THREE VARIETIES OF TIME IN
POETRY AND DRAMA
OF T.S. ELIOT
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OF T.S. ELIOT

By

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS: This thesis explores the expression of certain time-notions in the creative work of T.S. Eliot. Attention is devoted to Eliot's transmutation of the philosophies of such thinkers as Hulme, Bergson, Heraclitus and Plato into poetic and dramatic art. But the emphasis falls on the nature of the artistic product and its context, rather than on specific identification of sources.
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis investigates Eliot's aesthetic expression of a philosophy of time. So many different philosophers have explored the nature of time in such diverse ways that it is difficult to appreciate Eliot's work in relation to such an expansive and elusive tradition. But the corresponding tripartite classifications of time—views proffered by Henri Bergson and T.E. Hulme provide a convenient frame of reference in which to discuss the poetry and drama, for the schemes establish relationships among a wide variety of philosophies.¹ The significant difference between Bergson and Hulme lies in the values which they ascribe to the different attitudes toward time; Eliot tends to accept Hulme's position, but frequently attacks that of Bergson.² But Eliot's hostility to Bergson took some time to emerge, and he actually owes a great debt to Bergson's formulations.³ This thesis, then, will stress possible Bergsonian influences in Eliot's work. I will not, however, attempt to present supporting arguments for the various philosophies which bear on Eliot's work. Rather, my discussion of the philosophy itself will sometimes proceed heuristically, because attempts at justifying a particular philosophical bias tend to shift interest from an aesthetic to a non-aesthetic reading.⁴
Hulme seems to support the notion that time is eternal, absolute, and teleologically ordered, whereas Bergson adopts a contrary relativist position. "True time" for Bergson is \( \text{la durée} \), pure duration which he claims to be the basis of psychological, biological and historical evolution:

In a word, pure duration might well be nothing but a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another, without any affiliation with number: it would be pure heterogeneity.

Duration cannot be represented spatially, for it is interpenetrated change within the flux; it cannot be measured by mechanical means, and it is not teleological. Bergson identifies those who are preoccupied with clock-time as mechanists, and labels those who have faith in an absolute teleology as finalists. Although Hulme is an advocate of the finalistic variety of Bergsonian "false time," he does recognize a threefold division in planes of experience, which correspond to Bergson's divisions of time-perception. Hulme's inorganic world of mathematical and physical science is likely to be that to which a mechanist is most suited; his organic world of psychology and biology, which cannot be adequately analyzed intellectually, is durational; and the ethical and religious values of the third world are those held by the typical finalist. Both Hulme and Eliot support the belief that this finalistic order is immanent in the flux, but
unfortunately obscured by the general preoccupation with relativism which has been with us since the turn of this century. Thus, the critical difference between Hulme and Bergson, the difference which draws Eliot to Hulme, lies not in their classifications of time, but in their prejudices toward different time-values.

Although Eliot does not finally agree with Bergson's value-judgement of duration, some of the myriad implications of Bergson's durationism are accepted by Eliot. In *Creative Evolution* (*L'Evolution créatrice*), Bergson applies his idea of pure duration, along with finalism and mechanism, to biological evolution and ultimately decides that the teleological approach, that which Hulme supports, or the mechanistic explanation, the essence of Darwin's theory of evolution, are both inadequate views of reality. Duration is likewise pivotal in Bergson's explanation of freedom, language, aesthetics and sensation in *Time and Free Will* (*Essai sur les données immédiate de la conscience*) and *Matter and Memory* (*Matière et mémoire*). Bergson's discussion of these topics often depends for its substantiation on a comparison of durationism with the unfortunate consequences of mechanism—and it is a similar condemnation of mechanism which also occupies Eliot even after he has begun to develop his finalism.

One of the most significant intimations of Bergson's theory of time is that language is an inadequate vehicle for expressing consciousness in duration. Eliot himself struggles monu-
mentally with words, representing the impediments of the flux, as he seeks a finalistic solution in *Four Quartets*; some of the mechanistic protagonists of Eliot's plays are not as successful, however, for they ultimately drown in their own words as does Prufrock, the arch-mechanist of Eliot's early work. Likewise, communication is a fundamental problem for the protagonists of "Portrait of a Lady" and the sterile inhabitants of the landscape in *The Waste Land*.

Bergson's primary objection to language is that words, as discrete units, distort the interpenetration of past, present and future by stringing them out into space. Bergson, like Zeno, postulates the independence of time from space. "True time," unlike space, is not homogeneous or quantitative, nor are events in time causally related. Words may seem to express something of time, but according to Bergson, they cannot because they are extensive in space, fragmented, and causally related through fixed syntax. Language also functions on the basis that everyone associates roughly the same idea with each word. Associationists find nothing particularly alarming in this quality, but Bergson expresses strong objections to associationist thinking, which he considers to be a form of mechanism. His objection to the distortion which the associationist theory entails in its assumptions about language crystallizes in *Time and Free Will*, where he notes that
just in proportion as we dig below the surface and get down to the real self, do its states of consciousness cease to stand in juxtaposition and begin to permeate and melt into one another, and each to be tinged with the colouring of all the others. Thus each of us has his own way of loving and hating; and this hatred reflects his own personality. Language, however, denotes these states by the same words in every case: so that it has been able to fix only the objective and impersonal aspect of love, hate, and the thousand emotions which stir the soul.

This real self, which cannot be adequately described by language, is of paramount concern to Eliot as well as Bergson. It is this real self which evades many of Eliot's protagonists from Prufrock onwards. Bergson contends that there are really two selves. The real, or fundamental self, is not subject to classification nor predictability; we reach this fundamental self "by deep introspection, which leads us to grasp our inner states as living things, constantly becoming, as states not amenable to measure, which permeate one another and of which the succession in duration has nothing in common with juxtaposition in homogeneous space." The other self is our spatial and social representation, seemingly subject to the laws of causality and operating as a fixed quantity. The error of traditional determinist thinking, Bergson claims in this connection, is that it assumes that an organism actually is inert matter of a fixed quantity—when in reality the fundamental self, the "heart" of the organism, is capable of qualitative change which manifests itself in free action, particularly at a moment of crisis."
Eliot's sympathy with Bergson's theory of memory is particularly evident in "Rhapsody on a Windy Night," "La Figlia Che Piange" and "A Cooking Egg," but the philosophy also has an incidental place in numerous other works. Bergson's memory theory is clearly an outgrowth of his theory of time, for memory is the key to a personal peace with time. Bergson distinguishes two kinds of memory. One, mémoire volontaire, or motor mechanism, is the sort voluntarily evoked for pragmatic purposes such as rote learning or any act not specifically tied to the past. The other, mémoire involontaire, or pure memory, involves an imaginative re-creation of the past, bringing the past heavily to bear on the present—but it does not establish a causal link between past and present; it merely makes the past understandable in the present. If the two varieties of memory cooperate, an individual can live a life of pure duration. Moments will be related to one another as notes are related to a melody: the past will make sense in the present because they will both be part of a single interpenetrated whole. This whole, however, constantly mutates. Events can never occur twice in precisely the same way, because the relation which they bear to the perceiving consciousness alters as the memories which make up that consciousness alter.

Bergson's belief that "the spontaneity of life is manifested by a continual creation of new forms" finds especially cogent expression in Four Quartets as well as in Eliot's critical writing. Bergson's theory of a flux continually creating,
becoming never the same, is not particularly new: a similar notion was espoused centuries earlier by Heraclitus. But while Bergson views the generation of the flux as beneficent, Heraclitus bemoans the perpetual destruction which inevitably attends the generation. Both varieties of flux are durational and generative-destructive, but Heraclitus and Bergson significantly emphasize different aspects of that duration. 15

But whatever Eliot's similarities may be to Bergson, he is, after all, a finalist, not a durationist. Morris Weitz points out an important relation between Eliot and Classical philosophy which confirms Eliot's finalism:

Eliot's theory of time is Neo-Platonic, not Heraclitean. It is essentially an Immanence doctrine according to which the Eternal or Timeless is regarded as the creative source of the flux or temporal. This is not to say that Eliot denies the reality of the flux, in some Parmenidean fashion. He is no dualist, pitting the reality of the Eternal against the illusion of the flux. Instead, the flux, with all of its many ordinary experiences, is taken as real but its reality is derived and sustained by the more ultimate reality of the Eternal. 16

Despite his belief in the co-existence of the flux and an absolute Immanence, Eliot concerns himself in his doctoral dissertation with the philosophy of F.H. Bradley who, like Parmenides, denies the reality of the flux. 17 Hugh Kenner points to Eliot's considerable involvement with Bradley's teachings, and manages to identify some thoughts in Eliot's work which may have been derived
from Bradley. But Eliot's early interest in Bradley does not insure a later approval of his doctrines. If Eliot did choose to identify himself with Bradley, he would stand even more directly in opposition to Bergson, for Bergson and Bradley represent the same antipodes as Heraclitus and Parmenides respectively. But in his modification of the relativist position, Eliot is actually part of a general movement back to pre-Renaissance absolutism, which return Hulme welcomed in "Humanism and the Religious Attitude." Such an attitude embodies a reversion to the values of Aristotle and Aquinas, reflected in Eliot's defense of an "external standard." Louis Martz shows that Eliot may also have derived some of his formulations from St. Augustine's *Confessions*, particularly chapters XI and XVIII, in which Augustine describes his faith in an absolute Immanence from which flows the past, present and future of the flux.

The philosophic turn toward finalism which Hulme recognizes and Eliot supports, has actually come to fruition in some important twentieth century contributions to philosophical literature. The position of Eliot and Hulme is most obviously sustained in the writings of Eliot's personal friend Wyndham Lewis, who so caustically denigrates the contiguous "flux of Bergson, with its Time-god, and the einsteinian flux, with its god, Space-time." Other contemporary thought is derived from the Freudian hypothesis that, far from being desirable, the confluence of past and future in a durational present is symptomatic of repression. In *Eros*
and Civilization, Marcuse claims that according to the Freudian formulation, the id preserves memories of primal pleasure and freedom and projects them into the future, but the id must confront the repressive super-ego which "rejects this instinctual claim on the future, in the name of a past no longer one of integral satisfaction but one of bitter adjustment to a punitive present." Norman O. Brown, expanding the idea that an individual's past may be destructive, claims that all of human history is neurotic, a form of repetition-compulsion which perpetuates repression. Brown, while rejecting the past-in-present as a desirable condition, discredits the mechanistic approach to time as well, in favour of a timelessness akin to that preferred by Eliot and Hulme: "If we connect—as Freud did not—the repetition-compulsion with Freud's reiterated theorem that the instinctual processes in the id are timeless, then only repressed life is in time, and unpressed life would be timeless or in eternity." But, more importantly, in Love's Body Brown draws a distinction between Protestant literalism and Catholic symbolism: the literalist tends to look for one true meaning, and views historical events as unique; the symbolist looks for eternal recurrence and prefiguration. Those of Eliot's protagonists who are sacrificial-redemptive figures, then, can be identified by one line of reasoning with Christ, thereby bringing something of the past into the present.

As Eliot's figures search for finalistic salvation
through the flux, so Eliot seeks to refine his apprehension of time. He is not a philosopher, who works out his ideas first and then explains them. He is a poet dramatizing his own imaginative encounters with time through words which must struggle with the limitations of their linear extensity in the flux. There is a general, but very irregular, progress in his work toward a more concise expression of finalism; mechanistic elements do not vanish with the first overt intrusion of a durational consciousness, nor are hints of durational interpenetration absent from the last works. But while almost all of Eliot's poems and plays can yield insights into the nature of time, I will limit my consideration to only representative pieces. The classification of works in a particular chapter as mechanistic, durational or finalistic implies merely a preponderant emphasis, and not that each work is unalloyed with other strains of temporal philosophy. Several works, in fact, receive attention from a variety of perspectives in order to stress that Eliot's poetry and drama does not represent a fixed philosophical attitude.
CHAPTER ONE
MECHANISTIC FRUSTRATION

One of the distinguishing marks of much of Eliot's early poetry is its tendency to dwell on the stultifying qualities of a mechanistic world-view. Eliot makes little attempt at first to provide a solution to these frustrations, but rather aims at eliciting sympathy for the mechanist's plight. The volume Prufrock and Other Observations (1917) seems to be oriented particularly toward capturing a feeling for mechanism, which Eliot conveys through a variety of approaches. "Prufrock" runs the gamut of the consequences of mechanism, laying special emphasis on a Bergsonian dichotomy of the self. "Portrait of a Lady" and "Rhapsody on a Windy Night" seem to play ironically with the sort of music metaphor which Bergson uses to clarify the organic unity of memory. "La Figlia Che Piange" depends for its effect on a subtle theatrical metaphor, developed much later in the more complicated matrix of The Family Reunion, in which the mechanists must contend with others of different persuasions. Such an overt clash also dominates Murder in the Cathedral, The Cocktail Party and The Waste Land. But the battle-lines are most difficult to draw in The Waste Land, where durational and mechanistic elements keep constant but uneasy company.
"The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock," while familiar enough, poses a variety of philosophic problems which fructify into greater complexity in Eliot's later work. The Bergsonian split between the fundamental and spatial selves plagues Prufrock, who wanders through the "half-deserted streets" of a society which only tends to perpetuate his mechanistic outlook; the fragmented extensity of his world inhibits communication and love. Prufrock suffers all the more because he has glimpsed something of another time-world, that of "the mermaids singing, each to each," and it is the acuteness of his misery which transmutes arid philosophy into moving poetry.

