THE ART OF LOGIC AND PARADISE LOST
THE ART OF LOGIC AND PARADISE LOST:
AN ARGUMENT
MILTON'S OWN THEORY OF LOGIC
PUT INTO ACTUAL PRACTICE
IN HIS EPIC POEM

By
JOHN JOSEPH HARTIG, B.A.

A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts

McMaster University
(September) 1972
The idea that there is a connection between Milton's theory of logic and his writings is not a new one. However, an investigation into this idea in regard to Milton's most renowned work, *Paradise Lost*, has been sadly neglected. Some scholars do refer to the epic poem, but either superficially or unsystematically. This thesis is intended as a corrective for this neglect.

My thesis treats the first part of logic, "invention", in rather extensive detail in connection with *Paradise Lost*. The second part of logic, "disposition", is treated in only minor detail -- a treatment of "disposition", in itself, could generate a thesis. Nevertheless, my thesis should be a concrete demonstration that the elements in John Milton's *Art of Logic*, for both "invention" and "disposition", were applied by Milton, wisely and with careful detail, to his greatest work of poetry.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER I 14
   PART 1: the Efficient cause
   PART 2: the Material cause

CHAPTER II 62
   PART 1: the Formal cause
   PART 2: the Final cause

CHAPTER III 74
   PART 1: Dissentanies
   PART 2: Comparatives

CHAPTER IV 127
   PART 1: Disposition
   PART 2: Conclusion

BIBLIOGRAPHY 137

(iii)
God works a miracle with the chaotic elements, i.e. He creates Earth out of Chaos -- hence the "significant proximity".

Milton symbolizes the continuum of Existence by means of several fanciful "inventions" which depict regions of the universe as actually linked in some fashion, i.e. i) Earth hanging from Heaven by a Golden Chain (II,1051), and ii) Earth being accessible from Hell by way of a paved bridge (II,1027).
Reading a theory of logic involves a laborious process of understanding for most people. This is because it employs a specialist's language, that of the logician, highly precise and erudite, thereby generating a certain inaccessibility. And for this very reason John Milton, as a logician, has remained virtually unknown until fairly recently. My objective is to explore this facet of John Milton and to apply it quite pertinently (as I shall demonstrate) to *Paradise Lost*. It is, moreover, my intention to present his theory of logic in as plain and simple a form as I can manage. This is why I have elected to describe what logic is about in a rather loose form before I proceed to describe more precisely John Milton's special concept of it. Logic, then, concerns the correct rational process of the human mind. Such a process involves first finding things in the universe to think or say something about. This notion comprises two basic things: that one has, first of all, things to say something about, and secondly, that one can indeed say something about these things. Such is the first part of logic; its complement merely involves how one can
say something about things in the universe.

John Milton's *Art of Logic* fairly well adheres to this general description of logic. Milton defines it as "the art of reasoning well" which bespeaks the rational faculty undergoing some correct process. Such a process involves what Milton calls "invention" and "disposition". The first part of logic has to do with the finding of "things" which have "a certain fitness for arguing something." Milton identifies this "certain fitness for arguing" with "reason", and he terms that which has a natural bent for arguing "an argument". The second part of logic which is "disposition" involves the arrangement of these arguments about things into a meaningful and coherent form. This means forming "axioms" about things, developing "syllogisms", or organizing under a clear "method".

Whenever we think of Milton's *Logic* we should only rightly associate it with Peter Ramus' *Dialectica*, since Milton's work is actually an extended redaction of Ramus' earlier work. Indeed, Pierre Albert Duhamel has objected that Milton's work is not truly Ramist, and he insists that it is more Aristotelian than anything else. However, this critic appears to overlook some very basic distinctions involved with Ramus' concept of logic. Milton very explicitly agrees in the preface to his *Logic*, "with our countryman Sidney," that "Peter Ramus is believed the best writer on the art." He continues to say about Ramus' work: "So I have decided that it is better to transfer to the body of the treatise and weave into it, except when I disagree,


Linked with this contention that Milton was not so greatly influenced by Ramus' treatise is the contention that Ramus did indeed not really have such a great influence upon the whole of the sixteenth and seventeenth century thinking. Bernard S. Adams points to Norman Neilson and A. J. Smith as taking this up, and he competently argues against such contentions in chapter IV of his Ph.D. dissertation: Bernard S. Adams, *Milton and Metaphor: The Artis Logicae and the Imagery of the Shorter English Poems*, a Ph.D. dissertation, (University of Pittsburgh, 1964).
those aids to a more complete understanding of the precepts of the art."

What Milton refers to here when he says that he will use Ramus' work in such a way "except when I disagree" is: i) somewhat different organization of the material, ii) an expansion by added examples, and iii) occasional extra references to the "authority of Aristotle and other old writers". By this last expediency in his method Milton wishes to assert that Ramus' *Dialectica* does not really involve anything new. He feels thereby that "the suspicion of novelty which until now has been strongly attached to Peter Ramus ought to be removed by bringing up these testimonies from ancient authors." This underscores Milton's understanding of Ramus -- that Ramus actually respected the fathers of classical philosophy but disliked the scholastic contortions their works had undergone in the Medieval and Renaissance times. Milton's attitude very well parallels this as we can clearly see by his occasional remarks on the "theologians". Ramus meant only to reform Aristotelianism, not erase it; Milton likewise meant only to reform (more properly clarify) Ramism. In this we have what must be understood as a logical progression.

Wilbur S. Howell quite correctly suggests that Ramus meant to show respect for Aristotle when he changed the names of the "categories" in his *Dialectica* but still retained the same number of them as Aristotle had provided for in the *Ten Categories*. Below, I have provided a chart in which I have listed Ramus' ten categories of "invention", as given by Howell, and to which I have appended the list of categories, as given in Milton's own

---

3 Such distinctions about Ramus are referred to by Wilbur S. Howell in *Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700*, (New York, N.Y.; Russell and Russell, 1961), pp. 146-147.

4 See pp. 7 and 9 of Milton's *Logic*.

5 Howell, op. cit., p. 156.
The obvious parallel between Ramus' treatise and Milton's redaction of it, as demonstrated by this chart, therefore suggests a parallel respect by both men for Aristotle's work.

It is of course Milton's "categories" of "invention" which shall be my major concern in this thesis. This first part of logic involves such a richness that recent scholars very rarely get much to say about "disposition". I shall follow this trend as a conscious choice, for I feel that the true detail of significant things in the first part of logic has been altogether either neglected or unsystematic. I hope that the detail of things in the second part of logic may yet be exploited in some systematic fashion.

Peter Ramus called logic "dialectic" and defined it as "the art of disputing well".\textsuperscript{6} The association with "Reason" follows quite properly as the rules for disputing well "are derived from the workings of the human

\textsuperscript{6}Ibid., p. 154.
reason." Milton merely has taken the definition one step back, as it were, in the same continuum of logic which contains first "intuitive reason" and then "discursive reason". Milton's genius drives toward the primary basics of things, and therefore, he prefers the most fundamental term, "logic", and defines it as "the art of reasoning well". Walter J. Ong has made a lucid study of the history of the changing definitions of "dialectica" or "logic". He suggests that even in Ramus' own mind there existed some indecision about the essential definition of the term "dialectica": "In Ramus' 1555 Dialectica, he [Ramus] makes dialectica the 'art de bien disputer.' But the posthumous 1576 French edition alters 'disputer' to 'raisonner'." This of course implies that Ramus himself might have provided for this posthumous change and that he therefore associated the faculty of "Reason" very closely with what he considered "dialectica".

Both Ramus and Milton stress the idea of "utility" through their treatises. Ramus we must remember was a teacher at the University of Paris. Father Ong comments, "Ramus traces his reform of logic (and hence of everything else) to his interest in 'use'. He wants to put logic to the 'use' of erudition (ad eruditionis usum)." Father Ong continues to say that "'Usus,' with the other term 'exercitatio,' is a telling term employed by Ramus in respect to practice in general, but particularly, in respect to students' classroom exercise or drill." Milton, like Ramus, maintains a very pragmatic attitude about logic, as is exhibited by the various allusions in his treatise to the idea of "utility". The first and most general allusion to "utility" of course resides in his preface wherein he states: "The form of an art, as I said above, is not so much an arrangement of precepts, as the actual teaching of something useful, and the end is the same."(13)

7 Ibid.
8 This two-fold concept of logic is first of all referred to on p. 13 in the preface to Milton's Logic in terms of "thinking well" and "debating well", and then later on p. 367 in terms of the "discursive process" and the "first intuition".
10 Ibid., p. 41.
11 Ibid.
Those who followed Ramus and saw to his publication facilitated the utility of his work by inserting pictorial dichotomizations into the various editions.\textsuperscript{12} As early as the sixteenth century Ramus' own contemporary and biographer, John Freigius (whose "Life of Peter Ramus" Milton appended to the end of his Logic), had methodized the biography of Cicero so that Cicero appears "in what is probably the first geometrically schematized biography in the history of belles lettres."\textsuperscript{13} The "Patterson edition" of Milton's Logic does not include such schema, but one can easily and rather appropriately construct them — indeed this has been the practice of the several scholars who have recently investigated this field of study. I shall not deviate from this useful habit of appending such visual aids to my work. Through this stratagem I hope to show moreover how my thesis itself in some respects attempts to be a practice of Milton's logical theory.

This general orientation by first of all defining logic and then giving the immediate history to Milton's work should serve as a useful foreword for the brief formulation of what my thesis specifically deals with. My thesis intends fundamentally to demonstrate the definite and direct connection between John Milton's Art of Logic and his epic poem Paradise Lost. What this suggests is that John Milton actually applied his logical theory to his literary composition. Scholars over the last thirty years have pointed this out also of Milton's other works.\textsuperscript{14} However, I feel that the point can best be made by a study of the one work which is of course Milton's most celebrated and elaborate achievement. By such a concentrated effort I hope to present a rather detailed argument and one which is substantial. My ambition is no less than to explain the universe, as depicted in Paradise Lost, in the directly relevant terms of the Art of Logic. My analysis shall refer to the Cosmology

\textsuperscript{12}The idea is referred to in terms of "charts" by Ross Clyde Brackney in "By Fallacy Surpris'd:" Logic and the Miltonic Hero, a Ph.D. dissertation, (Stanford University, 1969), p. 13.

\textsuperscript{13}Ong, op. cit., p. 30.

\textsuperscript{14}This specifically refers to the coverage Irwin, Frissell, Adams, and Brackney give in their theses.
of the epic poem and also to the Nature of Things in that Cosmology. When I analyse the particulars of the Nature of Things I shall make references either directly to the actual lines which depict or define the essence of things or indirectly by recalling a situation or circumstance. What I hope the reader will gain from this thesis is a conversion to Walter J. Ong's own belief that "Poetry was in fact for Ramus and his myriads of followers just as logical as mathematics only the logic in poetry was somewhat thinner and devious." My objective therefore is to trace this idea through Milton's *Paradise Lost* not merely with a continued reference to his *Art of Logic* but also with the systematic format the *Logic* itself follows. And I hope in this to grasp in a firm fist that which has been elusive for so very long.

* * *

That there is a definite connection between Milton's *Art of Logic* and his literary works has no empty basis. The history of scholarship which merely dates back the last thirty years should be enough to argue the fact. G. C. Moore-Smith as early as 1937 drew attention to a connection between

---

what Milton's Logic says on free will and fortune and what various of Milton's poems say. But Smith leaves these interesting parallelisms in the form of brief notes or observations. He makes really nothing of them. The 1940's however held more substance in this line. Franklin Irwin followed up by writing a Ph.D. thesis in 1941 which concerned Ramistic Logic in Milton's Prose Works. His specific object was "to show how the logic ruled and ordered the structure of his writings" -- specifically regarding Milton's early prose works from 1641 to 1651 and then of course his De Doctrina. There must have been some immediate expansion of consciousness in regard to Milton and his Logic. For instance, Joseph McDill in 1942 pointed out again that the De Doctrina bears heavily upon the Artis Logicae; there were presumably others who alluded to such a fact. However, the next significant study in this area of Milton and logic came in 1946 with Leon Howard's excellent article on the categories of causation and how they apply to Paradise Lost. This is a fairly solid piece of work, and it has served me as a springboard to expand areas of causation which Howard leaves untouched. Harry Lee Frissell followed suit in 1951 in this kind of scholarship with his thesis on Milton's Art of Logic and Ramist Logic in the Major Poems. He devotes altogether too much space to the history of Classical Logic and Renaissance Logic and then only proceeds to recount Milton's treatise in less inaccessible language. This is beneficial surely, but the long fuse never really gets to what should

17 Franklin Irwin, Ramistic Logic in Milton's Prose Works, a Ph.D. dissertation, (Princeton University, 1941).
18 Ibid., p. 1.
21 These areas refer to the material, formal, and final causes.
be a powder keg of explosive significance. Frissell devotes a disproportionate section of his thesis (only 57 pages out of 245) to diverse examples of logic in Milton's major poems. This disproportion has been the main impetus for me to evolve a detailed study of Milton's Logic and the major poem as a rightful corrective in the line of scholarship. Generally there seems to be somewhat of a lull through the 1950's in scholarly activity either in article form or thesis production. Through the 1960's the activity noticeably picked up again as evidenced by Bernard S. Adams' thesis of 1964 which investigated in a sweeping fashion Milton and Metaphor: The Artis Logicae and the Imagery of the Shorter English Poems. Adams' study is a good one and has suggested much in the way I could approach my own analysis of Milton's major poem. Ross Clyde Brackney produced a Ph.D. thesis in 1969 entitled, "By Fallacy Surpris'd:" Logic and the Miltonic Hero. Unfortunately, Brackney's title sounds better than his thesis. He initially asserts: "It is my thesis that one way to determine whether Milton meant his characters to be heroic or not is to see whether they spoke in accordance with Ramian logic, which to the poet was the best method to ascertain the truth." Brackney's first three chapters are however somewhat too cumbersome to handle as he concentrates too finely on a collation of a whole history of critics to support his depiction of the Miltonic Hero. Chapter four, which is relevant to my study, investigates the logic in various speeches by Christ and by Satan in Paradise Lost, but when Brackney makes references to "non-sequiturs" etc. he does not make specific reference either to "Ramian logic" or Milton's own Logic. Brackney finally proceeds to discuss the logic involved also in Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes. However, his treatment appears rather loose and lacks the obvious citations for proof needed from the logical treatise of either Ramus or Milton. This again enforces my conviction to pin

24Brackney, op. cit., see fn. 12, p. 6 of my thesis.
25Ibid., p. 3 of Brackney. (Italics mine.)
my study down to one work, Paradise Lost, and to show its direct relevance to Milton's own Art of Logic. It should be noted that I do not intend to scan Milton's epic poem through the blurry lens of some general logic; I do not intend to focus upon it even through the Ramian perspective; my thesis intends to make Paradise Lost a specific specimen analysed through the power of that fine scope, Milton's Art of Logic.

However, before I proceed into the major body of my work, I must draw attention to the fact that it is not a novel thing that a logician should connect his concerns of logic with the concerns of God. Wilbur Howell remarks that to Ramus himself "logic was the center of the program of liberal studies, and the chief instrument of man in quest for salvation." Robert Fage in his 1632 redaction of Ramus' Dialectica also holds such a belief -- as clearly expressed when he writes:

In Laudem Scientiae Dialecticae sacrae:

This at the first from God almighty came,
From heaven descended this bright shining flame.
God reason taught, and man he did inspire
With faculties, which Logick doth require.
The matter precepts, forme Methodicall,
The end is reason's use, to teach th'unlearned all.

This piece of verse in praise of "Dialectica" first of all associates dialectica with "reason" and secondly claims that it is sacred and comes from God. Moreover, it makes an explicit reference to the "faculties" in Man through which Logic expresses itself. Milton was not unacquainted with such ideas as is shown through Raphael's discussion with Adam in Paradise Lost wherein the angel remarks, "But know that in the Soul/ Are many lesser

26 An example of this kind of study is Dennis Burden's The Logical Epic: A Study of the Argument of Paradise Lost, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967). Burden's meaning of "logical" is synonymous with "common sense"; he makes very few references to the Art of Logic itself. 
28 "Peter Ramus of Vermandois, the King's Professor, his Dialectica in two bookes." "Not onely translated into English, but also digested into questions and answers for the more facility of understanding", by Robert Fage, Gentleman, (London, Printed by W. J., 1632), p. Al. A xerox copy is available at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ont.
Faculties that serve/ Reason as chief." Since Milton maintains that "Logic is the art of reasoning well" (19), he would appear wholeheartedly in accord with what Fage's poem in praise of dialectica says. Note too that Fage calls the "matter" precepts, and so does Milton in his Logic when he comments, "Thus the matters of the arts are precepts." (53) Fage moreover calls "form" "Methodicall", and he calls "end" "reason's use" -- "to teach th'unlearned all" -- and so Milton does likewise in his statement: "The form of an art as I said above, is not so much an arrangement of precepts, as the actual teaching of something useful, and the end is the same." 30

Robert Fage prefaces his version of the Dialectica of Ramus with an address "to the reader" in which he delivers a historical recount of the emergence of the vices and virtues of mankind as from the Fall. He labels the happenings in Genesis with logical terms: "True it is indeed, that the Divell that old Dragon using the subtle serpent for his instrument, did offer the first occasion of sinning, whereby he became an externall cause of sinne." 31 Fage proceeds throughout his preface with this sort of transposition of the terminology of logic upon the moral history of mankind. Periodically he appends to the side of his prefatory preaching such glosses as: "The finall Cause, or the end or fruit of sinne", "Comparisons", "Testimonies", etc.

Robert Fage clearly and consciously then applied logic to the Genesis of mankind. Milton as clearly and as consciously did likewise in his own expression of the Genesis of mankind, i.e. in Paradise Lost.

30 See Milton's Logic, loc. cit., p. 13. (Italics mine.)
31 Fage's redaction, op. cit., p. 6. (Italics mine.)
These things however are not merely happy coincidences. They explode with solid impact in the face of what J. Milton French posits quite plausibly in an article. He suggests that Milton very likely knew Robert Fage's version of Ramus' treatise. French uses Milton's nephew, Edward Phillips, as the catalyst which activates this theory with its special power. There seems to be no doubt that Phillips lifted a portion of Fage's 1632 version of the Dialectica wholesale in order to compose his Mysteries of Love and Eloquence. French collates the almost identical phrasing between the two works. Since Phillips was taught by Milton, there is a strong suggestion that Phillips had come to know about Fage through some exercise assignment his uncle mentor had given him. What this clearly means to us is that Milton was probably acquainted with a precedent for regarding the story of Adam and Eve in logical terms before he even composed Paradise Lost. It is only a logical step that he follow Robert Fage's earlier example as an excellent suggestion for connecting his own Art of Logic with his epic poem.

What obviously argues the definite connection between these two of Milton's works is that there are exact words and phrases peculiar to the language in Milton's Logic which also can be detected in his poem. For the moment a brief listing of examples should suffice to illustrate this. Recall the prefatory explanation about the poem's verse wherein the author comments: "Rime being no necessary Adjunct or true Ornament of Poem or good Verse, in longer Works especially, but the Invention of a barbarous Age." Other such specific "indicators", not merely of Milton's long training in logic, but further, his direct application of an actual logical theory to which he subscribed (and which he wrote), are to be detected for instance in the prose "argument" which precedes the poetry of the first Book: "This first Book proposes, first in brief, the whole Subject, Man's disobedience ... then touches the prime cause of his fall ...". Another significant indicator is furthermore evident in Milton's prayer "That to the highth of this great Argument/ I may assert Eternal Providence,/ And justify the ways of God to men."(I,24-26) And of course it must be noted that Milton uses the very term, "argument", to introduce each prose synopsis of each Book.

The above is the strongest and most exact support for my thesis. It is complemented by the more elusive conceptual structures found in the poem. This has to do first of all with the use of metaphor — along the lines of Adams'

33 Ibid., French maintains this explicitly on p. 85.
34 Hughes edition, op. cit., p. 210. The italics are mine, as with the immediately subsequent quotations.
35 Ibid., p. 211.
investigation in regard to Milton's shorter poems: It also has to do with the use of the great conceptual balances involving: Heaven/Hell, Good/Evil, God/Satan, Light/Dark, and Man/Beast.

