?
A: That is what they call it, yes. They collect all the money together and divide it among themselves."

Unpublished testimony of Colin Buchanan Sword, Fisheries Officer, MacKenzie King Papers, P.C29856.

18. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.57-60

19. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.146.

20. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.52.

21. Ibid., p.147

22. "They came from a tradition which on the whole, treated agriculture with some respect and which in Canada denoted a status not obtainable elsewhere. Field, garden, and orchard gave the best promise of establishing independence; it was probably easiest for the average Japanese immigrant to escape the wage and employment restrictions by becoming a farmer then in other ways."

"They cultivate much more intensively and efficiently than the whites and it is not difficult to accept the estimate of a government agricultural inspector that they produce at least 85% of the berries grown in the Fraser."

Young, Reid, Carrothers, op.cit. p.52.

23. "The Japanese community in pre-war days was a complete unit with every kind of store, occupation and trade to serve the Japanese population."

M. Miyazaki, My 60 Years in Canada, published at his own expense in 1970, p.24

24. "Most businesses survived only because of the unpaid labour of the whole family."

K. Adachi, op.cit. p.153.

25. Ibid., pp.151-152.

26. Young, Reid, Carrothers, The Japanese Canadians, ed. H. Innes, Toronto: Toronto Press, 1939, p.161.

II

THE STRUGGLE FOR STATUS, 1877 TO 1918

In the House of Commons on December 16, 1907, Mr. Duncan Ross, Member of Parliament for the riding of Yale Caribou, listed the reasons of the people of British Columbia against having Japanese immigrants in "their" province. One of the reasons he gave seems to sum up one of the three major causes of anti-Japanese feelings.

> Because while they come as hewer of wood and drawer of water, they do not remain in a servile position. [1]

One of the central issues surrounding the Japanese presence in Canada seems to lie in this statement of Mr. Ross. The attempt of the Canadian Japanese to achieve some economic success in the community appears to have been one of the central motivating factors behind the anxiety expressed so often by the white community. Our particular concern is to examine the situation to attempt to come to an understanding of how anxiety about the acquisition of material goods became magnified out of proportion to become open racial animosity. The key to this question appears to lie with the term status. Joseph Gusfield defines status as being the ability of one group to get another group to defer to their values. [2] The historical situation of the Japanese-Canadian community illustrates three different struggles for status.

One of these is the struggle between Japanese and whites for material goods. The ability of the Japanese to acquire worldly goods resulted in them being able to refuse to accept a second class economic position. The ability of the Japanese to succeed was matched only by the willingness of the white community to regard this success as an attempt to gain control of the economy of the Province.

Another issue developed as a result of the growth of Japanese commercial and military power. Japan, once forced by the Americans to end their isolation, rapidly developed into a world power. The defeat of Russia by Japan and an ever growing world presence all increased the anxiety of British Columbians who felt threatened by the development of a major world power at their doorstep. This anxiety was aggravated by Canada's dependence on Britain for a foreign policy. The Anglo-Japanese treaty which prevented the development of anti-Japanese legislation in British Columbia brought the question of Canada's international status to bear on the situation of Japanese Canadians in British Columbia.

The third status issue involved was the question of British Columbia's status in relation to the rest of Canada. British Columbia had demanded concessions as a condition of her acceptance of Confederation. When these concessions were slow in coming, British Columbia voted to secede in 1877. Even after relations improved British Columbians continued to feel the loss of autonomy and the interference of Easterners in their political affairs. This was particularly the case when Oriental immigration was discussed. British Columbians felt

that Eastern politicians had no right to decide on solutions to British Columbia's problems. This perceived loss of autonomy maintained the political focus on the issue of Oriental immigration, and resulted in continual pressure being placed on the Pacific coast Japanese population by the white population.

Japanese immigrants came to Canada with aspirations to succeed economically and achieve a kind of status which was not available to them in their homeland. Many of the early immigrants even hoped to transfer the economic success they achieved in Canada to Japan. In this particular instance, status was conveyed in proportion to the economic wealth of the individual. Financial success meant an increase in influence and power. In the case of the Japanese-Canadian, this influence and power was felt mostly in their own community. Economic success had the effect of removing Japanese-Canadian labour from the control of Anglo-Saxons. As Japanese success grew, anxiety in the white community increased, to borrow Ross's words, the Japanese were not "remaining in a servile position". The status of the white worker or businessman, was challenged. This threat, whether real or imagined, was seen as a threat to the status of the whole white community. For this reason the entire Japanese community was attacked by the white population. This animosity was fueled by members of the news media and carefully manipulated by politicians who saw an opportunity for votes in the conflict.

The central issue in the conflict was not solely the allocation of material resources. British Columbia was a very young province with

enormous opportunities for growth and expansion. The Japanese and other racial groups were attacked because they were competing against whites. This competition involved more than just economic competition. The economic success of an individual or of members of a racial group reflects on the status of that group. The economic status of the Japanese-Canadians was felt to be a direct blow to the prestige of the white business and the white worker. Japanese success was difficult for these whites to accept. The anxiety generated by Japanese success became open racial hatred.

Racial animosity reinforced the already strong bonds within the Japanese community. The Japanese were unwilling to remain in inferior positions and they were unwilling to accept legal restrictions which were placed on them to keep them in this inferior position. They continually struggled to achieve a position of prestige and respect in the community. [3]

The period between 1877 and 1918, was the period of the greatest growth in the Japanese-Canadian community. There are two characteristics which set it apart from the period between the two world wars. Until 1918 the conflict was mainly centered in the primary industries and Japanese efforts aroused deep antagonistic feeling in the labour movement.

During the early period, attacks on the Japanese were quite open and on several occasions erupted into open violence. As was mentioned earlier, the one thing that kept the Japanese from being

expelled from British Columbia was the power of the Japanese government and the Anglo-Japanese Trade Agreement.

The status and power of the Japanese government as representatives in Canada enhanced the status and prestige of Japanese immigrants in Canada. This period saw the development of Japan from an isolated island nation into a major world power. Japan's victory over Russia established her importance as a leading world power. The Anglo-Japanese Trade Agreement allied Japan with the nations of the Commonwealth. This agreement prevented the exclusion of Japanese immigrants from Canada. The attitude of Canada to Japan is reflected in the following excerpt from a letter from Laurier to R. B. MacPherson, a Liberal M. P. from British Columbia.

> My first words to you must be to ask you and our friends to realize that the conditions, with regard to the Asiatic question, are not exactly the same as they were twenty years or even ten years ago. Up until that time, the Asiatic, when he came to white countries could be treated with contempt and kicked. This continues to be true yet for all classes of the yellow race with the exception of the Japanese. The Japanese has adopted European civilization, has shown that he can whip European soldiers, has a navy equal to the best afloat, and will not submit to be kicked and treated with contempt, as his brother from China still meekly submits to. [4]

Commodore Perry opened Japan to the world but he also opened the world to Japan. American interference toppled the isolationist Tokugawa government in Japan. It also brought two and one half centuries of self-imposed Japanese isolation to an end. The extent of Japanese imperial power is reflected in the protective attitude of the Japanese government to their emigrants. They refused to allow emigrants to leave Japan until the receiving government had made some

guarantee of protection. The power of the Japanese government is also reflected in the willingness of the Canadian government to accept the paternalistic authority of a foreign power over residents of Canada.

The Japanese government expected emigrants from Japan to be treated fairly and with dignity. One of the main obstacles of Japanese emigration to Hawaii was the Japanese government's demand that emigrants be treated fairly. Japan received guarantees in the form of treaties and trade agreements. The Anglo-Japanese trade agreement contained specific guarantees that the Japanese would be treated fairly in British countries. The treaty also gave Japan the right to interfere legitimately on behalf of their former citizens. [5]

The role of Japan was to protect the interests and safety of their citizens and former citizens. In Canada, the agency responsible for carrying out these policies was the Japanese Consulate. Consular intervention took several forms. [6] The Consul intervened with the Canadian government to have Provincial legislation excluding Japanese immigration declared ultra vires. The Consulate monitored the arrival of Japanese immigrants to Canada. They aided the Japanese-Canadian community in their preparation of briefs to present to the Canadian government. They payed the legal expenses of Japanese people who sought compensation for the losses sustained during the Vancouver riot of 1907. Their intervention placed serious constraints on any action that the government and people of British Columbia could take against the Japanese.

The intervention of the Japanese government prevented the Natal

Acts being made law. Exclusion legislation was passed in the British Columbia legislature in 1901, 1902, 1903 and 1904. Correspondence between Laurier and the Japanese Consul suggest that the legislation was disallowed at the request of the Japanese Consul,[7] and as a result at the Anglo-Japanese trade agreement.

Many pieces of legislation that originated in the British Columbian legislature were disallowed by the Federal authorities. Consular intervention prevented their enactment and the Anglo-Japanese trade agreement made such restrictive legislation ultra vires. British Columbians tended to view this interference as a loss of their provincial autonomy.

> The anti-Japanese elements in British Columbia saw that treaties deprived Canada of the right to control entry of aliens into her own territory giving Japan a more favoured position than any other nation. [8]

The symbolic effect of the denial of these pieces of legislation was to increase the anxiety of British Columbians. The role of the Japanese Consulate also helped to increase the anxiety felt by the anti-Japanese movement.

The Japanese Consul also acted to refute the charges of anti-Japanese groups in British Columbia. The Consulate kept a record of the number of Japanese entering the province and supplied the Canadian Federal government with this information on an ongoing basis. The intervention by the Japanese Consul, and the favour that it found in Ottawa, led to considerable discontent among the members of the Anti-Japanese movement. The continued inability of the British Columbian

legislature to pass laws limiting immigration to the province was seen as a pro-Japanese move directly attacking the interests of the people and government of British Columbia. Unquestionably, the inability of the anti-Japanese forces to force exclusionist policy through legal channels led to the violence of the 1907 riots in Vancouver.

Another instance of Japanese Consular intervention occurred during the course of the riot. The Japanese Consul was the very first official visitor in the Japanese section of the city in the aftermath of the riot. His assessment of the damages and his aid to the Japanese-Canadians who had property damaged during the riot assisted the Royal Commission's work a great deal. In fact, the Canadian government was put in the curious position of having to pay the Consul for his expenses incurred in helping expedite the course of their investigation.[9]

The protection of Japanese-Canadian interests by the Federal government served to enhance the status of the Japanese population even further. It also served to increase the anxiety of anti-Japanese forces. It was at this point that the three main status conflicts began to be accentuated. Some British Columbians felt that the status of their province was threatened by the continued refusal of the Federal government to allow exclusionist legislation. The Federal government's hands were tied because of the Anglo-Japanese alliance which guaranteed Japanese citizens protected status when they emigrated to Canada. In this way, the ability of the Canadian Federal government to act was impaired. Also, there was at this time a strong anti-

Japanese feeling among the residents of British Columbia who felt that Japanese labour was undercutting the labour market.

The Federal government attempted to reassure the populace of British Columbia several times. None of these attempts had the desired affect. Gestures, often largely symbolic, accomplished nothing due to agitation of the exclusionist forces. The Royal Commission to inquire into Oriental immigration seemed to accomplish nothing. The Federal government was caught in a difficult position. On one hand, they were required to live up to the terms of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, and on the other, were forced to make some attempt to deal with the exclusionist feeling that ran rampant in British Columbia. After the riot in Vancouver, the Japanese government voluntarily agreed to limit immigration to four hundred new immigrants per year. This might have reduced the level of anxiety if the treaty had been better understood and if the exclusionist forces had not mounted a campaign charging that the quota was being constantly violated. To understand the development of the conflict we will have to examine its historical development more closely.

In 1877, when the first Japanese arrived in British Columbia, there was already some hostility towards Orientals. This hostility was centered mainly in the fledgling labour movement. Trade Unions were in their very early formative stages and the Japanese who arrived in Canada often found themselves in conflict with labour because they undermined organizational efforts of existing unions or because they developed their own organizations. Management used racial differences

to weaken the bargaining power of both whites and Japanese workers.

> In the early years, organized labour objected strenuously to the admission of Japanese immigrants, as in the agitation which preceded and followed the Vancouver riot. Labour was then the militant antagonist of the Japanese because the latter were enjoying unrestricted competition in fishing, lumbering, mining and railroad construction work. [10]

The early conflict was centered in economic concerns. The first instances of violent competition occurred in the fishing industry.

In 1893, the first strike occurred in the British Columbian fishing industry. The strike had clearly racial tones. One of the demands of the strikers was for a reduction in the number of licences issued to Oriental fishermen. White fishermen were attempting to force naturalized Canadian fishermen of Oriental background out of the fishing industry.

Although this strike was mainly for improved prices at the canneries, it shows some sign of status conflict also. Anglo-Saxon and Indian fishermen were demanding a favoured position in the fishing industry. They were objecting to the presence of competition. They objected to the Japanese undercutting their price structure, but rather than attempting to improve the price structure for all involved, they tried to isolate the Japanese fishermen and force them out of the industry. Naturally, this played into the hands of the cannery owners who manipulated both groups for their own gain. Both Japanese and other British Columbian fishermen took turns being on strike while the other group worked.

Fishing seems to have been one of the focal points in the conflict between whites and Japanese. Although the 1893 strike subsided fairly rapidly when gold was discovered in the Yukon, the issue of licences was to crop up over and over again. In 1900, there was another confrontation between white and Japanese fishermen. Again, this strike dealt with the prices paid by the canneries. Scattered incidents of violence were reported and only the presence of the militia prevented a full scale riot from occurring. It must be noted that when the Japanese fishermen were on strike, it was Japanese fishermen who were cutting nets and intimidating white fishermen. Although the main concern of these strikes was instrumental, (the price of fish), resentment of the role and status of the other group prevented an alliance of the different unions negotiating for the collective welfare of the entire body of fishermen. These racial divisions only served to continue to allow the canners to pay low prices for fish.