"Prufrock" is a particularly confusing poem, because Eliot obviously wrote it for public perusal, and yet he tries to give the impression that, above all else, his protagonist does not wish to be overheard. There is a tenuous alloy in the poem of Eliot's "three voices of poetry": that of the poet talking to himself, that of the poet directing a monologue to an audience, and that of a dramatic character who limits the poet to "saying, not what he would say in his own person, but only what he can say within the limits of one imaginary character addressing another imaginary character."¹ Eliot goes on to qualify these general distinctions by noting that the voices are not necessarily mutually exclusive, so that in a poem primarily in the second voice, we sometimes derive part of our enjoyment from overhearing words which are not addressed
to us. Thus, while Eliot may actually be writing in the second voice, which includes the dramatic monologue, Prufrock is ostensibly speaking to himself, even though he begins with "Let us go then, you and I," as if he were speaking in the third voice. As George Williamson notes, the poem only "develops a theme of frustration, of emotional conflict, dramatized by the 'you and I." The epigraph to the poem, from Dante's Inferno (XXVII, 61-66), supports the private nature of the monologue, for it is Guido da Montefeltro's preface to his confession, which he expects will never be carried outside the Inferno. And Prufrock likewise betrays his own frailties with such candour because he feels assured that his acknowledgements will not escape his private interior hell.

J. Halverson unfairly dismisses the usual approach to Prufrock as a divided self, sprung from a Freudian reading, by reasoning that "though this interpretation will fit the poem in a rather loose way, it becomes pretty improbable at the line 'Oh do not ask, 'What is it?' Here a hardly credible split in the self is presupposed—as if one part of the self were going to spring a surprise on the other." While Halverson's objection may be appropriate to an interpretation positing a conflict between id and super-ego, it does not exclude the possibility that Prufrock's fragmentation lies along the lines of the deep fissure between the fundamental self and its spatial and social representation. The "I" is the social self, which may well be
surprised by the emergence at time of the fundamental self, the
"you" which is buried so deeply by the demands of a spatial,
social existence that it generally has little to do with the
activities of the more superficial self. As has been noted,
free acts according to Bergson cannot be conceived by the
spatial self; they must be left to the fundamental self, which
acts freely in pure duration. By this analysis, then, Prufrock's
most corrosive problem is an inability to allow his fundamental
self to direct free and decisive action.

But whatever the nature of Prufrock's fundamental self,
the bulk of the poem is occupied with the crippling world-view
of the spatial self. Like a true mechanist, obsessed with
quantity and measurement, Prufrock measures out his life with
coffee spoons, his "days and ways" in cigarette butt-ends.
These long-standing habits frustrate him by perpetuating a
frame of mind which locates activity through time in relation
to particular rituals which are hardly distinguishable from
the activity in the intervals. Prufrock, then, at first plans
to make his move "Before the taking of toast and tea," but,
unable to gather the necessary courage right away, he projects
the crisis to "after tea and cakes and ices." Finally, he
rationalizes, half-convincing himself that whatever he does
will not matter anyway "After the sunsets and dooryards and
the sprinkled streets,/After the novels, after the teacups,
after the skirts that trail along the floor." In keeping with
his fragmenting of time into intervals, and the accompanying break-down of the tea-ritual into its various parts, Prufrock also imagines that time progresses in a succession of discrete minutes, each of which can obliterate the last. The duration-ists' feeling for an interpenetrated whole of simultaneities is lacking in Prufrock's assertion that "In a minute there is time/For decisions and revisions which a minute will reverse."

The mechanist naturally gravitates toward situations where his activity is directed and rote, and tends not to assume a role in which he must exercise some ingenuity or display some depth. Therefore, Prufrock realizes that he does not even measure up to the stage-figure of the classically indecisive Hamlet. In his indecision, Hamlet has a depth and glamour which Prufrock could not simulate even if he were given the part to play. Prufrock's role is that of the lifeless "attendant lord, one that will do/To swell a progress, start a scene or two." He is also not a Hamlet because the prince at least ultimately made an attempt to rescue himself from "a sea of troubles." Prufrock, for all his immobility, is not a very convincing Lazarus either. He is, however, "Almost, at times, the Fool"--and a dead Fool at that.5

Prufrock's memory is also highly symptomatic of his mechanistic outlook. The poem begins with an invitation to the fundamental self to wander through quasi-metaphorical streets "that follow like a tedious argument/Of insidious intent,"
suggesting the confusion of memory. Prufrock fragments his memory of these streets with his intellect, rather than intuiting a single pattern. He remembers places and people along the route, but he is unable to piece together the images of "one night cheap hotels," "sawdust restaurants with oyster shells," "Arms that are braceletled and white and bare," and "the smoke that rises from the pipes/Of lonely men in shirt-sleeves, leaning out of windows."

The world in which Prufrock moves during the course of the poem is also fragmented, and that fragmentation naturally impedes a durational assimilation of new memories. Vereen Bell points out that Prufrock actually moves through three worlds: the winding streets, the effete drawing room and the embracing fog. He only glimpses wistfully the ideal world of singing mermaids. Bell also shifts part of the blame for Prufrock's inability to love to the fragmented society in which he lives, and certainly the eyes which reduce him to a formulated phrase represent an exterior threat from a spatially and verbally oriented society. Prufrock himself, however, excuses his disconnected discourse by pleading that he is distracted by the perfume of a dress—and thereby gratuitously assures us that he is not another Proust.

One of Prufrock's most paralyzing problems, confronting the poet as well, is the spatial extensity of language. Mechanist though Prufrock is, his thoughts do not naturally proceed linearly,
and yet Eliot must express those thoughts linearly, justifying the form by implying that Prufrock must so structure his thought in a misguided attempt to communicate with his fundamental self. Where the poet's problem with language ends and Prufrock's begins is unclear, except that Prufrock hypothetically has considerably less control over the matter than his creator. Both, however, are obviously aware of the problem: Prufrock crying, "This is not what I meant at all," and Eliot casting Prufrock's thought into poetry repeatedly beginning again, stuttering and back-tracking to dramatize the difficulty of forcing the intensive into an extensive mold. Leonard Unger describes the parallel in more traditional critical terms:

A familiar complaint about Eliot's early poetry, including "Prufrock," was that it was difficult, obscure and so on—that it did not clearly and directly say what it means. And indeed, it does not... Each part of the poem, each fragment, remains fragmentary even within its given context—a series of larger wholes is suggested, and yet the series of suggestions is a kind of whole. It is the poem. It is Prufrock. He has gone nowhere and done nothing.

Eliot simulates a mechanist's world-view by splitting the poem into sections, like the chorus and verse of a song. The chorus consists of the repetition of certain phrases verbatim, such as "And would it have been worth it, after all" and "In the room the women come and go/Talking of Michelangelo." He dramatizes the difficulties of language by repeating some lines only approxi-
mately without improving the sense significantly, suggesting that rephrasing is a futile exercise. "Would it have been worth while," itself appearing twice, is only another form of "And would it have been worth it after all." The lines "The yellow fog that rubs its back upon the window-panes, / The yellow smoke that rubs its muzzle on the window-panes" are essentially redundant, expressing an idea which is reiterated yet again in "The yellow smoke that slides along the street, / Rubbing its back upon the window-panes."

These problems of expression, memory and fragmentation all interfere with Prufrock's handling of the "overwhelming question." Although it cannot be pinned down too precisely, it must, in demanding only one "overwhelming" response, be rhetorical to some degree--perhaps of the order of "Why not act freely?" With few exceptions, the questions which Prufrock does ask himself can be reduced to a question of action. Prufrock, however, mixes such mundane musings as "Shall I part my hair behind? Do I dare to eat a peach?" with the more ironic and cosmic "Do I dare/Disturb the universe?"

Prufrock's repeated rationalization "there will be time" is mere procrastination likewise ignoring the urgency of the "overwhelming question." Hugh Kenner notes that within the passage, "the word 'time' reverberates, struck again and again," marking off time as mechanically as a clock:
There will be time, there will be time
To prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet;
There will be time to murder and create,
And time for all the works and days of hands
That lift and drop a question on your plate.

The passage is a fusion of elements from Emerson,\textsuperscript{11} Hesiod
and Ecclesiastes (III: 1-8),\textsuperscript{12} and as such presents a prescrip-
tion for mechanical activity which all but buries the "over-
whelming question." These lines are also significant for, ac-
cording to Morris Weitz, they have bearing on Eliot's doctrine
of an absolute Immanence in the relativistic flux. The "ques-
tion on your plate" is the same as the "overwhelming question!"
which leads us to a finalistic apprehension within our temporal
experience.\textsuperscript{13}

Only in his last look to the past does Prufrock finally
begin to suspect something of the presence of this Immanence:

We have lingered in the chambers of the sea
By sea-girls wreathed with seaweed red and brown
Till human voices wake us, and we drown.

The key phrase here is "linger ed in the chambers of the sea,"
which, according to Weitz, represents the Immanence, and is
related organically to the "question on your plate" and the
"overwhelming question."\textsuperscript{14} But Prufrock is ultimately lost,
for he never does understand the Immanent Moment. He is forever
a mechanist, dragging his fundamental self down with his social
self, instead of reconciling them. Thus, it is not merely "I" or "you" who drowns finally, but "we"; both Prufrock's selves, and implicitly the mechanistic reader.

Bergson occasionally uses the analogy of a melody to metaphorically describe the durationist's perception of wholes as interpenetrated parts, rather than as an extensity of disjointed units; such a metaphor is an essential mode of expression in "Portrait of a Lady" as well. "Portrait" is almost an ironically mechanical repetition of the "Prufrock" formula, and so the many similarities between the two poems--the fragmentation, ritual, rationalization, theatrical metaphor, distortion of language and memory--are hardly worth dwelling upon again, except insofar as they find distinctive expression within the music metaphor. One of the most obvious borrowings from "Prufrock" is that of "I know the voices dying with a dying fall/Beneath the music from a farther room," which at the climax of "Portrait" becomes "This music is successful with a 'dying fall'/Now that we talk of dying." This connection perhaps suggests that "Portrait" is an expansion of the musical moment in its companion-piece. Moreover, "Portrait" seems to be a somewhat more complex poem than "Prufrock" in that Eliot manages to maintain a tension between the single organizing principle of music and the fragmentation of the lives of the protagonists. The poet, then, segregates his art more obviously here from the quality of the main voice.
In "Portrait," Eliot uses music primarily to convey an ironic contrast between emotive unity and the protagonists' fragmented, autistic psyches. The lady and her "lover" listen to a Chopin Prelude, and she makes a banal, pseudo-sophisticated remark about the intimacy of the music, thereby betraying something of her formalistic approach to life. As if words were not fragmented enough in their normal extensity, the two mechanists mingle their conversation with the music, separating note from note and word from word. Finally, one of them perceives the disparity between Chopin's melting notes and the random rhythm of his own metabolism:

Inside my brain a dull tom-tom begins
Absurdly hammering a prelude of its own,
Capricious monotone
That is at least one definite "false note."

The mindless activity of the pair, then, crystallizes in the "dancing bear" simile near the end of the poem. They ironically "dance" as mechanically as an animal to durational "music."

Repetition is an integral part of music, fundamental to the development of a theme, but it is a sinister form of that periodicity which regulates "Portrait." The poem is about a relationship limping through a year; references to the months of December, April, August and October mechanically measure off time. Fittingly, a simile drawn from music implies the advent
of one of the "movements" of the year: "The voice returning like the insistent out-of-tune/Of a broken violin on an August afternoon." The cyclical nature of a year, as well as the traditional qualities evoked by seasonal metaphors, correspond to whatever development there is in the relationship between the pair: beginning in an "atmosphere of Juliet's tomb" at the "dead" of winter, proceeding through the false hope of spring, the languor of summer and finally dying in the autumn, achieving nothing, ending at the beginning. There is no reason, however, to believe that the cycle represents the interpenetration of past, present and future, for the relationship is not one which begets knowledge of the beginning in the end. On the contrary, the voice of the poem exclaims, "our beginnings never know our ends."

Although "Portrait does not express as thoroughgoing a concern with memory as "Prufrock," it does convey one significant connection of memory with music, and incidentally with Bergsonian notions of a crust of alien ideas which envelop the fundamental self:

I keep my countenance,
I remain self-possessed
Except when a street piano, mechanical and tired
Reiterates some worn-out common song
With the smell of hyacinths across the garden
Recalling things that other people have desired.
Are these ideas right or wrong?
The mechanist, naturally enough, is moved by a "mechanical" street piano with its ground-out "common" music, springing only indirectly from human touch. The smell of hyacinths, while it should be an occasion for a personal réchecé du temps perdu, instead brings to mind other people's thoughts, the matter floating on the surface of the fundamental self. The mechanist's standards are not internal and relative, but derived from the judgements codified by society, and so he must finally ask, "Are these ideas right or wrong?" This question bespeaks the same orientation toward public standards as "Let us...Correct our watches by the public clocks" and that of the last line of the poem: "And should I have the right to smile?"

Music is also interpolated ironically into "Rhapsody on a Windy Night." A musical rhapsody, though of indefinite form, does embody a certain amount of order and inter-relation, but this rhapsody, while flaunting the trappings of a durational whole, is actually associational and mechanistic. The "lunar synthesis" is actually only a substitution of a new system of association for an old. The predictability of associational succession would be as alien to the anti-deterministic Bergson as it is to Eliot, and yet Grover Smith reads "Rhapsody" and the very similar "Preludes" as indictments of Bergson by Eliot. He claims that Eliot finds implausible Bergson's view that durational images are a favourable confluence of subject and
object, or perceiver and perceived, and therefore Eliot holds
up a disagreeable set of images in these poems to discredit
Bergsonian optimism. Certainly, the images are disagreeable
enough in "Rhapsody," but if Smith had taken account of Bergson's
anti-associationism in *Time and Free Will*, instead of basing
his argument simply on *Matter and Memory* and *Creative Evolution*,
he would have been able to allow that Bergson might also find
the images upsetting for their associational extensity. Such
a basis of the imagistic linkage is apparent, for example, in
the train of "twisted" images in the poem. The woman whose
eye "Twists like a crooked pin" triggers memories of a twisted
branch and a broken spring, also obviously twisted. The chain
breaks momentarily at the tolling of the hours which fragment
the poem, but the associationist is back on his track after
half-past three with the memory of the twisted rose, and again
after four o' clock with the concluding line, "The last twist
of the knife."