* * *

There is yet one more important distinction to add to all this. I have suggested that Milton has made a "conscious" use of his Logic; this of course is used in a loose sense. Perhaps Milton did actually have the thought cross his mind: "Would it not be of benefit if I employed the detail of my treatise to what I have to say in my epic poem?" However, this sort of "direct" consciousness still remains as "opinion" -- though it seems possible. What one can more plausibly be assured of is that there was a sort of "remote" consciousness regarding the choice of special words which must have existed in Milton's mind. The writing comes automatically, and the mental associations which fired in the author's mind may, quite rightly, be identified as a "subconscious" process -- which Bernard Adams suggests. However, by my deliberate choice of the qualifying terms, "remotely conscious", I wish to emphasize that Milton always had the knowledge in his mind of what terms he specifically was using and where they came from. Were one to comment to Milton about his epic poem: "Isn't that interesting! Your words here like 'adverse', or here like 'argument', seem to strike some odd familiarity in my mind. But I cannot quite put my finger on it.", the author would probably lift an eyebrow and comment simply: "Why yes! These terms come from my treatise on logic. They say so much, so well, don't they?"

* * *

I feel that the line of scholarship I intend to pursue shall have a utility of its own. It is suggested by something Franklin Irwin said some thirty years ago about Milton's Logic: "It is perhaps the least known of all the works of Milton, who has been admired as a writer of prose and poetry but ignored as a student of logic." This remark still applies today. It is my function to draw attention through my own scholastic effort to the fact that Milton was not only a poet but also a logician. There are still too few people who know this. The appreciation of Milton's genius in logic moreover is intended to serve for a fuller understanding, thence better appreciation, of Milton, the poet.

* * *

---

37 Irwin, op. cit., p. 1.
CHAPTER I

PART 1

I have deliberately devoted an inordinate length to my first chapter. It contains three parts; the other chapters only contain two each. The first part of this chapter concerns itself briefly with the historical context of Milton's training in logic and of the writing of his treatise. The other two parts are rather involved because they deal with what Milton considers the "nameless Genus I" of causes. I have taken care to adhere to Milton's own logical classification. For this reason I have preserved the composites of the first genus of causes, the efficient and the material causes, within one chapter -- although they do deal with rather lengthy detail. Milton himself devotes a great length to the first genus of causes in his Logic -- which is of course justified since he considers "cause" as the first of all arguments -- "which anyone can know for himself." (29)

*   *   *

John Milton suggests that the art of logic may be considered as a "sort of habit of the mind." (9) It is for this very regard which Milton has of logic that Bernard Adams may quite reasonably maintain:

In composing poems, Milton would consider, quite sub-consciously, the various reciprocal relationships among the units of discourse he knew as "the topics of logic;" his metaphors, particularly, would derive from mental processes accustomed to seeing words and concepts in pairs (dichotomies) or combinations. 1

Obviously, to cultivate a habit of the mind which would perceive things in two-fold similarities or differences, to achieve the fine art of "thinking well", would take time and training. We must remember that Milton

had gone to Cambridge in the 1620's, and that by the time he got to Cambridge, it already had had a culture of select Ramists flourishing there for about fifty years. Gabriel Harvey, prone to Ramus' academic attitudes, lectured on rhetoric in the spring of 1575, and Chaderton had been engaged in arousing interest in Ramus' logic during the years between 1571 and 1577. Oxford apparently was more traditional in its line of education, and there seems to have been a bit of academic contention about the value of Ramism between the universities. The background into which Milton was set and his own curriculum at the university combined to bring logic to the attention of this clever young scholar. Wilbur Howell therefore judges that:

Milton's interest in Ramistic logic probably began during his association with Chappell. After all, the latter can be proved to be a moderate Ramist, and logic is one of the subjects which Milton would have had to study during his first years at the university.

About forty-five years were to elapse before Milton published his Latin redaction of Ramus' *Dialectica*. However, the date of composition should be significant for, as David Masson plausibly conjectures, it was probably sketched out in Milton's university days at Cambridge, between his taking his B.A. degree and his passing as M.A. Henry Irwin, in his dissertation, places the date of composition in the 1640's, since there is evidence of two anti-Trinitarian statements in Milton's *Logic*. It was in those years that Milton is believed to have lost faith in the doctrine of the Trinity. But Wilbur Howell redeems Masson's earlier contention by claiming that Masson's placement of the date of composition of the *Logic* is still fairly credible since these anti-Trinitarian statements could have been inserted in the 1640's into a work mostly finished at a previous time. Howell adds to this that:

Masson's conjecture, which would place the composition of the work between the years of 1629 and 1632, is supported by the reflection that a treatise like *The Art of Logic* belongs to a university environment, as the whole history of Ramistic scholarship in England demonstrates time and again.

And we know this trend of early composition of a logical treatise was true, for instance, of Abraham Fraunce.
biography of Milton, suggests 1648 as the date of the composition of Milton's *Logic*, but he admits that it might have been earlier. At any rate, all the scholars agree that there had been some fairly good time lapse between the composition of Milton's *Logic* and its publication. Milton therefore can be said to have had many years in which his special concept of the art of logic could have become a "habit of the mind" -- all in the training of "thinking well". Since the great epic poem was a late work in the life of Milton and published only five years before the *Logic* came out, it must have been influenced not only by the basic fact of the man's life-long training in logical thought but also by some already evolved theory about it.

---

**PHILOSOPHY**

(the total body of knowledge)

- Logic (first of all arts)
- The Arts
- Rhetoric
- etc.

---

John Milton comments at one point well into his *Art of Logic*: "For by the genus art we understand the uniting into a whole of precepts disposed in order which is the matter of any art and part of its form."(265) And what can one judge of *Paradise Lost* immediately, but that it is a great work of art, a logical work of great art? *Paradise Lost* maintains certain precepts derived seminally from the Bible, and it disposes these precepts in a certain order which weaves into it a definite coherence and unity. Logic has to be involved "a priori" in the production of any piece of written art form. Thinking well must be mirrored in the writing; with Milton, it was a special brand of thinking well, the *Art of Logic*.

Milton most succinctly and accurately describes his theory of art in the preface to his *Logic*. It is of direct benefit to my thesis to elucidate Milton's theory of art in greater detail, for in this we discover some basic progressions the poet's mental process must have gone through in the generation of *Paradise Lost*. Milton feels in his preface that he ought to comment briefly on his theory of art because "logic", after all, is the "art of reasoning well." He suggests first that the study of all the arts combines to make "philosophy"(9), and then that

---

this study of the arts can be divided into doctrine and science — "doctrine when it [this study] teaches the precepts of the arts; science, when the art, which is a sort of habit of the mind, is learned from those precepts."(9) This distribution of the study of the arts, although into two separate facets, still retains a clear connection — which is specifically that between "specials" and the "general", or between "particulars" and the "whole". Since the treatise was originally written in Latin, it is the Latin meanings which we are to associate with the words, "doctrine" and "science", in order to comprehend correctly what Milton is saying here. "Doctrina" refers properly to the format of any art, i.e., a listing of the rules and definitions to which the art adheres — for as Milton himself posits: "it is the orderly body or scheme of precepts and examples, by which something useful is taught."(9) "Scientia", on the other hand, refers properly to the form of the whole art, i.e., its concept in the mind as a complete and ready "knowledge" of what the art is about. In the sequence of time, "doctrina" first presents the list of the basic components of the art; and it is after this "technical training" that one achieves the power in the mind to conjure a sort of spontaneous knowledge of the whole concept of any art — an experience which in the limited human understanding may more aptly be described as an instant mental feeling or a general impression of what something is about. In this way, after the art is learned methodically, it eventually becomes "second nature" and works internally quite automatically — thence a "habit of the mind".

As logic, after long years of training, comes to work this way, so also does any other art — religion, for instance, may be so considered. Any faith outlines its "doctrina" — the orderly list of precepts, and from this is to be derived the general impression, the automatic and spontaneous knowledge of the whole which becomes a "habit of the mind". The list of tenets formulates the "doctrina"; the faith itself forms the "scientia", the instant knowledge and understanding. In the order of time, the tenets of the faith are first and undergo a wondrous progress in the mind where they conjoin into an animate and full apprehension. In the order of importance, it is the "scientia" of the faith which maintains priority — obviously because it is the complete and conceptual realization of what the "doctrina" means to teach. Such is the difference between the spirit and the letter — "for an art is what it is rather because of what it teaches than because of its method of teaching."(9) In this way, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. However, what I am to deal with is by nature restrictive — "when the art means doctrine — the meaning with which we are especially concerned here"(9) — and it is therefore by necessity
technical rather than full and alive -- although my efforts, I sincerely hope, do
succeed somewhat in taking the natural dryness out of an analysis of a thing like logic.

In reference to Paradise Lost, then, John Milton has taken the "doctrina"
which is the series of seminally generated precepts from the Bible, and he
interlaced these with other, but fanciful, precepts about things in Heaven and
on Earth -- thus he had some of the materials ready, others he had to invent,
for the "fleshing out" process of a magnificent literary unity called
Paradise Lost. Thereby Milton himself produced a sort of "scientia", a
comprehensive whole that gives a sort of general knowledge of things that
concern God and His creations. The purpose for generating a form of "scientia"
marked with fanciful precepts is useful -- for one's general impression of
one's faith is thereby transmitted in a pleasing form and so offered in a
readily palatable fashion. The object is to confirm one's faith generally
and through a reciprocal influence to confirm each of the basic precepts of
that faith. It is assumed that the reader has the maturity of mind to know
the true basic precepts of doctrine from the fanciful ones. And so, Irene Samuel
can rightly maintain that "poetry is doctrine, whether true or false, with a power
of influence."\(^{12}\)

Paradise Lost therefore is a product of both the art of logic and the art of
poetry applied to the Biblical history of the Creation. Since Milton considers
that "the art of logic is the first of all the arts and spreads its territories
widely"\(^{(17)}\), it follows that the written theory of the Art of Logic is most
malleable, extending into the actual expression of a piece of literary magnificence.
The connection between the art of logic and the art of poetry comes about rather
remarkably as a psychological phenomenon involving the great associative power
of the mind. The conceptual "scientia" (i.e. "know-how") of both logic and poetry,
after years of exposure to these arts, becomes a great and immediate force of
the mind, working in a two-fold but readily co-operative association. This process
can of course be belaboured as when poetic ideas require logical "working out", and
therefore, a bit of time; nevertheless, that logic and poetry do meet at some
point: in a conceptual unity, eventually if not immediately, is a plain fact of the
mental process of the poet. All in all, the process must be judged natural and
quite capable of "spontaneity", and therefore, to the well-trained and clever poet
it comes as a sort of "habit of the mind". That which contributes the life and
warmth to the words is the "knowledge" of poetry, and that which contributes the\(^{12}\)Irene Samuel, Plato and Milton, (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1947), p. 147.
sense is the "knowledge" of logic. The latter of course precedes in the order of time in the poet's mental experience, from youth as a "natural sort of logic" and later as a theoretical knowledge. This is to say that the mind learns to "think well" before it learns to "think poetically". And logic is also prior in the order of nature for it serves as the founding "substance" from which poetry takes being. Hence logic spreads its territories widely not only in the temporal scope but also in regions of thought. What this eventually says is that logic is associated with poetry necessarily -- otherwise the beauty of a poem would only be a mad babbling.

It is important to note that "doctrina" and "scientia" maintain a reciprocal relationship in which one contributes something to the other. A reciprocal working can be detected readily from the fact that the assisting causes for the creation of art "were the men divinely taught and eminent for ability."(11) The idea is that, at that moment, these men experienced some communion with divine influence to derive a spontaneous knowledge of something -- God therefore fires a "scientia" in their souls. However, their special insight is channelled through and expressed by their years of disciplined training in "doctrina", the technicalities of rules and definitions. This fact is discernible in their writings -- which, by the way, supply the archetype or standard by which any of their followers may train himself in basic precepts of "doctrina". With this assimilated from the legacy of his predecessors, the inheritor of a tradition works himself toward an eventual knowledge, which on cue may come as an immediate apprehension of the totality of an art. And what works as an aid for the inheritor of a tradition in this mental phenomenon is the assisting cause again of God, i.e. "inspiration".

Milton can rightly say that there is no conflict between either the training in an art, or the inspiration of God, and the free will. He says that art is "not commonly against the will, not at least in a strict sense against the will."(41) He continues that "Art is without difficulty to be referred to planning"(41) -- which accounts for the disciplined structure of his poem. This is in a co-operative association with a basic and ready raw material Milton calls a "natural logic at least"(11) -- training in theory merely aids and channels what is naturally there already. This harnessed ability is in a further co-operative association with God's spontaneous inspiration. Here too the will is merely facilitated by an "assisting cause" -- and therefore, it is alright that the "primal mover of every art is God, the author of all wisdom."(11) The
belief in this principle of inspiration becomes apparent in *Paradise Lost* in Bk. I, ll. 17-20:

> And chiefly Thou O Spirit that dost prefer  
> Before all Temples th'upright heart and pure  
> Instruct me, for Thou know'st; ... 

And when Milton invokes his Muse, Urania, in Bk. VII, the claim that he truly appeals to God for inspiration in his art can still be maintained. Urania has been seen by some, not really as a pagan Muse, but as a Christian Muse. Moreover the epic poet says: "the meaning, not the name I call: for Thou/ Nor of the Muses nine, nor on the top/ Of old Olympus dwell'st, but Heav'nly born."(VII,5-8)

* * *

Much of what I have said up to this point can be expressed as well in other significant terms of Milton's *Logic*, thereby contributing to a more full and complete understanding of that automatic mental process which associated logic and poetry in Milton's mind. Milton's purpose in writing his epic poem is a good place from which to proceed because it is "purpose" which first fires his "scientia" or "knowledge" of the arts of logic and poetry into active operation, and it is Milton's purpose to which these things bend. Certainly, the immediate purpose was to "justify the ways of God to men", but this was only because a very select and quite influential number of men were rather blundering, and if anything, "unjustifying the ways of God to men". These were the theologians who were generally slanting "doctrina" so that a heretical or warped concept was derived about the divine truths. Henry Irwin points to the bone of contention which Milton had to pick with these men -- for many of the works of theology in Milton's day were characterized by reasoning which was illogical, specious, and without solidity so that the result was a scripture that was misconstrued by mere formal sophism: "Thus declares Milton the truth of the scripture was obscured and even opposed, and errors were adopted as truth." Irwin suggests that therefore *On Christian Doctrine* was written as a definite reaction to such obscuring of true knowledge. And it is clear that this kind of reaction was maintained by Milton through the years with a firm consistency, for in the preface to the *Art of Logic*, Milton proves himself far from restrained in voicing his criticism of those who obscure scripture, stating plainly that he will not cram in those memorized canons of the theologians -- "which are anything but logical,'

---

13 See fn. 54 in the introduction which Merritt Hughes gives to *Paradise Lost*, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

14 Irwin, *op. cit.*, p. 66.
for the theologians fetch out as though from the heart of logic canons about God and about the divine hypostases and sacraments as if these had been furnished for their use."(17)

Therefore Milton himself became an active agent, in his own way, in matters of theology (as he did in politics). He made use of what his treatise on logic calls "divine testimony" -- and "testimony", we must realize, is what Milton considers an "inartificial argument"(279) -- it does not assume, it does not contrive, it is truth by divinely inspired witness, with which one cannot argue. The epic poem itself not surprisingly makes reference to "Biblical testimony", as for example, when Michael informs Adam that the faithful people in the visionary plain have made an Ark, and hold "in the Ark his God's testimony,/ The Records of his Cov'nant."(XII,251-52) Here then we have a direct reference to that which serves not only a meaningful purpose in supporting faith, since "divine testimony affirms or denies that a thing is so and brings about that I believe"(283), but we have a reference here also to that which served Milton as a basic material upon which he built a magnificent poetic structure. It is clear that Milton did not wish to leave the precepts found in the Biblical Genesis of the Old Testament in a bare form which would be no better than so many "memorized canons"(5) of faith. He took the inartificial witness of Genesis as true, thereby gleaning a skeletal structure of precepts from "divine testimony", and he then fleshed the thing out artificially by weaving it into a poem. Thus we have the transition from inartificial argument to artificial argument --- clearly a process of logic.

John Milton reveals that an artificial argument argues of itself, i.e., "from innate and peculiar force".(27) This seems clear enough, as displayed in any well thought out contrivance in the literary art. If something is needed to back up a precept of the religious art, then "invent a fanciful precept! A fanciful precept can work with and enforce a precept of faith -- hence the versatility of "fancy", not only in being able to deny and oppose that which is true, but also in being able to affirm and enforce that which is true." A fanciful precept is employed by Milton in Bk. VII, 11, "224-27, which works dynamically with that basic precept of faith that God created the universe through the Word. "So spake th'Almighty, and to what he spake/ His Word, the Filial Godhead, gave effect"(VII,174-75) writes Milton, and then he introduces his own invention of a fanciful detail on how the Filial Godhead went about his work: for "in his hand/ He took the golden Compasses, prepar'd/ In God's Eternal store, to circumscribe/ This Universe, and all created things."(VII,224-27)
THE CONSENTANY ARGUMENT

CONSENTANIES

After a fashion
Adjunct

Effect
Subject

Final
Formal

(Genus II)

CAUSE

Absolutely

(Genus I)

MAINTAINING
- Acting alone
- Acting with others
- By own power
- By accident

EFFICIENT

PROCREATING

By accident

By own power

Maintaining

Acting alone
William Scott sees a connection between the invention of artificial argument in logic and the working of the poetic fancy in poetry. In logic invention is that creative ability to discover arguments; so Fancy in poetry is a creative ability to discover poetic ideas: "Fancy becomes the organ of invention, or finding of material for discourse." However, as Scott points out concerning Fancy, it can lead to false reasoning, for which we have Adam's own words about it -- the Fancy that "forms Imaginations, Aerie shapes". Adam thus accounts for Eve's bad dream in Bk. V, saying that Fancy had superseded Reason thereby dislodging the proper order of things: "that in the Soul/ Are many lesser Faculties that serve/ Reason as chief". Milton however is the proper example wherein Fancy is kept in line and wherein a useful function to faith is served by the pleasing contrivance of an artificial argument.

John Milton's Paradise Lost, then, as a "logical artificial argument" certainly has a "fitness for arguing something", i.e. "for showing, explaining, or proving". It fills in imaginatively the gaps between the Biblical precepts, and gives them a secondary support. This kind of showing or explaining must of course be subject to a mature force of distinction in the mind of the intelligent Christian who is able to separate the true precepts pertinent to his daily faith from some fanciful inventions. What is important is the transmission and fact of enforcing of the basic Christian precepts, which are synonymous with a correct "doctrina". And in this, John Milton would view Paradise Lost in terms of "teaching of some useful matter". (9)

* * *

PART 2

1. procreating
2. maintaining
   2a. alone
   2b. with others
3. by its own power
3c. by accident

When Milton comes to the efficient cause, he divides the topic into three "modes of working", or if you will, three ways of looking at it: the first, as procreating or maintaining; the second, as acting alone or with others; and finally, as acting through its own power or by accident. Leon Howard in an article

---

which he wrote in 1946 has admirably applied the second of these modes to *Paradise Lost* regarding the fall of man. He admits that the other modes also appear in the poem, but he ignores them due to the already copious involvement of his article. This thesis however investigates all three modes, in the second, obviously concentrating on what Howard leaves untouched.

John Milton asserts: "The efficient is the cause by which the thing is or is brought about. For by the efficient is brought about the beginning of moving, yet the efficient is not within the effect."(33) It is a popular concept that God is the efficient cause of all things. Milton's *Art of Logic* provides for this concept by recognizing an order of causes -- "one is called *first*, either absolutely, as God, or in its genus, as the sun and anything of the sort; others, called *secondary* and so forth, depend on the first or the prior causes, and each is a kind of effect."(39) Of these others, Milton comments that they are "called *remote*, others *proximate*, where applies that common saying that whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of what is caused."(39) When looking at "what cause/ Mov'd the Creator in his holy Rest/ Through all Eternity so late to build/ In Chaos"(VII,90-93), we see that God, clearly is the first cause, but in terms of secondary causes we have the *proximate* which is that God does not want Satan to exult at depopulating Heaven(VII,150) and the *remote* which is the War in Heaven -- and eventually Satan's sinful pride. But of these things, we need not concern ourselves here in any immediate detail; let them suffice as an orientation into the hierarchy of causation.