> If fear of competition was at the root of the antagonism of the working class towards the Japanese, then this fear and antagonism was even more pronounced in the fishing industry. By its very nature, fishing was a highly competitive industry, requiring a maximum effort in a short season, physical risk, uncertainty of income, and the vagaries of supply and demand. The use of sailboats in the early years made fishing particularly hazardous. More over, the hetrogeneous composition of the fishermen of the province, sharply separated by race and language and isolated in ethnic communities bred antagonism and conflict. [11]

Fear of competition reflects an anxiety about the status of the group or person that you are competing against. A person fears competition because they are afraid that the person or group may be a

more effective competitive unit. The Japanese were accused of being economically more efficient, but at the same time, an inferior and undesirable race. This curious contradiction is quite prevalent in the newspapers of the era as well as in the speeches of politicians from British Columbia. People were afraid that this race that they considered inferior, would prove themselves superior to the British. In the fishing industry especially, they claimed that this was forcing the whites out of the industry. As we have already noted, this was not entirely true.

> I tell you that they have already got control of the fishing industry and also of several important mining enterprizes and are making inroads into the lumber business. The fact is that the Jap is an aggressive beggar and much more industrious than the majority of our people. He is not content to be an employee long but as soon as he gets a little ahead he launches out for himself. They often take contracts and as they almost invariably employ Japanese labour you can see what an increase there is likely to be in the Japanese population. They do not cut wages but demand the same as white labour and already are forming unions of their own. They can live much cheaper then our labourers, but on the other hand they dress better, spend more on their own amusements and are much more abstemious than the whites. [12]

The qualities that MacPherson attributes to the Japanese points to the anxieties that seem to be prevalent among parts of the occidental population of British Columbia. He points to the fear the British had that the Japanese would obtain control of the commerce, and then the government of British Columbia. This was a conflict over the allocation of status. Status concern is reflected in the anxiety expressed about the success of the Japanese. This concern is the crux of the conflict between whites and Japanese in the primary industries.

The British were afraid that they would have to defer to the Japanese who were achieving more success than the average individual. They were afraid that a time would come when they would have to defer to the Japanese because of their economic superiority.

The pattern in the other primary industries is much the same as in the fishing industry. Racial conflict caused by fear of competition prevented the labour force from uniting to obtain higher wages and better working conditions. Japanese success in an industry brought with it retaliation from a white population that was worried about its own power. Japanese labourers were forcefully escorted from some mining communities to prevent them from working in the mines. This was done even when there was a shortage of workers in the area.[13] The arguments of the labour organizations of the time were best stated by a labour organizer during the founding meeting of the Anti-Asiatic Exclusion League.

> Mr. W. A. Young, organizer of the American Federation of Labour, thought that if there were not enough white men in this country to cut its timber and to develop its prosperity along all lines then the timber should be allowed to stand and the development period be allowed to hold back for a time...[14]

The question of which race would become dominant in British Columbia seemed to be the central issue. Little was done to examine the facts behind the matter. It was generally accepted that the Japanese were only waiting for the opportunity to seize control of the province and subject its white residents to the worst cruelty. There is no evidence which suggests that the Japanese wanted anything more

than equal status and an opportunity to enter the free market system with the hope of improving their welfare. Even some of their most vicious opponents admitted that they had all the desirable qualities of immigrants except in the matter of race. They were a source of cheap labour because of their poverty upon entrance to Canada. Being poor meant they did not have a strong bargaining position. The Japanese did not accept these poor conditions for very long and made every effort to work their way up the economic ladder. Their success was perceived by a part of the white population as a threat to their own status and the anxiety this generated caused open violence and punitive legislation to be used against the Japanese population of British Columbia.

The Royal Commission report on Chinese and Japanese immigration which was prepared in 1902 points out how anxiety was generated among the labourers of British Columbia.

> You admit this competitor is not my equal; is not now and never will be a citizen; you debar him from municipal work and deprive him of the franchise. You admit that I cannot live decently upon what he lives upon, nor work for the wages he works for, yet you ask me to submit to this unequal and degrading competition and at the same time expect me to assume and discharge all the responsibilities of citizenship. [15]

This feeling was quite prevalent in the testimony the Commission heard. It brought about a recommendation from the committee that a head tax of five hundred dollars be levied on any Chinese landing in British Columbia. The Japanese could not be included in the head tax because of the Japanese treaty with Britain. The inability of the British Columbian government to enact legal sanctions against the Japanese in

British Columbia underlines another aspect of status conflict: the conflict between the provincial, the federal and imperial governments. Residents felt that their government was powerless in the face of the opposition from the other two governments and was as a result unable to act in the best interests of the province. It is interesting to note the reason the Commission gave for this policy.

> The interests of the Empire can best be served by building up a strong and united Canada, able to defend herself, but afford to help if need be to the Mother Country. Whatever permanently weakens British Columbia weakens the Dominion and the Empire, and no material gain to individual interests ought to weigh for one moment against the injury to the nation. [16]

The Commission argued that because labourers saw the oriental as inferior, it discouraged him from accepting some jobs and kept the province divided and consequently weakened. [17] The antagonism of white labourers to the Japanese and the divisive effect this had on British Columbia generated a fair amount of anxiety in Ottawa. Eventually, the situation became so serious that Ottawa was forced to act. It was unfortunate that the final stimulus for Federal action was the riot of 1907.

The year 1907 saw the greatest escalation of violence aimed against the Japanese. In 1907, the Anti-Asiatic Exclusion League was formed with the sole purpose of preventing the growth of the Oriental population of British Columbia. In the transcripts of the testimony given in Mackenzie King's Royal Commission to Inquire into the Methods by which Oriental labourers have been Induced to Come to Canada, the suggestion is made that the Canadian Exclusion League was financed by

the Hawaiian Planter's Association.[18] However, since Mackenzie King saw fit not to pursue the matter further, we may never be able to uncover the facts. One of the more curious aspects of Mackenzie King's Commission is that this was not investigated thoroughly. The Exclusion League's president and solicitor were present in the court at the time of the inquiry and yet at no time was there any evidence to suggest that they replied to the charges concerning their involvement with the Planter's League. Nor was an explanation for the presence of the representative of the Planter's League in Vancouver during the riot sought. It should be noted that several prominent Liberals were among the leaders of the Exclusion League. The Planter's Association quite obviously wanted to limit emigration of Japanese labour from Hawaii and had attempted to secure writs which would prevent boats carrying Japanese passengers from leaving Hawaii. At this time, Hawaii was the source of the largest number of Japanese immigrants to Canada. In 1907, some 7,601 Japanese immigrants entered Canada. By far the largest number of these immigrants came from Hawaii.

The large influx of immigrants coming to the province of British Columbia coupled with the exaggerated accounts of Oriental immigration in the newspapers, led to the formation of an Anti-Asiatic Exclusion league. Oriental immigration had always been an issue in British Columbia. Several hundred pieces of legislation had been passed by the British Columbian legislature attempting to regulate and control Oriental immigration to British Columbia. The majority of these had failed to obtain royal assent and were never put into effect.

One law which had been successfully passed and put into practice disenfranchised Orientals.[19] In 1871, British Columbia elected its first legislature. In this election Orientals had the right to vote. Apparently, a number of them exercised this right.[20] In 1875, the Chinese were deprived of the right to vote. In 1895, the Japanese and East Indians were included in the same legislation which disenfranchised the Chinese. This was clearly intended as punitive legislation. It had the effect of placing Orientals in the position of second class citizens. It also had the effect of barring Orientals from certain occupations.

> The legislation of 1895 was therefore the basis for a series of discriminatory measures which were enacted by the province, restricting British subjects of Japanese race from certain fields of employment. As opposed to the unsuccessful legislation against the Japanese based on the grounds of nationality the province succeeded in its purpose by drafting legislation in such a way as that it applied to racial groups rather than to aliens. The denial of the franchise was to come to symbolize for the Japanese, especially the Canadian born, the status of second class citizenship. The fundamental right of Canadian citizenship - the simple act of casting a ballot and participating in elections - was denied to them as it was to aliens. Citizenship became an empty status, for the lack of the right to vote signified, as so many Anti-Japanese spokesmen contended that the Japanese were undesirable citizens...[21]

The legislation barring the Japanese accomplished nothing but a reaffirmation of the "superiority" of the whites in British Columbia. It served as a reassurance that the government would not allow the Britishness of the Canadian Pacific Coast to be undermined.

The desire for the stability of British Columbia was one of the primary concerns of the Federal government in allowing some restrictions to be placed on the immigration of Chinese to Canada. In the last

quarter of the nineteenth century, there was still talk of British Columbia joining the United States. The Federal government had to find ways of appeasing the population of British Columbia and keeping them loyal to the concept of Confederation. [22] To accomplish this the Federal government completed the trans-continental railway and allowed some limits to be placed on Oriental immigration. These restrictions were mild at first. A head tax of fifty dollars was placed on Chinese immigrants landing in British Columbia. As immigration continued and the Oriental population grew, the head tax grew to five hundred dollars. Still the government refused to limit the immigration of the Japanese.

The government of British Columbia grew more insistent about the exclusion of Orientals. The political climate of British Columbia was quite unstable. The period between 1871 and 1903 saw the formation of fifteen different governments. It was not until the election of the McBride government that a Premier was able to maintain power for more than four years. Sir Richard McBride campaigned on the platform of total exclusion. It was on this platform that the McBride government swept the election of 1907, taking virtually every seat in the British Columbian legislature. The Natal Act that was passed by the McBride government was to bring about the 1907 riot in Vancouver.

In February of 1907 the Vancouver Province set the stage for the violence that was to follow. In an Extra edition the Province headline read "50,000 Japanese For British Columbia, Grand Trunk Pacific and the Machine Liberals Want to Flood this Country with Little

Brown Men". [23] This extra edition was published on election day. In a wildly exaggerated report which was later exposed as false by Mackenzie King's inquiry into Oriental immigration, the Province claimed that there was a plot between the Liberal party of British Columbia and the Grand Trunk Railroad to depose McBride and his policies of exclusion. [24]

In this case, the newspaper acted in the role of the messenger described by Shibutani. [25] They also took the role of interpreter and informed the people of British Columbia of what the influx of Japanese labour would mean for them.

> These are the facts. This conspiracy, or whatever you like to call it, is made possible in the expectation that the workingman of the British Columbia will vote for and place in power one of the parties, the so called Liberal-Grand Trunk combination.
>
> The presence of these Japanese will open large questions. Who knows but it is the intent of the Railway Company and its political followers to eventually enfranchise this Japanese horde? Their fine plan to run British Columbia could be with fifty or sixty thousand machine voters! [26]

Needless to say, McBride's party swept to power. They passed legislation excluding Orientals from landing in British Columbia. This version of the Natal Act was disallowed by James Dunsmuir, the former premier of British Columbia and the Lieutenant-Governor at that time.

On September 9th, 1907, the Anti-Asiatic Exclusion League was formed by members of organized labour groups, some M. P.'s, a clergyman, and some representatives from a similar organization in Seattle.

The situation was extremely tense because of Dunsmuir's disallowance of the legislation excluding Japanese immigrants. There was some suspicion that Dunsmuir, who was one of the largest employers of Japanese in the Province, was somewhat biased in his opinions. This was the final act in the long history of bills aimed at excluding Japanese immigrants being disallowed.

The anxiety about Japanese labour was acute. The amount of anxiety suggests that the problem was more widely based than the issues of jobs. British Columbia was in a boom period at this time. Jobs were available and in some cases men were urgently needed to supply labour for further expansion. Many people considered the Japanese as an unacceptable source of labour. In Atlin, for example, gold miners armed themselves and prevented Japanese labourers from entering the town. The provincial government failed to act and the Atlin Mining company was prevented from using Oriental labour to fill the "acute shortage of labour in Atlin". [27] Laurier referred to this same problem in a letter to R. G. MacPherson of August 8th, 1907. [28] It was suggested by a labour organizer at the Exclusion meeting, that the Japanese threatened the status of the white workers in British Columbia. He felt that "we", (whites), were better off if the resources of British Columbia were developed only by white labour. [29]

The Royal Commission Report on Chinese and Japanese Immigration suggests that there was a problem of status involved as well. The Commission's observation was that white men would not accept work considered to be fit only for Asiatics.

> Another feature of this class of labour is that it creates a dislike amounting to contempt, for the work itself in whatever calling it is employed. The majority of workingmen will not, if they can avoid it, work with Chinamen; they feel that they would be degraded in the eyes of their associates by so doing. [30]

As Oriental labourers became more and more successful, anxiety grew. Whites found themselves challenged in many industries by aggressive, hard working Japanese and Chinese. As Mr. Ross said in those memorable words in the House of Commons, "they do not remain in a servile position". [31]

The newspapers continually supplied "information" very much in the way Shibutani describes the role of the messenger. The newspapers also interpreted what their information meant in the context of the situation in British Columbia. Politicians who clamoured for the exclusion of Asiatics from British Columbia only served to legitimize the rumours of the Japanese threat. [32] Agitators involved in the Anti-Asiatic Exclusion League suggested courses of action that would provide a solution to the problem. Violence was offered as that solution. The wishes of the people of British Columbia were being ignored. Their legislative assembly was trying to get laws passed and the Federal authorities were preventing these laws from being put into effect. Violence had already set an historical precedent in British Columbia. Violence was used in the conflict between fishermen of different races. In April of that same year, miners had escorted Japanese labourers out of Atlin at gun point. A similar incident in Bellingham, Washington, occurred a few days before the Vancouver riot;

Hindu's had been dragged out of their houses, rounded up, and escorted out of town. This fact seems to have had quite an effect on the Vancouver meeting of the Anti-Asiatic Exclusion League.

> He had just come from Bellingham, where the Hindu's had been driven from the city. While not applauding the manner in which the act had been done, it was nevertheless true that the work was now done and there was not a Hindu in Bellingham at the present time. [33]

These people suggested to the people the way in which the situation had to be handled. They pointed a clear path to violence. Whipped to a frenzy by the speakers, the mob marched on "Chinatown". Catching the Chinese unawares, much damage was done and the mob met little resistance. The mob then attempted to march into "Japtown". There, they met strong resistance from the Japanese population and further advance by the mob was effectively halted. Police had provided very little protection and the Japanese armed patrols to protect their property. The next day, three firemen were wounded by a Japanese patrol. Several thousand dollars of damage had been done. A massive insult had been made to the honour of the Japanese population of Vancouver. [34] On a political front the Vancouver Riots caused several things to happen. Earl Gray, Governor-General of Canada, wired Mayor Bethune of Vancouver, to demand that order be restored. Once again, the British/Canadian government was frowning on the actions of the people of British Columbia.