The word "Rhapsody" in the title, then, creates the
false impression that the experience of the poem is a rapturous
one. The opening lines, introducing the dissolution of the
"floors of memory" and the normal patterns of memory within
"divisions and precisions," tend to give the same impression.
But all that really happens is that the moonlight substitutes
one malignant mechanist-associationist order for another. There
is little to rhapsodize about in the "crowd of twisted things,"
or in "eyes in the street/Trying to peer through lighted shutters," or in the grotesque description, following half-past three, of the moon. This new "synthesis" leads up to a depressing present moment at the end of the poem, rather than absorbing the realities of the present, taking them into account from the start. The surrealistic images of the poem finally clash startlingly with the mundane "The bed is open; the tooth-brush hangs on the wall, Put your shoes at the door, sleep, prepare for life!" And this life for which the protagonist prepares is obviously an imprisoning one. The revelation, "Memory! You have the key," is merely a reminder that his memory is only the key to a bleak existence, symbolized by the lonely room.

The music metaphor in the last three poems throws the mechanistic fragmentation into relief, but Eliot uses a theatrical analogy to convey something of the mechanistic world-view itself. The casual references to the theater in "Prufrock" and "Portrait" expand into an implicit foundation of "La Figlia Che Piange" ("The Crying Daughter"). The Italian title, obviously related to the Latin epigraph, suggests an episode from the commedia dell'arte as melodramatic as the parting scene recalled by the voice of the poem. He colors the memory at first, unclear himself about what really happened; his memory is as confused as the epigraph implies. The distortion of the first stanza
gives way to a completely wishful re-staging of the events in
the second stanza: instead of the girl flinging her flowers
to the ground and turning away with "fugitive resentment," the
parting is "light and deft." The "I" dissociates itself from
the "he" in the imagined drama, written and directed by the
"I" and starring a dominating "he" who can sever the relation-
ship without compunction, "As the soul leaves the body torn and
bruised/As the mind deserts the body it has used." The last
stanza begins to separate reality from phantasy, but the dis-
tinction is never entirely clear. "She turned away" is all
that can reasonably be said to be a certainty. The hair as it
was described and the armful of flowers appear as dubious fig-
ments of a romantic imagination at the line, "And I wonder how
they should have been together." The final, most Bergsonian
touch concludes the poem: Sometimes these cogitations still
amaze/ The troubled midnight and the noon's repose." The voice
is that of a hopeless mechanist, for aside from envisaging the
encounter as a dialogue between automata, he is unable to recon-
cile his memories to the present. His memories "amaze" him,
whereas the past should be comfortably integrated into the present.

The most outstanding example of a mechanist as stage-
director in Eliot's work is Amy of The Family Reunion. She
immerses herself in external, superficial patterns of life which
may be predicted and controlled, and she therefore enjoys ordering
the lives of those about her. She betrays this tendency, for example, as she replies to Charles' remark that Mary should be married by now: "So she should have been, if things had gone as I intended" (p. 287). Later, Amy intones, "Harry is to take command at Wishwood,/And I hope we can contrive his future happiness" (p. 290). She even admits at the end of the play that she has spent thirty-five years designing Harry's life. Harry is, however, sufficiently perceptive to realize that both he and Mary are part of this scenario. He recognizes, somewhat annoyed, that he has returned to Wishwood to find "The book laid out, lines underscored, and the costume/Ready to put on" (p. 334).

Amy, like a clock, is a machine and, as Warburton points out, she is "weak/And running down" (p. 320). In her youth she was more oriented toward gauging time by the cosmic clock of the alternation of sunlight and darkness; those were the days when "clocks could be trusted, tomorrow assured/And time could not stop in the dark" (p. 347). But her life, like that of the other mechanists in Eliot's early poems, is barely distinguishable from her death.

Besides Harry, some of the rest of the family sense that someone is controlling their movements, but they are apparently unable to identify the deterministic source. The Chorus, composed of Ivy, Violet, Gerald and Charles, express their uneasiness just before Harry's first entrance: "Why do we feel embarrassed, impatient, fretful, ill at ease,/Assembled
like amateur actors who have not been assigned their parts?" (p. 290). The Chorus consists solely of mechanists, and so their influence by example on Harry is almost as destructive as Amy's. They give at least tacit assent to Amy's world-view, but, unlike the Chorus of Murder in the Cathedral, they do not become increasingly aware of their responsibility for the main figure's suffering. Early in the play, they wonder, "why should we be implicated, brought in and brought together?" (p. 301)

And in their last speech, most of the Chorus is still confused: "We do not like what happens when we are awake, because it too closely resembles what happens when we are asleep" (p. 348).

Only Charles, who is meant to resemble Eliot in some way, even an incipient consciousness: "I fear that my mind is not what it was--or was it?--and yet I think I might understand." (p. 349).

The Chorus of Murder in the Cathedral is essentially mechanistic and passive like the Chorus of The Family Reunion, but they suffer more because they are aware ultimately that their passivity allows Becket to suffer. Northrop Frye expresses the development of the Chorus by charting their movement on an imaginary circle divided into quadrants, which he also applies to a variety of Eliot's other creations. At opposite vertical poles are paradise (plenitude) and hell (void), and on opposite ends of the horizontal axis are innocence and experience. Thus,
the women of Canterbury move around the circle through experience in the direction of hell. A similar visual analogy is also a part of Grover Smith's analysis of the Chorus: "They occupy a circumference, so to speak, of which Becket is the center, for they rely on him as the source of the movement they participate in. When he is the point, they are the wheel, as he is the wheel when God is the point." The relationship of which Smith speaks corresponds to that of the finalistic still point at the center of the wheel of the flux, but if Eliot is establishing such a temporal thesis in this play, then Bergson would find the spatial orientations of Frye and Smith highly inappropriate and misleading. The confusion which spatial explanations create becomes evident when the view of another critic confronts the constructions of Frye and Smith with his own diagram. Louis L. Martz claims that Becket and the Chorus represent the "stillness at opposite poles" of plenitude and emptiness, which would put Smith's center on a circumference. Moreover, Martz speculates that the Chorus is on "the way upward," where Frye claims that they are still moving downward. The critics may unconsciously be supporting Bergson's anti-spatial case, but their real concern should be with the Chorus' development within a variety of mechanism.

The Chorus is mechanistic not simply because they feel that their role is "only to wait and witness" (p. 240). Like the Chorus of The Family Reunion, they can act, but only in response to an exterior compulsion:
Some presage of an act
Which our eyes are compelled to witness, has forced our feet
Towards the cathedral. We are forced to bear witness.
(p. 239)

The force compelling the women of Canterbury is presumably divine,
but they are nevertheless mechanistic instruments. As they repeat
often enough, they are "Living and partly living" (pp. 243, 244,
257), and thereby bear a close resemblance to the members of the
Family who cannot distinguish their waking from their sleeping
moments. Appropriately, then, the women of Canterbury engage
in rote and fragmented activity when they are not serving ob-
viously divine ends:

And meanwhile we have gone on living,
Living and partly living,
Picking together the pieces,
Gathering faggots at nightfall,
Building a partial shelter,
For sleeping, and eating and drinking and laughter.
(p. 257)

They gradually become aware, however, of more than their personal
desolation. During the murder of Becket, they cry out, not knowing
quite why,

We are spoiled by a filth that we cannot clean, united to
supernatural vermin,
It is not we alone, it is not the house, it is not the city
that is defiled,
But the world that is wholly foul.
(p. 276)
As Man bears the sin of Adam and the glory of Christ because both figures were part of mankind, so the Chorus shares in the guilt of the Knights and the glory of Becket's martyrdom. Becket must tell them to take their "share of the eternal burden, / The perpetual glory" (p. 271) before they are ready to fully understand their responsibility. And by the end of the play, the Chorus clearly has recognized its culpability: "We acknowledge our trespass, our weakness, our fault; we acknowledge / That the sin of the world is upon our heads" (p. 282).

The Knights and Priests, of course, are also mechanists, but they do not exhibit discernible development during the course of the play. The traditionally masculine activity of the Knights contrasts with the passivity of the female Chorus, but both are indistinguishable in the flux: "action is suffering, / And suffering action" (p. 255). Therefore, the Knights are in a good position to appeal to the sensibilities of the Chorus, their fellow mechanists. The Second Knight does so by resorting to reason, anathema to Bergson: "I am going to appeal not to your emotions but to your reason. You are hard-headed sensible people, as I can see, and not to be taken in by emotional clap-trap" (pp. 277-278). The Knights are also as puppet-like as the Chorus but, unlike the Chorus, they are operated through the manifestly temporal prerogative of the King; they act in a manner which is "perfectly disinterested" (p. 277), because they are merely performing their duty. The Priests
likewise represent mechanists fallen prey to determinism, but their orders issue from the decidedly more benevolent Archbishop: "He will tell us what we are to do, he will give us orders, instruct us" (p. 242). When they do express a wish which is contrary to Becket's, it is only to oversee a ritualistic office with typical mechanistic punctuality: "My Lord, to vespers! You must not be absent from vespers" (p. 271).

Mechanism is also one of the major afflictions of the protagonists of *The Cocktail Party*, but it is a peculiarly Prufrockian mechanism which frustrates Edward. The suggestion of disease in Prufrock's sky, "Like a patient etherised upon a table," and Prufrock's symptomatic hesitation on the staircase, find their equivalents in Reilly's description of Edward:

Just for a moment
You have the experience of being an object
At the mercy of a malevolent staircase.
Or, take a surgical operation.
In consultation with the doctor and surgeon,
In going to bed in the nursing home,
In talking to the matron, you are still the subject,
The centre of reality.
(p. 362)

Similarly, Prufrock's lines, "I grow old...I grow old.../ I shall wear the bottoms of my trousers rolled," correspond to Edward's expression of fear, "I have met myself as a middle-aged man/ Beginning to know what it is to feel old" (p. 381). Edward
"meets" himself because he, like Prufrock, is really a divided self:

The self that wills--he is a feeble creature;
He has to come to terms in the end
With the obstinate, the tougher self; who does not speak,
Who never talks, who cannot argue;
And who in some men may be the guardian--
But in men like me, the dull, the implacable,
The indomitable spirit of mediocrity.
(p. 381)

Edward's "self that wills" seems to correspond to the Bergsonian fundamental self, and his "tougher self" is a variety of the repressive spatial self. If that spatial self ceases to stultify and complies with the desires of the fundamental self, it acts as a "guardian" of the door to freedom. But since Edward's repressive self does not assume the responsibility itself, he must be helped along by Reilly and his adjutants Julia and Alex, "who compose a sort of cabal dedicated to the reordering of the other characters' mixed-up lives."27 The other characters, Lavinia, Celia and Peter, are also initially mechanists, but not in an especially Prufrockian way. Celia ultimately finds the most spectacularly finalistic salvation, and Lavinia begins a new life as her husband comes to understand his own life and the significance of Celia's death, but Peter remains hopelessly adrift in the flux.

Another important manifestation of mechanism in the play is the protagonists' struggles with words, which fail to com-
municate meaning adequately because of their natural tendency to distort ideas into linear extensity, even if they are given the full attention of the usually autistically distracted listener. The opening two lines of the play suggest that communication is awry even between Julia and Alex: "You missed the point completely, Julia:/There were no tigers. That was the point" (p. 353). Similarly, Reilly must tell Edward three times that he wants gin and water to drink (pp. 359, 360, 363), because Edward is too preoccupied with his own problems to really listen to anyone else. As Arthur K. Oberg points out, the reasoning which the characters engage in tends to be hyperlogical, often depending on "if...then" constructions, as in Peter's doubtful proposition, "If I can hold to the memory/I can bear any future" (p. 371). In spite of their apparent reasonableness, however, the protagonists are not much better off than Prufrock crying "That is not it at all,/That is not what I meant at all." From Bergson's standpoint, their main problem is that they engage in mechanical exercises of the intellect, rather than employing a non-verbal durational intuition. But as Celia's Christ-like crucifixion suggests, Eliot by this stage in his career would be more likely to sympathize with Hulme's reliance on an apprehension of a transcendental logic as a solution to such problems.

The Waste Land is a far more complex time-poem than any
of the poems in the *Prufrock* volume, which tend to emphasize simply mechanistic death-in-life. Just as Amy, the women of Canterbury and the Chamberlaynes do not represent the only apprehension of time in their contexts, so mechanism is not the sole variety of perception in *The Waste Land*. But once considered by themselves, the mechanistic elements in the poem can more easily be related to the more significant, and less episodic durational scheme.

Numerous critics have commented upon the fragmentary quality of the poem, and among them Leonard Unger makes a conscientious effort to correlate the subject matter with the form. He notes that such phrases as "A heap of broken images," "I could not/Speak," "I can connect/Nothing with nothing," and "These fragments I have shored against my ruins" refer to the poem itself, which is an amalgam of quotations, snatches of conversation and disjointed images dramatizing the poet's grapple with words. F.R. Leavis expands this notion to suggest that "traditions and cultures have mingled, and the historical imagination makes the past contemporary; no one tradition can digest so great a variety of forms and the irrevocable loss of that sense of absoluteness which seems necessary to a robust culture." Eliot, then, had to overcome special problems of form: while portraying the fragmentation of society and dramatizing his own struggle, he had to preserve some measure of unity. Aside from the synthesizing figures of Tiresias and
Madame Sosostris, the poem would still manage to cohere, however, in its consistent attack on problems which can be reduced to consequences of a mechanistic outlook.