The author of *Paradise Lost* finds no bifurcational complexity in the procreating and maintaining cause. He states that within the first mode of working of the efficient cause there are "two modes in which often the same efficient cause is in the habit of working, procreating that which not yet is that it may come into being, and conserving what now is that it may continue to be."(35) A distinct peculiarity of the procreating and maintaining cause should be noted, for within the two modes of procreating and maintaining, "often the same efficient cause is in the habit of working."(35) And so, God generates the Universe, and He is the One to keep it in motion: "Now Heav'n in all her Glory shone and roll'd/ Her motions, as the great first-Mover's hand/ First wheel'd thir course."(VII,499-501)

17 Milton's *Logic*, p. 39. The emphasis is mine.
However, in the Creation, God, the procreating and maintaining cause, has a more specific aim in Mind; than merely the creation of planets and stars:

Let us make Man in our image, Man
In our similitude and let them rule
Over the Fish and Fowl of Sea and Air,
Beast of the Field, and over all the Earth.(VII,519-22)

And in this context, we may view even man as a procreating and maintaining cause himself -- but only in the secondary order of causes. -- for "Male he created thee, but thy consort/ Female for Race; then bless'd Mankind and said/ Be fruitful and multiply and fill the Earth."(VII,529-31) In his Logic, Milton comments significantly: "Thus father and mother procreate; the nurse maintains."(33)

Although Adam and Eve had not the luxury of a nurse in Paradise Lost, their function as procreating and maintaining agents of their progeny is readily imagined, especially after what responsibility the Fall thrusts upon their shoulders. But, in a sense, a better nurse does exist than Adam and Eve would ever make, for in the last two books a vision lies before the fallen man's eyes. He sees his progeny riding the throes of a turbulent history; yet, as in Noah's flood a surviving essence is mercifully maintained by the first order of things, "divine providence".

\* \* \*

In his treatment of the efficient cause, John Milton continues: "Secondly, the efficient cause works alone, or with others. And of all these last often one is principal, another less principal or a helping and servant cause."(35)

These helping causes can be further distributed into "impulsive" and "instrumental" causes. Those that are impulsive move the principal in some way, and they can themselves be distributed into the "proegumenic" which moves from within the principal and the "procatarctic" which operates from without. The procatarctic cause finally involves either an "occasion" or a "pretext". The occasion infers a "genuine" circumstance or situation which serves as a sort of excuse for acting, and the pretext infers obviously some circumstance or situation for acting which is "feigned".
the Creator in his holy Rest/ Through all Eternity so late to build/ In Chaos." (VII, 90-92) Raphael gives the answer as to the proegumenic cause which moved within the Father to create anew:

But lest his Satan's heart exalt him in the harm
Already done, to have dispeopled Heav'n
My damage fondly deem'd, I can repair
That detriment . . . (VII, 150-53)

The feeling is indicated in God's Mind; it is not named; but may probably best be referred to as His Self-Integrity or the Pride of God not willing to give Satan any pretext for scoffing at Heaven. Now, concerning the instrumental cause of the Creation of the World, logically this function falls to God's right hand man, the Filial Godhead: "And thou my Word, begotten Son, by thee/ This I perform, speak thou, and be it done." (VII, 163-64)

The joining instrumental cause is the Holy Spirit, for "My overshadowing Spirit and might with thee/ I send along." (VII, 766-67) Lastly, the legitimate excuse, or the "occasion", for the sequence of another Creation is plainly the Fall of a seemingly pure first Creation, that is, the Fall of Lucifer, who "fell with his flaming Legions through the Deep." (VII, 134)

* * *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>by nature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By itself</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BY ITSELF OR BY ACCIDENT</td>
<td>by planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by accident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by fortune</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

John Milton comments that "Thirdly, the efficient cause works by itself or by accident." (39) He sees that cause which works by itself
as producing an effect from an internal principle. (39) This internal principle is either by "nature" or "planning". Milton asserts that "A cause works by accident which works by some external power, that is a power not its own." (43) This, Milton continues, "is true of those things which are done by coercion or fortune." (43)

* * *

The third mode of working of the efficient cause is most interesting, next to that of the second mode. As has been indicated, the cause working by itself produces an effect from an internal principle. The first class of its kind is "by nature". And Milton utilizes "appetite" as an example to illustrate what he means by this kind of cause. (39) This becomes pertinent in Paradise Lost when we recall Eve being tempted by the Serpent in the Garden: "Meanwhile the hour of Noon drew on, and wak'd/ An eager appetite, rais'd by the smell/ So savory of that Fruit." (IX, 739-40) But Milton explicitly states in his Logic that "What men do by nature they do of necessity." (41) How does one reconcile this statement with God's just punishment for Eve's eating of the Fruit? It is rather evident, for there is more to the act than pangs of hunger. Appetite was not the first (or even genuine) cause which prompted Eve to disobey God's injunction. A prior cause exists; it is the genuine cause and it serves only to make the apple psychologically first, then physically appealing. "Ye shall be as Gods" (IX, 708) tempts the Serpent, and Eve becomes interested from the internal impulse of personality and not the external impulse of a necessity to eat that particular apple: "For many are the Trees of God that grow/ In Paradise." (IX, 618) And so, as God justly judges: "For still they knew, and ought to have still remember'd." (X, 12)

This leads directly to the essential of the other branch of acting "alone" -- which refers to "planning". Milton comments that "what they [men] do after planning they do freely." (41) Although the thing is not in a most obvious form of planning in Paradise Lost (it certainly appears
not explicitly premeditated enough), one can quite readily detect a
sense of planning, at the moment, in Eve's mind as the Serpent tempts her.
Deliberation becomes involved, and as it adheres to Eve's faculty of Reason,
a characteristic of planning comes into evidence in the poem: "yet first/
Pausing a while, thus to herself she mus'd."(IX,743-44) And of course after
committing the Original Sin, although "heighten'd as with wine"(793), she
displays a method in her madness by weighing the factors whether "Adam shall
share with me in bliss or woe."(831) Thus Eve proves herself capable of
planning — thence, also culpable and deserving just punishment.

In this section it is appropriate to deal more in detail with man
and angel's free will. Milton depicts God revealing such a claim as:
"I made him just and right,/ Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall./
Such I created all th' Ethereal Powers."(III,98-100) This kind of claim
is repeated in various terms, time and again, in Paradise Lost, but the
impression evolves, that in spite of the claim God certainly seems to do
his share in contriving events, thereby, fitting the picture of a deity that
pulls all the strings. However, to put this false impression right, one
must look more closely at the poem:

So without least impulse or shadow of fate,
Or aught by me immutably forseen,
They traspass, authors to themselves in all,
Both what they judge and what they choose. (III,120-23)

And here we witness a reference to what Boethius long ago has brilliantly
explored — that foreknowledge does not preclude man's free will,18 nor that
of the angel's either.

Leaving, however, these delicate probings aside for the sake of not
wandering over too great and complex a field, we can only in the finality
say that Milton (poet or logician) assumes one essential — and that, we
too must assume in reading his works. The essential is quite simply that
there is such a thing as free will. The poet puts it this way in his Logic:
"Those causes merely which work according to reason and thought, as angels
and men, act freely ex hypothesi — on the hypothesis of the divine will,

18 The work in which this idea is explored is of course Boethius' Consolation
of Philosophy.
which in the beginning gave them the power of acting freely." (43) The closest echo of this in Paradise Lost would be in Bk. III, 11. 681-85:

So spake the false dissembler unperceiv'd
Invisible, except to God alone,
By his permissive will, through Heav'n and Earth. 19

It is this "permissive will" which is the "hypothesis of the divine will", and it grants willingly free will to man and angel, and allows them their own choice of actions.

Milton utilizes his logical hypothesis on the free will in an application to the epic poem in the same way that he was shown previously to utilize inartificial and artificial arguments. Previously, he was shown to take the testimony of the Bible as true and to build a poem around that, thus transforming an inartificial argument into an artificial one. This time, he has said, as it were, grant me the premise of free will for both man and angel, and I will build a poem upon that.

Milton emphasizes the idea of free will in Paradise Lost quite strongly, insisting repeatedly the staunch sentiment which is felt in these words by the Almighty: "For still they knew and ought to have still remember'd."(X,12) We can account for God's adamant attitude as regards man's abuse of free will through Milton's statement in his Logic that "It should be noted, however, that where a proегumenic or internal cause is lacking, there the procataрктic or external cause has no power." (37) Leon Howard does not mention this factor in his article. We must, then, remember that God created man "sufficient", and angel certainly more sufficient than man. There is no explanation for the Fall of either man or angel except in a reference to "choice". The fault lies not in God, but in man or angel's deliberate choice for what is wrong -- which of course means that they undergo a process of "bad reasoning" -- for the Almighty in Paradise Lost observes that "Reason also is choice." (III,108) This definite belief, therefore, accounts for the stiff and repeated note in the epic poem on the freedom of the will.

19 The italics in this reference are mine.
The investigation into the efficient cause working "by itself" has been significantly useful; an investigation into the efficient cause working "by accident" also has its own significant usefulness. Milton states: "This is true of those things which are done by coercion or fortune, for these two are external principles opposed to the internal ones, namely, nature and will or thought."(43) The section in regard to "coercion" is very brief in Milton's Logic. It starts out with this assertion: "Something is done by coercion when the efficient cause is driven by force to the effect."(43) What follows is several examples in which force is manifested. This topic can appropriately enough be dealt with just as briefly in regard to Paradise Lost. The prime example of "coercion" in the epic poem deals with God's coercive force resulting in the fall of the Arch-Angel from Heaven: "Him the Almighty Power/ Hurl'd headlong flaming from th' Ethereal Sky."(I,44-45) This recognizes the remote (and first) cause of Satan's being hurled from Heaven. However, later in Bk. VI, 11. 861-64, we have the recognition of the proximate coercive cause of Satan and his companions' fall -- which, of course, is the Filial Godhead armed heavily and charging oppressively those too proud to serve:

... a spacious Gap disclos'd
Into the wasteful Deep; the monstrous sight
Struck them with horror backward, but far worse
Urg'd them behind ...

God also fulfills the role of remote coercive agent as regards man being forced from the Garden. But this is memorably expressed through the instrument that carries out God's stern judgment. Michael appears before the sinful pair in the Garden: "A military Vest of purple flow'd/... His starry Helm unbulk'd show'd him prime/... As in a glistening Zodiac hung the Sword,/ Satan's dire dread, and in his hand the Spear."(XI,242-48) Thus Michael is strikingly depicted as the proximate coercive cause whose duty, as plainly stated in his own words, is: "to remove thee I am come."(XI,260) And Adam in the midst of this is revealed as least prone to leave the Garden: "O unexpected stroke, worse than Death/ Must I leave thee Paradise?"(XI,268-69) Milton comments aptly in his Logic about the coercive cause which effects such painful discomfort: "So this necessity produces
certain mixed actions, which, as they say, a willing man does with an unwilling heart." (45)

The second expression of the accidental cause is "by fortune" which finds a ready application to both subjects, man and angel. The generation of a basic concept like fortune is of course owed to these grave happenings:

The first sort by thir own suggestion fell
Self-tempted, self-depraved: Man falls deceived
By th'other first . . . (III, 129-31)

Milton primarily asserts of fortune in his treatise that "Something is done by fortune or fortuitously when it happens beside the intent of the efficient cause." (45) By this, he means that "that occult cause which we call fortune, is in addition to the efficient cause." (45) A case, in point, would be Satan and his companions who admit to the efficient cause, God, but not as efficient cause; they rationalize something in addition to God, label it fortune or fate, and place it above God in the order of causation. The reason for this is clear in that the fallen angels do not wish to recognize God supreme (He is to them, at most, the first among equals). Should they recognize God supreme, they would admit to the fault of their actions; not wanting to do this, since "The first sort by thir own suggestion fell", they fabricate an outside reason beyond God as explaining their unpleasant situation in Hell, viz., fortune or fate.

When God's first creations disobeyed, they became susceptible to a characteristic weakness in their mental vision -- particularly regarding the causes of things. Herein resides the distinction between "divine providence" and "fortune". The idea is that seeing things in terms of divine providence indicates correct seeing -- one knows the hierarchy of causation; but seeing things in terms of fortune is faulty vision caused by forgetting the true order of causation. Therefore, Milton judges quite aptly in his treatise on logic when he comments that "ignorance of causes has fabricated the name of fortune." (49)
We have evidence of Satan's propensity toward an ignorance of causes in Bk. X, 11, 494-500:

... me also he hath judg'd, or rather
Mee not, but the brute Serpent in whose shape
Man I deceiv'd: that which to mee belongs,
Is enmity, which he will put between
Mee and Mankind; I am to bruise his heel;
His Seed, when is not set, shall bruise my head:
A World who would not purchase with a bruise ... ?

The first of all demons has not the insight or the foresight to see that this figure represents symbolically Christ's subjugation of Satan. This definite mistranslation of what God meant by such a judgment appears all the more ironic when we consider Satan's boastful offer to Eve: "not only to discern/ Things in thir Causes, but to trace the ways/ Of highest Agents, deem'd however wise."(IX,681-83)

John Milton clearly maintains in his Logic that the ignorance of causes has fabricated the name of fortune, "for when anything happens contrary to plan and expectation, it is commonly said to happen by fortune."(49) The fall of Satan and his troop out of Heaven and into the confinement of Hell serves as an example of the kind of thing that happened contrary to plan and expectation -- for, as Satan queries in a tone of complaint in the pit of Hell: "what power of mind/ Foreseeing or presaging . . . could have fear'd/ How such united force of Gods, how such/. As stood like these, could ever know repulse?"(I,626-30)

Milton, continuing his study on fortune in his treatise, looks then at the occult side of fortune, claiming: "Certainly fortune should be placed in heaven, but should be called by the different name of divine providence."(49) This leads Milton into the judgment that "if necessity is joined to providence it is usually called fate."(49) Such an attitude is exactly in evidence in Paradise Lost through the terminology the fallen angels use. Belial, in the Council in Hell, serves as an excellent example when he votes for an acquiescent policy: "for what can force or guile/ With him, or who deceive his mind, whose eye/ Views all things at one view?"(II,188-90) He continues then with this significant terminology: "fate inevitable/
Subdues us, and Omnipotent Decree,/ The Victor's will."(II,197-99)

With a strong echo of these words, Milton speaks of "fate or the decree of God"(49) in his Logic. However, in reference to what Belial has said in the epic poem about fate, we must note that Satan, himself, is conscious of that sort of idea. But his self-deluding pride will not permit him to acquiesce to what he has already recognized; instead, he prefers "Great things resolv'd, which from the lowest deep/ Will once more lift us up, in spite of Fate."(II,392-93) And Satan consistently displays his commitment to this wrong-headed way of looking at things throughout Paradise Lost. He, for one, will not change. In the temptation scene, the words of the Serpent issue from a heretical view of the things in existence: "And life more perfect have attain'd than Fate/ Meant mee, by vent'ring higher than my Lot."(IX,689-90) He pretends to the power of having broken the confinement in existence which has been assigned by providential necessity, and he uses this great pretension in his temptation of Eve. It should be observed, moreover, that Satan bases his claim to such a power upon another claim which has to do with the order of causes: "The Gods are first, and that advantage use/ On our belief, that all from them proceeds,/ I question it."(IX,718-20)

It is an interesting fact that God, Himself, in Paradise Lost, proves Himself in keeping with the way Milton defines fate in his Logic. For, as Milton's treatise stipulates that "if necessity is joined to providence it is usually called fate"(49), so the God in the epic poem complies in meaning:

Though I uncircumscrib'd myself retire,
And put not forth my goodness which is free
To act or not, Necessity and Chance
Approach not mee, and what I will is Fate. (VII,170-73)

It must be acknowledged that this is in reference to God's creation of the world. Here, He complies with the basic formula that providence plus necessity equals fate. But it is a recognition of God's necessity extended over the seminal Creation of: i) inanimate bodies (so that necessity is obviously excusable here), and ii) the inchoate formation of man (so that, in the beginning instance, the idea of necessity also becomes excusable here). God never identifies Himself with the same meaning of fate again.
in reference to man's existence -- post facto man's Creation. And there, the famous **ex hypothesi** of the *Art of Logic* comes in. God expresses the idea in the epic poem best in His assertion:

So without least impulse or shadow of Fate,  
Or aught by me immutably foreseen,  
They [man and angel] trespass, Authors to themselves in all  
Both what they judge and what they choose. (III,120-23)

The principle of fate involves a definitely ordered structure in regard to the workings of God's creation of the world. The basic idea, then, starts out like this: that God created the world through the **instrument** of the Son and the Spirit who became the **proximate** efficient causes in Creation -- although of the **secondary** degree -- while God remains in the background as the **remote** efficient cause -- but clearly of the **first** degree. However, in the fact that God functions in the **remote** order, we have the crux of the difficulty for lesser beings in distinguishing Fate from Providence. Adam recognizes the essence of what generates the difficulty before his Fall when he refers to God "who sit'st above these Heavens/ To us invisible or dimly seen."(V,156-57) But there, his spiritual vision is still accurate enough to recognize the proper order of causes, since he continues: "yet these declare/ Thy goodness beyond thought, and Power Divine."(V,57-58) Eve, also before the Fall, displays correct spiritual vision of the hierarchy of causation, for she recognizes Adam as "My Author and Disposer"(IV,635), and she admits: "so God ordains,/ God is thy Law, thou mine."(IV,637) However, at the Fall, Eve's spiritual vision loses focus, and she re-attributes a recognition which properly should have been attributed to God: "from the Tree her step she turn'd/ But first low Reverence done, as to the power,/ That dwelt within."(IX,835-37) What she considers more relevant here is the power of the Tree to transfer Godliness, not that this residing power is from God. She has, therefore, lost sight of Him. This shortening of the spiritual vision, correspondingly, results in Eve talking in terms of Fate. During her persuasion of Adam to sin likewise, she says: "Thou therefore also taste, that equal Lot . . . . Lest thou not tasting, different degree/ Disjoin us, and I then too late renounce/ Deity for
thee, when Fate will not permit." (IX,881-84) She says (in essence) to Adam: should you not eat and the transformation of myself to Deity occur, then it might be too late for me to come back down to your level. We must observe that she says this with the recognition of "necessity" -- "when Fate will not permit."

Thus far, the view of Fate as regards Paradise Lost falls in line with what Milton says about it in his Logic. God, Himself, recognizes His will as Fate in such terms as Milton's treatise prescribes. The consistency is carried through to Eve's use of the term, "fate". This is, moreover, carried through to Adam's use of it -- for, he comments about Eve's disobedience with the regret that no one can recall the past or undo what has been done, "Not God Omnipotent, nor Fate." (IX,925) Here, the idea of an inevitable necessity is also suggested; yet, God and Fate are not linked in Adam's comments on the subject, but are recognized as separate forces -- which indicates Adam's faulty vision into the true definition of causes. This ignorance of causation results, as we see later, in Adam's confusion about the great order of things, for, as God reprimands: "was she thy God?" (X,145)

We have sufficiently discussed both about Satan and man's relation to the idea of Fate. However, there is one great difference regarding this relation which we must touch on briefly. That difference arises out of the following judgment by God:

The first sort by their own suggestion fell,
Self-tempted, self-depraved; Man falls, deceived
By the other first: Man therefore shall find grace
The other, none . . . (III,129-32)

The alternation for man back to correct spiritual vision occurs out of receiving "grace"; as Adam's choice of words indicates during his repentance: "And love with fear the only God, to walk/ As in his presence, ever to observe/ His providence, and on him sole depend."20

20 Bk. XII, 11. 562-64. The italics are mine.
John Milton points out something about the idea of "pardon" in regard to unfortunate circumstances in his Art of Logic: "prayer for pardon is for the most part rested on lack of foresight, and surely there is sometimes room for excuse here."(47) The example by Cicero in Pro Ligario is given: "Pardon O father, he hath erred, he is slipped, he thought not."(47) And a little later Cicero's example is expanded: "I have erred, I have done rashly, it repenteth me, I fly to thy clemency."(49) Due to this kind of sentiment, Adam and Eve come to express their own call for pardon in Paradise Lost: "Repairing where he judg'd us, prostrate fall/ Before him reverent, and there confess/ Humbly our faults, and pardon beg."(X,1087-89)

* * *

PART 3

the Material cause

Primary

Proximate

Secondary

Remote

My investigation of the "material cause" is, like the investigation of the "efficient cause", rather intensive. Although Milton devotes very little space to the disposition of this second of the Genus I of causes, I find that it warrants a lengthy treatment simply because it, like the efficient, deals with so much that Paradise Lost involves.

Milton acknowledges that "Matter is commonly divided into primary and secondary; the secondary into proximate and remote."(53) He, however, does not find these bifurcations useful to his idea of logic: "This distinction
is indeed rather suitable to physics." (53) Therefore, my concern primarily shall be the same as that of the logician, i.e. "with the material only as the thing is from it" (53) -- "and especially as it is proximately from it." (53)

* * *

John Milton comments on the second cause in Genus I that "In the order of nature matter follows the efficient cause, and is a sort of effect of the efficient cause." (51) But matter itself may be considered as a cause when it is viewed as the substance that determines from which a thing is. (51) What then dictates that matter is a "cause" is simply the angle a thing in Creation is looked at -- "hence the efficient cause is called the principal cause of acting, matter the principal cause of being acted on." (51)

The most general and yet significant comment on existence that Raphael makes during his long discussion with Adam is put forward in these several lines:

O Adam, one Almighty is, from whom
All things proceed, and up to him return,
If not deprav'd from good, created all
Such to perfection, one first matter all
Indu'd with various forms, various degrees
Of substance, and in things that live, of life, (V,469-74)

The speech in which Raphael says this makes a number of recognitions clear about the nature of things -- recognitions which Milton brings up again in other parts of his epic poem with careful consistency.