Laurier sent the Honourable Rodolphe Lemieux, then Minister of Labour, to Japan where he negotiated what became known as the Gentleman's Agreement. This agreement limited further immigration from Japan to

Canada. It was felt by both governments that a drastic reduction of Japanese emigration to Canada would reduce racial tensions.

The terms of the agreement were as follows:

1) 400 immigrants in a year were to be allowed in under the classification of general labourers and domestic servants. (This involved males only)

2) Returning residents and their wives and families.

3) Labourers under special contracts which specified the terms of contract, the types of work and the standing of their employers, were to be allowed to enter Canada.

4) Agricultural workers contracted to Japanese farmers were to be allowed in but they were to be limited to ten workers per one hundred acres of land. [35]

Naturally, this agreement brought about a new pattern of immigration of Japanese to Canada. Since the entrance of males was severely curtailed but limits on females were much less stringent and because of the large number of single males, the "picture" bride system became a common practice. This was a system by which women were married to their respective husbands without ever meeting. The bride was married in Japan and then immigrated to Canada to live with her husband. These changes in Japanese immigration lead to important changes in the way the Japanese settlement in Canada developed. It spelled the end to the era of male workers who came to Canada to make some money so they could return to Japan. It started an era of development and more permanent settlement, characterized by the growth of family units among the Japanese community.

The Gentleman's Agreement did nothing to settle the unrest among the white population of British Columbia. Oriental immigration

was an important source of debate among politicians and people in Canada. This debate was to go on for another fifty years.

As we can see, the situation leading up to the riot of 1907 had been best described as one of anxiety created by the rapid growth of the Japanese population and the rapid change in circumstances it had brought. New immigrants were coming to British Columbia and a fairly large number were from the Orient. Some eight thousand Japanese alone, came to Canada in 1907. The Gentleman's Agreement was designed specifically to reassure the population of British Columbia. It failed for several reasons. One of the reasons it failed was because the terms of the agreement were misunderstood by the population of British Columbia.

> The Gentleman's Agreement failed in part because the details were never explained to the public. Many interested people in the Province laboured under the delusion that a maximum of four hundred Japanese immigrants would be permitted to enter this country, not realizing that this maximum had reference only to the two classes specified, namely domestic and agricultural labourers. When the total number of Japanese entering yearly was in excess of four hundred, as it was for every year except one in the next ten years, Japan was accused of bad faith. This charge was denied by Dominion statesmen converseant with the details of the Agreement but the denial did little to allay the suspicions of British Columbians that the Japanese Government was trying to circumvent the terms of the Agreement. [36]

This was to become a major problem in the years immediately following the 1907 riot. Once again, newspapers played an important part in developing the rumour that the Japanese Government was not living up to her part of the bargain. Politicians legitimized the claims made by the newspapers by campaigning on the platform of further

exclusion of the Japanese. It was in this way that the threat to the status of whites in British Columbia or the perception of the threat, was kept in the public view.

The newspapers acted in the role of the messenger and the interpretor in the "facts". It is interesting to note that they made very little attempt to research their stories. MacKenzie King's Inquiry came upon some startling information when some members of the press in Vancouver were interviewed. They found that the authors of some of the articles had relied totally on their own suspicians and some information from members of the Anti-Asiatic Exclusion League. The following is an excerpt from one of these articles which had been printed in a magazine called The Saturday Sunset.

> And again it may be in the interests of the Dominion Government to have the people of this province and Canada at large, believe that it was ignorant of the flagrant manner in which the Immigration Act has been violated and defied by the Japanese immigration companies in this city ... A reporter of the Daily Province published a copy of the contract under which the Japanese coolies are brought to this country...He should go further and show the people of British Columbia and the rest of Canada why, when the Japanese Government disclaimed authority over Japs in Honolulu, the Dominion Government did not take prompt action to prevent them from landing in British Columbian ports. Also he should ascertain whether or not Japan had an understanding with Canada to limit the number of emigrants to 480 a year, as Parliament was assured by Sir Wilfred Laurier we had, and why the number has been exceeded by thousands.[37]

The information in this quote is completely based on rumours and hearsay. McConnell, the editor of The Saturday Sunset, was interviewed by MacKenzie King during the course of his investigations into methods by which Oriental labourers had been brought to Canada. King proved that McConnell had based his article on information he obtained

from Von Rheim, the president of the Anti-Asiatic Exclusion League, R. G. MacPherson, an M. P., and a couple of newspaper men.

> No; I had no direct communication with any of them, except Mr. Von Rheim, the president of the Asiatic Exclusion League, and Mr. MacPherson and a couple of newspaper men who had been down there.
> 78 Q; Did the men who were down there, do you think communicate directly, with any of those people, so that they could give us direct information about it? A: I don't think they did. [38]

Here we have Mr. McConnel admitting that not only had he not bothered to ascertain the truth of the allegations and information that he had been given by these men, but that he did not think that they had any information other than their own beliefs. For every question that King asked, McConnell was forced to admit that he had only second hand information or popular rumours.

> Can you say, of your own knowledge, whether they have brought men from Japan? A: No; not of my own knowledge I could not. [39]
>
> Did you know anything of the facts connected with that matter? A: Nothing, except by hearsay. [40]

The publication of information in this way serves to legitimize the rumour. What was before only speculation becomes reality. This created reality served to create an extremely unpleasant situation for the Japanese. People were told that the Japanese were intent on destroying their lifestyle. The reports of Japanese immigration were widely exaggerated. Rumours were printed as truth.

Another interesting aspect of newspaper reporting also came out during the course of King's investigation. This information dealt with a contract that purported to be an agreement between a Japanese

labourer in Hawaii and an Immigration Company in Canada. King attempted to secure a copy of the contract and the name of the man who had written the article. Apparently, the contract had been destroyed by the newspaper. He was unable to find anyone who had seen the original copy of the contract. The article first appeared in the Vancouver Daily Province, on August 8th, 1907.

> So that if I subpoened the whole staff of the 'Province' they would not be able to give me any light?
> A: That was the answer made to my questions that the 'Provinces' full staff could not throw any more light upon it, than was contained in the paper of that issue. I think they would be willing to do so if they could, to facilitate the inquiry, and to find where the contract came from. [41]

MacKenzie King was unable to find any evidence of illegal agreements between the immigration companies and the Japanese residents of Hawaii or immigrants from Japan. The irresponsible reporting of the Vancouver Daily Province served to help create and maintain the atmosphere of mistrust and racial animosity that existed in British Columbia.

Politicians aided in maintaining this atmosphere as well. The passage of legislation denying equal status to the Japanese and restricting the occupations that they could enter into also helped to legitimize the white perception of the Japanese threat.

It is particularly interesting to note the attitude of British Columbian politicians towards the "Yellow Peril". McBride and his Conservative Party campaigned for exclusion. MacPherson, the Liberal member for Vancouver in the Federal House, tried to pressure Laurier

into making similar campaign promises.

> The Japanese government is not keeping faith with our government and will never attempt to do so until they are brought up with a round turn. There is no doubt in my mind - and I have made very careful study of the question - that they are the only agency behind the whole matter, is the Japanese government. They may assure you to the contrary, but the Jap himself is as full of deceit as he is of ubanity and that is saying a great deal.
>
> In a very short time our Province will be Asiatic and I am very much afraid that the trouble which might be averted now by prompt action being taken, will assume gigantic proportions before many years have elapsed. I am not an alarmist, Sir Wilfred, over this matter, but I speak whereof I know and am very much in earnest.
>
> I would like very much to keep this country White and I would also like to keep it Liberal, but it is impossible to keep it either one of the two unless the Japs are preemptorily told that they must carry out their understanding with your government. [42]

MacPherson unfortunately had no information to contribute to MacKenzie King's commission. His attitude was clearly racist but he appealed to another desired goal which played an important role in the way the situation developed. The Liberal party had to pass laws which would maintain their power in British Columbia. The climate which had been created by the news media and the Exclusion League demanded that restrictions be placed on the Japanese in British Columbia. This climate continued long past the existence of the Laurier government. The Liberal Party of British Columbia passed a resolution recommending total exclusion. [43] This helped maintain the power of the Laurier government in British Columbia. Attempts to limit immigration further were frustrated by Japanese insistence that their former citizens be protected under the conditions of the Anglo-

Japanese trade agreements. Borden's government tried unsuccessfully to limit further Japanese immigration in 1911.

In 1914, the government of Canada passed a law prohibiting the landing of any skilled or non-skilled labourers at a British Columbian port.

The outbreak of war in 1914 saw the temporary cessation of hostilities between the Japanese and the Anglo-Saxons in British Columbia. The Japanese fleet protected the British Columbian coast. The Japanese-Canadians became a valuable part of the British Columbian wartime work force.

The only really interesting development from the Japanese participation in the Canadian war efforts was the attempt to send a battalion of Japanese-Canadian soldiers overseas. Nearly two hundred Japanese-Canadians volunteered for overseas service. The recruiting officer in British Columbia refused to accept them in a regiment from British Columbia. They were eventually enlisted in a battalion recruited in Alberta. They went overseas and served with some distinction. The refusal of the military authorities to allow them to join a battalion from British Columbia is another example of how the status conflict kept the two races from cooperating. The refusal to permit them into the military service shows how pervasive was the fear of inter-racial conflict caused by the conflict for prestige and status.

Another important development was to occur during the war years. Japanese soldiers were allowed to vote in the Federal election of 1917. This temporary enfranchizement was to reawaken Japanese demands for the

vote after the war. The Veterans were to become the focal point for the Japanese struggle for the vote after the war.

The end of the war was to bring with it the development of more legal and de facto harrassment of the Japanese-Canadians. The tone for what was to follow had already been set by the developments in the early part of the century.

As we can see, the growth of the Japanese population was paralleled by the growth of fear of Oriental competition among the white workers of the time. The Japanese presence in certain occupations made these occupations undesirable for white workers. Conflict between white and Japanese labourers was prevalent. The news media helped to maintain the tension by the publication of articles attacking the Japanese presence in Canada and exaggerating the numbers of Japanese immigrants coming to Canada. Politicians passed legislation which re-enforced the impression that the Japanese were inferior citizens. The actions of the British Columbian government helped to maintain the tension of the situation. The continued passage of legislation aimed at exclusing the Japanese, legislation the government knew would be overruled by the Dominion government, helped to increase the racial hostility. British Columbians found their status being threatened on two levels. They were being challenged economically. The status of the government of British Columbia was threatened by the Imperial government's refusal to put their interests before the interests of the treaty between Britain and Japan. Gradually, as time went on, the Federal political parties began advocating exclusion legislation. The continued activity of the Anti-Asiatic Exclusion League and

politicians aligned with it, maintained the atmosphere of distrust and suspician. Their actions lead to the riot of 1907. Their actions maintained the tense atmosphere after the Gentleman's Agreement had been signed.

The Vancouver riot can be seen as an attempt by some of the people to maintain control over a situation they felt was rapidly slipping out of their control. Discriminatory legislation served two functions. It kept the Japanese in a position of second class citizens. Its presence also served to legitimize the reports of the Japanese threat in the newspapers. Newspspers only served to give credance to the anxiety felt by many people in British Columbia. This anxiety came about as a result of competition between the Japanese-Canadian population and Anglo-Saxons. The fear of loss of status from this competition was so great, labourers even refused to work in occupations in which there was a concentration of Oriental workers. This pattern was to continue for another thirty years.

Notes to Pages 33 - 63

1. Hansard, Ottawa: Kings Printers, December 16, 1907, p.744.

2. "If Status depends on the act of the prestige givers in relation to the prestige-receivers, then efforts to redistribute prestige depend upon the ability to control the giving of prestige against the reluctance of the prestige-givers to grant it. Only in this sense can social status be a subject of political conflict over the allocation of material resources. Status politics is political conflict over the allocation of prestige."

   Joseph Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969, p.18.

3. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.109.

4. A letter from Sir Wilfred Laurier to R. G. MacPherson dated August of 1907 from the Public Archives unpublished collection of the Laurier Papers, p. 127981.

5. "Until 1924, Japan exercised a degree of control over Japanese residing in Canada by virtue of the dual role citizenship of many immigrants. She continues to exercise such control over Canadian citizens of Japanese origin who have not renounced their citizenship and she retains a paternalistic interest in those of her citizens in Canada who have never become Canadian citizens. She is legally justified in doing so by virtue of the conditions of the treaty between Canada and Japan which have made it possible for citizens of the latter to reside in the Dominion and for Japan to intervene legitimately on their behalf. It is a matter of record that Japan has seen fit to do so in the past."

   Young, Reid, Carrothers, The Japanese Canadians, ed. H. Innes, Toronto: Toronto Press, 1939, p.132.

6. "Finally, there appears to be no doubt as to the consular intervention of a more extensive nature with reference to all classes of Japanese, involving the accumulation of

comprehensive data on their welfare and the excercise of material influences by means of indirect contact through the Canadian Japanese Association and other agencies."

Ibid., p.132.

7. "I can assure you that there was no necessity to remind me of the request of your government for the disallowance of the British Columbia legislation against Japanese immigration. I told you at our last interview that the government of Japan has fulfilled their agreement towards us and that we would act accordingly."

Letter from Sir Wilfred Laurier to T. Nosse, Imperial Japanese Consul, March 21, 1904, unpublished. It should be noted that the correspondence between Laurier and the Japanese Consulate contains several references to the disallowance of Natal Legislation.

8. "I understand from the reports in the press of this city that the Trades and Labour Council intend to make representation on your arrival here of the increase of Asiatic immigration into Canada. I need hardly anticipate an answer to these people; yet, perhaps it is better for me to present the facts to you so far as Japanese immigration is concerned. These facts which are easily obtainable, or what is more probable, designedly malicious in their representation of the conditions. Since 1908 when the Lemieux understanding was reached between the Government of Japan, and your Government, Japan has honourably and faithfully adhered to the arrangements made in pursuance of that understanding.