Death and mechanism bear an integral relation to one another in The Waste Land. The poem opens with a classically mechanistic dissociation of present from past at the revival of memories thought lost beneath a blanket of "forgetful snow." The memories painfully accentuate the disparity between the speaker's joyful childhood and her present monotonous and mechanical schedule: "I read much of the night, and go south in the winter." She is no more alive than the others interred in "The Burial of the Dead": the crowd flowing over London Bridge to stultifying jobs ("I had not thought death had undone so many"), and the shade crying, "I was neither/Living nor dead, and I knew nothing." Hugh Kenner points out that death also figures prominently in the lines, "'You gave me hyacinths first a year ago;/They called me the hyacinth girl,'" preceded by a snatch of a song (Frisch weht der Wind...), for they recall the rantings of Ophelia just before her death.---Significantly, a "death by water" like that augured by Madame Sosostris. The mechanist's death-in-life, of course, is monitored by the clock, be it the clock of Saint Mary Woolnoth, which keeps the hours "With a dead sound on the final stroke of nine," or the clock which regulates the pub-closing announced so insistently by the bartender. His "HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME" punctuates the already
fragmented conversation and ushers the patrons out the door as they bid each other good-night with Ophelia's mad words.

Bergson, prizing intuition and deriding intellect, would find the chess game prefacing the pub scene to be a pastime as suitable for mechanists as drinking by the clock. The game assumes an important place among the metaphors for mechanism in the poem for, aside from being an intellectual pursuit, it implicitly ends in stalemate, symbolizing the sterile unions of "two female wrecks." The abrupt shift from their elaborate surroundings to the anti-intellectual atmosphere of the pub, however, does not represent a transition to a less sterile environment, for all mechanists are not necessarily intellectuals. In fact, the clerk and typist of "The Fire Sermon" are hardly chess players, and yet their encounter is one of the sermon's exemplums for mechanistic sterility. As F.O. Matthiessen aptly points out, Eliot deliberately mechanizes the rhythm of the scene by using continuous rhyme for the first time in the poem, while stressing the similarity of the clerk and typist to other figures on the landscape: "they are all playing the same sterile game, burning alike with sterile desire." Even the music filling the background of "A Game of Chess" and "The Fire Sermon" is of the same staccato, mechanically-generated variety; the record which the typist puts on the gramophone as she smoothes her hair with "automatic hand" is undoubtedly as tasteless as "O O O O that Shakespeherian Rag."
The *Waste Land* is peculiar among Eliot's major works in that it does not seem to imply that immanent within the flux is a finalistic solution. Eliot offers durationism as another variety of the flux, but it does not appear to fare much better than mechanism as a vehicle of salvation. The poem is, however, a worthwhile exploration of the dead-ends which mechanism and durationism lead us to, for though they may not be solutions, the struggle with them is dramatic enough to engross the reader. Once a finalistic solution has been discovered elsewhere, however, this drama should not be dismissed as no longer meaningful, for as Weitz cogently insists, the "flux is not an illusion, but it is an illusion to regard it as the only reality."36
CHAPTER TWO
DURATIONAL INTERPENETRATION

Eliot poetically simulates the durational interpenetration of past, present and future in some of his works with a peculiar arrangement of his syntax and narrative. At first, the interpenetrating qualities seem to be almost incidental. His objection to durational thinking is relatively implicit in his structuring of "A Cooking Egg," "Sweeney Erect," and "Sweeney Among the Nightingales." In The Waste Land, with its strong admixture of mechanism and durationism, Eliot finally delivers an unequivocal rejection of durationism, particularly in his indictment of Tiresias. But Eliot does not banish durationism so easily. In Four Quartets, he still struggles with a Bergsonian as well as a Heraclitean flux in an attempt to see into "the still point of the turning world." All of these poems rely to a substantial extent on their structures to convey a feeling of duration, but Four Quartets presents the struggle with the flux most dramatically; the earlier poems tend to represent interpenetration more simply through forms which bear some resemblance to Classical syntax, reflective of Greek and Latin time-notions.

These syntactic forms, which have their rough equivalents in Eliot's poetry, are identified by H. and A. Thornton as the "appositional mode" and the "periodic mode." According to the
Thorntons, Greek and Latin poetry tends to blend past, present and future. The syntax is often paratactic, proceeding either "appositionally" or "periodically": "In the appositional mode of expression, the inflections in the main look backwards, pointing to something already mentioned which they pick up again; in the periodic mode, they point forward to what is to come."¹

That is, sentences begin by stating a basic idea in an initial clause, which is ornamented or explained by reference to the past or future. On a more molar level, stories themselves frequently move back and forth from the present to supporting myths. One of the characteristic features of the Classical styles, then, is a "ring composition," which the Thorntons claim represents early man's view of history as cyclical, ending at its beginning.²

In Eliot's poetry, the "appositional mode" brings the past into the present in "Sweeney Erect" and "Sweeney Among the Nightingales," while the "periodic mode" flows into the "appositional mode" in "A Cooking Egg."

In "A Cooking Egg," past, present and future forge themselves into a pattern which should be fairly obvious to the reader, but which eludes Pipit. The poem divides into three sections: the first presents a dull present, the second projects a hopeful future, and the last looks to the past which generated the present so dependent on a wistful future. The whole poem obviously moves in an "appositional" or "periodic" fashion, then, and within the last section alone, it moves from past to present,
to future, and back to the present, similarly imitating the movement of Classical poetry. In the first sentence of this last section, the "is" indicates a present concern with what was "bought" in the past: "But where is the penny world I bought/
To eat with Pipit behind the screen?" The query, certainly, is the equivalent of the rhetorical "Où sont les neiges d'antan?"
The next sentence's verb, "are creeping," roots in the present the decay over which the scavengers pick as the speaker metaphorically bewails Pipit's walking death. The next line, "Where are the eagles and the trumpets?" seems to look to the projected future which never materialized. Finally, the poem ends in a dismal present:

Buried beneath some snow-deep Alps.
Over buttered scones and crumpets
Weeping, weeping multitudes
Droop in a hundred A.B.C.'s

Pipit has nothing left to do but resign herself to a life of Prufrockian tea-parties.

While there is something of the past, present and future in Pipit's consciousness, they can hardly be said to interpenetrate. Eliot fences the poem off into sections with rows of periods, then, to suggest the segregation of tenses in Pipit's mind. The poem sits as a comprehensible whole before the reader, who naturally tends to integrate the sections, which he can do more easily than Pipit, who cannot readily see her life as a
whole. But it is difficult for the reader to judge whether Pipit suffers as acutely from mechanism as many of the personalities in the Prufrock volume. Surely she is encumbered by the linearity of words, her thoughts proceeding as they would in a conversation, but the mingling of tense in the poem does suggest that she makes some attempt to bring the past, present and future together. In any case, a propensity for verbal expression does not necessarily make her a mechanist, for it would make mechanists of Bergson and Eliot too. But she does suffer from a despair typical of mechanists, and her tendency to speak of herself as "Pipit" rather than as "I" is perhaps symptomatic of her Prufrockian schism.

"Sweeney Erect," ironically commenting on Emerson's understanding of history, depends for its most important meaning on an "apposition" which is closer to the original Classical form than that of "A Cooking Egg." The mythic figures of Polyphemus and Nausicàa penetrate the present by contrasting ironically with Sweeney and the girl on the bed. The elevated tone of most of the first three stanzas suddenly breaks down at the lines "Gesture of orang-outang/Rises from the sheets in steam," which ambiguously welds an heroic past to a brutal present. The translation of certain phrases from earlier lines of the first three stanzas into the present of later stanzas also reinforces the interpenetration: the "cavernous waste shore" laced with
rocks becomes the "oval O cropped out with teeth" of the epileptic; the "snarled and yelping sea" becomes a "sickle motion from the thighs"; Ariadne's tangled hair is now "withered roots of knots of hair"; the "perjured sails" of the Theseus myth transform themselves into the sheets which the girl casts about, relaying different messages to Sweeney, Mrs. Turner, Doris and the ladies of the corridor.

The stanza most obviously refuting Emerson's view of history lies near the mid-point of the poem:

(The lengthened shadow of a man
Is history, said Emerson
Who had not seen the silhouette
Of Sweeney straddled in the sun.)

Emerson follows Heraclitus in assuming that "time is illusion, all time is present; and if one moment, at the next moment is history, the succession itself is unreal, for the past as a collection of objective events is never present in any single moment."3 For Emerson, as for what Norman O. Brown calls the Protestant literalist, the stream of time forever changes, becoming never the same, rather than symbolically remaining the same as long as it retains the same name. Armed with the conviction that there is no continuity of the past in the present, Emerson touts self-reliance as a virtue and assumes that everything in experience is ephemeral except the self, anchored in the present from birth to death. But Eliot often finds Emerson laughable,4
and betrays this attitude in the Classical form of the poem, bringing the past into the present as he traces the atavistic lineaments of Sweeney, "Broadbottomed, pink from nape to base."

The same sort of anti-Emersonianism presents itself in "Sweeney Among the Nightingales." But here, instead of organizing the poem around correspondences between the first and second parts, Eliot blends myth into the scenario in such a way that past and present are barely distinguishable. He simulates interpenetration as much as could reasonably be hoped for in a linear form. Again, Sweeney is central to the poem because all history can be read in his physique:

Apeneck Sweeney spreads his knees
Letting his arms hang down to laugh,
The zebra stripes along his jaw
Swelling to maculate giraffe.

The often ludicrous combinations of the epic and ordinary are perhaps too obvious to trace through the poem. The important point is that Sweeney is oblivious to the interpenetration: Agamemnon's fate as Sweeney's; past as present.

In *The Waste Land*, the intrusion of the past into the present is more complex, part of a pattern which integrates various myths and literatures. But here, as in the shorter poems, Eliot "is not confining himself to voicing anything so essentially limited and shallow as the inferiority of the present
to the past. He is keenly aware of our contemporary historical consciousness, and of the problems which it creates. The main problem of that consciousness is that it is aware of too much of the past, so that impressions are chaotic and fragmented. The artist's role is to discover some sort of unified pattern. Thus, Matthiessen points out that Eliot tries to organize his poetry by integrating the works of other writers into his text in such a manner that past and present blend into a coherent whole. The cohesiveness of that whole is more or less obvious, depending upon the degree of fragmentation which the poet wishes to convey, and the nature of the "apposition" or "periodicity" varies according to whether the emphasis of the poem falls on personal or more cosmic history. But whatever the emphasis, each history can serve as a metaphor for the other, as they both portray contemporary social disintegration. As J.R. Daniels notes, "Eliot's disillusion is basically independent of time or place; it is the disillusion which Hulme desired for the Humanistic world." That is, Eliot and Hulme, both anti-Humanists, felt that civilization as it stood in the early twentieth century represented an elevation of relativistic values which tended to deny the stability afforded by absolutism or deity. If civilization deteriorates, as it apparently does in The Waste Land, it does so as a consequence of practically universal acquiescence to the flux, rather than faith in finalism.

Eliot expresses the temporal and national boundlessness
of this disintegration with techniques conceivably borrowed from Ezra Pound. The universality of the fragmentation is conveyed in Eliot's use of various languages: including Latin, Greek, Italian, French, German, Sanskrit and Renaissance English; Eliot's Unreal City is a composite of at least "Jerusalem Athens Alexandria/Vienna London." Moreover, when myths surface in the text, they often suggest another myth or literary piece, and thereby tend to support the Jungian notion that a collective unconscious has been in operation for centuries. The Grail legend, as elucidated in J.L. Weston's From Ritual to Romance, is the ostensible basis of the poem, but Eliot turns the story into one with heavy Christian overtones. Cleanth Brooks, in fact, goes so far as to say that the Christian material is actually at the centre of the poem, although Eliot never deals with its myths directly, preferring to link them with as many other beliefs as he can. 8

Sometimes the cross-references become remarkably dense as in "The Fire Sermon," where Buddha's Fire Sermon merges with the Sermon on the Mount and St. Augustine's Confessions, and the protagonist is an unstable blend of Phoenician sailor, Ferdinand of The Tempest, and Tiresias; the accompanying music modulates from the song of the nightingale Philomela to the music of a gramophone and Ariel's dirge, resolving in the "pleasant whining of a mandoline." Moreover, Matthiessen points out, the interpenetration here focuses on the "compressing into a single moment of the past and present of London." 9 The passage is also
at least as anti-Emersonian as "A Game of Chess," in which the players are repellent largely because they play at an abstract, inhuman occupation severed from the past, symbolizing the meaninglessness of history.  

Anti-Emersonian interpenetration is also implicit in the card-reading of Madame Sosostris. Charlatan though she may be, she actually does read the future as it is borne out in the poem. Although Eliot's notes are not always to be trusted and other conjectures can only be tentatively proffered, it seems that the merchant of the prophecy reappears as Mr. Eugenides; "the lady of situations" as a chess-player; the "crowds of people, walking round in a ring" materializes immediately as the horde of mechanists crossing London Bridge; the man with three Staves is associated "quite arbitrarily," Eliot says, with the Fisher King; and the Hanged Man represents Frazer's hanged god, or Christ, implicitly present in the latter part of the poem. But while Madame Sosostris provides a sort of dramatis personae for the poem, while bringing together the myths of the past and projecting them into the future, she is not able to interpret adequately all that she sees. What she does not see, according to Cleanth Brooks, is that the way to life may be through death.