God willed the basic substance for all into existence, as revealed by Raphael's words: "one first matter all." Taking this "primary" matter, the Almighty distributed it into types of matter and infused it with life and then with form -- as clearly evidenced in Raphael's testimony that it was "Indu'd with various forms, various degrees/ Of substance, and in things that live, of life." Once God had determined the basic element of being into existence, the element from its own nature and peculiar force determined what sort of Beings were shaped out of it. And in this way, "one first matter all" was a determinant cause of what would result for both angel and man. The
basic belief that the thinking Beings of both Heaven and Earth are not only composed of "matter" but distinguished by a various type of matter is suggested in Milton's Logic wherein the poet/logician asserts: "We know that matter is common to all entities and nonentities, not peculiar to sensible and corporeal things." (53) And so, we have the basic logical recognition that types of matter compose living existence, for which Paradise Lost gives a clear expression in dealing with man and angel.

In his theory on matter, John Milton reveals a definite Platonic trend of thought -- after all, he even comments: "Thus the matters of the arts are precepts." (53) Given such an admission, one may as well discuss the matter of the soul or the matter of the angels -- as indeed Milton does in his poem. Moreover, one should recall that although Raphael speaks of Creation in these terms: "Thus God the Heav'n created, thus the Earth,/ Matter uniform'd and void" (VII, 232-33), he poses this possibility to Adam (a possibility posed in suggestively Platonic language): "though what if Earth/ Be but the shadow of Heav'n, and things therein/ Each to other like more than on Earth is thought?" (V, 574-76) It should be noted that this Platonic trend of thought is not only evidenced in Milton's thinking but also in the thinking of some of his Protestant contemporaries. Thus Milton finds a logical place in a historical context. Robert H. West points out specifically in his excellent study on angelology that there is in evidence a tradition in Milton's time which posited that the angels have a kind of spiritual "body", and therefore, retain some "outside" and "inside" context for discussion. 21 At any rate, in our most proximate concern, we must realize that the knowledge of Milton's Platonic bent serves as an aid toward a proper perspective of the way he looks at things in the universe depicted in Paradise Lost. And so, everything proceeds from the most general Oneness, the "All in All", God, and distributes from Him geometrically with ever increasing subtleties -- a pattern that the universe follows, and certainly all the arts because they too were created by God. Moreover, while all things distribute from God, they still retain links which bespeak the commonality of all things, if not in nature, then in a single reason -- depending upon their place in the scheme of things: and hence that Platonic thinking that "matter" belongs to both the physical order and the spiritual.

* * *

21 Robert H. West, Milton and the Angels, (Atlanta, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1955), refer especially to pp. 124 and 140.
Milton gives God a personality in his poetic drama, but he endows that personality only with a bare skeletal framework in comparison to the more fleshly sketch Satan receives. Milton's God has all the standard qualities that the Almighty is expected to have: "Thee Father first [the angels] sung Omnipotent,/ Immutable, Immortal, Infinite,/ Eternal King; thee Author of all being."(III,372-74) However, anything definite about God's substance is not developed by Milton -- but there is no need for that, since a conceptual God is most desirable for the purposes of a lowly mankind. Still, because Creation is set up on a graduated scale (V,483), there is something to be said about the substance of God. We know that there is either "Ethereal substance"(VI,330) or "corporeal"(V,413) substance of varying degrees in the universe. God belongs to the highest quality that "Ethereal substance" can attain. But because it is so high, it might be disrespectful to pin down an exact "definition"(261) of it, which is of course probing into the secrets of God -- for, as Raphael advises Adam (the representative for Mankind in Milton's poetic drama): "Heav'n is for thee too high/ To know what passes there; be lowly wise."(VIII,171-72) We should remember too that God's inviolable Nature would readily be respected by men in a seventeenth-century society, and therefore much of His Essence is to be taken ex hypothesi from Paradise Lost.

Still it may be said that whatever the substance of God is, other than the general abstraction that it is the highest "Ethereal substance", God's substance does find some "description"(267) which is accessible to the human understanding. When a description is made of some substance, there follows a natural association with what Milton calls "adjuncts" in his Logic. Here, therefore, it becomes appropriate to insert a brief treatment of the logical topics, "subject" and "adjunct". Both must be discussed because they are inevitably linked in that a subject contains an adjunct, and an adjunct is that which is contained in a subject. The methodology of taking these topics out of the order prescribed in the Art of Logic and inserting them under a discussion on "matter" serves to avoid superfluous repetition under separate headings.
Milton comments that "A subject is that to which anything is adjoined" (79) and by this is suggested an entity which has already "been constituted by its causes" (79), but which is ready to have adjoined something "extrinsic or in addition to the essence." (79) That which the "subject" receives is the "adjunct", and an adjunct quite commonly involves "qualities" (91) (or properties). A quality is "that by which a thing is said to be of what sort it is" (91) -- thereby an attribute which identifies the essence of a thing, although it does not define the essence. Milton maintains in his Logic that "definition" gives essence (261), whereas "description" gives a property (267). Therefore, subject is to definition, as adjunct is to description. Description involves an imperfect definition (267), and where the "Ethereal substance" is concerned that is the best we can do.

Let us proceed, then, to facilitate our human understanding of what God is by means of the "adjuncts" (properties) attached to His Essence. What perhaps is the first quality to be associated with God in our mental vision is that of "light". God is indeed called, the "Fountain of Light" (III, 375), which shines so brilliantly that He makes His Form invisible even to the angels themselves -- as revealed in their singing: "thyself invisible/ Amidst the glorious brightness where thou sit'st/ Thron'd inaccessible." (III, 375-77) However, when He chooses, and "when thou [God] shad'st/ The full blaze of thy beams, and through a cloud/ Drawn round about thee like a radiant Shrine,/ Dark with excessive bright thy skirts appear." (III, 378-80) This would imply that God's spiritual substance is fitted to some form which exists barely discernible behind the cloud. The argument that God does have some kind of form is given further credence by the fact that in Bk. VI the "Paternal Deity" endows His Son with His own arms of war, for how else would the "Paternal Deity" have need for the arms of war unless He had a form for the use of them? And we must remember in arguing back to the particular concern of this section of the thesis: the existence of form argues the existence of matter. (55)
Only in application to God is God not the "efficient cause [that] prepares the matter that it may be fit for receiving the form."(51) Were it the case however, God would have had to make Himself in a sequence of time -- which is not merely a falsity but also a logical impossibility. What one can say of Him at most, then, (with any assurance) is that God is the very highest of "Ethereal" matter; the Matter is endowed with the various properties of form, light, immutability, and immortality; this Matter is also of a "singular" quality, but it is experienced by the Son and the Spirit who "partake": therefore exclusively and directly, but permissively, of the essence of the Father. This "communion" of the nature of the Deity is inaccessible to the understanding of man. Milton does not pursue at length any concern to comprehend truly the mysteries of God -- perhaps that is why God seems somewhat bare, without that fleshly fullness that even Satan has. At any rate, Milton would seem satisfied with some such statement as: "God is His own Matter", "He is His Form", "He is What always is" -- as is suggested in his Logic by such a comment on the third mode of adjuncts: "Thus also God is named who is, who was, and what is to be."(93) All of the brief statements which I have put forward regarding God's Matter and Form are simple "axioms" which are recognitions of Absolute Being. Therefore, where God Himself is concerned there is no thought of His causation; there is only the fact of Essence -- which is of the highest quality of spiritual substance, and which is a fact of Absolute Existence. God, herein, may have Matter and Form, but in this singular case, this fact precedes any efficient causality. God is the only exception in the logical sequence of causes since He alone does not have an efficient cause, but the sequence of causes, as defined in the Art of Logic, becomes applicable again to all that proceeds from His eternal Fact of Existence. And why should God not rightly be the exception in the logical sequence of causes? -- since He first of all is Omnipotent and secondly He is the One who gave to man and angel Reason which in the correct application is Logic itself.

John Milton observes that matter, like the efficient cause, is commonly divided into a "proximate" and "remote" order. He writes: "The logician is concerned with the material only as the thing is from it, and especially as it is proximately from it, for the proximate argues with the greatest strength."(53) This is to say that what is closer to us, we understand more clearly. With this, let us go on to
investigate the two great Creations that come from God: first, the angels as they are more proximate to God and the beginning of things, and then, in more specific terms, man. We should observe that Paradise Lost expresses quite naturally the understandability of things depending upon where on the scale of being they are relative to man, i.e. proximate or remote. God is incomprehensible enough; what proceeds from Him receives more definite description: angels (as they are more proximate to us) described with more detail but still retaining qualities difficult to the human understanding, and of course, man (as he is most proximate since he concerns himself) quite simply and fully described.

* * *

THE ETERNAL SPIRIT

Good Spirits
[the Eternal Spirit creates these "proximately"]

the process
of mutation
through "free will"

Corrupted Spirits
[the Eternal Spirit creates these inadvertently, as it were, or indirectly and therefore "remotely"]

The matter of the angels issues quite proximately from the Essence of God. The Creator refers to the Divine Paraclete and Co-sharer of His Essence, at one point, as "My overshadowing Spirit." (VII, 165) This fact of being involved with the Father and the Spirit points to the fact that the angelic essence actually came from the very essence of God, i.e., spirit came from Spirit. God decided to make the angels in a likeness to His own Being. Whatever the angels turned out to be then was, in a sense, determined or "forced" from the definite nature of the spiritual
substance of God. Milton, therefore, rightly maintains in his _Logic_ that "Matter is the cause, for the effect comes by force of the matter." (51) This is to say that spirit will come out of Spirit — perhaps, a simple and obvious statement, but still it must be stated as a matter of fact. Milton continues about the "force of matter" with this comment: "That force is signified by the words from which, since these popularly are the sign not of the matter alone, but sometimes of the efficient cause — as in the words: from the blow a wound." (51) And so, the angels are from the Essence of God, Himself, who is not only their material cause but their efficient cause as well.

To say much definite about the substance of the "Ethereal People" (X, 28), as with the substance of God, is difficult. The best to be done with this (again as with God) is to speak about the "properties" or "adjuncts" peculiar to angelic matter. However, even this methodology barely makes its mark on the very borders of comprehensibility, since we are dealing with properties which properly do not belong to the human sphere of experience.

The first property one can attribute to the angelic make-up is that of light because it is first noticeable and most popularly associated with angels. The testimony to this singular property of angels rests in Adam's first sighting of Raphael when Adam queries: "What glorious shape/ Comes this way moving; seems another Morn/ Ris'n on mid-noon?" (V, 309-10) This impression of the light which is first associated with angelic essences is experienced again when Adam discerns Michael's approach — as "From yonder blazing Cloud." (XI, 229) Elsewhere, Milton envisions a scene in which "all the Sanctities of Heav'n/ Stood thick as stars" (III, 60-61) around the Almighty. This property of light in the angelic substance is of course a fitting "adjunct" since we have seen that the Almighty Himself possesses this property in the intensest degree; it is only logical that this property of light should pass on from like to like, as spirit was made from Spirit.
The second property one can attribute to the angelic make-up is that (as Milton depicts it in Paradise Lost) angels possess visibility. This -- next to the initial perception of whatever transmits light -- comes second to the eye. With visibility not only is light perceived merely as light, but the detail of substance and form is adjoined. It was said, form argues matter; and since form inevitably implies the distinguishability of the details of shape, it is not illogical to say that the angelic matter is visible. In the universe which Milton has built up in his epic poem, he pictures Satan in a midnight search of the serpent: "through each Thicket Dark or Dry,/ Like a black mist low creeping." (IX, 178-80) In another situation, Satan could have as well chosen to be invisible had Milton endowed him with this quality, but instead, Satan is pictured as assuming various animal disguises when his object is merely to approach Adam and Eve in order to study them:

> Down he alights among the sportful Herd
> Of those fourfooted kinds, himself now one,
> Now other, as thir shape serv'd best his end
> Nearer to view his prey, and unespi'd
> To mark what of thir state he more might learn. (IV, 396-400)

This defines in a definite way the quality of Satan's substance -- quite pliable certainly, but again as certainly, limited. This limit through the property of visibility applies also to the angels who have not fallen. None of the good angels are ever invisible before the eyes of Adam and Eve. And even when there is no need for visibility, the good angels are described in terms of sight, as in the instance when Raphael is travelling to the Earth to act as "Divine Interpreter" (VII, 73) for our first parents: "till within soar/ Of Tow'r'ing Eagles, to all the Fowls he seems/ A Phoenix, gaz'd by all." (V, 271-72)

The angels who have not fallen realize how magnificent their angelic substance is, but with this, they realize their limit. Only the essence of the Almighty retains a kind of invisibility throughout Paradise Lost, for His Form is constantly shrouded within intensest light. The good angels accept God as completely singular, and they will not become self-deluded about the versatility of their own nature.
The fact of their limitation must be considered as another "property" or "adjunct" which adheres to the angelic make-up. Perhaps, it is not as noticeable as their properties of light and visibility, but it certainly is the most significant in the plot of Milton's epic poem. The limitation of the angels is also their most pervading property, for it is expressed through all their other properties -- which are no more than a likeness to God's Essence -- and therefore clearly less. This fact of limitation is reiterated time and again not only by the evident fact of the fallen angels but by the admission of the good angels as well. This is why the good angels are repeatedly found singing the praises of the Lord in the poem. And this is why Raphael makes the recognition, even of the "more refin'd, more spiritous, and pure" (V, 475) substances, "As nearer to him [God] plac't or nearer tending/ Each in thir several active Spheres assign'd." 

A fourth property which adheres to the make-up of the angels is that of flight. We have this suggested of Raphael through the instance in which he appears like a Phoenix as he travels to the Earth on his errand. And even the fallen angels retain this wonderful ability of flight. Satan exhibits it in his flight out of Hell. But despite this wonderful mobility of the angelic substance, there is a power in the Essence of God which this mobility cannot elude -- as proven when God "survey'd/ Hell and the Gulf between, and Satan there/ Coasting the wall of Heav'n on this side Night." (III, 69-71)

Milton gets the idea of the limitation, even of angelic substance, across in yet another way, by making the angels vulnerable in several areas -- as displayed in the War they have in Heaven. In the context of spirit against spirit, the tactile sense becomes quite evident. This is indeed the practical reason for the two camps of angels being able to wage war between themselves. We know that the angels are able to be grasped, for instance, as suggested in Michael's intent: "as hoping here to

---

22 Robert West also refers to the idea that the angels are limited. See West, op. cit., p. 124.
23 Bk. V, 11. 476-77. The emphasis is mine.
end/ Intestine War in Heav'n, the Arch-foe subdu'd/ Or Captive dragg'd in Chains."(VI,258-60) And how else could Satan thus be "dragg'd" unless his substance offered resistance (and therefore a form of solidity) to other ethereal substance?

The property of being able to be wounded by the force of arms in Heaven follows in a natural association with an angelic metabolism that exhibits some kind of resistance. The angelic substance indeed resists the penetration by any foreign matter, but once the angelic substance is penetrated wounding results. The best example of this would be the instance in which Michael hacks his sword into Satan's spiritual body, where it is said that it "deep ent'ring shear'd/ All his right side."(VI,326-27) And of course, what is a war without the presence of pain? For, the next association we have with the angelic metabolism is that it is indeed sensitive in this very respect: "then Satan first knew pain."(VI,327)

After the wounding and the subsequent pain, Satan experiences something else quite novel to him, as "from the gash/ A stream of Nectarous humor issuing flow'd/ Sanguine, such as Celestial Spirits may bleed."(VI,331-32) Satan's bleeding, of course, suggests that the quality of color is adjoined to the angelic substance. However, from this fact arises a logical paradox. Milton explicitly asserts in his Logic that "Color is the quality of a mixed body, sprung from a proper mixture of lucid and opaque."(269) But we know that the angels are "pure/ Intelligential substances."(V,407-08) Therefore, how can they properly possess a quality of color? The answer to this paradox in the angelic metabolism, which is pure, and yet, possesses a quality of a mixed body, can only be accounted for in terms of Raphael's rather brilliant "invention" -- which is meant to facilitate Adam's understanding by "measuring things in Heav'n by things on Earth."(VI,893-94) We must realize that it is really Milton who (through Raphael) measures things in Heaven by things on Earth. And Milton, therefore, merely has "invented" an attribute for pure substance to facilitate his poetic "description". It is this very "invention" by Milton which allows him in his poem both to recognize the actuality that angelic matter is pure substance and to
facilitate the Fancy by adjoining color to angelic matter. The versatility of Milton's poetic art, then, permits the mixture between a recognition of an actuality and a fanciful description. Yet, this artistic combination of things adheres to logic since it is based upon a conscious hypothesis -- as Raphael suggests through his clever "invention" of measuring Heaven by an earthly standard. And so, Satan is of pure substance, and yet, can be measured by things on Earth, and thereby be exhibited to possess the quality of color.

Another property to be associated with the angelic essence is the tendency toward unity and harmony. Satan and his Host perhaps do not so much exhibit the latter of these, as evidenced best by Satan whose nature is at war within itself, beset by most unharmonious feelings. But the fallen angels do retain a tendency toward unity, at least overtly, in the substance of their spiritual bodies -- as a remaining testimony to what their complete nature once was, both internally in feeling and externally in substance. Note, then, that after Michael had wounded Satan in battle, "th'Ethereal substance clos'd/ Not long divisible."(VI,330-31)

* * *

The fallen angels (who do not even understand their own essence correctly) serve to point to a final attribute which is "adjoined" to the angelic essence, viz., the potentiality for mutation. After the recovery in Hell, Satan comments of Beelzebub: "But O how fall'n! how chang'd/ From him, who in the happy Realms of Light/ Cloth'd with transcendent brightness didst outshine/ Myriads though bright."(I,84-87). Although Satan has observed a fact of definite limitation in the substance of a fallen angel, he will not realize this limitation, and he instead suggests a possibility for a new attempt in capturing Heaven: "I give not Heav'n for lost."(II,14) Beelzebub displays a similar selective attitude in his speech when he says he sees, "Too well", his fellows, "In horrible destruction laid thus low,/ As far as Gods and Heav'ny Essences/ Can perish."(I,137-39) Yet, despite the obvious fact of this degradation, Beelzebub dismisses the proven limitation of the angelic nature -- which he still prefers to call "Gods" and "Heav'nly Essences". He (like Satan), therefore, does not see "Too well".