I beg leave to append herewith a memorandum which gives an account of the entries and departures of Japanese to and from Canada in the years 1908, 1909, and 1910 to the latest returns. These figures are a complete answer to any charges which may be levelled at the Japanese."

Letter to Sir Wilfred Laurier from C. Yada, Japanese Consul dated August 11, 1910, unpublished letter, p.173840 in the Public Archives Collection of the Laurier Papers.

9. "Permit me on behalf of my government to thank you for your letter of the 15th instant, enclosing a cheque of $1,600 as an allowance for expenses legal and incidental to my government, in connection with the preparation and investigation of claims by Japanese residents for damages to their property in the unfortunate riot of the 7th of September."

Letter to MacKenzie King from K. Morikawa, Japanese Consul in Vancouver, p.C32950 in the Public Archives unpublished collection of the MacKenzie King Papers.

10. Reid, Young, Carrothers, op.cit., p.136-137.

11. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.57-58.

12. Letter to Sir Wilfred Laurier from R. G. MacPherson, unpublished, p.153671 of the Laurier Papers.

13. K. Adachi, op.cit., p.61.

14. The Vancouver Daily Province, September 9, 1907, p.7.

15. Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the subject of Chinese and Japanese Immigration Into the Province of British Columbia, Sessional Papers, Ottawa: Kings Printer, 1902, p.277.

16. Ibid., p.279.

17. Ibid., p.278.

18. "Do you think that the Planters' Association were responsible for bringing about the Exclusion Act passed by the United States?
A: Yes, and they intended to keep all labourers in Hawaii, and tried to cut wages in Hawaii.
Q: Do you think the Planters' Association formed the league here too?
A: I believe so, to the best of my knowledge the local Asiatic League may have a share of the incidental fee."

Testimony of Shintaro Anno, unpublished material from p.C29928 of the Public Archives Collection of the MacKenzie King Papers.

19. "No Chinaman, Japanese or Indian shall have his name placed on the Registry of Voters for any Electoral District nor be entitled to vote at any Election."

Provincial Election Act of British Columbia, 1895.

20. Canada and Its Provinces, A History of the Canadian People and Their Institutions by One Hundred Associates, ed. Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty, Vol. XXI, The Pacific Province, Toronto: Glasgow Brook and Company, 1914, p.180.

21. K. Adachi, op.cit., p.53.

22. "Thus the question of secession was put squarely before the house. That body however, was in no temporizing mood; the amendment was declared out of order; and the secession resolution carried that afternoon on a vote of fourteen to nine. It was at once forwarded to the secretary of state for transmission to the Imperial government. It reached Ottawa about the time of the Dominion elections, and in the changes occuring at that time was lost sight of - mislaid - and did not reach London until January 24, 1879. In the meantime, a better feeling had arisen, and therefore no action was taken."

Canada and Its Provinces, op.cit., p.203-204.

23. The Vancouver Daily Province, February 1, 1907, p.1.

24. "Everyone is also aware that year after year, session after session, the McBride government has introduced and passed legislation, virtually prohibiting the entry into this country of Oriental labour. This legislation has been as often disallowed by the Liberal administration at Ottawa. Consequently it was perfectly obvious to any intending large employer of Oriental labour that as long as McBride was in power he would be a thorn in the flesh."

The Vancouver Daily Province, February 1, 1907, p.1.

25. "Most obvious is the role of messenger, the person who brings a pertinent item of information to the group. He usually sees himself as relaying something he has heard even though he is reporting the information from an idiosyncratic viewpoint. Another common role is that of the interpreter, the person who tries to place the news in context, evaluating it in the light of past events and speculating on implications for the future. When there are several possible interpretations or plans of action, the protagonist sponsors one over the others. Sometimes he is an individual who is personally affected...if so he may become an agitator. In rare instances a person who believes a report fase may support it to encourage beliefs that serve his interests...A key role is that of the decision maker, who takes the lead in determining what ought to be done. In many instances a person with specialized knowledge, an official, or someone of high status is expected to assume such responsibility."

Tamotsu Shibutani, Improvised News, New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., 1966, pp.15-16.

26. The Vancouver Daily Province, February 1, 1907, p.1

27. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.61.

28. Sir Wilfred Laurier to R. G. MacPherson, Unpublished letter dated Ottawa, August 8, 1907, p.177063 in the Public Archives Collection of the Laurier Papers.

29. The Vancouver Daily Province, September 9, 1907, p.7.

30. Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire Into the Subject of Chinese and Japanese Immigration Into the Province of British Columbia, Sessional Papers, Ottawa: Kings Printer, 1902, p.270.

31. Hansard, Ottawa: Kings Printer, December 16, 1907, p.744.

32. "British Columbia is to be a white man's country. The majority of the residents of that province are utterly opposed to the present flinging wide of the gates to Asiatics. If the government does not step in and put a stop to the already humiliating conditions of affairs there will be another little episode like the one which occurred in Boston Harbour when a little tea was thrown overboard."

    Mr. R. G. MacPherson, Liberal M.P. Vancouver, Mr. W. Galliher, Liberal M.P. Kootenay, The Vancouver Daily Province, September 9, 1907, p.7.

33. Mr. A. E. Fowler, Secretary of the Exclusion League of Seattle, in the Vancouver Daily Province, September 9, 1907, p.6.

34. "It is a small consequence to the Japanese residents of this city, this matter of damages. It is a matter of considerable consequence and considerable importance to them that their national pride, the same pride that a British subject feels because he is a British subject should be injured or affected."

    Report of the Commission to Inquire Into the Methods by Which Oriental Labourers have been Induced to Come to Canada, Sessional Paper No. 74g, p.17.

35. Young, Reid, Carrothers, The Japanese Canadians, ed. H. Innes, Toronto: Toronto Press, 1939, p.16.

36. Ibid., p.16.

37. Saturday Sunset, Vancouver, November 9, 1907.

38. Unpublished document from the Mackenzie King Papers, p.C29463.

39. Unpublished document from the Mackenzie King Papers, p.C29454.

40. Unpublished document from the Mackenzie King Papers, p.29454.

41. Unpublished document from the Mackenzie King Papers, p.38913.

42. Letter from MacPherson to Laurier dated August 20, 1907, p.127980, of the Laurier Papers.

43. "That as the opinion of British Columbia generally is against the immigration of Orientals and as the Liberal party of the Dominion has successfully excluded the Chinese, the party should adopt immediately a policy which will accomplish the same object against all Orientals, and that is the opinion of this convention that the Natal Act which has been effective in restricting Oriental immigration to the other British countries, should be passed as a federal enactment, and any existing treaty or acts which prevent the passage of the Natal Act should be abrogated at the earliest possible date."

    Resolution passed at B.C. Liberal Party Convention, of October 2, 1908.

    From the Laurier Papers, p.127983.

III

THE STRUGGLE FOR STATUS, 1919 TO 1950

Status concerns continued to operate in three different areas: the relationship and status of Japan as compared to Canada, the status of British Columbia and its position within the Canadian Federation and the status of the Japanese-Canadian population compared to the white population of British Columbia.

All three of these relationships played an integral part in the way the historical situation of the Japanese in Canada developed. In a debate in the House of Commons in 1922, the issues involved in all three of these relationships were spelled out.

The debate centered around a motion by Mr. W. G. McQuarrie, Liberal member of Parliament for New Westminister, which called for the total exclusion of 'undesirable' Oriental immigration.

> That in the opinion of this house, the immigration of Oriental aliens and their rapid multiplication is becoming a serious menace to living conditions particularly on the Pacific coast, and to the future of the country in general, and the Government should take immediate action with a view of securing the exclusion of future immigration of this type.[1]

The debate around this resolution brings to light some fairly interesting features of the entire debate surrounding the Japanese presence in British Columbia. It shows how acute the threatened loss

of status, the loss of their ability to control the fate of the province, was in the minds of the people of British Columbia. One of the more interesting features of the debate is the fact that the members of both the Conservative and Liberal parties from British Columbia combined to present the bill. Irrespective of their party loyalties, they combined to create an alliance among west coast members to press for the exclusion of Asian immigrants. This action is indicative of the seige mentality that was present among the people of British Columbia. They felt their freedom was being hampered by many other interests which ran counter to their own. There was real resentment about the Federal government's continued refusal to restrict Oriental immigration because of Imperial considerations. This was a central issue in the debate. [2] The relationship between British Columbia and the Federal government and the British Imperial government had always been tense because of policies on Oriental immigration. Several references were made during the course of the debate to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. [3]

Another key argument that influenced the stand of the British Columbian contingent was the Japanese government's immigration policy. In Japan, immigrants were strictly limited in the amount of land they could own and in the areas in which they could settle. The policy of the Japanese government was used as an example of the way Canadian-Japanese should be treated. [4] As the expansion and development of Japanese military power became more and more obvious, fears and

anxieties of the white population of British Columbia grew. This anxiety about the role of Japan in world affairs translated itself into fear and suspicion towards the Japanese community in Canada.

> Although the reaction in public opinion against Japanese aggression and atrocities after July, 1931, took time to develop in Canada over several years of time, the demands for anti-Japanese action through boycotts and embargoes appear to have been relatively ineffective. But in view of later developments, these demands are excellent symptoms of exceeding deep-lying hostilities towards Japan and of an identification of resident immigrants with the activities of their homeland. Most Canadians did not dissociate one from the other. [5]

The identification by whites of Canadian-Japanese with the policy of the Imperial Japanese government became very important during the time period leading up to internment and created a situation of anxiety about the possible role of Japanese-Canadians in the war. There was an historic pattern set in Anglo-Saxon society on the west coast to suspect the loyalty of the Canadian-Japanese. This suspicion intensified economic competition between the two races. The anxiety that it created was magnified by the Exclusionist forces in the press and in the government.

> They cannot become good Canadians because of their dual citizenship. Even if they become naturalized, they do not divest themselves of their allegiance to their own emperor. [6]

The evidence, if there is any at all, does not show that Japanese-Canadians were loyal to Japan and disloyal to Canada. For the most part, it shows that Japanese immigrants maintained their ties with the land from which they had come. Up until 1924, children born of Japanese parents in Canada were automatically given dual citizenship.

After 1924, they only retained their dual citizenship if they were registered with the Japanese consul fourteen days after their birth. Still, almost eighty-six percent of Japanese-Canadian children were registered. Even with this kind of commitment to ties with Japan, no disloyalty to Canada was necessarily implied. It was natural for Issei to respect the institutions and culture which they came from, almost in the same way British immigrants respect the Queen and the British Empire.

On another front concerted attempts were being made by some Japanese-Canadians to assimilate to the white community. These assimilation attempts divided the Japanese community to a certain degree. Eventually, the racial animosity of the white community restored a certain degree of harmony among the Japanese-Canadian community.

The formation of the Camp and Mill Worker's Union marked a pronounced and determined effort by the Japanese to assimilate into white working class culture. The Japanese Labour Union aggressively attempted to assimilate with the white labour organizations. They supported white workers when on strike and applied for membership with white unions.

The Japanese in Canada unionized much more quickly than other racial groups because of their existing social structure. Other groups of workers often had different racial backgrounds which caused problems in organizing. The Camp and Mill Worker's Union and the Japanese Labour Union, became responsible for Japanese workers in most occupa-

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tions. Their membership peaked at approximately one thousand members. The mildly socialist union was founded by Etzu Suzuki, and became extremely active in combatting racism in the labour movement.

> We attacked the Anti-Asiatic Exclusion League and the racist politicians in the labour movement. We said that the function of labour unions was to protect the workers from the capitalists, that discrimination was basically against the principles of the labour movement. [8]

The thrust of the Labour Union was towards assimilation. The Union was composed of young Issei, many who came from a white collar background in Japan. Their position was a reaction against the attitude of many older Issei who planned to make some money in Canada and then to return to Japan. The latter group controlled the Canadian-Japanese Association and were supported heavily by the Japanese Consul. The Union came into direct conflict with the Canadian-Japanese Association for the leadership of the Japanese community.

> Suzuki and I reached the conclusion, the Labour Union reached the view, that the Japanese Association was an obstacle. That it was absolutely necessary to break its control over the Japanese here. [9]

The struggle between the two groups ran for more than a decade. Eventually the labour union lost much of its influence in the community and the Japanese Association regained some of its power, but things were never the same again. The Union started concerted attempts to assimilate and concerted attempts to fight back against racist attacks on a day to day basis. It was with the Japanese Labour Union that the CCF members from Vancouver, Angus McInnes, and H. Winch, first became associated. They were two of the Japanese community's most important allies.

The drive for assimilation became particularly important in the period leading up to the Second World War and it was the Camp and Mill Worker's Union that began the movement among the Issei. Their paper, the Daily People, called for acceptance of the Japanese community into the larger white community. Their membership in the Trades and Labour Council in 1927 was a major victory for the Japanese-Canadian community. It spelled reduction of the animosity of the organized white working class towards the Japanese. It also indicated the shift the Japanese working force had made out of wage labour into their own small commercial enterprizes. As the Japanese-Canadians shifted into petit bourgeois enterprizes, they drew more and more antagonism from small businessmen and farmers. In 1931, the Trades and Labour Council voted in favour of supporting the enfranchisement of the Japanese-Canadian population. The ties with, and the support from, the Trades and Labour Council was largely of symbolic importance. The Council did not become active in lobbying for the end to discrimination against the Japanese but at least inside their own organization they recognized racial equality. Their support was important because it meant an end of their active opposition rather than any active support they gave the Japanese community.

The Nissei was the group most affected by attempts to assimilate with the white community. Nissei were often alienated from the cultural values propounded by their parents. They had the most contact with the white community. They went to white schools and assimilated different cultural values resulting in some resentment

about their parents' conservative perspectives limiting their freedom. More than any other group, they desired to be assimilated into the white community.