This particular reading significantly colours Brooks' controversial interpretation of the poem's conclusion. He takes the wheel of "Death by Water" and of Madame Sosostris' augury to be a symbol of regeneration, assured with the coming of Christ.
Brooks, then, seems to be in agreement with Frye, who suggests that the poem moves in cycles, that the sea-gull which appears at the end of the seasonal cycle in "Landscapes" re-appears in "Gerontion" and in the fourth section of The Waste Land. Brooks, however, specifically objects to Leavis' considerably earlier interpretation that "the thunder brings no rain to revive the Waste Land, and the poem ends where it began." According to Leavis, the lines "I sat upon the shore/Fishing, with the arid plain behind me" suggest a resignation to the status quo. But whether the protagonist does set his lands in order for awhile, or whether the world does collapse like London Bridge, is a meaningless quibble from the Bergsonian point of view. The durationist, for whom time is nothing but simultaneities, would contend that there is no essential difference between ending at the beginning and going nowhere. If the past, present and future are all one, Brooks and Leavis' statements are equivalent.

The other great unifying figure in the poem, aside from the pseudo-seer Madame Sosostris, is Tiresias, the unhappy arch-durationalist. Although he has been both a man and a woman, he is unable to have children, and is as sterile as the Waste Land and the rest of its inhabitants. Since, according to Eliot's note, "What Tiresias sees, in fact, is the substance of the poem," he would seem to be a figure of duration, benignly uniting past, present and future as he draws the poem together. But for all his awareness
he suffers, his problem analogous to that of the over-educated Prufrock, whose doubts and rationalizations obstruct a durational as well as a finalistic world-view. Tiresias, then, is over-aware. As Elizabeth Drew points out, "He is agonizingly aware, in the imprisonment of his personal waste land, that the possibilities of rebirth cannot be dismissed as an historical anachronism; that the truth of the experience is eternally present and that the living of it plunges the whole man into a process of disintegration and conflict." Tiresias' cheerless durational condition is also highly important because it marks Eliot's incipient dissatisfaction with durationism; heretofore the only really identifiable malaise in his poetry lay in mechanism.

Although *The Waste Land* is the last of Eliot's major works before the appearance of an overt preoccupation with finalism, *Four Quartets* still struggles almost twenty years later with problems of duration. Critics have traced Bergsonian as well as Heraclitean elements through the Quartets, but whatever the nature of the flux, it is hermeneutically relevant only insofar as it is the medium through which the finalistic order can be apprehended. Artistically, it is important because as Eliot approaches the intersection of finalistic time with the flux, the form of the poem reflects his reversals within the flux. As Helen Gardner points out, the poem does not begin with an intellectual truth;
the meaning of the truth is worked out as the poem proceeds, moving ever nearer to elucidation. Therefore, the affixing of labels to the elements of a poem which at least pretends to be a philosophy-in-the-making, must take account of the instability of these elements. Thus, though the epigraphs to "Burnt Norton" are from Heraclitus, there is no reason to assume that the poem will end where it began—especially since the Quartets continually stretch beyond the end-in-beginning of the flux.

Nevertheless, critics persist in dwelling on the Heraclitean qualities of the Quartets. Morris Weitz, however, makes a significant plea for keeping Heraclitus in perspective:

There are elements from Heraclitus' philosophy in Eliot, especially in the Four Quartets, but these do not relate to Eliot's own positive theory of time. They are rather the notion of the Logos in the flux; the contrast of wisdom and learning; the ultimate reality of the fire; and the generative-destructive character of the four elements: earth, water, air and fire. What Eliot does with these ideas is to transform them into his own Christian philosophy.

Weitz, then, tends to emphasize the Christian implications of Eliot's work, but even this reading is unnecessarily rigid. Philip Wheelwright, in fact, manages to construct a convincing argument that it is a Hindu notion of rebirth through discipline and concentration which underlies the Heraclitean regeneration at every moment. If a case can be made for a Heraclitean organization with either Christian or non-Christian overtones, however, Northrop Frye's circles might be able to express some-
thing of the regenerative spirit of the poem. He represents the progress of the Quartets with "audio-visual aids," which is a reasonable enough approach to the Heraclitean elements. But it would obviously be futile to explore the specifically non-spatial Bergsonian qualities with Frye's method. Another interesting approach is that of John Clendenning; he associates Emerson's theory of the discontinuity of past from present with the Heraclitean theory of flux, and goes on to demonstrate Eliot's anti-Emersonianism, while indirectly discrediting Heraclitus. But more typically, critics simply use the epigraphs as a starting point:

Although the Law of Reason (Logos) is common, the majority of people live as though they had an understanding (wisdom) of their own.

The way upward and downward are one and the same.

The original meaning of the first epigraph was that the individual should subordinate himself to community and harmony in order to free himself from change, but the Christianized interpretation is that the divine Word (Logos) is immanent in the flux. Eliot repeats the communal idea of the epigraph several times in the poem, but usually without identifiably Christian overtones. Such a case occurs in "The Dry Salvages":

I have said before
That the past experience revived in the meaning
Is not the experience of one life only
But of many generations.
The second epigraph also has its applications at numerous points in the Quartets. The line embodies a typical Heraclitean paradox, while summarizing Heraclitus' generative-destructive principle. The Heraclitean idea of paradox, that opposites are reducible to a single truth, is evident throughout Eliot's poetry and critical theory, as Fei-Pai Lu emphasizes in his book on the dialectical structure of Eliot's work. The paradoxes in Four Quartets, for example, sometimes occur as short phrases of the order of "future futureless" in "Dry Salvages." At other times, the stream of paradoxes becomes particularly dense, as in "East Coker":

In order to arrive at what you are not  
You must go through the way in which you are not.  
And what you do not know is the only thing you know  
And what you own is what you do not own  
And where you are is where you are not.

Here and elsewhere, Eliot's paradoxes imply that the finalistic order can be apprehended through a reconciliation of such antitheses. The generative-destructive theory suggested by the second epigraph is the basis of Heraclitus' elemental order: "Fire lives in the death of air, and air lives in the death of fire; water lives in the death of earth, earth in that of water." If, as has often been said, each of the Quartets corresponds to one of the Heraclitean elements, culminating in the fire of "Little Gidding," they compare favourably to the circularity of the
Classical end-in-beginning, as do some of the earlier poems.

The circle need not be accepted as an organizing principle of *Four Quartets*, but its implicit presence does draw together the Christian and Oriental strands of the poem. Elizabeth Drew points out that "Jung sees the pattern of 'reality' in the Heraclitean forms of a dynamic system in which a central energy perpetuates itself by opposing forces which, though apparent antitheses, are found to be phases of one cyclical process." At the center of Jung's *mandala*, the magic circle of the collective unconscious, sits the figure of either Christ or Buddha; they are superimposed on the intersection of perpendicular lines. In a Heraclitean arrangement, of course, those lines would be drawn between the generative-destructive pairs of elements on the circumference.

But the relation among the Quartets cannot be described so simply as analogous to that of four concentric circles. If the critic insists on a spatial model, in spite of the Quartets' interpenetrating qualities, he might better describe the progress of the poetry as like that of a spiral—a series of circles back-tracking, intersecting each other, but still moving forward. Eliot, fully aware that the poem does not move in a straight line, stresses that the way to final enlightenment passes through a Dantean *salvia oscura* of words; the inadequacy of language must be experienced before a freedom from its fetters can be appreciated:
So here I am, in the middle way, having had twenty years—
Twenty years largely wasted, the years of l'entre deux guerres—
Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt
Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure.

Like Dante, who makes his epic journey to enlightenment "Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita," Eliot is at the mid-point of the Four Quartets here at the end of "Dry Salvages," and therefore midway to the last finalistic moments of "Little Gidding." Although each of the Quartets was published separately, perhaps we have here a hint of a final plan. Dante proceeded on a spiral to paradise, and the Quartets similarly spiral to their end. The names of each of the Quartets at first seem simply to suggest a circle from England to America and back again, but the circles within each Quartet must make some progress forward, for the return to England is to "Little Gidding," named for a seventeenth century Anglican community with far clearer finalistic overtones than "Burnt Norton."

The Four Quartets seem to be very repetitious, but actually each apparent redundancy, each "new start," is different from the last; each is "a different kind of failure" because the experience of the last "failure" guides the new experiment, demanding expansion and progress toward enlightenment. Eliot expresses the importance of this seeming repetition in lines which are themselves repetitious and circuitious, although making some progress in sense between their beginning and end:
You say I am repeating
Something I have said before. I shall say it again.
Shall I say it again? In order to arrive there,
To arrive where you are, to get from where you are not,
You must go by a way wherein there is no ecstasy.

One example of such fruitful repetition spans "East Coker" and
"Dry Salvages." The vague lines "As we grow older/The world
becomes stranger, the pattern more complicated" expand into
the parallel, but more illuminating lines of "Dry Salvages":

It seems, as one becomes older,
That the past has another pattern, and ceases to be a mere
sequence—
Or even development: the latter a partial fallacy,
Encouraged by superficial notions of evolution,
Which becomes, in the popular mind, a means of disowning
the past.

Even within a few lines, Eliot sometimes refines his idea between
modified repetitions. At the opening of "Burnt Norton," for
example, "what might have been" occurs twice; three lines merely
identify it as an abstraction, but its repetition in the more
concise two lines which follow lend it greater significance by
identifying it with the flux through which the immanent Eternal
Moment may be apprehended:

What might have been is an abstraction
Remaining a perpetual possibility
Only in a world of speculation.
What might have been and what has been
Point to one end, which is always present.
One of the most revealing sets of repetitions, suggesting the nature of an important difference between the outlooks of Heraclitus and Bergson, occurs in "East Coker." The Quartet opens with "In my beginning is my end," and the idea develops in the first stanza; the opening sentence recurs verbatim at the head of the next stanza, which expands the idea further; finally, the Quartet ends with "In my end is my beginning."

Far from being a circle, the Quartet makes a monumental progress from a Heraclitean to a Bergsonian flux. While Heraclitus admits that the flux is generative as well as destructive, he emphasizes its destructive qualities, while Bergson rejoices in the "creative evolution" of the flux. The stress of the first and last sentences of "East Coker" correspondingly shifts from destruction to generation. And obviously, the relative position of the lines reflects the contiguity of the beginning and end of the Quartet itself. Just as past and present cohere in a durational memory, the beginning and end of "East Coker" blend together in the intervening development. Le Brun appropriately emphasizes, then, the introduction of the typically Bergsonian ideas of newness in this intermediary section of the Quartet.26

Bergson and Eliot also seem to be on common ground in their attitudes toward the linear extensity of language. Both seem to prefer the flux of melodically related language in a coherent whole to an extensity of fragmented isolates, although
Eliot ultimately reaches beyond the flux as Bergson does not. Eliot tries to avoid within the flux "The Word in the desert," which is any word without context, as well as the word of God perceived but not understood. And like Bergson, he also makes explicit use of a music metaphor to convey his preference for pattern:

Words move, music moves
Only in time: but that which is only living
Can only die. Words, after speech, reach
Into the silence. Only by the form, the pattern,
Can words or music reach
The stillness.

Eliot works to give his words substance in shifting contexts in order to move beyond Bergson to the world of the finalistic Word, and he does so in a form which is itself musical. The irony is that the melodic interpenetration through which he achieves his end is heavily Bergsonian.

Suggestions of interpenetration are common in the Quartets, even though Eliot is not striving to establish a specifically durational order. Such interpenetration is apparently, however, the inspiration for such difficult lines as

Time present and time past
Are both perhaps present in time future,
And time future contained in time past.
If all time is eternally present
All time is unredeemable.
The past also penetrates the present in the reversion to Renaissance spelling in "East Coker": "In daunsinge, signifying matrimonie." In a more complex way, past, present and future blend in the startling interplay of tenses and meaning in certain lines of "Dry Salvages":

I sometimes wonder if that is what Krishna meant—
Among other things—or one way of putting the same thing:
That the future is a faded song, a Royal Rose or a lavender spray
Of wistful regret for those who are not yet here to regret.