---

24Cf. Satan's change of feelings when he first lands on the Earth in the beginning of Bk. IV, 11. 114-16, and the evidence, a little later, that there still is something inside of him which makes him admit that he could love mankind, in Bk. IV, 11. 363.
Beelzebub's admission, then, that "Gods" and "Heav'nly Essences" can in some way perish means that the angelic substance possesses the attribute of mutability -- which, on a two-directioned scale in existence, is a downward mutability for the rebellious angels. This sort of mutability involves, of course, "Of the effect", (71) John Milton states in his Logic that "Special modes or special examples are generation, corruption, and the like taken from physics." (73) Part two of this chapter has amply treated "generation" through the "efficient cause". Here, however, it becomes quite appropriate to treat the "corruption" of things. This notion of corruption in the metabolism of the rebellious angels is indicated by a negative change in the degree of their brightness and strength. Milton suggests repeatedly the idea that the fallen angels "though Spirits of purest light,/ Purest at first, [have] now gross by sinning grown." (VI,660-61) Elsewhere, he writes of Satan himself:

At last as from a Cloud his fulgent head
And shape Star-bright appear'd, or brighter, clad
With what permissive glory since his fall
Was left him, or false glitter. (X,449-52)

This acknowledges that whatever brightness Satan retained after the Fall was only through the "permissive will" (III,685) of God; yet, even that "permissive glory" evidenced on the outside of Satan is most unrelated to what is on the inside of the corrupt angelic nature, and in this, Milton does right to call the outside glitter, a "false glitter". Milton does right too in calling Satan's light a "false glitter" because Satan has, after all, left the "Precincts of light". (III,88) His residence properly has become the dark abyss of Hell, and he indeed cannot escape Hell no matter where he might fly: "Which way I fly is Hell; myself am Hell." (IV,75) Despite, then, whatever glitter does remain to him, Satan is rightly the "Prince of Darkness". (X,384)

As to the loss of strength in the angelic make-up of the fallen angels, the best illustration of this comes up several times in the War in Heaven. Abdiel, who proved himself notably unpretentious amongst the plotting rebels in council, later in battle strikes the first blow -- indeed, at Satan himself. Satan is far from invulnerable, and "ten paces huge:/ He back recoil'd." (VI,193-94) Soon the Fiend actually is wounded
in a one to one battle against Michael. After the Fall, in the instance wherein he is discovered, "Squat like a Toad"(IV,801), by Eve's ear, he is proven to be far from an equal match for Gabriel: "Th'Eternal to prevent such horrid fray/ Hung forth in Heav'n his golden Scales."(IV,996-97) Satan was shown greatly outweighed in strength, and he could but flee: "Murmuring, and with him fled the shades of night."(IV,1015)

The fallen angels have proven that they misapprehend their own being in Heaven, and now that they are out of Heaven, they still prove themselves a mass of misapprehensions -- as twisted as ever. The admissions, however, made in the Council in Hell hold greater import yet than we already illustrated. We have seen that Satan has observed a fact in the mutation of the angelic essence when he comments on Beelzebub's fallen state. Despite this, he still puts the possibility of open war once more against Heaven before his assembled Host. Satan, therefore, has selectively ignored the fact of his mutation. Mammon does something subtly different with this idea of a mutated angelic substance. His suggestion is that "Our torments also may in length of time/ Become our Elements... our temper chang'd/ Into their temper."(II,274-78) Of course, this kind of observation about mutability is selective too. It recognizes a possibility for the mutation of the angelic metabolism, but it ignores the fact that that mutation would be for the worse. Mammon, however, pretends that the change would naturally be an amelioration of his state in Hell. What he, in essence, suggests by, "our temper chang'd/ Into their temper", is equivalent to saying that he will become Hell. Indeed, this does take place, for we see this of Satan in that self-pitying soliloquy about himself: "Which way I fly is Hell; myself am Hell."(IV,75) We know that with this mutation of his nature, there is no amelioration. Satan suffers at all times and in all places; he, as the leading representative of his Host, is an indicator of what the other fallen angels are experiencing. This is clearly a change in the metabolic state which offers only unpleasant experiences: "Me miserable! which way shall I fly?"(IV,73)
Moloch is another fallen angel who, in the Council, reveals a misunderstanding of his own nature by the possibilities he takes into account for future action. He puts them before the Council in propositional forms -- one of them being: "Or if our substance be indeed Divine,/ And cannot cease to be, we are at worst/ On this side nothing." (II, 99-101) This essentially suggests to the other angels that they have no place to go, but up, from Hell. But Moloch wishes to persuade his fellows of this with the antecedent suggestion that the angels are indeed of divine substance -- which is obviously meant to add strength to the secondary suggestion that, from Hell, there is no way but up. The antecedent in Moloch's propositional statement should reside by itself as a pure and simple axiom. Framed as it is in a proposition, it merely becomes a suggestion at most, followed by another suggestion. Moloch virtually admits, in his statement ("Or if our substance be indeed Divine . . .") that he is not even sure of his own nature.

Thus the fallen angels make judgments on their nature in a way which is narrowly and stubbornly willful because of pride, so that they judge the quality of the stuff they are made of as higher than it really is; or, they make judgments on their nature in a way which proves rather selective that they regard only aspects of their nature which will support their preconceived notions of themselves (as with the belief that they are of indestructible Ethereal substance: "this Empyreal substance cannot fail." (I, 117) ) -- yet, they will disregard the very fact that they have been mutated. The fallen angels argue their course of action from what they think they are, which plays an intrinsic part in the propositions they put forth in their argumentation. That they do not instead argue from true axioms of what actually and simply is the case points to the fact that they are going through a process of not reasoning well -- which is to say, an illogical process. However, they, more than man, should be able to understand their own nature, for they are closer to the Author of Creation than all other things in existence. Recall Milton's comment in his Logic: "The logician is concerned with the material only as the
thing is from it, and especially as it is proximately from it, for the
proximate argues with the greatest strength."(53) The fallen angels,
being more proximate to God, should more than man see and be ready
to believe from where their being was generated. They should also obviously
realize the limited properties in the substance of their being. In this,
they all should have been aware of the caution Abdiel gives to Satan
specifically: "Then who created thee lamenting learn./ When who can
uncreate thee thou shalt know."(V,894-95)

However, what clouded their understanding was an emotional process
of pride and envy which they were equipped to cope with more than man
who was not bright or excellent, but merely sufficient. They felt that
their substance was superior to what it actually was, and they allowed
these feelings of greatness to get out of hand, thus becoming "self-deluded".
Clearly they had undergone an emotional process, not a logical one in
the progression toward their Fall. It is the emotional process which
belongs more correctly to man's experience; the logical process (intuitive
reasoning) belongs more correctly to the angels. But as the fallen angels
succeeded to the former despite their pure essence, God's judgment is
just: "Man therefore shall find grace;/ The other none."(III,131-32)

Raphael, in understanding his own angelic but limited essence,
serves as a most proper figure to inform Adam of his human essence -- all
in the line of telling Adam that he has a place in the scale of existence
and that he should keep it, neither to move down the scale through
disobedience, nor to reach too high above his proper mark by presumption.
Raphael tells Adam: "Heav'n is for thee too high/ To know what passes
there; be lowly wise/ Think only what concerns thee and thy
being."((VIII,172-74) Adam, of course, has a thirst for knowledge
and does not wish to talk about himself so much as to know "Of things
above his World, and of thir being/ Who dwell in Heav'n."(V,455-56)
Raphael complies with Adam's quest for knowledge of higher things, but
he tells Adam in terms of Adam's own experience: "Thus measuring
things in Heav'n by things on Earth/ At thy [Adam's] request."(VI,892-93)
In this clever way, even while Raphael is talking about the angels,
he is telling Adam something about himself.

The "Divine Interpreter" tells Adam not only that angels are
"those pure/ Intelligential substances"(V,407-08), but also that these
substances are related to something in man. Raphael states that the stuff
of the angels requires food, "As doth your Rational".(V,410) This is to
say that in the broad span of things there are connections; existence forms
a continuum, so that not only does the body physically crave food, but
the mind mentally craves it too: "and both contain/ Within them every
lower faculty/ Of sense, whereby they hear, see, smell, touch, taste,/ Tasting concoct, digest, assimilate,/ And corporeal to incorporeal
turn."(V,410-13) This subtly alludes to the extremes in the continuum
of existence which reside in Adam's being: both the corporeal and the
spiritual. Hence, Raphael, using his nature as an example, cleverly
brings the conversation back to the standard reference point, man.

What Raphael eventually reveals to Adam about the context of being
which applies to man is initially that the world was born out of the
conflicting elements of Chaos(VII,221), and then, that man was created
out of the "Dust of the ground".(VII,525) Herein, man in a remote way was
fashioned out of Chaos -- a fact that argues for man's potential "fitness" for
returning to discord, even before his Fall takes place. The elements
of Chaos unite and harmonize through the will of God to give man his
body, but man has however a potential "fitness" to rise above the elements
of his body. As Raphael informs Adam: "[God] in thy nostrils breath'd/
The breath of Life . . . and. thou becam' st a living Soul."(VII,525-28)
And this living soul was special, for it was a rational soul, imbued
with "Sanctity of Reason". (VII,508) As such, man was related to "those pure/ Intelligential substances". Herein, then, lies that "fitness" for man rising above his chaotic elements, and as Raphael clearly states: "time may come when men/ With Angels may participate." (V,493-94)

We have found out that what the Art of Logic calls "the force of the matter" in application to spirits came from the Eternal Spirit. This singular "force of the matter" was, therefore, not only "signified" by the material cause, but by the efficient as well. With man, "the force of the matter" is two-fold: by spirit and by the corporeal. Therefore, Milton states in his Logic that that "force of the matter" in man's case is signified "of the parts -- as in the statement: Man consists of spirit and body." (51)

In the gradation of things, the incorporeal is more excellent; the corporeal (although initially not corrupt) is definitely less excellent. These two recognitions may very well be considered as two axioms the truth of which is supported from Milton's own words about "Godlike shapes and forms/ Excelling human." (I,359-60) It is because of this truth that Uriel fears for the safety of the world threatened by an ill-purposed Intruder from the spiritual order: "hard thou know'st it to exclude/ Spiritual substance with corporeal bar." (IV,585-86) Such a statement recognizes the ability of the spiritual order to overcome whatever is corporeal through evil intent, thereby corrupting the already lower corporeal essence. But as we have seen, the motion on the scale of existence can go two ways, for, in man himself there is something of the spiritual order which can overcome the lesser excellence of the body -- as Raphael puts it: "Till body up to spirit work." (V,479) This can only be achieved by man's continual obedience to the Lord, and this is the very core of Raphael's message to Adam.

However, Raphael offers messages to Adam on other things too. When Adam asks the "Divine Interpreter" about the disproportions found in the universe that has bright heavenly bodies revolving around such a small thing as the Earth, the angel cautions Adam: "consider first, that Great/ Or Bright infers not Excellence." (VIII,90-91) What Raphael, in essence,
here is cautioning against is a mistake in inference (which is reasoning badly) -- the very thing Satan fell into in considering his Brightness as altogether more excellent than it was.

Still, man has not done too badly with his reasoning ability, considering his composite nature, which renders him less excellent and merely "sufficient" in comparison to any pure and still incorrupted angel. Because of his bipartite nature, man is more remote from God, and therefore, he must use a different process to attain knowledge of his Creator. This process is "discursive", which comprises both Reason and Conversation (Conversation arguing Reason first); it is not "intuitive" (Reason that has, as it were, a "ready-made" knowledge). The materials for man's process toward the discovery of knowledge are whatever is proximate. He talks about them, which means he talks about the things in Nature -- Nature being greater than man, he only being a part. But as reasoning precedes conversation, man's ability to converse about things is determined by how keen his reasoning ability is. His mental perception can cut through the scale of being with the utmost realization coming in the fact of God's existence. We find Adam in a process of reasoning well shortly after his admission about his ignorance of causes: "who I was, or where, or from what cause, Knew not."(VIII,270-71) He then talks directly to those things proximate to his experience: "Ye Hills, and Dales, ye Rivers, Woods, and Plains/ And ye that live and move, fair Creatures, tell, Tell if ye saw, how came I thus."(VIII,275-77) Finally, the process toward "knowledge" finds completion in the realization that he came, "Not of myself; by some great Maker then."(VIII,278) This is a clear display of man's reasoning well that he came from "some great Maker" -- which suggests some commendable contact, although ever so vague, with whatever is spiritual in man.

But there is a further suggestion in Milton's epic poem that man had made yet another contact with a knowledge of what the other part of his nature was -- and this before Adam and Eve had supped with Raphael who had come to tell Adam, as part of his assigned errand, all that Adam's reasoning could not grasp about the existence of things. The suggestion that Adam and Eve had used their "Sanctity of Reason" well, then, to figure
out that they came from the dust of the Earth remains clear in Eve's address to Adam: "Adam, earth's hallow'd mould." (V, 320) -- which is even before Raphael refers to the idea. And why should this not be the case? After all, Adam initially reasoned by himself along the scale of being to finally infer that there is a Maker. Surely, Adam's reasoning that he came from the dust in the Earth (a more proximate realization) would be a lesser feat.

In his reasoning process, at any rate, man had a harder problem than an angel for the understanding of the self. And indeed, man's greater removal (which means he had to know God from a remoteness) renders him more excusable for his weaknesses. Here, Milton's renowned lines find a proper application again, for "Man therefore shall find grace/ The other none." (III, 131-32)

* * *

Like the pure essences of spirit, man, composed both of spirit and body, is mutable. With the angels, the mutability could only be effected by some cause equal or greater to themselves. What was greater, was God. But as He is no deluder and as He would not change His divine plan by creating the angels and then corrupting (mutating) them, mutability had to be effected by whatever was equal to the angels. This is, of course, to say that they "self-deluded" fell. With man, mutability was effected by a greater cause than he -- from the spiritual order -- although the true greatness of that cause may be questioned, considering that Satan found need for guile. Yet, before man's Fall, we observe that Satan has an attitude in which he quite well considers himself better than equal to his task: "Ah gentle pair, yee little think how nigh/ Your change approaches." (IV, 366-67)

There is no indication that upon sinning, man's corporeal appearance is in the slightest immediately changed. It does, however, corrupt through time until the body finally dies: "for dust thou art, and shalt to dust return." (X, 207) And as to the spiritual change we are told that the spiritual essence of man corrupted in some parallel to Satan's
spiritual corruption. For, what soon began to rise in man's heart were, "high Passions, Anger, Hate,/ Mistrust, Suspicion, Discord . . . . [and] subjection now/ To sensual Appetite."(IX,1122-27) This rise of negative emotional qualities, unfelt prior to the spiritual mutation, finds its parallel to Satan's experience, when he is about to land in Eden after deceiving Uriel: "each passion dimm'd his face,/ Thrice chang'd with pale, ire, envy, and despair,/ Which marr'd his borrow'd visage."(IV,114-16) The passions of Adam and Eve are later given expression in the poem through their initial marital quarrels.

Our first parents' spiritual change, we should note, is accompanied by a correspondent occurrence in Nature, for harmony is destroyed. Man has dislodged himself from his proper position in the chain of Being and thereby disrupted the whole unity -- it no longer is the continuum it should be. Cosmic changes are experienced in Bk. X; different laws are set up to generate seasons, and variant winds blow across the face of the Earth, "with adverse blast".(X,70) "These changes in the Heav'ns"(X,693), work with "noxious efficacy . . . In Synod unbenig'n."(X,660-61)

The explanation of these Cosmic changes in terms of the greater existences in the universe, set up by Milton in Paradise Lost, resides in the transmigration of Sin and Death through Chaos to the Earth. Hence, "Discord first/ Daughter of Sin, among the irrational,/ Death introdud'd through fierce antipathy."(X,707-09) Milton plans the situation so that Sin and Death finally reach Earth in the same point of time that Adam and Eve have sinned -- which generates a "pathetic fallacy" in Nature -- cleverly separate, in the poetic drama (plot), yet concomitant, in their symbolic correspondence. And so, in short, Nature degenerates, and "Thus began/ Outrage from lifeless things."(X,706-07)

Not only is the atmospheric matter under a degenerate change, but "Beast now with Beast gan war."(X,710) Things of life too fell into an outrage as one destroyed the life stuff of the other, "to graze the Herb all leaving,/ Devour'd each other."(X,711-12)

But despite these baleful changes in the macrocosm, the Almighty did not permit complete metamorphosis of man's spiritual substance; He saved
for it an essential grace which characterized it with a goodness which it possessed before the Fall. Therein, the stuff of the soul retained a prelapsarian likeness to the Almighty, a likeness which brought man's spirit closer to the Almighty and made him the envy of the fallen spirits. Thus while Satan's spirit was substantially corrupted because of "The Hell within him, for within him Hell/ He brings" (IV,20-21), man's spirit was substantially salvaged, and what was reserved for him was "A paradise within thee [Adam], happier far." (XII,587)

The Almighty could have avoided the corruption of man's spirit and the corruption of the other existences in a once harmonious world through an outright confinement or destruction of Satan. The former expedient would have meant God's deliberate frustration of a thinking being's freedom of will -- which He obviously preferred not to do since it was His "permissive will" which allowed Satan to traverse from the abyss of Hell to the upper regions. The latter expedient of destroying Satan would have meant a disintegration of whatever spiritual matter God had generated for the Ethereal Being, Satan. Abdiel recognizes God's power to do this, when he warns Satan: "Then who created thee lamenting learn,/ When who can uncreate thee thou shalt know." (V,804-95) But God chooses not to destroy what He has one time created for the simple reason that Raphael gives, in that "to create/ Is greater than created to destroy." (VII,606-07) Satan may challenge God to destroy him, but God finds no reason to do a lesser act than an act of creation as a demonstration of His Power.

In sum, what these observations recognize are two things: the extremes of material being in a graduated scale of existence, namely, spiritual and corporeal; and the mutability of the matter composing these existences. The spiritual substance and the possibility of mutation belong properly to the angels; both the spiritual and the corporeal substances belong to man, as does the potential for mutation.

* * *

Of course, we must remember that Milton does not expect the literate Christian to take the existence of things visible and invisible, as they are depicted in Paradise Lost, literally. He has merely made several useful "inventions" for his epic poem in order to get certain ideas of
Christian faith across. In this, Milton (like Raphael) becomes useful as a sort of "Divine Interpreter". (VII,73) We cannot do much better than to anthropomorphize the spiritual world in our understanding of it, for man only knows this earthly context. Therefore, Raphael says: "and what surmounts the reach/ Of human sense, I shall delineate so,/ By lik'ning spiritual to corporeal forms." (V,572-74) What Raphael, in essence, here suggests is that Milton would certainly not take the nature of the universe he depicts really seriously, except where the actual precepts of faith are concerned -- which again asserts Milton's original belief, expressed in the preface to his Logic, that the "doctrine" of an art is of a primary importance, and the "science" (as regards the logic of the epic poem's "invented" universe) really holds a secondary importance.
CHAPTER II

PART 1: the Formal cause

the nameless Genus II of causes

PART 2: the End cause

The last chapter of this thesis has been quite lengthy. This was meant as a deliberate reflection, first, upon Milton's own comparatively lengthy disposition of the efficient cause, and secondly, upon the lengthy involvement of the material cause with Milton's epic poem -- although Milton devotes only a brief disposition to this latter cause in his Logic. The efficient and material causes, considered together as the nameless Genus I of causes, maintain more importance than the nameless Genus II of causes. Milton disposes of the formal and the end causes quite briefly. They, moreover, do not have as great an importance in the epic poem as the other two. This chapter is intended to reflect both the brief disposition Milton gives to the nameless Genus II of causes and the lesser involvement this genus expresses in the epic poem.

*   *   *

At the end of his treatment of both "form" and "end", John Milton has some qualifying statements to make in regard to the "distribution" of these causes. About form, he suggests: "But there is no true distribution of form. For the distribution of internal and external which some hold will not apply to all things but merely to the corporeal." (63) This, we
know, is true according to a theological orthodoxy in regard to the spiritual order, since there, only spirit exists, and its nature (as a single and pure essence which is invisible and ungraspable) also dictates that it has no distributable form. Although no true distribution does exist in the spiritual order according to what is visibly identifiable, Milton does make a distribution of his angels in *Paradise Lost*. The distribution of "form" and "end", as allowed for in the epic poem, issues from the way Raphael explains things to Adam. Raphael has divided the genus of angels into either good or bad -- visibly so distinguishable -- and then, he divides the good and bad into Hierarchies -- with other apparently visible differences. But the "Divine Interpreter" explains to Adam that he speaks only in terms which are accessible to Adam's understanding. What he informs Adam essentially (as has already been suggested) is that he is anthropomorphizing the Heavenly context: "Thus measuring things in Heav'n by things on Earth/ At thy [Adam's] request."(VI,892-93) And this is all for a "logical convenience" ("invention") to facilitate Reason.

Yet another significant recognition which here is applicable is made in chapter VIII of Milton's *Logic* in which Milton treats the "end" cause. He comments in this chapter that "Finally the law of distribution orders the parts of distribution to be opposites; but between the highest and the subordinate there is no opposition."(69) This simply recognizes the graded difference between highest and subordinate within a single species of things, i.e., "differences within a similarity", so that division does not strictly have to take place in a continual stream of two opposites. Therefore, the distribution of angels into angels visibly distinguishable as either angels from Heaven or angels from Hell follows the law of distribution rightly, but the recognition that this distribution does not have to follow through, absolutely in terms of opposites, provides for the fact that either subordinate genus of angels can be subdivided into a variety of species, called "Hierarchies".