> More serious familial problems developed in the second generation. The parents were engrossed from the beginning in the exacting task of making a living which resulted in the neglect of the welfare of their children. The break between the two generations widened when the children began to go to school, to learn English, and to acquire the cultural traits of the New World. The process of separation was accelerated when Japanese children played with White companions and participated in Canadian games and social activities. With adolescence came the emergence of new interests for which satisfaction could be only in the White section of the community. [10]

Unfortunately, the process of assimilation was halted by the hostility of the surrounding community. Attempts by the Nissei to integrate themselves into this community were rebuffed. As Japanese children left school the gap between them and white society grew more evident. Legal restrictions prevented them from using their education to their best advantage. Their contacts with the outside community were generally limited because of racial hostility.

> Death came painfully in the last years of my High School life. The Canadian within me slowly became extinguished. Persistently, the fact that I was of Japanese origin was imposed upon me. Rather unsympathetic teachers, prejudiced, often thoughtless students treated me as a different being, because of my physical characteristics, which I, in spite of every effort could never hope to alter. [11]

The legal and de facto restrictions kept the Japanese-Canadians from assimilating into the larger community. Even when concerted efforts were made by the Japanese to assimilate they were rejected by white society. The formation of the New Canadian, and English

language newspaper was just one example of their desire to be united with their white counterparts. In the light of subsequent events, their efforts seem particularly pitiable.

> We, the Second Generation, compose a pact of youth of this country, we too, are responsible for the progressive growth and peace of the Dominion of Canada. Therefore, all Canadians, regardless of racial origin, have at least one common ground of endeavour, which means that we must pursue those ways that lead to the good of Canada. [12]

The period between the two wars saw the greatest number of legal restrictions placed on the Japanese in British Columbia. The franchise battle was only one area in which the struggle for status was waged. Fishing was one of the primary areas in which the white community met and fought with the Japanese community. Punitive legislation was the order of the day and although the situation never escalated to the point where open violence on the scale of the 1907 riots occurred, restrictive legislation limited the Japanese-Canadian access to the labour market.

Fishing was a source of major concern. Pressure placed on the Federal government by the Frazer River Fisherman's Protective Association lead to a concerted attempt by the Department of Marine and Fisheries to reduce the number of fishing licenses issued to Japanese-Canadians. In 1922, white fishermen campaigned actively for the total removal of Oriental fishermen. In 1919, 3,267 licenses were issued to Japanese fishermen. This represented close to half the number of licenses issued. In the next three years, the number of licenses issued to Japanese-Canadian fishermen were limited to this

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number. In 1922, the British Columbia Fisheries Commission, The Duff Commission, reported on its examination of the British Columbian fishing industry. The report recommended the gradual and total removal of the Japanese from the fishing industry. The Commission called a total of one hundred and ninety one witnesses. Only three were Japanese.

> Our investigations have made it clear to us that all interests concerned, excepting of course the Japanese Fisherman's Association and allied interests profess to be at one as to the desirability of having white fishermen employed to a greater extent in the salmon fishery of British Columbia...As a result of this pressure, the department, in the June last, decided to gradually eliminate the oriental fishermen from the fishery by beginning with the following reduction in the number of licenses issued in 1922...It will be seen that the question we have to consider in this connection is not whether Oriental licenses should be reduced in number, but what percentage of reduction should be decided upon in order to bring about the deplacement of Orientals by white fishermen in the shortest possible time without disrupting the industry. [13]

In 1922, the number of salmon trolling licenses issued to Japanese fishermen was to be decreased by thirty three per cent over the number issued the year before. The British Columbia Fisheries Commission headed by William Duff, M. P., recommended that in 1923, the number of licenses issued to Japanese-Canadians be reduced by another forty per cent and that in 1925, another fifteen per cent reduction should occur. Due to problems administering the report of the Duff Commission, in 1925, the Select Committee on Marine and Fisheries recommended that the number of licenses be reduced by a further ten per cent, until Orientals were totally removed from the fishing industry.

> ...that the licenses issued to other than White men and Indians to be reduced by ten per cent of the number issued in 1926, and the same reduction in each future year so that these licenses will be entirely confined to Whites and Indians. [14]

Further punitive restrictions were placed on the Canadian-Japanese engaged in the fishing industry. Japanese fishermen were prevented by law from using gas powered fishing boats in Northern waters. This greatly hampered their effectiveness and prevented them from competing on an equal basis with their white and Indian counterparts. Fishing was always a central issue in the relationship between Japanese and Whites. One of the first steps by the RCMP and the Navy after the bombing of Pearl Harbour was the confiscation of all Japanese-Canadian fishing equipment.

Fearing their total elimination from the fishing industry, the Japanese fishermen's Associations fought back. They appealed the reduction of licenses to the Privy Council. Eventually, the decision was overturned but not until the percentage of licenses to Japanese, who were naturalized Canadian citizens, had dropped from close to fifty per cent to approximately thirteen per cent of the total licenses issued. The effect of this legislation was to force the Japanese to seek employment in other areas of the economy.

Punitive legislation was enacted in other areas of the economy as well. Disenfranchisement brought with it some very specific economic restrictions against the Japanese population in Canada. These restrictions prevented their entry into certain professional occupations, (law and pharmacy which required full citizenship as an entrance requirement)

de facto restrictions prevented other Japanese-Canadians from obtaining employment outside their community. At the same time, legal restrictions were put into effect to limit the access of Japanese-Canadian labour into the primary industries of logging, mining and fishing.

> Through various legalistic strategies based on nonenfranchisement of orientals, Japanese-Canadians and other orientals were excluded from most of the professions - law, dentistry, pharmacy and others. They were ineligible for employment in Federal, provincial or municipal civil service jobs or indeed even in manual jobs involving public funds. This extended to the exclusion of Japanese-Canadians even from road construction or work on railways or other projects which involved mixed private and public funding. They were frozen out of handlogging on crown timber (most of the provincial forests) or even working for private companies utilizing such timber. Similar restrictions existed for work on crown held mineral claims. [15]

The effect of this legislation and the de facto restrictions was to maintain the Japanese in a certain status position within the total labour scene in British Columbia. Japanese-Canadians were prevented from obtaining those professions which carried with them the most prestige, professional occupations. They only had one other way of obtaining prestige and status in the community. That way was to become economically successful. Naturally they could only look for this kind of success in the economic areas that were open to them. When they became successful in these areas, (the primary industries), restrictions were placed on them to reduce their competition and at the same time, to secure the position, (status), of white workers in the industry.

> The white man is handicapped by the responsibilities of civilization; the oriental is prepared to struggle for his solitary existence. Organized society has erected a fabric and an insti-

> tution to which the oriental contributes nothing. He is not concerned in municipal, provincial or federal problems; he is filling a field that would solve the unemployment problem in western Canada. He is the human teredo so far as organized labour is concerned, because he has created an industrial stratum into which the white man cannot descend.[16]

The statement by Mr. Stork indicates some of the curious contradictions that are involved in the Japanese question. He admits that white men have difficulty competing with the Japanese. He puts it down to Japanese racial inferiority rather than to the hard work and sacrifice of the Japanese-Canadians. He points out that they do not participate in the social and institutional fabric of Canada and yet he ignores the fact that legal restrictions make it impossible for the Japanese to participate in the institutional structure of Canada while de facto restrictions make it impossible to participate in the social fabric. The same curious argument involves itself in the debate around assimilation. The Japanese are condemned for not intermarrying with the white population. At the same time, Mr. McQuarrie says that it is undesirable that Canada become a "mongrel nation".[17]

The upward mobility of the Japanese-Canadians was severely limited by the franchise bar. It also helped to maintain them in a lower status position in the eyes of the white community. It was this prejudiced attitude with regard to Japanese labour which created the situation which Mr. Stork refers to as "an industrial stratum into which the white man cannot descend". The fact that there were certain job areas in which white men would not work was a result of their own prejudices and not a result of the competitive efforts of Japanese

labour. Again, there were some rather curious labour practices which ensured that the racial division was perpetuated rather than lessened. One example of legislation which helped to maintain the position of Japanese-Canadian labourers as second class citizens in primary industry, was the Male Minimum Wage Act of British Columbia.

In 1925, the British Columbian Legislature set a minimum wage of forty cents per hour to be applied universally to labourers in British Columbia. Complaints from employers forced the government to establish a two tiered minimum wage system. Twenty-five per cent of the workers employed as labourers by a firm could be employed at a lower minimum wage scale than the rest of the workers.

> The employers were unhappy when the cheap supply of labour dried up. As a result, in 1934, the British Columbia Board of Industrial Relations modified the original ruling of the Minimum Wage Act so that a quarter of the workers in the saw mill industry might be paid 25¢ an hour while the general rate was set at 35¢. No stipulation was made as to what type of men were to be included in the special category, but in practice employers assigned Japanese to it. [18]

The net effect of all these restrictions was to force the Japanese-Canadians into different occupations. This shift did not lessen racial tensions, in fact, it only served to shift the concentration of racial animosity from the labour movement to a more petit bourgeois group of farmers and business men. [19] By the 1930's, much of the active opposition from the organized labour movement had ended and instead it was organizations like the White Canada movement that opposed the Japanese drive for equality. These organizations were largely composed of farmers and business men. The CCF began to play

an increasingly large role on behalf of the Japanese. Men like Angus McInnes were largely responsible for swinging the tide of organized labour to a position less hostile to the Japanese. [20] In 1935, the CCF, even though it elected only three members from British Columbia, polled the highest number of votes in that province. [21]

The move of the Anti-Japanese forces to a more middle class composition parallels the shift in the occupational concentration of the Japanese-Canadians.

> All the restrictions led to increasing numbers of Japanese-Canadians entering the range of self employed enterprizes still open to them. The mid and later 1920's saw an increasing number of Japanese-Canadian workers shifting into small scale farming, opening a plethora of corner stores and starting a roster of service businesses such as laundering, gardening and so forth. This process was intensified during the 1930's. By the mid 1930's there were approximately 700 mini farms and about 860 trading establishments (the vast majority "corner store" type operations) owned and run by Japanese-Canadians (sumida). [22]

If we look at the three charts in Appendix III, we see the steady growth of Japanese-Canadian employment in businesses like farming and other enterprizes of a commercial nature. By 1941, there was no longer any concentration in the primary industries. Fishing was the only primary industry which retained even a fraction of the original Japanese-Canadian work force.

The changes in occupational categories came at a time when the Japanese-Canadian population was growing rapidly. Young, Reid and Carrother point out in The Japanese Canadians that the birth rate among the Japanese population in Canada was considerably higher than most other ethnic groups. In 1931, over forty per cent of the popu-

lation was under twenty-four. 10,256 of a total 22,205 Japanese-Canadians were under twenty-four.[23] This marked bulge in the population curve towards the younger age groups marks the family development that was going on in the Japanese-Canadian community. In 1922, the Gentleman's agreement had been renegotiated limiting the total number of immigrants to Canada to one hundred and fifty a year. This was the effective curtailment of any large scale Japanese immigration to Canada. With the limits on immigration came a new commitment to remaining in Canada. The change in attitude among the Japanese-Canadian is demonstrated by the split between the Camp and Mill Worker's Union and the Canadian Japanese Association. The Camp and Mill Worker's Union was centered among the younger Issei and made every attempt to assimilate with the white labouring classes. The Canadian Japanese Association was a much more conservative organization composed of older Issei who retained much closer ties with the Imperial Japanese government and the Japanese Consul.

> The Labour Union advised people to get adjusted to Canada. We didn't mean that Japanese culture was bad but that we had to adapt in order to stay in Canada.[24]

> The Japanese Association had important influence over the life of the Japanese living in Canada. As long as the Japanese Association followed the Consul's ideas it had 'guarantor authority', it could give 'authorized approval' for legal documents.[25]

The Camp and Mill Worker's Union exerted an enormous influence on the Canadian-Japanese Association and although they were eventually purged from the organization because of their socialist tendencies, many of their ideas on assimilation were accepted by the Association.

In 1940, for example, the Canadian Japanese Association published a document entitled the Japanese Contribution to Canada. The intent of the document was to stifle some of the criticism of the Japanese-Canadian community by showing the degree to which they had assimilated economically as an integral part of the province of British Columbia. They also became involved in a protracted struggle for enfranchisement.

Economic success was only one of the ways that the Japanese-Canadian community worked for status and acceptance. The franchise battle was one way they saw of improving their status. The struggle centered around returning veterans from World War I of Japanese origin. They had voted in Europe and saw no reason why veterans should be disenfranchised when they returned to Canada. All told, there were around one hundred veterans of World War I who were Japanese-Canadians. In 1931, they were given the vote after a long and heated debate. This did not spell a lessening of the hostility towards Japanese-Canadians. In fact, the situation was exactly the opposite. The enfranchisement question had been taken up by the Federal government and any person disqualified in a Provincial Election was prevented from voting in a Federal Election. The Japanese organized a movement for enfranchisement and in the early thirties, received the support of the fledgling CCF party.

In 1936, a delegation was sent to the Elections and Franchise Committee to present a brief calling for the enfranchisement of the Japanese-Canadian population. The delegation consisted of Dr. S. I. Hayakawa, Dr. E. C. Banno, Mr. Minoru Kobsyashi, H. Hyoda and four

Nissei. They were opposed in the committee meeting by politicians from British Columbia, men like Tom Reid, Howard Green, A. W. Neill, H. H. Stevens, and others. Neill and Reid presented a brief countering the claims of the Japanese-Canadian delegation. The drive for the franchise was sponsored by a new Japanese organization composed mainly of Nissei. The Japanese Canadian Citizen's League was to emerge as the most important organization in the Japanese community in the years surrounding World War II.