Even more subtly, old excursions into mechanism revive in the Quartets as Eliot retreats into his personal poetic history in his irregular progress through the flux. Frequent references to disease recall the etherised patient of "Prufrock"; chronometers and tolling bells are reminiscent of the preoccupations of any number of Eliot's mechanists. But sometimes the metaphors are successful simply for their beauty. One such is "Midwinter spring," expanding at the opening of "Little Gidding," and preceded by its lesser known equivalent in "East Coker," where interpenetration is conveyed by the blend of all the seasons:

What is the late November doing
With the disturbance of the spring
And creatures of the summer heat,
And snowdrops writhing under feet
And hollyhocks that aim too high
Red into grey tumble down
Late roses filled with early snow?
The interpenetration of the elements of the Quartets is so dense that it obstructs qualitative analysis, but such confusion may be deliberate. The reader must, like a good Bergsonian, intuit meaning and see the poem as a whole which is a unified blend of thoughts from various sources. If Heraclitus and Bergson are at odds in the poem, their differences can be reconciled in the intuitional exploration of time. Such blends of Heraclitean and Bergsonian thought as "Time the destroyer is time the preserver" can be grasped not so much by the intellect, as by the mind's eye watching the river, the "strong brown god," erode and yet conserve the landscape of time. 28
CHAPTER THREE

FINALISTIC SALVATION

Eliot's own theory of time becomes overtly finalistic in many of his later works, even though they still betray something of a passing concern with the flux. But the discussion here will concentrate only on those works in which a finalistic apprehension dramatically displaces mechanistic and durational preoccupations: Four Quartets, Murder in the Cathedral, The Family Reunion and The Cocktail Party. While Four Quartets back-tracks frequently into mechanism and durationism, it does ultimately lend significant finalistic overtones to its Bergsonian and Heraclitean elements; the plays similarly come to a finalistic resolution, but their course is more direct. Northrop Frye claims that all of Eliot's plays feature a central figure who goes through a spiritual purgation, but the plays do not suggest with equal rigour that salvation is distinctively finalistic. The movement of Sweeney Acionistes is difficult to judge, because it is only a fragment; The Rock, while Christian enough, is a quasi-play in which a finalistic solution is given, rather than developed; The Elder Statesman and The Confidential Clerk simply do not offer unmistakably finalistic solutions. Moreover, these plays are not dominated by Christ-figures, which tend to lend credibility to a finalistic reading of the other plays.
In a 1959 interview, Eliot said of *Four Quartets*, "I'd like to feel that they get better as they go on. The second is better than the first, the third is better than the second, and the fourth is best of all. At any rate, that's the way I flatter myself." Perhaps he meant that the Quartets "get better" in the sense that they tend to approach a finalistic vision with a necessarily concomitant extrication from the entangling words and meanings of the flux. But such a value judgement, based on the assumption that a poem struggling with the flux is worse than one which makes a finalistic break-through, is best left to Eliot. The approach to the progress, as Gardner points out, should not be one which guages the poem by ordinary standards of quality:

There is progress throughout *Four Quartets* towards an "easy commerce," a freedom in communication, which does not necessarily make Little Gidding in its clarity a better poem than *Burnt Norton* is in its obscurity, but does give us a sense of completion, that what was to be said has now at last been said.¹

A common approach to the shifting patterns of *Four Quartets* is to trace a single word or image through the poems while heeding the accompanying contextual changes. Leonard Unger, aside from following the rose-garden image through the poem, analyzes the occurrences of a wide variety of other images throughout Eliot's work.² Helen Gardner, focusing her attention on *Four Quartets* in particular, follows such images as sunlight
and the yew-tree, and the words "end" and "beginning" as they relate to the musical structure. Such critical approaches as these assume a development in the poem which belies Northrop Frye's minority opinion that the essence of the poem is a circularity which not only dominates each Quartet, but unites them: "the four Quartets form a single cycle that begins and ends at the same point." But the analysis of temporal elements in Four Quartets which will be offered here presupposes the development which Frye denies, and Unger and Gardner support.

"Burnt Norton" takes the first few exploratory steps in the direction of a resolution; even though the development only begins here, the finalistic notion is already immanent in this Quartet, just as the moment of epiphany is immanent in the flux. The Quartet introduces a central problem in the first several lines: redemption cannot be found in the flux, if the flux is the only reality. The sole exit to a finalistic apprehension, represented by the rose-garden, lies in a memory which would lend coherency to the flux. And such a memory does not seem to be operating at the pessimistic opening of the poem:

Footfalls echo in the memory
Down the passage which we did not take
Towards the door we never opened
Into the rose-garden.
An understanding of the significance of the privileged moment eludes memory because "Garlic and sapphires in the mud/Clot the bedded axle-tree." In other words, an exclusive pre-occupation with the flux disrupts an apprehension of the Eternal Moment, the axle-tree. Notice that the axle-tree, presumably synonymous with the yew at the centre of the wheel of the flux, is at this stage distinct from the rose-garden. The experience in the rose-garden is a personal recherche du temps perdu which may or may not be illuminating. The axle-tree, on the other hand, symbolizes a common transcendency which may be glimpsed through a variety of personal epiphanies.

The yew in "Burnt Norton" is still in the process of being defined, not yet merging with the Immanence at the heart of the flux. In this Quartet, the "chill/Fingers of yew" merely intimate death. But the definition of the Immanence makes more evident progress. It cannot adequately be described as a still point, since it is the source of change, and so as soon as Eliot makes his first flat statement about the so-called point, he must back-track and qualify what he has said:

At the still point of the turning world. Neither flesh nor fleshless; Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is, But neither arrest nor movement. And do not call it fixity, Where past and future are gathered.

Eliot reaches toward a concise, poetic expression for this point,
but he is unable to condense these lines satisfactorily within "Burnt Norton." Yet he continues to complicate the description of the Immanence by introducing "a while light still and moving" into the poem. Not until later do the descriptions of the light and point cohere into a single statement.

In "East Coker," Eliot begins to formulate a procedure for salvation. The Quartet is full of imperatives. "Wait without thought, for you are not ready for thought" tells the reader that one may not proceed too rapidly to salvation; he must cope with the flux first. The extended series of paradoxes which follow are also prescriptive, for they begin with the repeated imperative, "You must go." The words describing the point and the light also merge in an action-oriented statement typical of "East Coker": "We must be still and still-moving/Into another intensity." Significantly, the "We" of this imperative suggests the common availability of salvation. The idea that plurality represents durational harmony expands here into the notion that the Immanence is common to all, although perceived through private epiphany. Similarly, a finalistic reading adds an extra dimension to the durational interpretation of "In my beginning is my end." The word "end" here begins to assume an Aristotelian, teleological cast to complement its Heraclitean overtones. The recurrence of the statement, and its subsequent inversion suggest that "end" and "beginning" have assumed increased importance since their vague
presentation in "Burnt Norton," where the only hint of a final cause lies buried in the relatively prolix lines,

Or say that the end precedes the beginning
And the end and the beginning were always there
Before the beginning and after the end.
And all is always now.

The "end" is also "home"—not a place, but a metaphor for a state of mind disposed toward exploration: "Home is where we start from." A spatial metaphor suffices temporarily, for the refining process has not proceeded so far that such metaphors are particularly encumbering, although Bergson would object to spatialization in any case. For Eliot, the spatial localization here still represents some regression back beyond the stage in "Burnt Norton" of "I can only say, there we have been: but I cannot say where." The sharpening of the description of the point, the use of the word "home" and a refinement of "end" all fall appropriately in the last movement of "East Coker"—which is really a compendium of the poet's progress so far. He is "in the middle way" here, which implies that, aside from being half-way to his goal, he is still wandering in the way up and the way down; he is not at the source of the flux.

"The Dry Salvages" makes further progress in this way by refining some of the earlier terminology and introducing
overtly Christian material into the poem. Gardner seems to be correct in claiming that the emphasis in "East Coker" is on beginning, but she erroneously notes that "the word 'beginning' does not occur at all" in "Dry Salvages." Its occurrence does not, admittedly, add much to what has already been said of it, except that it is now in the context of a sea metaphor which represents the flux: "And the ground swell that is and was from the beginning." The word "end," however, does undergo significant alteration in this Quartet, where its spatial overtones are abandoned in favor of a meaning befitting a non-spatial, cumulative flux: "There is no end, but addition." The next step, after some inevitable back-tracking, is to develop the teleological implications of the word. Such a significant transition is particularly appropriate in this Quartet, in which lengthy and overtly Christian passages surface for the first time. The references to the "wounded surgeon" and Good Friday in the fourth part of "East Coker" are only casual and fleeting reminders of Christ's death and Resurrection, whereas the fourth part of "Dry Salvages" is an unmistakably Christian prayer, beginning with

Lady, whose shrine stands on the promontory,  
Pray for all those who are in ships, those  
Whose business has to do with fish, and  
Those concerned with every lawful traffic  
And those who conduct them.
Even the liturgical diction suggests that the poet reverts here to theological, pre-relativistic values. After the prayer, the way to salvation begins to assume the tone of a Christ-like injunction: the way leads through "prayer, observance, discipline, thought and action." Eliot here countermands the warning of "East Coker" to "Wait without thought," for the Quartets are now well on their way to their teleological "end," and the reader is better prepared to understand it. In the last section, Eliot again marks his progress to date, but he now fixes his position by the yew-tree, which indicates that he is encouragingly near the goal of his journey:

We, content at the last
If our temporal reversion nourish
(Not too far from the yew-tree)
The life of significant soil.

The tree is now clearly the symbol of the Eternal Moment. The poet by this stage is able to convey more succinctly than in "Burnt Norton" that his fundamental problem is a reconciliation of the universal yew-tree with the personal rose-garden: "We had the experience but missed the meaning."

In "Little Gidding," Eliot gives the impression that he is at last writing from the yew-tree. He is neither on the way up or down. He is at "Midwinter spring...Suspended in time."

The private experience coincides with an understanding of the Immanence: "The moment of the rose and the moment of the yew-tree/
Are of equal duration." Fire imagery acquires great importance in this last Quartet as a symbol of finalistic apprehension, and its presence is so ubiquitous that it is useless to cite many isolated examples. It can be established with one example in particular, however, that the fire is actually at the still point. If the still point is a place of peace, as Louis Martz claims, it is also a haven of the dove, the traditional symbol of peace. And because the dove is aflame in Eliot's apocalyptic vision, it also suggests a host of other peculiarly Christian symbols, including Pentecostal fire, and the peace that is a sword:

The dove descending breaks the air
With flame of incandescent terror
Of which the tongues declare
The one discharge from sin and error.

It follows from this, then, that "the fire and the rose are one," a restatement of the line asserting the identity of rose and yew-tree. But this last line in which fire and rose coalesce does not necessarily represent the apex of Eliot's poetic expression. Prior to this stage he managed to express the absolute either in non-spatial terms ("intersection time") or as the Immanence defined as not-flux ("in the stillness/Between two waves of the sea"). Also, the suggestion that love is a means to salvation does not really develop substantially
in "Little Gidding," and is not part of the final summing-up. Perhaps if there were another Quartet, the traditional associations of the rose with love and the fire with passion would have found some more concise expression. As it is, the final Quartet intimates that though the poem has reached an "end" of sorts, that end only generates new avenues for exploration:

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

Apparently, "where we started" ambiguously represents both the still point and the inexhaustible potential of spiritual and poetic exploration within the flux. The value of each "end" is that it begets knowledge of the source of the flux and a recognition of the endlessness of finalistic explorations.

While *Four Quartets* grapples with the limitations of the flux on language, a variety of Christ-figures in Eliot's plays must struggle with humanity and their own mechanism or durationism. The Christ-figure is particularly important in Eliot's work, for it represents a transcendence of time. William Spanos has, in fact, already discussed its significance in connection with *Murder in the Cathedral* and *The Family Reunion*. He bases his analysis on the principle that "Christ's
assumption of flesh absorbs time into the eternal order."\textsuperscript{11}

But his remarks are merely an application of Erich Auerbach's commentary on the \textit{figura}, an historic prefiguration, such as that which binds Christ with Adam:

\begin{quote}
Figural interpretation establishes a connection between two events or persons, the first of which signifies not only itself but also the second, while the second encompasses or fulfills the first. The two poles of the figure are separate in time, but both, being real events or figures, are within time, within the stream of historical life.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

Thus, the \textit{figura} transcends time: the past, present and future are indistinguishable as they are at the still point. Harry and Becket and the Christ-figures of \textit{The Cocktail Party} are finalistic figures within the flux, then, who embody something of Christ and Adam, while prefiguring a Second Coming by demonstrating the possibility of an ultimate salvation.

Becket is Eliot's most obviously figural creation. His spatial self, from the first moment, bespeaks a fundamental self which is finalistically-oriented, but Becket must struggle with temptation in order to achieve a genuine reconciliation of his two selves. Grover Smith suggests that the relationship between Becket and the Chorus compares to that of the Church as still point and the Chorus as wheel in \textit{The Rock}. He goes on to point out that "Becket and the Women of Canterbury (like Tiresias and the forms populating his memory) typify the dualism
of eternity and time, duration and flux, spirit and flesh, action by suffering and suffering by action." But the relationship is not actually so simple as this. As a Christ-figure, Becket symbolically embodies both flesh and spirit, something of both the wheel and the point, until after his death when he becomes pure spirit. Furthermore, Smith's separation of duration from the flux is very misleading, since duration is a variety of flux; therefore Tiresias might better be said to represent a mechanical-durational dichotomy. Becket, however, is not as clearly a durational figure as Tiresias, except insofar as a figura incidentally happens to bring the past into the present.

Becket's encounters with the Tempters dramatize the struggle with non-finalistic elements within himself. The movie version makes clearer than the play the connection between Becket and Christ during these temptations: Becket kneels in prayer, like Christ on the Mount, before the First Tempter enters; he stands beneath a crucifix just before the entrance of the next Tempter; bows to the crucifix before the Third Tempter enters; and again kneels before the altar as he hears the voice of Eliot, as the Fourth Tempter. The first three Tempters try to seduce Becket with obviously material baubles—worldly pleasure, duty to the king, baronial alliance—but the Fourth lures him to glory in martyrdom. Thus, the first three rely for their arguments on the distractions of
the physical world which would be as tempting to a durationist as to a mechanist, but the last Tempter is the most difficult to deal with because he obstructs the already formidable leap from the rim to the still point of the wheel of time.

The First Tempter is the most easily overcome. He proffers his temptation of worldly pleasure in rhymed couplets, suggesting something of his extremely mechanistic leanings. In the movie of the play, the camera focuses on the chess game in which Becket and the Tempter engage during their discourse.\(^{18}\) The connotations of mechanical order and intellectualization which imbue the game of chess in *The Waste Land* are also present here, with overtones suggestive of Becket's secret longing for martyrdom in a political arena.\(^{19}\) Even in the final text of the play, which lacks the game of chess, Becket mentions the game in a list of other mechanical distractions recited after all the Tempters have made their cases:

Thirty years ago, I searched all the ways
That lead to pleasure, advancement and praise,
Delight in sense, in learning and in thought,
Music and philosophy, curiosity,
The purple bullfinch in the lilac tree,
The tiltyard skill, the strategy of chess,
Love in the garden, singing to the instruments
Were all things equally desirable.