*   *   *
Both "form" and "end" fall into the second genus of causes, left nameless according to Ramus due to the order of time conflicting with the established Aristotelian classification of causes as either internal or external. But this problem need not concern us. John Milton, however, suggests: "As the matter, so also the form is a kind of effect of the efficient. For the efficient produces the form not yet existing and induces it into the matter." So God moulded both man and angel -- beings that find their identity first from their substance, and then, through their shape. As for the latter, Milton supplies us with this definition: "Form is the cause through which a thing is what it is." Milton goes on to say that "Single things, or what are commonly called individuals, have form single and proper to themselves; certainly they differ in number among themselves, as no one denies." This observation is equally applicable to man and angel. In dealing with the higher order first, we must say that angels are "individual", presumably of great "number" (as in the Legions that warred), and they each have a form "single and proper" to themselves. These things are clearly evidenced in Raphael's form. Bk. VI, 11. 352-53 informs us that angels "limb themselves, and color, shape or size/ Assume, as likes them best, condense or rare." When Raphael soars down from Heaven on his mission, he is depicted as assuming shape, so that he is, at one time, "Not unconform to other shining Globes"(V,259), and at another time, "to all the Fowls he seems/ A Phoenix."(V,271-72) But when he lights upon the eastern cliff of Paradise, Raphael "to his proper shape returns/ A Seraph wing'd."(V,276-77) We are told he has "each shoulder broad", "loins and thighs with downy Gold/ And colours dipt in Heav'n", "his feet/ Shadow'd from either heel with feather'd mail/ Sky tinctur'd grain".(V,284-85) This is an obvious anthropomorphization of an angelic being -- no matter how splendid and woundrous the description. And through this "invention", Milton succeeds in endowing an angelic "individual" with some shape comprehensible to us.
When Adam espies Raphael, he calls to Eve: "what glorious shape/ Comes this way moving?" (V,309-10). However, Adam does not prove himself so dazzled by Raphael's "glorious shape" that he cannot distinguish to which Hierarchy the angelic messenger probably belongs, for he soon comments:

None can than Heav'n such glorious shape contain;
Since by descending from the Thrones above,
Those happy places thou hast deign'd a while
To want, and honour these . . . (V,363-66)

And likewise, when Michael comes to assure Adam in Bk. XI that all is not lost for the offspring of mankind, Adam announces Michael's approach in these terms:

One of the heav'nly Host, and by his Gait
None of the meanest, save great Potentate
Or of the Thrones above, such Majesty
Invests him coming; yet not terrible,
That I should fear, nor sociably mild,
As Raphael . . . (X,229-32)

Therefore, although Adam does not initially identify the angelic messengers by their "proper" names, he does, at least, attempt to identify them by what is more general, i.e., to name their special "species". We are left, however, with a strong suspicion that Adam would be able to recognize the proper forms of Raphael and Michael should he see them again.

The words with which Adam announces the approach of the angelic messengers recognize several things Milton's *Logic* maintains about form. First of all, "form is the source of every difference"(61) -- which means by discerning shape, one simply knows who is who, or what is what. And "Therefore by it a thing may be distinguished from all other things."(61) This is the logical reason for Satan asking, after being caught by the guards in our first Parents' "blissful Bow'r"(IV,689), "Know ye not mee?"(IV,819) However, although he "started up in his own shape"(IV,819), his proper form (as well as his substance) is not what it once was -- as is indicated by the two guards who have a hard time recognizing their once Heavenly companion. After Satan's true identity has been made clear, Zephon comments: "Think not, revolted Spirit, thy shape the same,/ Or undiminisht brightness, to be known/ As when thou stand'zt in Heav'n."(IV,835-37)
That Adam has been able to distinguish sets of angels merely by sight tells us that the hierarchy of being applies even to the spiritual order. And therein resides a logical truth of existence -- for Milton writes: "[T]hings which differ in number also differ in essence; and never do they differ in number if not in essence."(59) Milton recognizes the same logical truth in Paradise Lost when he comments that the angels were "By God created in thir bright degree, / . . . and to thir Glory nam'd/ Thrones, Dominations, Princedoms, Virtues, Powers . . .".(V,838-40)

According to Milton, then, matter is the fundamental substance for all: "one first matter all".(V,473) However, the quality of that matter varies in degree between the species, and this quality of difference gives definition to what is called essence. Not only does essence differ between species, but also within a single species of existence -- for, according to Milton, as long as there is number, there is difference in essence. It is with this important recognition that Milton says: "Here let the Theologians awake. -- Because if whatever things differ in number differ also in essence, but not in matter, necessarily they differ among themselves in forms, but not in common forms, therefore in proper forms."(59)

What this basically says, applied to Paradise Lost, is that angels are angels -- they all have a likeness generically which identifies them as angels. However, within that genus, "angels", there are identifiable species of angels -- as indicated when Adam surmises that Michael is of the Thrones. Moreover, within each species, there are identifiable proper forms or individual angels which -- "Here let the Theologians awake," -- differ on a value scale relative to their own species -- with God as the Absolute Standard "from whom/ All things proceed".(V,469-70)

However, what most importantly is to be said about all this is that the difference in form argues a definite difference in essence (or the quality of the substance of being) among the angels themselves.

Milton applies this kind of theory about angelic matter and form to his epic poem in order to remove the vagueness often attached to these two causal concerns. The most memorable application of this
theory resides in Milton's description of Raphael at supper with our first Parents when the angel with quite tangible substance and form, "nor in mist, the common gloss/ Of Theologians" (V, 435-36), falls to his food "with keen dispatch/ Of real hunger, and concoctive heat." (V, 436-37)

Here, then, is an excellent example in which Milton quite obviously means to remove the usual vagueness attached to the spiritual order in regard to matter and form. Here, too, it should be added, Milton not only proves himself consistent with the theory on matter and form he espouses in his Logic, but he also re-echoes that very sentiment found in his Logic when he criticizes "those canons of the theologians" (7), and when he remarks, "Here let the Theologians awake." (59)

Milton comments further in his Logic that "Form is produced in the thing simultaneously with the thing itself. Therefore the maxim is altogether true: When the form is given, the thing itself is given; when the form is taken away, the thing is taken away." (61) This accounts for the reason why Uriel is deceived by Satan who appears in the likeness of a cherub. Uriel, in his lack of perception into the artifice of the Fiend, is therefore making a "logical mistake". He judges on the basis of what he sees, for he knows that "form is the source of every difference." (61) And he rightly thinks this. Form is, after all, a cause of being and a good indicator that calls to mind the "knowledge" one has about anything in existence: "Whence that said above about the cause in common, namely that it is the fount of all knowledge, is understood especially to apply to form." (61)

What Uriel has confronting him is the most skilful of the evil spirits in the artistry of disguise. In this context of spirit meeting spirit, Uriel's spiritual senses are understandably deceived. Hence, this application to a world anthropomorphized becomes valid: "But to know the internal form of anything, because it is usually very remote from the senses, is especially difficult." (63)

Milton then refers the context of form to the things created by man's handicraft (like walls, for instance), saying that identification in this context comes quite easily. Of course, we must remember that in the universe depicted in Paradise Lost things work on a relative basis. This means quite
often that what from man's order of experience can be applied to artificial things, can in parallel fashion, from the spiritual order of experience, be applied to man. Therefore, Milton's observation ("In artificial things, however, the form, as being external and exposed to the senses, is more easily observed."(63)) can readily be applied to man relative to the spiritual order. For such a reason, the angelic messengers of God have no problem at all in ever finding Adam and Eve -- the two are partially corporeal beings, and as solid to spiritual eyes as any wall may be to their own human eyes.

However, Adam, in turn, proves himself not as definite about distinguishing the angelic forms. He does not know their proper forms immediately; the most he can do is surmise at their species. The spiritual order is too remote from Adam's senses for him to distinguish anything in it immediately and accurately. Only by God's "permissive will" can Adam speak with Raphael and Michael, and thereby, have some experience with the spiritual order. After the transpiration of man's Fall, both Adam and Eve are removed from Paradise and the spiritual order becomes even more remote.

Now, when disguise is utilized by something from the spiritual order, Adam and Eve, even before their Fall, must logically have a very difficult time in perceiving through a false form. After their Fall, the chances of deception are again logically increased, and this would account for the phenomenal increase of sin in Adam and Eve's progeny as depicted in Bk. XII. However, here again these lines become most relevant:

The first sort by thir own suggestion fell,
Self-temtled, self-deprav'd: Man falls deceiv'd
By th'other first: Man therefore shall find grace,
The other none . . .

(Milton, Paradise Lost, III, 129-32)

Milton utilizes the "invention" of disguise in Paradise Lost quite faithfully enough in accordance with his logical beliefs. This is to be seen, moreover, in regard to Milton's assertion that a difference in form argues a difference in essence.(59) For this very reason, Satan, in a changed form, appears most naturally as a toad or a snake, and someone like Raphael appears as a Phoenix with golden plumage. Granted that Satan is able to deceive Uriel in the shape of a cherub (a shape most most uncorrelated
to his nature); however, this unfitting shape assumed by Satan merely bespeaks his skilful ability at deception. He is the most skilful artificer of them all for his own evil means. Moreover, we must realize that the circumstance of the moment (because of Uriel's presence) is a determining "force" in what kind of shape Satan must assume. He soon mars it anyway when, upon reaching the Earth, his fiendish nature still projects through his disguise of an innocent cherub -- with an obvious lack of control. (IV,114) But later, when Satan is in the Garden by Eve's ear, he is depicted in the likeness of a toad -- which plainly involves a freer situation, for there is no one like Uriel to "force" Satan to assume the shape of a cherub. Hence comes the natural correspondence between shape and essence. However, we must note that in this situation the sharp perception of the spiritual order is able to see through the disguise and bring Satan back to his proper shape:

... him there they [the guards] found
Squat like a Toad ... .

Him thus intent Ithuriel with his Spear
Touch'd lightly; for no falsehood can endure
Touch of Celestial temper, but returns
Of force to his own likeness ... . (IV,800-14)

Finally we must note that the most significant circumstance of disguise in the epic poem finds Satan "within" the form of a snake. The snake, like the toad, is a shape more freely chosen and more naturally chosen by Satan than that cherub shape forced upon him by Uriel. A threat in Adam and Eve's discerning power is not at all an influencing factor in the disguise Satan chooses to use -- our first Parents would not be able to see behind Satan's false shape, be it cherub, snake, toad, or any other thing in Heaven or on Earth. Merely the "force" of the form itself, the snake, moves Satan to enter into its being. By this, it is clear that the situation requiring the snake form finds itself less determined than the situation requiring the cherub form. And hence, the snake, like the toad, becomes a shape freely chosen for the "fitness" in itself, and both forms argue a plain and direct correlation with the corruption of the internal essence.

*   *   *

69
The last of the four causes may most briefly be dealt with. Milton does not like to split fine hairs about the various distinctions made in regard to "end". He acknowledges that "Some however distinguish between the end and the final cause in this manner, namely, that the end is the usefulness of a thing, but the final cause thought on its usefulness."(65) The final cause, therefore, can exist in the mind of the Creator as a plan or intention before the effect comes about. Milton, however, looks at things in a practical way: "But when it is merely in the mind of the efficient and is not yet obtained, it does not yet truly exist; and how can it be a cause when it does not yet exist?"(65) Therefore, to be able to speak of final cause, one must talk of something that has been effected, that is, become real, for only an intention made into a reality can be spoken of in any solidly "useful" way.

Raphael tells Adam the end of Creation in a "post facto" context. He therefore speaks of the final purpose of real things, and simply because of this, his information becomes not only pertinent but, to Milton's way of thinking, useful. In a general statement about the end of things, Milton comments: "The final cause is not other than some good, and in the same sense it is called an end and a good."(65) He then acknowledges more specifically an Aristotelian trend of thought which dictates that even the avoidance of evil has the nature of good.(65) This very thinking applies to the circumstance of the Creation of the world -- and eventually man -- out of Chaos. In Bk. VII, after all, the Hierarchies of angels reveal this in their praises to the Creator, "whose wisdom had ordain'd/ Good out of evil to create."(VII,187-88) Milton goes on to say in his Logic that one of the "signs" that point out the end cause is that not, which "is the sign of the end which is occupied with the shunning of some evil."(67) That sign appropriately becomes expressed in Paradise Lost in the words: "lest his heart exalt him."1 Therefore, God wills a new goodness in order to frustrate Satan's gloating satisfaction at having

1Bk. VII, l. 150. The italics are mine.
corrupted one third of God's initially created goodness -- which essentially means that God does shun a sort of evil.

However, this negatively oriented end is not the only end for the creation of mankind. There exist co-"end causes" in the great plan of the Creator; so complex is the purpose of the Almighty, that in Him reside a multiplicity of reasons and no unilateral simplicity. For, the end of Creation as discussed under the sign, "lest not", is after all, an avoidance which one might mistake for some kind of "spite" against the fallen angels -- as Satan does in asserting: "spite then with spite is best repaid."(IX,178) Other signs that express the end cause are phrases like: because of which, toward, because of, on account of, by reason of, and whither.(67) These are obviously more positive signs. A simple expression of this positive end may readily be found in any Catholic grade-school catechism book in the form of a question and answer: Q: Why did God make you? A: God made me in order to know, love, and serve Him here on Earth, and to be happy with Him forever in Heaven. Even Milton's Protestant Ethic is not so far removed from this general assertion of belief. Raphael speaks of man someday supping with the angels; this apparently will be possible "if ye be found obedient"(V,501) -- which again points to the idea of an avoidance of evil, this time in the more specific context. Yet, Raphael later cautions man in his striving, with an acknowledgement of these positively oriented purposes: "what thou canst attain, which best may serve/ To glorify the Maker, and infer/ Thee also happier, shall not be withheld/ Thy hearing." The end of man's creation, therefore, in the positive sense works two ways: from man to God, in terms of knowing and loving; from God to man, in terms of grace and happiness.

However, most simply put, the end of all things is God. Milton makes reference in his Logic to the wise Hebrew in Proverbs 16:4: "The Lord hath made all things for himself."(67) This idea becomes rather aptly...
expressed in Milton's epic poem when Raphael acknowledges that "one Almighty is, from whom/ All things proceed, and up to him return."(V,469-70) This tendency in the motion of things (if not corrupted), moreover, foreshadows the final end in the Apocalypse wherein all good things shall be subsumed in God, wherein (as Milton writes in Paradise Lost) "in the end/ Thou shalt be All in All."(VI,731-32)

John Milton refers in his Logic to an interesting observation Aristotle makes when he says that "We use things as though all were for our sake; for we too are in a way an end."(67) This idea is grasped by Adam in his discussion with Raphael in Bk. VIII, when he questions the angel on what he thinks is an erroneous disproportion in Nature:

When I behold this goodly Frame . . .

... this Earth a spot, a grain,
An Atom, with the Firmament compar'd
And all her number'd Stars, that seem to roll
Spaces incomprehensible . .

... merely to officiate light
Round this opaceous Earth . . (VIII,15-23)

This question is prompted from what Adam feels through instinct -- that he is the centre of the universe, and all things therefore officiate for him. In his Logic, Milton acknowledges the greatness of man within the hierarchy of things in these words: "Thus man is given as the end of physical things, God as the end of man."(67) However, Adam's instinct of the first half of this truth comes out in a question with a misapplied context, for his instinct (as regards the physical subservience of things for the sake of the spirit of man) is framed in regard to what might be a law of physics: the apparent physical subservience of heavenly bodies to the physical existence of the Earth. Thus expressed, Adam's instinct for his own nobility is expressed only suggestively in the form of the greater physical context: the Earth and the Planets -- when it should have been more concretely expressed in the form of the specific context: the spirit of Man and the general tendency of the proximate things to centre around him.
Adam, therefore, refers the context of what should be a question about himself to that which is greater. The instinct which prompts such a question is indeed right; the application is wrong. In this application of his instinct, to a greater context than should properly concern him, Adam has made himself more remote and therefore prone to an improper view of things. Raphael offers correctives to Adam's geocentric universe, asking instead of Adam: "What if the Sun/Be Centre to the World, and other Stars?" (VIII,122-23) Hence, man is right in his egocentric instinct that physical things (as far as he can attain) are meant by the Deity for man's own end; he sees this from the very tendency of all the things he knows which cater to his own use. For man's own spirit is, after all, chosen especially, to move toward God. But the tendency of things is merely an indicator that points to the nobility of man's soul; God has not set up this tendency as an unfailing law of physics -- as Adam wrongly infers by the way he frames his question to Raphael. In his instinct that he is the centre of things, man therefore must make qualifications, for he, as a standard of the universe, is at most a limited standard -- as Raphael acknowledges when he says that he will not withhold "what thou [Adam] canst attain." (VII,115)

Milton comments finally, in regard to the "end cause" that "For all the arts there is something that is their highest good and final end; this is the form of the art." (67) He adds that the form and the end can be the same. Therefore, for the art of logic both the form and the end are "to reason well". (67) What we can glean out of this, for our purposes, is that a connection comes in here between logic and man in their ends -- for, the end of logic is to reason well, which Milton would claim also as the immediate end of man since only by reasoning well does man become proximate to God, who is Truth, and the Final End. Therefore, it is right for man to use the art of logic, but he can make mistakes, if he attempts too great a leap in comprehension through the nature of things toward God. And so, man should take his own evolution toward his Maker in stride, and "be lowly wise." (VIII,133)

* * *
I have distributed this chapter of my thesis into two parts. Part one deals with "dissentanies", which are things that in some way disagree, and part two deals with "comparatives", which are things that in some way agree. These two topics of invention are quite obviously complementary, and that is why they are subsumed under one chapter. Dissentanies and comparatives, like the efficient and material causes in Chapter I, form a rather lengthy portion of this thesis. My disposition of these two topics, as with my disposition of the first two causes, is intended as a purposeful "invention" in my thesis to reflect both the comparatively lengthy disposition they are given in Milton's Logic and the detailed involvement they maintain in Paradise Lost.

* * *

Dissentanies and comparatives are particularly utilized by John Milton in the unique expression of images. Rosemond Tuve, in 1947, pointed to Milton's habit of expression as, indeed, being only part of a whole tradition of logically functioning imagery, evident "from Marlowe (or Wyatt) to Marvell."¹ And she continues, that this particular tradition

is accounted for by the increasing popularity in the seventeenth century of Ramism. Miss Tuve explains that as Ramian writings held "arguments" which argued the "relatableness of a word or thing", Metaphysical writings in a very similar fashion drew connections which laid "great stress on the capacity of 'specials' to state 'generals'."² This involved "logically functioning images" which "define, differentiate, explain or support by similitudes."³

In drawing out her ideas, Miss Tuve recognizes such renowned names as Spenser, Sidney, Donne, and Milton, as connected with a Ramian tradition; however, considering the already expansive concern of her work, she wisely avoids making it cumbersome by not going into a detailed study of each of these writers. Milton's Paradise Lost, for instance, is not even mentioned as an expression of this tradition. But even this sort of exclusion seems to be quite deliberate, as characteristic of Miss Tuve's observation in her work on Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery that "to have included Milton's imagery in this study would have been to overbalance it."⁴ Miss Tuve applies such an expediency of exclusion to other areas too, and for this reason, George Watson finds this to say in criticism of her work:

"[S]o far as the poets are concerned, there are only three who have... been shown to have been Ramists: Sidney, Ben Johnson, Milton... while there is a deafening silence on the subject of Ramus on the part of Donne, Herbert, and Cowley."⁵

In line with this sort of criticism, we must of course recall Pierre Duhamel's outright objection that Milton himself may not even really be considered a Ramist.⁶ However, despite such subsequent counter reaction in a few critics like Watson and Duhamel, Miss Tuve still deserves great credit for her work of 1947. Considering that she was a pioneer in this

²Ibid. Miss Tuve develops this idea between pp. 344-47.
³Ibid., p. 345.
⁴Ibid., p. 315.
⁶See Duhamel's article, "Milton's Alleged Ramism", op. cit., on p. 2 of the introduction of this thesis.
field of study in regard to Ramus and considering that her work was of such an expansive nature, her theories for the most part, after twenty-five years, still bear up as quite reasonable.

Unfortunately, there was a time lapse of seventeen years before Bernard S. Adams wrote his Ph.D. thesis on *Milton and Metaphor: The Artis Logicae and The Imagery of The Shorter English Poems*. Adams establishes that Milton's imagery in the shorter poems works on contrasts and comparisons along lines definitely related to the *Art of Logic*. He is not so narrow as to forego pointing out relevant connections to *Paradise Lost*, but as such, his references remain merely as "pointing out" -- which plainly suggests the want of a depth study between the *Art of Logic* and Milton's epic poem in terms of contrasts and comparisons.

It should be observed that Adams makes an honourable mention of Miss Tuve's work of 1947 significantly early in his thesis -- indeed on the second page. However, Adams does not acknowledge that his own work probably issued from some significant comment Miss Tuve had made in her work. Miss Tuve, for instance, acknowledges (although only in the fine print of her footnotes) that Milton did mention "metaphor" in his *Art of Logic* as a matter of logical expression -- since under the topic of "likes", he explicitly says: 

"[T]he short form of similitude pertains the metaphor."  

This, at any rate, suggests again that Miss Tuve had a greater detail of knowledge about this field of study in store than her followers were always willing either to acknowledge or to admit.