The Japanese presentation to the Elections and Franchise Committee dealt with a brief asking that the franchise be extended to second generation Japanese. The report spoke of the economic disadvantage that the Japanese were at because of the franchise bar and appealed to British traditions of fair play and justice. They also pointed out that second generation Japanese were largely assimilated and retained few of the cultural traditions of their parents.[26]

> Norris's brief, 62 pages of closely packed detail was an uncommon marriage of magisterial detachment and unchecked emotion, of dry technicalities and purple prose. Its main points were: (1) that the considerations which prompted the original enactment of the discriminatory legislation - for example, lack of education and a sufficient acquaintance with the English language - no longer existed (and that the maintenance of the disqualification was a "weapon of industrial expediency and an instrument of race oppression"); (2) that denial of the franchise tended to create sectionalism "contrary to the intention of the Federaltionalists who brought about the union of the Provinces under the British North America Act", and that the Dominion Government should represent the people of Canada without discrimination as to race between provinces; (3) that it tended to create an economic minority ("a minority which if deprived of the franchise will not be absorbed into the life of Canada, and living under a sense of oppression, will eventually become a source of difficulty"); and (4) that it created and aggravated international ill-feeling.[27]

Norris's brief presented the very real dangers inherent in the traditional Anti-Asiatic position, dangers that were going to have to be dealt with in the aftermath of the bombing of Pearl Harbour and the fall of Hong Kong. The Asiatic questions had divided British Columbia from the rest of Canada and would continue to do so as long as the members from British Columbia were placed in a position opposing the moderate policies of the Federal government. Also, as long as British Columbian society was racially divided, questions could easily explode in violence similar to what had occurred in 1907. The major factor in continuing the atmosphere of interracial hostility was the position taken by Liberal and Conservative politicians representing ridings in British Columbia and the role of the press in perpetuating the myths created by those politicians. Reid and Neill's position, taken in response to the Nissei brief, was typical of the attitude of most Conservative and Liberal politicians from British Columbia.

Reid and Neill recounted all the myths that had circulated against the Japanese since their arrival in Canada. Their position lacked any accurate factual background, instead, it relied heavily on exaggeration, rumour, and innuendo.

> The granting of the franchise will not, and indeed could not break down the peculiar racial characteristics which the oriental has and which it is admitted still exists. It would, however, as they themselves readily suggest, further economic assimilation, but are we in Canada prepared to allow an unassimabile race of people to control the economic and political life, if not of Canada then that of British Columbia, the dangers of which have become more apparent in that province during the past number of years. [28]

The "peaceful penetration" argument was one of the most prevalent arguments during this time period. It was one of the most difficult arguments for the Japanese-Canadians to counter because any economic successes they achieved were taken as a further example of "peaceful penetration". Laws limiting the number of occupations that the Japanese were to be admitted to also caused concentrations of Japanese in certain industries which was also seen as an attempt to control the industry. The simple fact was that the Japanese were not in control of any occupational area in the Province. [29] Even if the percentage were to grow much larger with the inclusion of other groups of Orientals, Reid could not prove or even begin to prove, that there was a concerted attempt by them to do anything other than carve out a decent living for themselves and their families. Inaccuracy and exaggeration characterized the attack against the Japanese. Adachi points to the same condition in his discussion of the Elections and Franchise Committee.

> Indeed, Neill's loose grasp of the facts was rather woeful. He visualized at least 25,000 Japanese rushing to the polls when, in fact, less than 5,400 would have been eligible. [30]

The exaggeration of various facts and the total distortion of other information combine to demonstrate how the rumour process becomes one in which news is fabricated and then given the authority of fact by the various roles that people play in conveying it. Government legislation aimed against the Japanese leant credence to the belief that the Japanese were a threat to the people of British Columbia. Royal Commissions, Special Commissions, and Special Reports, whether, in fact,

they did anything, helped to reinforce the public's perception of the Japanese as a threat to their security. The role that the politicians from British Columbia played in this process cannot be underestimated. The positions that they took, created and reinforced the perception of the "Yellow Peril", the "Peaceful Penetration threat" and other myths that surrounded the Japanese-Canadian presence in Canada. The roles of R. G. MacPherson, A. W. Neill, Thomas Reid, H. H. Stevens, H. Green, G. Black, T. Lucas, W. McQuarrie, I. MacKenzie, L. W. Humphrey, L. J. Ladner and the other politicians, who disgraced the British Columbian scene between 1900 and 1950, cannot be excused. They are largely responsible for the escalation of the issue. Whether they were responsible for the situation developing because of political expediency or because of their own racist conviction is difficult to determine. It is clear that the issue of Japanese immigration and enfranchisement helped to maintain Liberal and Conservative power against the growing strength of the CCF.

In 1935, the CCF was fighting its first Federal election and the issue of their support for Oriental enfranchisement gave their opponents a weapon to use against them. The Liberals were particularly odious in their use of racist slogans to gain votes.

> A vote for any CCF candidate is a vote to give the Chinamen and the Japanese the same voting right as you have. A vote for the Liberal candidate in your riding is a vote against Oriental enfranchisement. The Liberal party is opposed to giving the Orientals the vote. Look behind the solicitor for a CCF candidate, and you will see an Oriental leering over his shoulder with an eye on you and your daughter. [31]

The effect of these slogans on the results of the election are difficult to determine. The CCF polled the largest vote of any

party but only elected three out of a possible sixteen seats in the Province. On the other hand, election slogans of this calibre helped to reinforce the perception of the Japanese-Canadians as a danger to the rest of the population of British Columbia.

Rumour circulated by the press, and by politicians combined with the attack on Manchuria by the Imperial Japanese government all helped to create and reinforce an attitude of unease in the minds of the white population of British Columbia. This unease translated itself into a suspicion of Japanese-Canadians who were thought to be allied to the cause of the Imperial Japanese government.

> The increasing hostility in the late 1930's towards the resident Japanese in British Columbia was, of course, linked to suspicions of Japan's foreign policy. When Japan committed herself to a massive invasion of China, marked by the notorious rape of Nanking and the bombing of open towns, popular revulsion against Japan became exceedingly crystallized. As most Canadians associated the immigrant Japanese and their children with the activities of the Japanese in the Far East, the year 1937, in effect became a decisive turning point in the fortunes of the Japanese in Canada. Regardless of their own wishes, they were caught up in the tides and currents of Japan's affairs. [32]

Coupled with the connection between the Japanese-Canadians and Japan, was a perception among the white population of British Columbia that Orientals were a threat to their way of life. This argument was essentially the same as the arguments about the extent of assimilability of the Japanese population. Perhaps one of the best examples of the prevalent perceptions surrounding the Japanese-Canadian community appeared in Maclean's Magazine on May 1st, 1933. The article was entitled "The Oriental Threat" and was written by

Charles F. Hope and W. K. Earle.

The article points out that immigration has brought about a tremendous influx of Orientals who threaten to overrun the British Columbian economy. It should be noted that this article deals specifically with the Japanese and has virtually nothing to say about the Chinese or other Asian immigrants.

> ...but Canada's Gentleman's Agreements have not prevented a tremendous increase in the numbers of these nationals accompanied by an alarming acquisition of land and a penetration in many spheres approaching a monopoly. [33]

The authors of this article ignore the fact that since the negotiation of the second Gentleman's Agreement, the number of immigrants to Canada had shown a steady decline and that the Japanese government had followed the letter of the Agreement. The Japanese-Canadian population actually showed a decline in numbers between 1921 and 1941. (see Appendix I) Although Hope and Earle claim that the Japanese were approaching a monopoly in many areas, they do not nor could produce any evidence to support that claim.

> Everybody in British Columbia knows that so far as the original Gentleman's Agreement is concerned there never was at any time any serious attempt on the part of the various Canadian governments to enforce it. [34]

The confusion which surrounded the Gentleman's Agreements because of its relatively confidential nature, caused many problems for Japanese-Canadians. Japan lived up to its end of the agreement, a fact that was generally not accepted. Another problem was caused by rumours of illegal immigrants. Eventually five illegal immigrants were deported including the interpreter for the Mackenzie King

Commission. This helped fuel the rumours that there were several thousand illegal immigrants in the Province.

> With the Japanese, penetration appeared to be ordered and controlled as though from some central source. It has all the ear marks of the efficiency which characterizes Japanese expansion everywhere. [35]

Again the innuendo contained in the statement is unprovable. This statement also points to the anxiety that was felt about Japanese-Canadian success. One would suppose that by claiming Japanese success was a result of foreign control, one could continue to believe in his own superiority in face of evidence to the contrary. The economic status of the Japanese-Canadian community was an issue that was central to the conflict with the whites. When the Japanese started to become successful they became a threat to the status of white British Columbians who then legislated against them.

> The advance of the Asiatic Retail Trade has been recently at the rate of 15% annually. Moreover, new lines of retail activity have been concerned. One by one the manufacturing trades-clothing, dress making, boots and shoes, ship building, and the manufacture of aerated waters are meeting competition from Orientals. [36]

This is a particularly interesting passage in the article. It clearly points to the anxiety that was generated by competition from the Oriental population of British Columbia. The hard work and the drive for success of the Japanese created this attitude among the white population. Economic success was the only way that the Japanese could achieve a recognized standing in the community, and whites felt that as they lost status the Japanese gained it. There was even more anxiety created when the Japanese competitiveness was placed in the

context of Imperial Japanese expansion.

> Canadians should never forget that a large proportion of Japanese immigrants to Canada are ex-soldiers and sailors, many of whom have seen active service and are of the military samurai class, and that the army and navy are exclusively under the control of the Emperor, the Japanese Parliament excercising little or no control. Recent events in Manchuria throw a sinister light on this subject...
>
> ...Observers of current events are aware that the national genius that governed the Manchurian adventure directs the peaceful penetration into Canada, only the weapons are different. [37]

It is interesting to note how the authors of this article take the role of both messenger and interpreter if we can refer back to Shibutani's model once again. Here the authors present us with two snippets of information, Japanese immigrants have military backgrounds, and the army is under the control of the Emperor who is in turn, responsible for the invasion of Manchuria. Hope and Earle make their point crystal clear by telling us that the total sum of these bits of information is that Canada is being invaded by Japanese immigrants. The carefully chosen rumours that these authors write about became news because they were published in a national magazine. They were legitimized by the actions of politicians who campaigned against the "dangerous" Japanese presence in Canada, and by legislation and royal commissions which indicated the government's concern about the "danger".

The authors of this article also had some solutions to propose. C. E. Hope was heavily involved in the White Canada Association and the Native Sons of British Columbia. After the war he, along with Tom Reid, A. W. Neill, J. W. Corneth, the Mayor of Vancouver and several

other very prominent British Columbians, signed a petition demanding the return to Japan of all Japanese-Canadians. [38] In this particular article, the authors set down three principles which they felt were fundamental to the question of immigration.

> (1) No aliens should be allowed to enter into, or remain in any country unless it is to the benefit of that country's nationals.
>
> (2) The presence of a rapidly increasing unabsorbable race is a great danger.
>
> (3) The treaty which allows for immigration from Japan should be abrogated.
>
> The situation is rapidly becoming intolerable and must be dealt with, for agitation in British Columbia will never cease until a remedy has been found. It is a threat against the very existence of the country as a great white domain. [39]

As radical as this article may seem, it appears to have been fairly acceptable during this particular period. Similar attacks against the Japanese took place on the floor of the Provincial and Federal Parliaments, intertwined themselves with municipal politics, and became important issues in West Coast election campaigns.

Let us now consider what the effect of these factors must have been in the minds of the people of British Columbia in particular, and Canada in general. First, an atmosphere of anxiety had been created. Competition economically from Japanese-Canadian communities was perceived as a threat to the status of white British Columbians. The inability of the Federal government to deal adequately with the interests of the white population of British Columbia increased this anxiety. The public was kept informed of the Federal government's

inaction by the members of Parliament from British Columbia who lashed out at the Japanese population and the Federal government's immigration policy at every opportunity. These politicians continuously fueled the anxiety by spreading rumours about the reasons Japanese immigrants were coming to Canada. Legislation confirmed people's perception of the "Oriental Threat" by passing laws restricting the Japanese from involving themselves in certain occupations. The franchise bar was the weapon which was most effective in maintaining the image of the Japanese as second class citizens. The franchise bar assured the people of British Columbia that Orientals would never be considered equal. When the Japanese continually mobilized and tried to fight against their disenfranchisement, it was in an attempt to be recognized as equals. The only other way they had of demonstrating their right to equal status was by working for a measure of economic success which would establish them in the community. In this way economic success becomes an indication of status. Economic success spelt out status gain and economic failure spelt status loss. In this way, competition over the material allocation of societal resources became intertwined with the allocation of social prestige. Japanese refusal to accept the status of second class citizenship indicated a refusal to defer to the status of whites in British Columbia. Their refusal to defer helped to maintain the anxiety and uncertainty of the white population. Undoubtedly, politicians and the news media fueled this anxiety with the construction of improvised news legitimized by governmental action. This is the situation we found ourselves in, in 1941.

In 1941 rumours of war with Japan were circulating. The war with Germany was going badly. In British Columbia, the anxiety about the Japanese-Canadians' connection with Imperial Japan were increasing the anxiety about war in the Pacific. The actions of the Japanese military in China confirmed their plans for expansion. Suspicion was cast on resident Japanese-Canadians who had been traditionally linked in the press and by the politicians to Imperial Japan.

On December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbour was attacked. At the same time, Malaya, Hong Kong, the Phillipines, Guam and Wake Island were attacked. On December 25th, 1941, Hong Kong surrendered and two Canadian battalions were captured.

In the months leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbour, the Canadian government had taken steps which suggest some anticipation of the events that followed. Japanese-Canadians had volunteered for service overseas in 1939. At the beginning of 1941, King announced that Japanese-Canadians would be exempt from military service.

> This policy was established "not upon any mistrust of their patriotism" King emphasized but because of the "dangerous" situation caused by anti-Japanese hostility in British Columbia. [40]

This action, even if the intent was to protect the Japanese-Canadian community, which is doubtful, served as another action confirming the suspicions of white British Columbians about the Japanese-Canadians. The attack on Pearl Harbour served to underscore these suspicions.

> The bombing of Pearl Harbour provided anti-Japanese interests in the province with a savoury propaganda item which far

> exceeded their most optimistic hopes. The very nature of the attack - its "treacherous" and "sneak" method of execution - seemed to underscore indelibly all the principal charges about the resident Japanese and their "character", charges and insinuations which have been carefully nurtured and proselytized on the west coast for decades. [41]

In the initial period after the attack, newspapers urged people to remain calm, but as the Federal government remained inactive, anxieties and increased attacks on the Japanese community, reached a fevered pitch.