\(^{(p. 258)}\)
The Tempter uses a form of "midwinter spring" in his argument, but he corrupts its finalistic overtones to suit his purposes. When he tells Becket that "Spring has come in winter" (p. 247), he simply implies that Becket, in the "winter" of old age, should revert to the "spring" of his youth. But Becket replies in a way which suggests that he is not concerned with the endless cycling of the flux:

But in the life of one man, never
The same time returns...
Only
The fool, fixed in his folly, may think
He can turn the wheel on which he turns.

(p. 247)

In the movie, Becket then checkmates the Tempter after the final, convincing words, "You are twenty years too late" (p. 247). But at this point, Becket has only beaten a mechanist at a mechanist's game, which he should not have been playing at all, even if he is only a durationist.

The Second Tempter cannot be check-mated so easily, even though he is likewise mechanistic. He also represents an anti-Platonic position, manifested in his remark designed to turn Becket away from a pursuit of the ethereal: "Shall he who held the solid substance/wander waking with deceitful shadows?" (p. 248) The word "shadows," reminiscent of Plato's shadows in the cave, as well as Dante's shades, seems to be fairly significant here. It was, in fact, one of the few words retained from the
otherwise altered speech of the Tempter as it stood in 1962: "Fare forward, shun two files of shadows." Before the First Tempter enters, Becket also refers to shadows: "the substance of our first act/"will be shadows, and the strife with shadows" (p. 246). Here, the shadows are more obviously the spectres of temptation than anything else. Frye points out that both this remark and the Chorus' description of Becket as "unaffrayed among the shades" recall the line from the Purgatorio, "Treating shadows as a solid thing." Thus, these references seem to support Weitz' contention that Eliot is a Neo-Platonist, rather than Heraclitean, and they suggest as well that Becket, like Dante, has his eye on salvation.

The Third Tempter also betrays certain mechanical inclinations, even though he offers a different variety of temptation. His Prufrockian penchant is obvious in such lines as "I know how to hold my estates in order" (p. 250), and he also introduces the proposition, upsetting even to a durationist, that "time past is time forgotten"(p. 252). The Tempter ironically calls for an alliance, telling Becket, "You look only/To blind assertion in isolation!"(p. 251), and yet he is not willing to admit the sort of alliance of past with present which characterizes a durational memory. But Becket simply chooses to ignore the Tempter's remark on memory, perhaps because of its obvious fallaciousness, and answers instead only the latter part of the Tempter's speech.
The Fourth Tempter presents Becket with an alternative which is not so easily discarded as the others. He, like his predecessors, only represents Becket's inner compulsions, but Becket does not make the allegory explicit for the audience until he asks the final Tempter, "Who are you, tempting with my own desires?" (p. 255) The Tempter also makes it plain that the mechanism displayed by the other Tempters is merely a reflection of Becket's Prufroccian qualities. Like Prufrock, who wonders "Do I dare?" on the stairs to his freedom, Becket can also be found, the Tempter reveals, "hesitating at the angle of stairs" (p. 254). While the previous Tempter refuted the memory thesis which dominates Bergson's Matter and Memory, this one does not accept a basic principle of Time and Free Will. For Bergson, nothing is fixed nor predictable, but the Fourth Tempter tries to waylay Becket with the lines,

Neither does the agent suffer
Nor the patient act. But both are fixed
In an eternal action, an eternal patience.
(p. 255)

He speaks the language of the finalist, surely, even making use of "the wheel may turn and be forever still" (p. 256), but he is only tempting Becket "To do the right deed for the wrong reason" (p. 258). While Becket rejects the temptation to glory in his own martyrdom, he nevertheless clings to an essentially anti-Bergsonian position, for he does not abandon a belief in
divine determinism.

In the original Canterbury production of the play, the parts of the Four Knights and Four Tempters were played by the same quartet of actors for the sake of expediency, as well as for the reason cited by the director, E. Martin Browne:

I believed, and still believe, that the doubling helps the audience to grasp one of the main theses of the play by showing a parallel between the force that Becket is fighting within himself and the antagonists from without. If the Knights' apology is "the temptation of the audience," the point that emerges from this doubling is that the false values offered to Becket and to the audience, in the twelfth century and in the twentieth, are the same.

The Knights, in pursuing their mechanistic arguments, do indeed manage to bridge time. Their language is often modern and colloquial, as in "you are Englishmen, and therefore your sympathies are always with the under dog. It is the English spirit of fair play" (p. 277), and they therefore seem almost anachronistic in their setting. But because they are out of joint with their time, they tend to bring the figura, which already transcends over a thousand years, into the present, lending a contemporary relevance to Becket and Christ.

The figura himself makes his position clearest in the Interlude. Here he emphasizes the finalistic meaning of "In my end is my beginning." Christ, as both God and Man, lies in and out of the flux, and therefore his birth-in-death
represents both mutability and the immutable Eternal Moment from which the flux flows. The martyr bears a figural relation to Christ, and so is himself in and out of the flux. Thus, Becket remarks, "Just as we rejoice and mourn at once, in the Birth and Passion of Our Lord; so also, in a smaller figure, we both rejoice and mourn in the death of martyrs" (p. 261). The birth-in-death of "Journey of the Magi" has similar finalistic implications; it is better read as a precursor of Becket's sermon, rather than as an expression of Bergsonian or Heraclitean philosophy:

were we led all that way for
Birth or Death? There was a Birth, certainly,
We had evidence and no doubt. I had seen birth and death,
But had thought they were different; this Birth was
Hard and bitter agony for us, like Death, our death.

Becket's martyrdom is more figural than that of the other martyrs whose name-days follow immediately after Christmas, although St. Stephen's martyrdom suggests a resurrection to Becket:
"Is it an accident, do you think, that the day of the first martyr follows immediately the day of the Birth of Christ? By no means" (p. 261). Becket's death comes at a tenuous midwinter spring, Eliot's habitual symbol for birth-in-death:
"Longer and darker the day, shorter and colder the night./
Still and stifling the air: but a wind is stored up in the East" (p. 263). And Becket senses his own figural relation to Christ: "I shall rise from my tomb/To submit my cause before God's throne" (p. 269).
Unlike Becket in his play, Harry does not enter *The Family Reunion* as a fully-formed Christ-figure. The figural relation between Adam and Christ corresponds roughly to that between Harry as durationist and as finalist, but Harry never really becomes as sympathetic a figure as Christ. Although he makes considerable progress along the path to enlightenment, Harry generally remains true to Eliot's description of him as "an insufferable prig."\(^{23}\) Harry must struggle with the flux, as does Eliot in *Four Quartets*, in order to find his way to the symbolic rose-garden. Thus, as Spanos points out in taking issue with Anne Ward, Harry's salvation is in the Eternal Moment immanent in the flux, not "out of time."\(^{24}\) However unpleasant Harry might be personally, then, he stretches toward a finalistic apprehension, and that, "The Dry Salvages" tells us,

> is an occupation of the saint--
> No occupation either, but something given
> And taken, in a lifetime's death in love,
> Ardour and selflessness and self-surrender.

Harry, like Adam, commits his own sins, and like the men who followed Adam and shared the guilt of Original Sin, Harry also bears the burden of someone else's transgression. Grover Smith claims that Harry is innocent, however, because his sins were predetermined by his father. Harry, according to Smith, is not like the descendants of Adam either, because by *necessitas*
peccanti they were prone to commit their own sins until the redemption of Christ. But Smith's position becomes untenable in the face of evidence indicating that Harry did commit his own sins and is figuratively accountable for his father's sins as well. Eliot, in a letter to E. Martin Browne, points out that Harry is really expiating his own sin, that of wanting to kill his wife, as his father wished to murder Amy: "So the crime and the necessity for expiation repeat themselves...At the beginning of the play he is aware of the past only as pollution, and he does not dissociate the pollution of his wife's life from that of her death. He still wants to forget, and that is the way forbidden." Harry's unusually strong resemblance to his father (p. 321) merely serves to point up that, symbolically at least, the sin of Harry's father is also Harry's. But Harry does not begin the play reconciled to the idea of assuming responsibility for anyone else's shortcoming, let alone those of his father. From the first, he can see the rest of the Family for what they are, hopeless mechanists and durationists of varying degrees, but he does not offer any sympathy. His first words to them are symptomatic of his critical, but unhelpful attitude: "How can you sit in this blaze of light for all the world to look at? If you knew how you looked, when I saw you through the window" (p. 291). Likewise, when he hears of John's accident he condescendingly remarks,
A brief vacation from the kind of consciousness
That John enjoys can't make very much difference
To him or to anyone else.
(p. 324)

Thus, aside from forgetting in the culpable way which Eliot
points to, Harry is guilty of dissociating himself from
responsibility for humanity.

Harry's personal struggle within the flux, however, is
enough to occupy him for most of the play, and almost excuses
his inattention to others. At first, Harry considers "what is
always present" as "what matters" (p. 294), but, as "Burnt
Norton" makes clear, "If all time is eternally present/All
time is unredeemable." As in Four Quartets, the distinctions
between mechanism and durationism are blurred in The Family
Reunion, for what matters after all, is the opposition of final-
ism to any variety of flux. Therefore, Harry also copes with
characteristically mechanistic problems as he drifts through
the flux. When he speaks of "flickering intervals of light
and darkness" (p. 294) which trouble him, he metaphorically
bemoans his mechanistic fragmentation. Agatha prefaces Harry's
first entrance with a significant covert allusion to Henry
James' "The Jolly Corner": 27

The man who returns will have to meet
The boy who left...
And it will not be a very jolly corner
When the loop in time comes--and it does not come for
everybody--
The hidden is revealed, and the spectres show themselves.
(pp. 288-289)
In James' story, Spencer Brydon returns to his home, "the jolly corner," and tracks down the ghost of what he might have been. Agatha suggests, then, that Harry has a similar schism within himself, and she augurs the appearance of the Eumenides through a "loop in time." These are the forces which will warn Harry away from the "boy who left." The split in Harry can perhaps be compared to that between the fundamental and spatial selves, although the self that might have been does not lie so clearly in the realm of the mechanistic as Prufrock's spatial self. It is ironic, then, that while Harry himself is so fragmented, holding only "a fragment of the explanation" (p. 296), he can accuse others of "trying to think of each thing separately" (p. 326). Moreover, while most of the Family cannot pinpoint the cause of their discontent, Harry is just conscious enough of the mechanistic difficulty with words which he shares with them:

This is what matters, but it is unspeakable, Untranslatable: I talk in general terms
Because the particular has no language. (p. 294)

 Appropriately, Harry's important observation comes at what Amy calls "a very particular occasion" (p. 288).

Harry requires assistance from a variety of sources to extricate himself from his tangle in the flux, and assume a more Christ-like benevolence. Agatha and Mary, while representing what might have been, are nevertheless helpful in ushering Harry
into his rose-garden. Agatha is the more enlightened of the two, but she tells Mary that they are both in the twilight zone between the flux and the timeless world:

You and I,
My dear, may very likely meet again
In our wanderings in the neutral territory
Between two worlds.
(p. 343)

They are "only watchers and waiters: not the easiest role" (p. 305). Downing is also helpful, insofar as he is spiritually attuned to Harry, and therefore able to see the Eumenides and sympathize with him. Dr. Warburton, while hardly mystical, unknowingly helps Harry along by referring him to Agatha, who knows the secret of the relationship between Harry's mother and father. And, of course, the Furies finally lead Harry past Agatha and Mary, across "the frontier/Beyond which safety and danger have a different meaning" (p. 342).

Harry's first encounter with the Furies, in the presence of Mary, represents something of a false start. Eliot explains its intended significance in a letter to E. Martin Browne:

The scene with Mary is meant to bring out, as I am aware it fails to, the conflict inside him between this repulsion for Mary as a woman, and the attraction which the normal part of him that is still left, feels towards her for the first time...This attraction glimmers for a moment in his mind, half-consciously as a possible "way of escape";
and the Furies (for the Furies are divine instruments, not simple hell-hounds) come in the nick of time to warn him away from this evasion—though at that moment he misunderstands their function.

The "way of escape" is a slipping back into the relative innocence of what might have been—marrying Mary as Amy planned before Harry took another wife. The Furies warn Harry away from denying his real past, but in addressing them, Harry continues to treat his past and present selves as dissociated entities. "It is not me you are looking at," he cries to the Furies, "but that other person, if person/You thought I was" (p. 311). Harry obviously still must move from a mechanical dissociation to a durational unity before he can achieve epiphany. Mary is of some help to Harry along this way, even though Eliot comments while he is working on intermediate drafts of the play that "Mary understands nothing, and is in a fair way to having to follow exactly the footsteps of Agatha, in order eventually to reach the point that Agatha has reached."30 While she may not understand all the implications of her remark, she does say just before the Eumenides appear, "I believe the moment of birth/Is when we have knowledge of death" (p. 310). The end-in-beginning of which she speaks is more than a Heraclitean or Bergsonian creation within the flux. Her epigram, like "In my beginning is my end," points to the genesis of finalism in the death of durationism, as well as portending the death of Amy before Harry
begins a new life.

Harry's second encounter with the Eumenides is in the presence of Agatha, and only now, Eliot claims, "does he begin to understand what the Way of Liberation is: and he follows the Furies as immediately and as unintelligibly as the Disciples dropping their nets." When Agatha steps into the embrasure which the Furies just occupied and explains the origin of the curse which weighs upon Harry, she symbolically assumes the role of the Furies. Heretofore, she was only a quasi-mystic who "only looked through the little door/When the sun was shining on the rose-garden" (pp. 334-335) which she could only hope to attain. But she now acts temporarily as a divine instrument. She frees Harry from the hold of phantasms by telling him the truth about the relationship between his parents so that Harry recognizes that he only repeated the sin of his father by dreaming that he pushed his own wife overboard.