However, in regard to this general coverage of scholarship involving Milton's use of metaphor and logic, I must assert (as I have in another fashion earlier) that my concern is not to investigate the great span of

---

7 Adams, op. cit. For a complete footnote reference, see fn. 2, p. 2 of my thesis.

8 Adams dispatches in one page, disparity, contraries, and relatives, by a mere mention. Refer to p. 104 of his thesis.

9 Miss Tuve, op. cit. She refers to this specific comment from Milton's *Logic* (197) in fn. 7, p. 184; and again, to a similar comment by Milton in fn. 4, p. 256.
a seventeenth-century Metaphysical tradition and the exhaustive contentions involved with it. Milton is my only concern, and in this specific, I am quite assured that Rosemon Tuve was correct in the claim that Milton was not only a Ramist but that his poetry followed a Ramian discipline. However, more specifically than this, I am completely assured that the several authors of the Ph.D. dissertations I have consulted are correct in their claim that Milton applied his own Art of Logic, arranged after the method of Peter Ramus, to both his prose and poetic writings. In my thesis, my specific concern, again, is to demonstrate in careful detail the connection between the Art of Logic and Paradise Lost. And finally, in this chapter, what Adams did in a sweeping fashion for the shorter English poems, in regard to contrast and comparison, I intend to do in concentrated detail for Milton's epic poem -- the most celebrated of Milton's works, yet, as regards any systematic or detailed analysis in terms of Milton's own Logic, the least treated.

* * *

Dealing with "dissentanies" and "comparatives" becomes somewhat difficult in Paradise Lost because the references to these topics of "invention" are scattered throughout the epic poem and form a string of isolated occurrences, so that there is no truly connected pattern under which these topics (or forms of "argument") may find a ready place. The problem resides in finding a methodology which will subsume the major occurrences under general concepts, that become, at the same time, useful topics for discussion.

Of course, before this can be done, it must be understood that Milton is to be taken at his word, which means that certain terminology in his epic poem finds its definitive equivalence in his Logic. The only test for the validity of this connection is that of "Reason"; the connection must make sense. What shall mainly be dealt with in this process are "opposites", "relatives", "adverses", and "contradictories", as most recurrent, and therefore, most important to Milton's epic poem, in regard to "dissentanies". In regard to "comparatives", what shall mainly be
THE DISSENTANY ARGUMENT

DISSENTANIES
  - Diverses
  - Disparates
    - Opposites
    - Contraries
      - Affirming
      - Adverses
      - Contradictories
      - Negative
      - Privatives
discussed are "lessers", "greaters", "likes", and "unlikes". My treatment of these topics (which may also be considered as "arguments") shall be, logically, from the general to the specific, from the pinnacle of existence, which is God, down the hierarchy to Man.

* * *

PART 1

"Dissentanies"

John Milton begins Chapter XII of Bk. I of his Logic with the observation that "The consentany argument has been set forth in cause and effect, subject and adjunct."(99) With this one sentence, he curtly dismisses the sum of what he has dealt with previously and proceeds to introduce the next "species of argument", namely the "dissentany". Its definition is given quite succinctly: "A dissentany is what dissents from the thing it argues."(99) Milton illustrates what he means, through this example: "virtues are praised, and its dissent, contrary vices are to be censured."(101) By following Milton's method of clarification, we can "invent" an example ourselves which illustrates a dissentany and which is, at the same time, quite pertinent to Paradise Lost. Thus, Heaven is bliss, and its dissent, contrary Hell, is utter and eternal torment. Furthermore, we must observe that what Aristotle rightly maintains of "contraries" is also common to all dissentanies, "to wit, by their dissent to appear more evidently -- which clearly applies to our example. Aristotle's idea explained in the Miltonic terminology of logic says that when a fully positive argument ("consentany") rests alone, it merely states a case, but when a negative argument ("dissentany") sets the positive off by a juxtaposition, the fact of the dissent puts the entire situation in a more striking light. Due to this psychological phenomenon, Milton finds "consentanies" good for "explaining" but "dissentanies" good for "convincing".(101) He goes on to say that dissentanies are
useful in "contradicting, overthrowing, and refuting, so that he who does not wish to be taught by a consentany argument is led back to it by the absurd result of a dissentany argument, so that even an unwilling man is unable not to assent to the truth." This situation even applies to Satan. It seems that before his Fall, he had experience only of consentany arguments; the happy surroundings of Heaven were all he knew, and therefore, he took all too much for granted. His status in Heaven was merely explained to him, as it were, as a statement of fact; but there was nothing "convincing" about it. After his Fall, Satan could experience dissentanies, for as Moloch, one of his Host, admits: "descent and fall/ To us is adverse."(I,76-77) But more than this, Satan could feel the convincing force of the dissentany argument — as illustrated in Bk. IV, when he wonders (although for an instant) about relenting because of a fear that "in the lowest deep a deeper deep/ Still threat'ning to devour me opens wide,/ To which the Hell I suffer seems a Heav'n."(IV,76-79)

The same psychological phenomenon may be explained in parallel terminology as regards Adam and Eve. Before their Fall, they only knew what was consentany, but after their Fall, they also knew what was dissentany — a transpiration about which the Almighty judges: "Happier had it suffic'd him [man] to have known/ .Good by itself, and Evil not at all."(XI,89-90) However, in their psychological process, Adam and Eve find their dissenting experience definitely "convincing" of the fact that they were wrong and that they should relent. And therefore, unlike the adamant Fiend, they actually "confess'd/ Humbly thir faults, and pardon begg'd."(X,1100-01)

* * *

Dissentanies do not merely serve as a strategic technique for contrasting situations or as a psychological ploy which renders situations in some strikingly evident light. It should be observed that dissentanies equally apply to words, as well as situations — which

---

10 Milton's *Logic*, op. cit., p. 103. The italics are mine.
specifically means, Milton's metaphorical language. Herein, the use of "opposites" involves again that psychological phenomenon of rendering something strikingly evident. That is why Milton uses such verbal constructs, time and again, even from the poem's beginning: "What in me is dark/ Illumine, what is low raise and support." (I,22-23) But Milton extends the clever contrast of his words into a greater context yet, by sprinkling associations through various distances in his poetic masterpiece. B. Rajan, for instance, cites forty passages which were composed as precise opposites or analogues to other sections of the work.11

* * *

John Milton labels the "slightest of the dissents" as a "diverse argument" which disagrees "in a single reason". (103) He finds the label apt, for what is "signified" are those things which have a sort of agreement among themselves. He continues to explain that "They dissent therefore in a single reason, since they do not dissent through themselves and in their nature, but merely by reason of an attribute."12 Such is the very fact of Creation described in Paradise Lost by Raphael when he says of the universe: "one first matter all/ Indu'd with various forms, various degrees/ Of substance, and in things that live, of life."(V,473-75) — which again points to the idea expressed earlier about the "differences within a

12 Milton's Logic, op. cit., p. 103. The italics are mine.
This is the nature of things in the universe, and this, properly called "diverse", fact of things involves the coherent continuum of existence -- in which all things are indeed connected and retain a similarity, at least "in a single reason", if not "in nature". And we must recognize, it is the diverse properties residing in the same continuum called, "universe", which both necessitates and at the same time validates Raphael's ploy of "lik'ning spiritual to corporeal forms" (V,574), so that Adam can understand those things "diverse" from his sphere of experience.

When Raphael goes into detail about the Creation of diverse things, he speaks not only about the existence of different things which can co-exist agreeably but also about the existence of those things which find a necessary separation from other things because they are disagreeable. As the "Divine Interpreter" describes Creation, he moves from a reference to the adverse disagreement in things, such as "The black tartareous cold Infernal dregs/ Adverse to life" (VII,239-40) (which involves an extreme dissent), to the diverse co-existence of things in the mention that "then founded, then conglob'd/ Like things to like, the rest to several place/ Disparted" (VII,240-41) (which, of course, involves the slightest of dissents). The motion from adverses and the cold to diverses and the Creation with "vital virtue infus'd, and vital warmth" becomes, later, parodied in another situation -- thus producing a clever "chiasmus", not only in the situation that depicts the direction in which "cause" moves but also in Milton's specific references to logical terms. When Sin and Death break out of Chaos in Bk X, "Both from out Hell Gates into the waste/ Wide Anarchy of Chaos damp and dark/ Flew diverse." (X,282-84) By the terminology used here, Milton obviously suggests that Sin and Death are "diverse" entities which are both separate, and yet, alike in their horror. In this "mode" of analysis, Satan and his Host of demons must also properly be classified as "diverse". However, in regard to this situation of Sin and Death flying beyond the Hell Gates, Milton depicts the horrible

13 See p. 63 of my thesis. The idea there refers to the distribution of the "end" cause.
pair as certainly going their separate ways, and yet, wreaking similar destruction. What Sin and Death effect; then, is not "generation" but "corruption". Moreover, Milton uses his logical terms here in a reverse order to those which he was shown previously using in regard to Creation. He was shown to depict Creation in a generative process which moves from the adverse elements to a diverse co-existence; now, he depicts a corruptive process in which the diverse Horrors, Sin and Death, move diverse things in Creation into becoming things adverse to life, "As when two Polar Winds blowing adverse/ Upon the Cronian Sea, together drive/ Mountains of Ice."  

* * *

However, dissentanies can be distributed into more confining classes. This applies to the second distribution of dissentanies, called "opposites". The universe looked at through this argument of logic makes a smaller portion of the universe appear in a magnified degree, so that it may be analysed in greater detail — herein, we may perceive the more extreme differences in things. Let us adjust, then, the power of our imagination's scope from a general view to the more specific.

* * *

John Milton writes in his Logic that "Opposites are dissentanies which dissent in reason and fact:"(109) He expands this by explaining:

But in fact and reason means not alone by reason of some certain subject which when they [opposites] are attributed to it they do not at the same time agree with, but that even in reality, that is through themselves and among themselves, by their very nature, they dissent, even when not attributed to any subject.

Therefore, given the subject, "universe", opposites reside permissibly

---

14Bk. X, 11. 289-92. It must be acknowledged that Hughes in his edition Milton's works, op. cit., p. 413, footnotes Tillyard as first pointing out Sin and Death's parody of God's creative act earlier in Bk. VII.
15Milton's Logic, op. cit., p. 111. The italics are mine.
within it. But due to the nature of opposites, only under certain conditions can they co-exist:

Opposites cannot be attributed to the same thing if they are supposed to work with respect to the same thing, under the same relations, and at the same time. To the same thing, that is, to the same thing or subject by number. With respect to the same thing, that is, in the same part. Under the same relations, that is, from the same point of view, as the sun is both greater and less than the earth. But it is not from the same point of view, for in itself it is greater, but as it appears to us less. Aside from these three conditions opposites can be attributed to the same subject.

In a simple application to Paradise Lost, this is to say, good and evil both find definitely delineating ("distinguishable") places in the universe as opposing forces, although the influence of one upon the other can make the boundaries shift -- only by His "permissive will". That these opposing forces maintain their distinguishable places in the universe is plainly expressed by the Cosmological Structure depicted in Paradise Lost. Good and evil reside naturally in extreme parts of existence, i.e., Heaven and Hell. And these opposing forces in the epic poem adhere to Milton's logical conditions. Heaven and Hell can be attributed to the same subject, "universe", only: i) if not attributed to the same part, which is clear by their separation. ii) Heaven cannot be both greater and less than Hell, and vice versa, "under the same relations, that is, from the same point of view." This would otherwise be a logical absurdity. But it is not from the same point of view, for in itself, Heaven is greater, but as it appears to Satan ("self-deluded") less. iii) Finally, Heaven and Hell are not attributed to the same part of the universe, and do not have identical relations, all at the same time. This is clear from the plain fact of impossibility.

\[\text{16 Ibid. The italics here are Milton's own.}\]
Milton continues next in his Logic to make this very important distinction: "In the diverse if one is affirmed, the other is denied; in opposites from the affirmation of the one comes the denial of the other."(113) This suggests the close and automatic connection that exists between opposites, so that to think of one, one cannot help but to think of the other: as in the affirmation, "Good is truly stronger", which automatically infers that, "Evil is truly weaker". Therefore, Belial is correct when he puts up Hell, "By policy, and long process of time,/ In emulation opposite to Heav'n."17 But he does not realize how automatically, by nature, he falls into a logical role by preferring Hell as an opposite construct to Heaven. However, to focus even into a smaller view in the Cosmology of Paradise Lost, one should recognize that there is also a natural disposition between those existences more proximate to man: "less bright the Moon,/ But opposite in level'd West was set/ His mirror."18 Therefore, the various foci upon the universe depicted in the epic poem consistently substantiate that "Opposites dispose of each other."(113)

What most importantly comes out of these things that have been said thus far is that good cannot be without evil, and vice versa. This reflects the old maxim, "Nihil ex nihil fuit", and Milton logically adheres to it in his great poem. Although evil does not exist, in fact, from the Beginning, before the incurrence of it by man or angel, Milton suggests an ever-present potentiality for it. Mammon, for instance, observes this correctly in his rhetorical question:

```
How oft amidst
Thick clouds and dark doth Heav'n's all-ruling Sire
Choose to reside, his Glory unobscur'd,
And with the Majesty of darkness round
Covers his Throne; from whence deep thunders roar
Must'ring thir rage, and Heav'n resembles Hell? (II,263-68)
```

But from this statement of fact, he invalidly infers a reverse and invalid conclusion: "As he our darkness, cannot we his Light/ Imitate

17 Bk. II, 11. 297-98. The italics are mine.
18 Bk. VII, 11. 375-77. The italics, here also, are mine.
when we please?" (II, 269-70) At any rate, the point is that Mammon has made a true observation of a condition which existed before the angels fell. This condition is reiterated when the "Divine Interpreter" informs Adam:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{There is a Cave} \\
\text{Within the Mount of God, fast by his Throne,} \\
\text{Where light and darkness in perpetual round} \\
\text{Lodge and dislodge by turns, which makes through Heav'n} \\
\text{Grateful vicissitude, like Day and Night. (VI, 4-8)}
\end{align*}
\]

-- which is, of course, a condition suggested as pre-existent to actual evil, but suggestive of the potentiality for it. Again, focusing on a smaller scope, an added suggestiveness for evil's potentiality applies to the condition of Adam and Eve before their Fall, in the fact that Eve is depicted with "wanton ringlets wav'd" (IV, 306), and the serpent also, as "sly/ Insinuating". (IV, 347-48) Therefore, in these ways, Milton logically inserts into Existence those elements, even from Eternity, which are considered as "opposite". And herein, logically something comes out of something, the evil essence from those elements through which it exists, at least, potentially.

Along these lines, there is something interesting to be said about Adam and Eve. It is true that the condition could have been suspended in which Adam and Eve would only know "Good by itself and Evil not at all." (XI, 87) Evil would, in fact, exist, but in potentiality only, as regards our first Parents. They had knowledge of evil, but they did not actually know it; they knew evil in a "reason", but not in a "fact". 19 And this condition could have been preserved without any great problem in logic. For, before man's Fall, evil still existed in an actuality as a reflective and necessary opposite in the definition of good (one-third of Heaven's Host had fallen). As for the condition of the angels before their own Fall, there is no problem either, for at least, opposite elements existed which held the potentiality for evil's essence.

19 Recall that Milton refers to such a distinction between "reason" and "fact" on p. 111 of his Logic.
The fact that "Opposites dispose of each other", accounts for Milton being able to say: "Socrates is a man, hence he is not a horse."(113) In like wise, it may be said that "Hell is absolutely Hell, hence it cannot be Heaven" -- in spite of Mammon's hopes for transmutation. The parts that make opposites cannot become each other unless their very definition be lost. And we know that this will not happen in Paradise Lost, for in it, God is shown making this, not only judicial but logical, decree: "Man therefore shall receive grace,/ The other none."(III,131-32) This plainly decrees the perpetuation of a condition of opposites. The Fiends of Hell, moreover, although they do commute to the "Precincts of light" (only because of the "permissive will"), carry their Hell along within them any way, to underscore their inescapable definition. Milton suggests this definitive condition between good and evil, in yet another way, when he pictures Sin and Death, about to embark for Earth, but meaningfully placed in front of that quite concrete backdrop, that in the Cosmology of Paradise Lost, bespeaks a fixed opposite:

Within the Gates of Hell sat Sin and Death,
In counterview within the Gates, that now, 20
Stood open wide . . .

And so, despite evil's mobility, its distinction from good remains not merely "opposite" -- as suggested by "counterview" -- but "opposite forever" -- as an intrinsic condition in the very definition of "opposite".

What most significantly issues from what has been discussed above is, of course, that the distinction of opposites is preserved by a necessarily mutual definition -- which is a definition (to use Milton's own terminology) "by their very nature".(111) But Milton proceeds with as much significance to say that if opposites should at all conceivably be attributed to the same subject, then, "not merely are they unfitting, but with the preservation of the law of opposites, which follows, they are unable to be fitting."(111) This is to say that

---

20 Bk. IX, 11. 230-31. The italics are mine.
opposite species simply cannot be mixed and become one subject. Milton expresses this law in dramatic form in his epic poem when he, first, depicts the forceful ejection of the evil angels from Heaven. Later, he again expresses the "preservation of the law of opposites" when he depicts the forceful ejection of a sinful mankind from Paradise, certainly because God wishes to preserve his logical universe:

But longer in that Paradise to dwell,
The Law I gave to Nature him forbids:
Those pure immortal Elements that know
No gross, no unharmonious mixture foul,
Eject him tainted now, and purge him off.21
As a distemper . . .

* * *

Disparates

Opposites

Contraries

"Disparates" do not find a significant mention in Paradise Lost. Milton devotes as little space to the easy disposition of disparates in his Logic. He asserts that they are "slacker" by definition than "contraries", in that "Disparates are opposites one of which is equally opposed to many"(113), whereas contraries are "keener" by definition, in that they are opposites, "one of which is opposed to one only."(117) Contraries maintain a lengthier treatment, in the Logic, as well as the epic poem -- which points to Milton's consistent devotion to the detail of things that stand out with sharper and more contrasting characteristics.

As to disparates, however, there is a reference to this logical term in the epic poem when Raphael speaks about the creation of a universe of diverse things: "then founded, then conglob'd/ Like things to like, the rest to several place/ Disparted, and between spun out the Air,/ And Earth self-balanc't on her Centre hung."22 These lines display a two-fold consideration in Milton's mind of both "comparatives" involving similar things, i.e. "like things to like", and "dissentanies" involving things that do not agree in some way, i.e. specifically "disparates" in that they "to their several place/ Disparted". Since disparates concern a thing

21 Bk. XI, ll. 48-53. The italics are mine.
22 Bk. VII, ll. 240-43. The italics are mine.
which is equally opposed to many, there is a close approach to the slacker meaning of the "diverse". However the slack opposition which is characteristic of disparates involves a difference by nature despite the fact that the boundaries circumscribed by this category of opposites takes in a great number of things. In the example drawn from the epic poem, the context refers of course to the plurality of things in the universe. There are disparate things, Raphael is saying, that in the universe find separate and indigenous places, as they differ equally from each other by nature. The reference is apparently here to things like stars, planets, and comets, which are separate in their own natures — nor can the same thing be a star, a planet, and a comet. Such is the nature of the variety of heavenly bodies that spin in the airy cosmos.

Milton finds disparates also in the smaller context involving the variety of earthly bodies — as he says in his Logic: "Thus man, tree, rock, and infinite things of this sort are disparates, nor can the same thing be a man, a tree, and a stone."(115) And it is this very specific "argument" of disparates which Adam uses when he wants God to create for him a Being like to himself: "but in disparity/ The one intense, the other still remiss/ Cannot well suit with either, but soon prove/ Tedious alike: Of fellowship I speak."(VIII,386-89)  

In Chapter XIV of the first book of his Logic, John Milton makes this clear: "But it is understood that one of the contraries is opposed to another of the same genus."(117) Given a number of "likes", therefore, the presence of the extremest condition between two members of one genus will generate
the condition of "contrariety": as in the genus of color, white and black; in the genus of the Cosmos of Paradise Lost, Heaven and Hell; and in the genus of moral condition, good and evil. Although contrariety can lack a mean, it often involves the presence of some mean: whether of "negation" or "participation". Milton comments that "The mean of negation is whatever can be said to be between two contraries yet to be neither of them."(119) In the Cosmology of the epic poem, the mean of negation is, of course, the Earth, which is clearly neither Heaven, nor Hell, yet belongs to the genus of the poetic cosmos. Milton then goes on to comment that "The mean of participation is what participates in the nature of either extreme."(119) In reference to the genus of moral condition, the condition of man's soul, after the Fall, finds itself between good and evil -- a definite participant of both.