> For a period of almost a week following Pearl Harbour, there was almost no organized public agitation against the resident Japanese and no massive attempts to molest them. Then almost immediately the CPR dismissed section hands and red caps and Vancouver hotels dischrged employees, as did many mills and factories throughout the west coast, all adding to the sudden spectre of unemployment faced by 1,800 fishermen whose boats had been tied up and immobilized. "Black hand" notes warned proprietors to close their stores, arson was attempted at a rooming house in Vancouver's little Tokyo district, and tradesmen and merchants who depended on white cliental suffered an inevitable drop in business. [42]

Politicians pressed for the total evacuation and internment of Japanese-Canadians. Once again, Tom Reid, Ian MacKenzie and other Federal politicians pressed the Canadian government for removal of the Japanese-Canadian community on the west coast. Vancouver Alderman Wilson, one of the leading opponents of the Japanese, and a son of one of the leaders of the Anti-Asiatic Exclusion League involved in the riot of 1907, moved before the Vancouver city council, the removal of the Japanese from the West Coast. [43]

I do not want to dwell too long on the injustices that were done to the Japanese under the guise of military safety. It is obvious that the Orders in Council served to deprive Japanese-Canadians of

their civil rights and their property. One only need refer to Adachi's The Enemy Who Never Was or Laviolette's The Canadian Japanese and World War II to get a complete picture of the injustices that were done.

In 1941, immediately after the bombing of Pear Harbour, Japanese fishing boats were confiscated. Several other war time measures were placed on the Japanese community. These were to get more and more extreme as the war went on. First, they were forced to surrender all cars, radios, cameras and firearms. A curfew was placed on them. Japanese language schools were closed. The three Japanese language papers were closed and the New Canadian, the Nissei paper, was taken over by the British Columbia Security Commission. Some Japanese who had been investigated previously by the RCMP were arrested and interned. On December 16, 1941, Order in Council 9760, Japanese-Canadians were ordered to register with the RCMP. On January 29, 1942, and on February 5, 1942, Japanese nationals of 18 to 45 years of age, were ordered to leave the coastal area by April 1st. On February 24, 1942, the exclusion order was revised and extended to include all persons of Japanese descent. Japanese internees were allowed to take one hundred and fifty pounds of baggage for each adult and seventy-five pounds of baggage for each child. The rest of their property was to be left in their homes. Most of them would never see their belongings again. Many examples of people being given only short notice before they were evacuated have been recorded.[44]

Internment usually proceeded in two stages. The people were assembled in the cattle barns at Hastings Park in Vancouver and then

shipped by rail to the internment camps in the interior of British Columbia. There were very few incidents of resistance. The British Columbia Security Commission appointed a Japanese Liaison Council. There was a great deal of antagonism in the Japanese community towards this Council because of the presence of a suspected gambler and underworld figure, Morii, and because Nissei were not represented on the Council.

The Canadian government was ill prepared for the evacuation of twenty thousand people. The Orders in Council gradually extended the power of the Security Commission and the Custodian of Alien Property until he was given the right to dispose of any of the property in his care with or without the consent of the owner. Storage facilities for the personal property of Japanese-Canadians were inadequate and some of it was lost during the course of their internment. The auctions at which this property was sold secured very low prices for the property. [45]

12,029 Canadian citizens, both first and second generation Japanese-Canadians were interned in the interior of British Columbia in the towns of Greenwood, Kaslo, Sandon, New Denver, Slocun City, and Tashme. Another 945 were sent to work in road camp projects at Blue River-Yellowhead, Revelstoke, Hope-Princeton, Schrieber and Black Spur. Another 1,161 were sent to self supporting projects at Christina Lake, Bridge River, Minto City, Lillooet, McGillvray Falls, Assiniboia and Swing Crew in the Okanagan Valley. Dr. Miyasaki, the author of My 60 Years in Canada, and the first Japanese-Canadian to be elected to a political office, settled in Lilloet. Morii was also allowed to

settle in a self supporting community in the interior. His case is one of the particularly interesting stories that crop up from time to time. He was accused by the Japanese community of being an RCMP spy, a gangster in league with the Black Dragon Society, a Japanese nationalist group, and yet, he was made Chairman of the Liaison Committee. A Royal Commission found no evidence of any illegal activities and cleared him of the charges. In the course of the hearing however, evidence was produced which clearly demonstrated that he had been in contact with the Black Dragon Society in Japan and had written articles in their magazine favourable to Japanese Imperial expansion. It was also shown that he had been convicted of manslaughter. It was strange that the Security Committee would appoint a man suspected of being a pro-Japanese nationalist to head the Liaison Committee.

The remainder of the Japanese population in British Columbia were sent to various industries in western and central Canada including nearly one thousand who had permits for special employment in British Columbia.

By December of 1943, the Department of Labour asked the internees to accept work in the province. Many did. In Alberta, Japanese-Canadian labour helped to bring in the sugar beat crop.

Early in 1945, after the American government had released the Japanese from their internment camps, the Canadian government asked the Canadian-Japanese whether they would ask to be repatriated to Japan or accept dispersal east of the Rockies. Often, in confusion, and with a great deal of bitterness, nearly 10,600 people signed forms requesting

repatriation to Japan. In the end, nearly 4,000 Japanese-Canadians were repatriated to Japan before Mackenzie King cancelled the repatriation order.

Although the war with Japan ended in 1945, it was to be some years before the fate of the Japanese-Canadians was to be settled. An enormous group of civil libertarians, members of the CCF, John Diefenbaker, and Issei and Nissei groups lobbied for equal citizenship rights for Japanese-Canadians. On the other hand, members from British Columbia lobbied for exclusion of Japanese.

> When the "Japanese Question" comes up in the House of Commons this session, there is every indication that a concerted effort will be made by a group of members to have all Japanese in Canada deported. A number included in this group are well known by their racist activities which antedate "Pearl Harbour" and were an open manifestation of their "jockeying for political position". [46]

This group of members of Parliament gradually found themselves cut off from the mainstream of political decision making. First, Mackenzie King announced in August of 1944, that no Japanese-Canadian had been charged with any act of sabotage during the war. [47] He also put forward a general policy concerning Japanese-Canadians that was to be a guiding principle in governmental action after the war.

> The government has had certain basic principles before it in formulating the basic policy which I wish to present today. In the first place, it recognizes the concern felf by British Columbia at the possibility of once again having within its borders virtually the entire Japanese population of Canada. In the past that situation has led to acrimony and bitterness ...In view of that concern, it is felt that it must be accepted as a basic factor that it would be unwise and undesirable, not only from the point of view of the people of British Columbia but also from that of persons of Japanese origin themselves to be concentrated in that province after the war. [48]

Undoubtedly, civil security on the west coast had a great deal to do with the decision to relocate the Japanese at the end of the war. It is clear that King saw internment as the one way of preventing widespread civil disorder in British Columbia. It is clear also that the situation which made decisions of this type necessary developed from the agitation which preceded the war. There is no doubt that violence would have occurred had the Japanese not been interned. It is less clear, but very likely, that violence would have occurred if the Japanese had been allowed to resettle in British Columbia. Tom Reid, in an article in Macleans, in 1948, points out his commitment to keeping the Japanese-Canadians out.

> "We can't afford to go to sleep", said Mr. Reid recently. "Those Ontario interests won't stop until they've sent the Japs back here to compete with our fishermen and farmers as they did before. If that happens there is only one thing we can do. We can keep raising hell until we've driven them out again." [49]

This quotation sums up two of the main status issues that were resolved by the relocation of the Japanese-Canadians. The status of British Columbia, as a province, was decided because the relocation of the Japanese showed British Columbia's ability to control her own future within a Federal system. It also solved the conflict between whites and Japanese economically. No longer would white fishermen and farmers have to compete for economic status with their Japanese counterparts.

In 1945, Mackenzie King announced the creation of a National Emergency Transitional Powers Act which would keep the Orders in Council

in effect. The Act made it possible to keep the Japanese interned and to go ahead with the repatriation of Japanese-Canadians to Japan. In 1947, the passage of the Transitional Measures Act, maintained the power of the government to control the Japanese-Canadians in matters of employment, business, travel, residence and association. On March 31, 1949, the controls were finally lifted and Japanese-Canadians were given the right to vote.

In the four years leading up to the removal of controls, a tremendous amount of pro-Japanese agitation had gone on. The Japanese-Canadians had appealled the sale of their property and a Commission under H. I. Bird had given them a little more of the real value of their property. This amounted to a return of the commissions charged by the Custodian for selling their property plus 6.8% of the sale price on auctioned goods, he then added 30% to claimants whose goods were sold by auction and 12% to those whose property was sold by tender. [50]

Besides the battle over property claims which was to go on until 1967, there was a great deal of agitation in the press for the restoration of basic civil liberties to the Japanese. Several newspapers criticized government policy and suggested the government was only protecting the interests of some Liberal members from British Columbia.

> But it would at least relieve us of the stigma of a ludicrous hypocracy if this were admitted and treated openly, and if it were also allowed that the real pressure behind the Japanese-Canadian "distribution" is for the benefit of people like Ian Mackenzie, Minister of Veterans' Affairs the Vancouver politician who told the people of his province - without reference to any law or ruling - that there would never again be a Jap west of the Rockies. [51]

In the end Japanese-Canadians were given full citizenship rights. The human tragedy experienced by the Japanese can never be fully explained or fully compensated for. The status questions that were involved in building and maintaining racial hatred against the Japanese had been resolved. Japan was no longer a major world power. British Columbia had excercised her peculiar sort of self determination by running the Japanese out of the province. Relocation east of the rockies settled once and for all the allocation of status through economic competition.

We can see how the issue developed from the period before the First World War. A situation of tension existed between two racial groupings because of competition. Labour leaders, politicians and the media used the issue for their own political purposes. In the period after the First World War, racial prejudice against the Japanese-Canadians followed them into the different areas of the economy. Attempts made by the Japanese to assimilate were, for the most part, rejected. Trade Union acceptance of the Japanese-Canadians came only after legal restrictions had forced most Japanese-Canadians out of the primary industries and into commercial enterprizes or farming. Politicians from the Liberal and Conservative parties manufactured an issue of "Peaceful Penetration" and suggested the Japanese were intent on conquering British Columbia. The media played into their hands and furthered the circulation of improvised news until a condition of near hysteria was created. At the advent of World War II, the government was confronted with an extremely touchy problem. The threat of racial

conflict in British Columbia provided the momentum necessary to intern the Japanese for "security reasons". The threat of racial violence on the West Coast of Canada if the Japanese had been allowed to return forced the Canadian government to disperse the Japanese east of the Rockies. Once the three status issues which provided the momentum for the racism were solved, the Japanese were given equal status.

Notes to Pages 70 - 105

1. House of Commons, Debates, Ottawa: Kings Printer, 1919 to 1950, May 8, 1922, p.1509.

2. House of Commons, Debates, Ottawa: Kings Printer, 1919 to 1950, May 8, 1922,p.1511.

3. House of Commons, Debates, Ottawa: Kings Printer, 1919 to 1950, May 8, 1922, p.1509.

4. Ibid., p.1509.

5. Forest E. Laviolette, The Canadian Japanese and World War II, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948, p.25.

6. House of Commons, Debates, op.cit. p.1509.

7. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.412.

8. R. Knight, M. Koizumi, A Man of Our Times, Vancouver: New Star Books, 1976, p.43.

9. Ibid., p.45.

10. Young, Reid, Carrothers, The Japanese Canadians, ed. H. Innes, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1939, p.104.

11. Young, Reid, Carrothers, The Japanese Canadians, ed. H. Innes, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1939, p.153.

12. Norah Fujita in the New Canadian, November 24, 1938.

13. British Columbia Fisheries Commission, Minutes and Proceedings, Ottawa: Kings Printer, 1923, p.11.

14. The Japanese Contribution to Canada, Vancouver: Canadian Japanese Association, 1940, p.11.

15. R. Knight, M. Koizumi, A Man of Our Times, Vancouver: New Star Books, 1976, p.116.

16. House of Commons, Debates, Ottawa: Kings Printer, 1919 to 1950, May 8, 1922, p.1526.

17. "The real test of assimilation is intermarriage. The divergence of the characteristics of the two races is so marked that intermarriage does not tend to perpetuate the good qualities of either race."

House of Commons, Debates, Ottawa: Kings Printer, 1919 to 1950, May 8, 1922, p.1522.
It should be noted that sentiments similar to these were uttered on many occasions by Members of Parliament from British Columbia.

18. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.146.

19. "Until the mid-1930's labour was a major force behind exclusionist legislation. In search of narrow and mistaken self interest, the orthodox unions and much of unorganized labour mobilized their voting clout behind anti-orientalism. By the late 1920's and the 1930's the main source of anti-oriental agitation shifted from the organized working class to the petty bourgeosie, gentlemen, farmers and allied lumpen, who began to experience competition from Japanese forced out of wage industries."

R. Knight, M. Koizumi, A Man of Our Times, Vancouver: New Star Books, 1976, p.117.

20. Ibid., pp.117-118.

21. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, pp.182,183.

22. R. Knight, M. Koizumi, op.cit. p.117.

23. Young, Reid, Carrothers, The Japanese Canadians, ed. H. Innes, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1939, p.197.

24. R. Knight, M. Koizumi, A Man of Our Times, Vancouver: New Star Books, 1976, p.62.

25. R. Knight, M. Koizumi, A Man of Our Times, Vancouver: New Star Books, 1976, p.44.

26. House of Commons, Special Franchise Acts, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 10, May 22, 1936, p.215.

27. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.161.

28. House of Commons, Special Franchise Acts, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, March 16, 1937, p.210.

29. Percentage of Japanese working in specific Occupations in British Columbia.

Trade or Industry	Percentage 1941
Fishing	16.3 %
Lumbering	8.3 %
Labourers	14.7 %
Agriculture	18.8 %
Manufacture	13.4 %
Trade	8.4 %
Service	12.9 %
Transport & Communication	2.9 %
Clerical	2.1 %
Miscellaneous in all industry	2.2 %

Submission from the National Japanese Canadian Citizens Association to the Hon. H. I. Bird, p.11, September 17, 1947.

30. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.164.

31. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.182.

32. Ibid., p.184.

33. C. E. Hope, W. K. Earle, "The Oriental Threat", MacLeans, May 1, 1933, p.12.

34. C. E. Hope, W. K. Earle, "The Oriental Threat", MacLeans, May 1, 1933, p.12.

35. C. E. Hope, W. K. Earle, "The Oriental Threat", MacLeans, May 1, 1933, p.54.

36. Ibid., p.54.

37. Ibid., p.54.

38. "Wherefore your petitioners humbly pray that your Honourable House may be pleased to enact such measures as may be necessary to insure that all people of Japanese descent be deported from Canada at the close of the present war, and that provisions for their acceptance by Japan be embodied in the Armistice or peace terms."

Petition signed and circulated in 1945 by the following:

Tom Reid, M.P.
J. L. Gibson, M.P.
A. W. Neill, M.P.
Major R. M. Payne
Henry L. Edmonds
Chas. E. Hope
Austin Harris
A. H. Peppar, Farmers Institute
E. L. Greenlee, Farmers Institute
E. R. Chamberlain, High School Principal
F. H. Jackson, Native Sons of British Columbia
J. A. Sim, Trollers Association
F. E. Elliot, Canadian Legion
H. S. Cunningham, Reeve Maple Ridge
J. T. Brown, Reeve Surray
E. C. Warren, Reeve Saanich
G. H. L. Hobson, Vancouver
H. N. Jarman, Canadian Legion
J. W. Corneth, Mayor Vancouver
W. Mott, Mayor New Westminister
G. Muir, Mayor Nanaimo
W. C. Hamilton, Mayor North Vancouver
J. Simpson, Reeve Matsqui
Alex C. Hope, Reeve Langly

There are one or two notable exceptions from this list. One is Charles Wilson who was a Vancouver alderman and the other was Ian Mackenzie, Minister of Veteran's Affairs who offered to resign if the Japanese were allowed to return to British Columbia. One can only presume pressing business kept them elsewhere.

39. C. E. Hope, W. K. Earle, "The Oriental Threat", MacLeans, May 1, 1933, p.55.

40. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.189.

41. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.201.

42. Ibid., p.200.

43. Forest E. Laviolette, The Canadian Japanese and World War II, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948, p.29.

44. National Japanese Canadian Citizens Association submission to the Hon. H. I. Bird.

45. "Under these circumstances, when goods were sold at public auction, buyers knowing that Japanese goods would be sold at low prices without reserve would refrain from normal competitive bidding. In addition with such large sales, being in total the entire possessions of 21,000 people, and without instructions from owners as to minimum prices and with fees paid on a percentage basis, auctioneers would be more inclined

to go after a high volume of sales than a fair price for individual items."

National Japanese Canadian Citizens Association submission to the Hon. H. I. Bird, p.40.

46. The Hamilton Spectator, September 29, 1945.

47. House of Commons, Debates, Ottawa: Kings Printers, 1919 to 1950, August 4, 1944, p.5915.

48. Ibid. p.5915.

49. J. Scott, "Why B. C. draws the Color Line?" MacLeans, February 1, 1948.

50. K. Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1976, p.331.

51. The Hamilton Spectator, December 15, 1945, p.3.

IV

THE JAPANESE CANADIAN, SYMBOLIC POLITICS IN ACTION

Status concerns operated at three different levels throughout the conflict between white British Columbians and Japanese-Canadians. The presence of these three status concerns magnified any instrumental conflict that existed between the two groups. An examination of the status concerns provides us with a greater understanding of why the history of Japanese-Canadians is characterized by bitter racial animosity.

British Columbians were concerned about the role of the Japanese in the province's economy and the extent to which they were able to compete successfully with the white population on equal terms. Whites seemed to feel threatened by the economic success achieved by the Japanese. This anxiety went far beyond the instrumental effects of the competition. It was exaggerated into a picture of the organized conspiracy to take over the province and to subject the whites to control of the Imperial Japanese government. Japanese Canadians were identified closely with the Japanese government. In this way, British Columbia's concern about Canada's role in World affairs was brought into play in the internal politics of British Columbia. Canada was seen as a very weak participant in world affairs by her west coast

residents. Japan was singled out as a particular area of concern because of the rapid growth of Japanese Imperial power during this time period. The third area of status concern was the lack of control British Columbian's felt they had over the destiny of their province. Eastern Canadians seemed unaware of the threat posed by Japanese immigrants, and more importantly, seemed to feel that the Anglo-Japanese alliance was more important than the feelings of the British Columbia population. Frustration about British Columbia's ability to exclude or expell Japanese immigrants because of Federal government interference combined with intense economic competiton and anxiety about world politics, led to a situation where the slightest provocation could spark violence and bitter racial disputes.

Economic concerns were the central concern of the people of British Columbia. Anxiety about economic competition between the two groups, was magnified far beyond legitimate concerns. They became largely symbolic because they appealed to the peoples' fear about the way status and prestige were distributed within the society. Information passed to the people by various methods increased their anxiety. It lead them to believe that their economic, social and political position in the province of British Columbia was under attack.

For the Japanese, it was very much a double bind situation. If they succeeded economically, they were accused of plotting to take over the country. If they did not attempt to achieve something economically, they were forever doomed to live as second class citizens confined to the most menial of occupations. The allocation of prestige

and status are directly linked to economic success. Economic success is an indication of where a person fits into society. The inability of whites to control the symbols of status and prestige, (the allocation of economic success) increased their concern about their status. Since, they felt that the Japanese were an inferior race, they preferred to see the Japanese success as an indication of a conspiracy against them. Their efforts to control the situation were largely frustrated by the Federal government, and, as a result, their anxiety and concern grew.

In the scenario portrayed by Gusfield, legislation conveyed prestige and status on the sponsoring group. In British Columbia legislative attempts to deal with the situation appeared to have aggravated the situation. Whites were capable of passing legislation which disenfranchised the Japanese but they were unable to pass legislation which would bar Japanese entry to Canada or legislation which would confine the Japanese to an inferior position in the economic marketplace. Legislation which managed to pass through the provincial legislature was disallowed by the Federal government. Exaggerated accounts in the press attributed this to collusion between the Federal government, the British government, and the Japanese government, or to the inability of Eastern Canadians to understand the problems of British Columbia. The difference between Japanese and white lifestyles was magnified by the press so that the public had little or no difficulty dehumanizing the Japanese-Canadian. Differences in culture as well as the obvious physical differences kept the two races separate. Whites viewed the Japanese immigrant as some sort of subhuman "little brown

man" who would never be able to reach the levels reached by the civilized white man.

The Japanese government did everything it could to protect the rights and interests of its emigrants. In Canada, this protection came from the Japanese Consul who investigated complaints of racial attacks against Japanese-Canadians during the Vancouver riot and who played a major role in the Japanese-Canadian community. The Imperial Japanese government also used the power of the Anglo-Japanese treaty to protect the rights of Canadian-Japanese. This treaty prevented the passage of exclusionist legislation, further frustrating the white population of British Columbia. Although the Japanese government eventually did limit emigration to Canada, this limitation came through a "Gentleman's Agreement" between the two countries rather than the result of Canadian legislation. The power of the Japanese government and the relative weakness of the Canadian government increased the anxiety of the British Columbian population. They felt powerless in the face of serious opposition from the Japanese government and their government in Ottawa seemed to care very little for their plight. They were unable to control their own destiny because they were unable to secure the cooperation of the Federal government. Ottawa appeared to put the aspirations of the Japanese immigrant ahead of the aspirations of the people of British Columbia. The letters between Laurier and MacPherson seem to indicate that Ottawa was itself unable to meet the requests of the people of British Columbia. From these letters it appears that the Anglo-Japanese treaty was considered too important to jeopardize because of the desires of a few anxious people on Canada's West coast.

Throughout this entire period, Japan was growing as a world power. Early in the twentieth century the Japanese government established itself as a major world power by defeating Russia. Throughout the twenties and thirties, this power continued to grow. Japan expanded throughout the Southern part of Asia with little or no difficulty. Canada was faced with the growth of a major world power on its doorstep. Canadian-Japanese were closely identified with the Imperial Japanese government. When the Imperial Japanese government expanded, British Columbians wondered about the role of Canadian-Japanese in their former government's plans for further expansion. At the same time, the Canadian government seemed to support the British position that the Japanese government's friendship was to be maintained at all costs.[2]

Very little was done to reassure the people of British Columbia. Several Royal Commissions were struck but very little action resulted from them. They succeeded in convincing the government of the necessity of limiting immigration but the actual limitation to immigration came as a result of the "Gentleman's Agreement" rather than as a result of Canadian legislation. The provincial government passed legislation which prevented Japanese-Canadians from voting but they were unable to limit the economic success achieved by the Japanese immigrants. In many ways, the government interfered with the ability of the Japanese-Canadian to compete economically with whites but the end result always appeared to be the emergence of the Japanese-Canadian in another enterprize.

Everywhere white British Columbians looked, their status appeared to be being undermined. They were unable to control their own economic and political destiny because of the interference of the Federal and Imperial governments. White British Columbians saw the growth of a major world power on their doorstep and could not help but wonder what the role of that country's emigrants was to be in British Columbia. They saw a group of people whom they considered to be inferior compete against them successfully. Throughout this entire period they saw newspaper accounts and heard politicians warning them of the danger of the "Japanese Peril". These factors accentuated public anxiety. In turn this resulted in open violence and the eventual disruption of the lives of a large group of people. To look at the history of Canadian Japanese is to learn a sad lesson about the Canadian past.

Notes to Pages 111 - 116

1. F. E. Laviolette, The Canadian Japanese and World War II, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948, p.25.

2. Letter from Sir Wilfred Laurier to R. G. MacPherson dated August of 1907, from the Public Archives, unpublished collection of the Laurier Papers, p.127981.

APPENDIX I*

Japanese Immigration and Population

Year	Japanese Immigrants	Total Japanese Population	Total Japanese Population in B.C.
1900-01	6	4,738	4,597
1903-04	354		
1905-06	1,922		
1906-07	2,042		
1907-08	7,601		
1908-09	858		
1909	244		
1910	420		
1911	727	9,021	8,587
1912	675		
1913	886		
1914	681		
1915	553		
1916	887		
1917	1,036		
1918	892		
1920	525		
1921	481	23,342	22,205
1922	395		
1923	404		
1924	510		
1925	424		
1926	443		
1927	511		
1928	535		
1929	179		
1930	217		
1931	174		
1932	119		
1933	106		
1934	125		
1935	70		
1936	103		
1937	146		
1938	57		
1939	44		
1940	43		
1941	4	23,149	22,096
1941-51	27	21,663	7,169

APPENDIX I(continued)

Japanese Immigration and Population

Year	Japanese Immigrants	Total Japanese Population	Total Japanese Population in B.C.
1951-61	1,170	29,157	10,424
1961-71	4,917	27,260	13,585

*Ken Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was, pp.412-13, in a slightly amended form.

APPENDIX II

Japanese in Fishing

Year	Japanese Licenses	Total Licenses
1896	452	unknown
1901	1,958	4,722
1903	1,796	4,723
1904	785	1,439
1905	1,049	2,776
1906	474	1,751
1907	771	1,726
1908	unknown	
1909	unknown	
1919	3,267	6,584
1920	3,267	6.584
1921	3,267	6,584
1922	2,321	6,004
1923	1,442	5,201
1924	1,404	5,109
1925	1,206	5,690
1926	unknown	
1927	1,067	7,891
1928	1,093	7,406
1929	1,068	7,070
1930	1,114	9.176
1931	1,114	8,008
1932	1,115	7,452
1933	1,131	7,890

Chart assembled from various sources including Adachi, The Enemy That Never Was, Young, Reid, Carrothers, The Japanese Canadians and various unpublished sources in the MacKenzie King and Laurier papers.

APPENDIX III

Japanese Canadian Employment In British Columbia

1924*

Occupation	Number Employed	Percentage of Japanese Employed
Fishermen	2,500 +	26.8 %
Lumber & Sawmill	2,733	28.1 %
Railway	611	6.3 %
Farm Labour	430	4.4 %
Mining	232	2.3 %
Clerical	309	3.1 %
Domestic & Hotel	590	6.3 %
Self Employed	636	6.5 %
Farmers	567	5.8 %
Merchants	396	4.0 %
Professionals	106	1.0 %
Fish Saltery Workers	359	3.6 %
Miscellaneous	319	3.2 %
TOTAL	9,738	100 %

* Compiled from T'ieng Fang Cheng, Oriental Immigration in Canada, 1931, p.197 as quoted in A Man of Our Times by Knight and Koizumi, 1976 pp.114-115.

1931**

Occupation	Number Employed	Percentage of Japanese Employed
Fishermen	1,464	18.5 %
Lumber & Sawmill	960	10.8 %
Transport & Communication	238	3.0 %
Fish Saltery Workers	27	.3 %
Farm Labour	830	10.7 %
Mining	101	1.3 %
Clerical	103	1.3 %
Gardeners	190	2.5 %
Domestic	706	8.9 %
Manufacture	384	4.9 %
Farmers	487	6.0 %
Merchants	674	8.6 %
Professionals	91	1.1 %
Labourers (Not employed in agriculture, mining or logging)	1,441	18.3 %

** From Young, Reid, Carrothers, The Japanese Canadians, Toronto: Toronto Press, 1939, pp.246-252.

APPENDIX III(continued)

Japanese Canadian Employment in British Columbia

1941***

Occupation	Percentage of Employed Japanese
Fishing	16.3 %
Lumbering	8.3 %
Labourers	14.7 %
Agriculture	18.8 %
Manufacture	13.4 %
Trade	8.4 %
Service	12.9 %
Transport & Communication	2.9 %
Clerical	2.1 %
Miscellaneous	2.2 %

*** Submission on behalf of the National Japanese Canadian Citizens Association to the Hon. H. I. Bird, September 17, 1947.

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