Carol Smith notes that "The freedom he desires is from guilt and responsibility, but the Furies show him that he must accept both before he can be truly free." It is clear enough that Harry accepts the guilt in this scene with Agatha and the Furies, but his acceptance of responsibility for others, as he assumes a more Christ-like demeanor, can more clearly be attributed to what he learns from Agatha apart from the Furies. She tells Harry, for example, that
we cannot rest in being
The impatient spectators of malice or stupidity.
We must try to penetrate the other private worlds
Of make-believe and fear. To rest in our own suffering
Is evasion of suffering. We must learn to suffer more.
(p. 327)

And Harry, in marked contrast to his earlier callousness, declares finally that he will leave to "care over lives of humble people" (p. 339). Such responsibility seems to be what Eliot espouses, and not, as Weitz claims, that "Detachment from things, persons and places is the right goal of man"—an attitude more befitting an Eastern ascetic than Christ.

Grover Smith points out that "Eliot had somewhere in mind the idea that on an allegorical level Harry could suggest by his conduct the role of Christ, for he is to symbolize redemption of the family from the paternal curse by being 'Its bird sent flying through the purgatorial flame'; in other words its scapegoat." Indeed, Harry's new life begins in the spring, the traditional time of the Resurrection; like the "wounded surgeon," the emblem of Christ in "East Coker," Harry is also wounded (p. 334); and as Northrop Frye points out, the final extinguishing of the candles makes Wishwood a Chapel Perilous in which death begets life. If Harry's story can thus transcend time and place to bear a figural relation to that of Christ, it can also embody something of the Orestes myth, as well as the suffering of Adam and his descendants. Harry, then, is not disqualified from being a finalistic figure just because he also represents a variety of other things.
The Cocktail Party also has its figural elements, but the ritual sacrifice differs from that of Murder in the Cathedral and The Family Reunion in that it unfolds as a drawing-room comedy. As far as Frye is concerned, however, all of these plays are comedies in the sense that "The end restores what the audience has seen all along to be the desirable state of affairs, hence in a comedy's beginning is its end." The end is also a beginning, as a new order germinates, and so the Christian figural events of Eliot's plays imitate a "divine comedy" in which the Fall and Crucifixion are tragic episodes. While The Cocktail Party may be more obviously a comedy than most of Eliot's other plays, its figura is not so easily isolated, for several of its characters share Christ-like attributes, but none corresponds perfectly to the Redeemer. The play's mythic origins in Alcestis are also significantly more obscure than than the Aeschylean qualities of The Family Reunion.

Harcourt-Reilly, who brings Lavinia back from a figurative death, corresponds most clearly to Hercules, who brought Alcestis back from the Underworld. Both Christ and Hercules are off-spring of a union of a divinity and a mortal, and Harcourt-Reilly is similarly a mediational figure between the everyday world and the transcendental. Rexine points out, in fact, that Harcourt-Reilly's hyphenated name is meant to suggest this mediational role: Harcourt is a "sturdy English" name, whereas Reilly has overtones of a very different Irish spirit. But Reilly is
only a guardian of the door to the rose-garden; therefore, he does not himself undergo a redemptive crucifixion. He resembles Agatha of The Family Reunion, for he is capable of augury (p. 364) and can usher others across the frontier to salvation which is momentarily beyond him. He even expresses basically durational ideas at times. His belief in a flux which coheres through durational memory is evident in his lines,

Ah, but we die to each other daily. What we know of other people Is only our memory of the moments During which we knew them. And they have changed since then. (pp. 384-385)

Later, he confesses his own limitations, confirming that his spirit is indeed anchored in the flux:

And when I say to one like her "Work out your salvation with diligence," I do not understand What I myself am saying. (p. 421)

Denis Donoghue shows that the play emphasizes images of sight and blindness, and Reilly is also part of this pattern which is closely allied to the strategy of redemption. His song "One-eyed Riley" with the line "And me bein' the One Eyed Riley" [sic] suggests that he is the proverbial one-eyed man
in the country of the blind. Julia and Alex are assisting guardians of the rose-garden, but they are not as perceptive as the "One-eyed Riley". Julia's inferiority in particular becomes clear in the obviously metaphorical meaning of her lines, "I must have left my glasses here; /And I simply can't see a thing without them" (p. 364).

Both Lavinia and Edward are led to their salvation along a route which parallels that taken by Christ to redeem mankind. Lavinia's absence and return to her husband is analogous to Christ's Harrowing of Hell and Resurrection, as well as to the Alcestis story. Similarly, Reilly tells Edward that he must take "a long journey" before he can find salvation (p. 404), just as the Magi make "a journey, and such a long journey" to the birth-death of Christ, and as Harry goes on a "pilgrimage of expiation" (p. 350). The conclusion of the play is clearly a beginning-in-end for Edward and Lavinia. The play begins and ends with a cocktail party, and the last exchange of the pair appropriately recalls the "In my end is my beginning" which concludes "East Coker":

LAVINIA:  
EDWARD: It will soon be over.  
LAVINIA:  
EDWARD: There's the doorbell.  
LAVINIA:  

Now for the party.  
I wish it would begin.  
Oh, I'm glad. It's begun.

The meaning of the party has shifted by now, however, from an arena for spatial selves engaging in stichomythic parries like
those of "A Game of Chess"^42 to a symbolic renewal. Edward has come to understand in the last moments of the play what Reilly has been telling him: "That every moment is a fresh beginning" (p. 440).

Celia is the most obvious figura of Christ in the play, for just before her death she leads a life of asceticism and self-sacrifice which is unmistakably Christ-like. Eliot rather heavy-handedly leaves little doubt of her significance as Alex tells the Chamberlaynes and their guests that "she must have been crucified/Very near an ant-hill" (p. 434). But even before she leaves on her redemptive journey, Celia is a figure of loneliness and suffering (p. 413) among her mechanistic acquaintances. Unlike most of the others, she is reluctant "to become a thing...she suffered more, because more conscious" (p. 437).

Part of that consciousness is a sense of sin which is so vague as to be universal (pp. 414-415), befitting a figure whose death is the occasion for the redemption of others. Some of these protagonists ultimately realize that their autistic mechanism is partly to blame for her isolation and subsequent death: like the Chorus of Murder in the Cathedral, and the Family of The Family Reunion, they are responsible for being irresponsible. Harcourt-Reilly brings the point of the play home at the final gathering:
As for Miss Coplestone, because you think her death was waste 
You blame yourselves, and because you blame yourselves 
You think her life was wasted. It was triumphant. 
But I am no more responsible for the triumph— 
And just as responsible for her death as you are.  
(p. 438)

As a figura of Christ, Celia must, of course, have some-
thing of the "flesh" as well as the "spirit" about her. She 
does not, therefore, display the trappings of an ascetic final-
ist all through her life. As Reilly points out after his story 
of the magus Zoroaster who met his own image, Celia also had 
a divided self:

When I first met Miss Coplestone, in this room, 
I saw the image, standing behind her chair, 
Of a Celia Coplestone whose face showed the astonishment 
Of the first five minutes after a violent death.  
(p. 437)

Celia seems to have been divided between the finalistic martyr 
who meets the violent death, and the more mundane self of the 
flux whom Reilly saw sitting in the chair. Prufrock is compara-
rably divided, but his schism lies along the lines of the funda-
mental and spatial selves, both of which are merely anchored 
in different varieties of flux. It is the fortune of only a 
few of Eliot's creations, like Celia, Becket and Harry, to 
escape at least fairly honourably from the flux, while Prufrock 
and his fellow shades vanish into the mechanistic or durational 
"yellow fog."
The multiplicity of Christ-figures in this late play partake in one of Eliot's most overtly finalistic gestures, but the two plays which follow it chronologically, The Confidential Clerk and The Elder Statesman, do not develop the finalistic themes significantly further, if at all. Such an irregular progress is typical of the pattern which extends from the mechanistic Prufrock through the durational Tiresias to the finalistic Celia. Eliot may have been writing the same work all his life, as he claims, but he did not write a volume of philosophy which must argue its way steadily and logically to its conclusion.
NOTES

Notes to Introduction

1. For an extensive sampling of Bergson's many sources, see Ben-Ami Scharstein, *Roots of Bergson's Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943).


4. Morris Weitz, "T.S. Eliot: Time as a Mode of Salvation", *Sewanee Review*, LX (1952), 49. Weitz agrees with this critical dictum of I.A. Richards, but adds that a prose paraphrase of a poem may sometimes be useful.


8. J. Alexander Gunn, *The Problem of Time* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1929), p. 19. Gunn notes that Zeno "showed the difficulties and contradictions which are inevitable if we endeavor to conceive of change as merely motion from one point to another in space, and in a time consisting of discrete moments."


Most of the argument is in *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (London: George Allen, 1913), pp. 86-169. But various related points and expansions are scattered throughout Bergson's work.


The Bergsonian elements in Eliot's critical writings are not the concern of this paper; they are traced in the Le Brun paper already cited. Le Brun suggests that "dissociated sensibility" and the "objective correlative" are based on Bergsonian ideas.


"Time as Salvation", p. 52.


Speculations, pp. 1-72.
21 Le Brun, p. 150.


23 Time and Western Man, p. 86.


Notes to Chapter One


2 Voices of Poetry, p. 33.


4 "Prufrock, Freud and Others", Sawanee Review, LXXVI (1968), 574.

5 M. M. Blum, "The Fool in 'The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock'", Modern Language Notes, LXXII (1957), 424-426. The half-facetious argument is that the only Fool in Hamlet is Yorick, and "Prufrock" features a "head motif."

6 In Alain Resnais, or the Theme of Time (London: Secker & Warburg, 1968), p. 45, John Ward notes in connection with the movie "L'Amour dernière à Marienbad": "The baroque hotel with its endless corridors and impersonal guests represents the confusion of memory (or in Bergson's terms--memory/intellect) process...The maze-like garden and complex ornamentation are extensions of this symbol."

8 "Reading", pp. lxxiii-lxxiv.


10 *Invisible Poet*, p. 11.


12 Kenner, p. 12.

13 "Time as Salvation", pp. 53-54.

14 "Time as Salvation", p. 54.

15 Williamson, p. 80.


17 G. Smith, p. 25.

18 Ward, p. 23.

19 All page references in the main text of this thesis are to *The Complete Poems and Plays of T.S. Eliot* (London: Faber, 1969).


21 There are numerous published versions of *Murder in the Cathedral*. The most distinct text is that of the 1952 film version, in which many of the speeches are altered, an audience with the King precedes the original beginning, the Fourth Tempter is represented by the disembodied voice of Eliot, and Becket plays a game of chess with the First Tempter as they exchange arguments. All of the alterations were made by Eliot or with Eliot's approval (see "Preface by T.S. Eliot"). Even the 1969 and 1962 editions of the play in *The Complete Poems and Plays* differ in their distribution of speeches and wording; the 1969 text even omits the part of one Knight. References to this play in my thesis, however, are to the 1969 text, except where discrepancies are significant.

23 Poetry and Plays, p. 190.

24 "Wheel and Point", p. 139.

25 "Wheel and Point", p. 140.

26 G. Smith, p. 191.

27 G. Smith, p. 217.


29 Moments, pp. 21-22. See also Kenner, p. 160.


31 Aside from the Baudelaire passage cited by Eliot in connection with this passage, see also Blake's Urizenic vision in "London."


33 John Ward comments on the significance of a match-stick game, occupying a place in "L'Année dernière à Marienbad" symbolically equivalent to Eliot's game of chess in The Waste Land: "The game has a mathematical form which is Bergson's paradigm of intellectual operations!" (pp. 50-51).

34 Frye, p. 69.


36 "Time as Salvation", p. 52.
Notes to Chapter Two


5. Matthiessen, p. 34.


7. "T.S. Eliot and his Relation to T.E. Hulme", *University of Toronto Quarterly*, II (1933), 393.


25. Design, pp. 142-143.
27. The musical qualities of Four Quartets are the obvious things to look for in a poem with such a title, and they have been thoroughly commented upon by numerous critics. A good discussion can be found in Gardner, pp. 36-56.
28. This example should be enough to cast doubt on Weitz' over-generalized remark: "Eliot omits the generative power of the Heraclitean elements and stresses their totally destructive character because he wishes to emphasize the ultimacy of death in the flux, if we regard the flux as ultimate" (p. 51).

Notes to Chapter Three

1. T.S. Eliot, p. 93.
3. Art, p. 58.
5. Art, pp. 48-54.

8. Art, p. 52.


15. Film, p. 57.

16. Film, p. 60.

17. Film, p. 65.

18. Film, pp. 53-56.

19. G. Smith, p. 182.


22. Making of Plays, pp. 57-58. Eliot later preferred that the Knights and Tempters be played by different actors "to leave questions for the audience to resolve by themselves" (letter of 20 September, 1956, quoted in Browne, p. 58).


27. G. Smith, p. 205; Matthiessen, pp. 175-176.

28. G. Smith, p. 205. Smith only refers to Agatha, but Mary also represents what might have been just as obviously, for she is the bride which Amy intended for Harry.

29. *Making of Plays*, p. 107. This and the following two references are from the letter dated 19 March, 1938.


33. "Time as Salvation", p. 63. The remark is actually made in connection with "Little Gidding."


35. T. S. Eliot, p. 93.

36. G. Smith, p. 214.


41 G. Smith, p. 217.

42 Donoghue, p. 174.
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