Contraries are distributed into "affirming" and "negative":
the affirming contraries merely recognize the fact that both parts of a contrary exist separately, so that both affirm a condition or fact, thing to thing, between two subjects; the negative contraries merely negate the same condition or fact, thing to not-thing, between two subjects. 23

\* \* \*

\[ \text{Relatives} \]
\[ \text{Affirming} \]
\[ \text{Adverses} \]

The affirming contraries are distributed into "relatives" and "adverses". Milton says that "Relatives are those of which one exists

\[ \text{---} \]

23 Here, for the sake of brevity, I have expressed much of what Milton says on p. 121 of his Logic in my own fashion, which still adheres generally to Milton's logical terminology.
from the mutual affect of the other."(121) Milton continues: "They are affirmatives, that is, as there are two words, so there are two things opposed between themselves, as father, son."(125) Thus the separate fact of both is affirmed, yet, the mutual connection of them is recognized: "And thence the named things are related because they are mutually connected, and all their nature consists in relation. Thus to be a father is to have a son, to be a son is to have a father. Hence the saying: All relatives can be transposed; as the father is the father of the son, the son is the son of the father."(125) And so, the Filial Godhead in the epic poem merely expresses another "mode" of this mutual sharing of definition, when he says: "thou [Father] always seek it/ To glorify thy Son, I always thee."(VI,724-25)

Milton has backed up this idea of mutuality by citing Aristotle in his Logic, whose claim essentially was that "he who knows one perfectly, that is definitely, immediately knows the definition of the other, which, like their essence, is reciprocal."24 The application of this logical rule becomes all too obvious in regard to the Father and the Son. However, this claim about the mutual defining force of relatives, one for the other, leads Milton to this interesting claim: "Not merely cannot one exist without the other, but it cannot even be understood."(127) This certainly applies to Satan and his horrible Progeny, for, when the Satanic Father threatens to burst past the gates of Hell despite Death who guards there, Sin reveals that she is conscious of the logical law of relatives. She informs her Father, first, that Death refrains necessarily from destroying her, "but that he knows/ His end with mine involv'd."25 And so, when Sin forewarns Satan that not even he is invulnerable against the sting of Death, we are to assume that what holds as law between Mother and Son, also holds as law between the Satanic Father and Son, that their "ends" are

24 Milton's Logic, op. cit., p. 121. The italics are mine.
25 Bk. II, 11. 806-07. The italics, here also, are mine.
mutually involved. The destruction of one would mean the automatic destruction of the other. In the epic poem, only God could be considered as exempt from this law of relatives, for He can be the only exception to anything -- \textit{ex hypothesi}. That God, the Father, could exist without the Son is just about inconceivable, but were we to discuss God's existence according to Milton's logical thinking, we would have to assume that God could exist without the Son, but not the Son without the Father, for God, plainly, is the Almighty.\textsuperscript{26}

\* \* \*

When Satan revives and speaks to Beelzebub in Bk. I, he reveals the yet stubborn intent of the fallen angels: "But ever to do ill our sole delight,/ As being the contrary to his [God's] high will."\textsuperscript{27} Thus Satan names doing ill (which means evil) as a contrary to, by interence, of doing well (which means good). This fact needs no belaboring, except for the important recognition that this particular contrary does have a "mean of negation". Taken \textit{ex hypothesi} that Satan still has free will, he had a choice of: i) doing ill, ii) doing well, or iii) abstaining from activity, which means, doing neither, by simply confining himself to Hell. But the Fiend was not content to settle back to the latter, which is clearly a "mean of negation", for that would be passivity, an unfit "argument" for his "spite".

Satan himself tells us in more specific terms in Bk. I the sort of contrary action that he would take: "and mee preferring, / His utmost power with adverse power oppos'd."\textsuperscript{28} This terminology is most apt for the opposition of these cataclysmic powers, since "Adverses are affirming contraries, which are absolutely diagonally adverse to each other."(131) Milton states further that by the words, are absolutely diagonally adverse, "nothing other than direct opposition, the most

\textsuperscript{26}I refer to this relationship between the Father and the Son in a different mode, i.e., in terms of "greaters" and "lessers", later in this thesis. Ross C. Brackney maintains the same point of inequality between the Father and Son. Refer to p. 121 of my thesis.

\textsuperscript{27}Bk. I, 11. 161-62. The italics are mine.

\textsuperscript{28}Bk. I, 11. 103-04. The italics are mine.
complete, is to be understood."(131) It is not surprising then to find that Milton's Logic gives in the list of examples of adverses that of "good and evil" -- which are two adverse genera.(133) For, the law of distribution is preserved in the progressive continuum from the general to the specific in this one example: good and evil are opposites, more specifically contraries, affirming contraries, and most specifically, adverses. Incidentally, the frequency of occurrences of the word, "adverse", is most predominant in the epic poem, and appropriately so, since it defines most acutely, as well as points to the intensest meeting of strength between opposing forces -- as when the Satanic Legions display no tardy disinterest in preparing for battle: "nor stood at gaze/ the adverse Legions."(VI,205-06)

* * *

Milton proceeds to say in his Logic that "Denying contraries are those one of which affirms, the other denies the same thing."(137) They are so named from the negation of each other; moreover, their species are of two sorts, either "contradictories" or "privatives". Milton states that "The contradictories are denying contraries, both of which universally deny, as just, not just; animal, not animal; is, is not."(137) There is clearly no mean in the extreme condition of contradictories.(137) It should be noted that Adam reveals that he knows out of what contradictories come when he explains to Eve in Bk. V that her dream was merely due to Fancy. 29 Normally, "Reason"

29 Harry Frissell refers to Adam's explanation about Fancy, but he does not look at Adam's explanation in the somewhat technical analysis as I do. See Frissell, op. cit., p. 194.
is the chief operant in the hierarchy of Faculties; it "joins and
disjoins", which means it involves itself with the logical
dilemma, "either/or"; it therefore, judges and chooses what is
true or false. In Adam's words, it "frames/ All what we affirm
or what deny". (V,104-05) Through this logical process comes
"knowledge". (V,106) But when Fancy supplants Reason as first,
then an illogical process ensues; correct data is falsified, since
"of all external things/, Which the five watchful Senses represent,/
She forms Imaginations, Aery Shapes." (V,101-03) Yet, Reason still
"joins and disjoins", but as it works with deceptive data, it proceeds
through the logical dilemma ("choice") wrongly. Thence, issues
not only "opinion" (V,106), but often direct contradiction, in that
the mind affirms what in plain fact should be denied, which in our
logical language is a case of, "is, is not". (137)

Eve's problem with Fancy may easily be imputed of Satan. The
Arch-Fiend suffers from all too egocentrical hallucinations so that
he thinks he is equal to God. His "right reason" has left him.
Yet, Satan has the audacity to accuse others of a kind of
wrong-headedness -- specifically, for instance, when Satan confronts
Abdiel before the actual battle begins in Heaven and threatens him
with the first blow "since first that tongue/ Inspir'd with contradiction
durst oppose/ A third part of the Gods." 30 What Abdiel outrightly
contradicted (or said "is not") is Satan's claim, that "God is not God,
but at most, first among equals". This clearly becomes a "contradiction
of a contradiction". Put in the logical explanatory language, the
situation works like this: Satan claims, "God is not God", in the
discourse of Bk. V wherein he demands to "live by right/ His equals". (V,795-96)
Abdiel contradicts this contradictory belief, by saying, in essence,
"It is not the case that it is, that God is not God". And at this point,
Satan displays a basic knowledge of logic by voicing his threat of striking
Abdiel down first because he feels that the faithful angel was "Inspir'd

30 Bk. VI, 11. 154-56. The italics are mine.
with contradiction".

Later on, Adam also displays a basic knowledge of logical dissentanies when he queries about his punishment:

\[\ldots\]

\begin{center}
How can he exercise
Wrath without end on Man whom Death must end?
Can he make deathless Death? that were to make
Strange contradiction, which to God himself
Impossible is held, as Argument
Of weakness, not of Power \ldots
\end{center}

Adam knows that he must die, but a probable punishment would be in a perpetual torment which would mean he must not die; hence, "deathless Death", not dying, dying, or by logical transposition, living, not living, which simply put, is to Adam a "strange contradiction". But although we know that Adam is coincidentally right in much of his logical terminology, his "reasonings"(X,830) are all wrong; his attempt to use clear logic is "though through Mazes".(X,830) This is why he finally reaches an incorrect conclusion: "But to my own conviction: first and last/ On mee, mee only, as the source and spring/ Of all corruption, all the blame lights due."(X,831-33) He is definitely wrong since, from the human view, it must be observed that Eve alone was the "source and spring" of the blame (as Adam feels earlier in contradiction to his present opinion(IX,1134) ), and since, from the Absolute View, Adam is not to be blamed alone, as Adam now feels, but Eve also is to be blamed -- both then, partners in the Original Sin, as a de facto "argument". Incidentally, it must be observed that Adam's reasoning process in this particular section is, in concept, analogous to the reasoning situation of the fallen angels who in their "false Philosphie" also wander through "Mazes lost". (II,561) Both situations depict reasoning Beings, who are simply reasoning badly.

* * *

31 Bk. X, 11. 796-801. The italics are mine.
"Privatives" are the most particular of contraries. They are negative contraries which involve the negation of something in the very nature of the one same subject. Milton expands this idea by commenting: "And here what is affirmed is called the habit, by which anyone has what he has, but the thing denied is called the privative, by which anyone is deprived of or lacks this thing, as sight and blindness."(143) In explanation by comparison, Milton continues to say: "Adverses are indeed directly opposed, yet not in such a way but that they are able to be mingled."(149) This is why Satan is able to transgress into the "Precincts of light", and why he hopes "out of good still to find means of evil".(I,165) But privatives admit of no mixture(149) because they apply to the very nature of the same subject. When the Almighty decrees that "Man therefore shall find grace/ The other none"(III,131-32), He recognizes a privation to the very nature of the fallen angels. Milton further comments in his Logic that "privation commonly is the extinction and taking away, or at least deficiency of habit", but more than this he comments that "Habit is being, privation is not-being" -- which falls in line with the fact that not only an adjunct is taken away from the Ethereal essence of the angels who fell, but that that very essence (that is, its very nature) is mutated itself -- thence become "gross" or "corrupted".

*   *   *
THE COMPARATIVE ARGUMENT

COMPARATIVES
- Quantity
  - Equals
  - Unequals
    - Greaters
    - Lessers
- Quality
  - Likes
  - Unlikes
Up to this point in his *Logic*, John Milton has concerned himself with the nature of *consentanies* and *dissentanies*; he concerns himself next with *comparatives*. Each of these three major species of argument maintain a lengthy disposition in Milton's treatise -- after all, they are distributed into several important sub-species. However, before going into the detail of the "comparative" argument alone, Milton briefly defines the function of each of the three general species:

"Thus the consentanies are fittest for proving, the dissentanies for refuting, the comparatives for making plain." As to the latter, he points out this essential fact in their nature: "Though by the very nature of comparison comparatives are equally known, yet one must be better known and more evident to some one than another is."(153)

This point in Milton's *Logic* about the "comparatives" underlies Raphael's whole conversation with Adam; by it, the angel is able to make plain the universe and the nature of things in it to Adam, working logically from things better known ("proximate") to things unknown ("remote").

Something which has previously been suggested becomes applicable here again. The comparison must not, in fact, be true -- as Milton indicates in his treatise.(155) This is the reason Raphael anthropomorphizes Heaven, but in so doing, plainly leaves open the possibility that it is a feigned or made-up comparison:

... and what surmounts the reach
Of human sense, I shall delineate so,
By lik'ning spiritual to corporal forms,
As may express them best....

(V,571-74)

In his *Logic*, Milton recognizes the validity of feigned comparisons only because they argue some utility, so that "even feigned comparisons certainly [can] argue and produce confidence."(155) It is a type

32 Milton's *Logic*, op. cit., p. 153. The italics are mine.
of confidence Raphael is sent to instill in Adam. God tells the angel: "and such discourse bring on,/ As may advise him of his happy state." (V,233-34). This, of course, is intended to confirm mankind's trust in the goodness of Heaven, a "consentany argument" -- even before he has occasion to compare it with Satan's "dissentany argument" -- which issues initially from the tempting words: "ye shall be as Gods". (IX,708) And here applies that second of Raphael's purposes: to forewarn mankind about Satan, "what enemy/ Late fall'n himself from Heaven, is plotting now/ The fall of others from like state of bliss." (V,239-41) It is for this two-fold end that Raphael finds it necessary to make plain to Adam things that he does not know. What Milton says in his Logic appropriately falls into place here: "Hence the extraordinary usefulness of comparatives stands out, for by this it comes about that an unequal knowledge of things by force of comparison is made equal."33

Thus Raphael's visit is not merely "sociable"(V,221); it is functional. The angel has not come to cater to Adam's "intellectual" (or more properly, "idle") curiosity, as Adam seems to think in Bk. VIII, by momentarily forgetting to restrict his questions to good and evil, Heaven and Hell. Adam strays away from those things which concern him most by asking about the seeming disproportions among the Heavenly Bodies -- something which really is irrelevant to him, except that it appeals to his detached sense of curiosity (which is simply synonymous with Fancy). But Adam comes back to a sense of utility when Raphael gently cajoles: "Solicit not thy thoughts with matters hid,/ Leave them to God above, him serve and fear"(VIII,167-68), and again, very simply, "be lowly wise".(VIII,173) Adam, then, takes this advice up and elaborates on his conviction of it, when he

33Ibid. The italics are mine.
acknowledges that Fancy is apt to rove unchecked:

Till warn'd, or by experience taught, she learn
That not to know at large of things remote
From use, obscure and subtle, but to know
That which before us lies in daily life,
Is the prime Wisdom.

And so, Adam corrects his high flighted curiosity of the things which are too remote from him to a more utilitarian attitude:

"Therefore from this high pitch let us descend/ A lower flight,
and speak of things at hand/ Useful."35

If we recall, Milton's initial prayer was for "Thou O Spirit" to grant: "What in me is dark/ Illumine, what is low raise and support;/ That to the high of this great Argument/ I may assert Eternal Providence."(I,22-25) Adam functions as the poetic expression of this very prayer. This is evidenced by that progress in understanding which Adam undergoes through the guidance of Raphael, and then, despite the setback of the Fall, this is further evidenced by that progress in understanding which Adam undergoes through the visionary experience with Michael. What must be said, first about Adam's progress in understanding in regard to the "comparatives" "invented" by Raphael, is that these "comparatives" serve, indeed, as a "mode of understanding" (deliberately so "invented" by the force of Milton's own mind) for the minds of all those who read Paradise Lost — thereby, justifying "the ways of God to men".(I,26) We should observe that in the visionary experience with Michael there is also evident the use of "comparatives" in order to make things plain to Adam — as in the explanation, for instance, of Death: "till like ripe Fruit thou drop/ Into thy Mother's lap".(XI,535-36)

However, what should impress us most evidently about Adam's Hilltop experience with Michael is that it comprises a series of facts and testimonies, both good and bad, taken from a prescient view of the history of mankind. As such, this privileged look into history becomes, indeed, a presentation of "consentany" and "dissentany" arguments, made by Michael's visionary force for the sake of convincing Adam that he was wrong in sinning and that he

34Bk. VIII, 11. 190-94. The italics are mine.
35Bk. VIII, 11. 198-200. The italics are mine.
should in the future keep God's laws, because there is still a hope of Heaven for him. What must, then, be said about Adam's progress in understanding, in regard to the experience with Michael, is that it functions, indeed, as an "argument" to his progeny, i.e., to all those who read Paradise Lost, or "To all Believers" (XII, 519), to retain God's laws and to sustain a hope of reaching Heaven.

In this way, Adam is displayed as the poetic expression of Milton's own initial prayer for "illumination". Moreover, Adam's experiences with Raphael and Michael do not only function as poetic "inventions" which depict Adam's progress in understanding, but they also function as "inventions" which give us, the readers of the epic poem, a "mode of understanding" about the most basic stories in our Faith, the Fall of the angels and of man. And finally, Adam's experiences with Raphael and Michael do not only function in the poetic context as special "arguments" for Adam's own "illumination" and conviction, but they also function as special "arguments" for our own "illumination" and conviction.

* * *

Milton distributes "comparisons" into "quantity" and "quality". There seems to be a difficulty involved, however, in their definition, because Milton uses very similar words in his disposition of each. Compare, for
instance, these statements:

But from what we have said above about logical quantity, it must be understood that that is logically greater which is greater not merely in magnitude, measure, or number, but also in authority, potency, distinction, probability, difficulty, or anything else of the sort. For logical quality is not merely habit, or disposition, or natural potency or impotency, or finally figure or exterior form, which are the Aristotelian species of quality, and to be treated in other arts, but is a certain affect or ratio by which things compared among themselves are said to be of a certain sort, namely, like or unlike.

However, the use of similar words in speaking about quantity and quality merely underscores the plain fact that there is a great affinity between them -- as Milton specifically admits through a reference to "equals and likes". (193) This affinity clearly suggests that quantity, which often deals with magnitude, measure, and number, is nothing more than a concrete indicator of the sort of quality a thing possesses. But more than this, the two have such a closeness that they can be reflexive. This is exemplified through the instance in which Adam describes Michael's approach in these terms: "One of the heav'nly Host, and by his Gait/ None of the meanest, some great Potentate/ Or of the Thrones above, such Majesty/ Invests him coming." (XI,230-33) Here, it may be said of Michael that his striking quantity of "bearing" reflects that very quality residing within his "figure". And inversely, that very quality residing within his "figure" reflects a commensurate quantity of "bearing", which (in Milton's thinking) means "authority" and "distinction".

What must be stressed at this point is that in both definitions of quantity and quality, Milton makes a common reference to "potency". This reference becomes important when Satan is discussed in this part of my thesis. The differentiating factor which dictates under which place

---

36 Milton's Logic, op. cit., p. 169. The italics are mine.
37 Ibid., p. 193. The italics are mine.
of quantity or quality a particular situation or reference to potency ought to belong is plainly: how Milton speaks about it in that particular instance.

* * *

John Milton comments about the first distribution of quantity: "The argument of the equal, therefore, is used when equal is illustrated by equal."(157) This form of argument is expressed in the epic poem by Satan who wishes to set himself and Hell up as "equal" to God and Heaven. However, to use Milton's own language about logical quantity, it is "not merely by the nature of the thing", that this argument exists, "but as it were in the opinion of the one who is thinking".(169) Were the first indeed the case, the argument that Hell is equal to Heaven would be true; but as the latter is indeed the case, the argument is false. Yet, false though it be, in terms of magnitude, measure, number, and potency, Satan's Hell does pretend to become a quantified construct of Heaven. Herein, it becomes an equal to Heaven, "in opinion", but still qualifies to be discussed under the topic in Milton's Logic, called "equals".

Therefore, let us recall this basic similarity established in the "physicality" of both constructs, first Hell, then Heaven:

There stood a Hill not far whose grisly top
Belch'd fire and rolling smoke . . . (I,670-71)

That day, as other solemn days, they spent
In song and dance about the sacred Hill. (V,619-20)

But more than this topographical parallel, there is the suggestion that Hell intends to parallel Heaven also in architecture, because
that very Architect whose "hand was known/ In Heav'n by many a
Tow'red structure high"(I,732-33) just happens to be practicing his
profession in Hell.

What results from this energetic pretension of the fallen angels
is a sort of paradox, possible only because of the world of "false
Philosophie"(II,565), that Heaven and Hell are not only opposites (from
the objective point of view), but that Hell is an equal to Heaven (from
the Satanic point of view). An improper mixture of the two views, i.e.,
a Satanic view trying to be objective, accounts for Mammon's fond
opinion that as, "Heav'n resembles Hell"(II,268), so Hell can be tempered
to resemble Heaven. From this issues Mammon's paradox: "To found this
nether Empire"(II,296), "In emulation opposite to Heav'n"(II,298) --
which involves not only the logical term "opposite", but also the idea
of "equaling", in the word, "emulation" -- a mixture which (to use
Adam's terminology) makes for "strange contradiction". This, of course,
is a favourite gambit in Milton's literary strategy for characterizing
the wrong-headedness about anything.

Nonetheless, this thinking in paradox, as exhibited by Mammon, does
adhere to the proper concerns of logic, for opposites can be compared
in some sense of equality. This suggests the reverse of what was discussed
under "dissentancies". Recall, first of all, the idea about the "differences
within a similarity"; now, with the "comparatives", it is a case more
properly of the "similarities within a difference". However, Milton
elaborates this latter idea more specifically by commenting:

The same is true of adverse, as in the
argument: Good is to be desired; equally,
therefore, evil is to be fled from, since
beyond doubt properly and therefore
reciprocally: Everything that is to be
desired is good.

(163)

And since we have already demonstrated from Milton's associations
and his specific terminology that Heaven is actually adverse to Hell,
we can equally say: "Heaven is to be desired; equally, therefore,
Hell is to be fled from". These things, of course, add a certain

38 See p. 63 of my thesis. The idea there refers to the distribution of
the "end" cause. Also see p. 81; here the idea refers to "diverses".
specificity to Mammon's fond hope, for what he is saying, in the more particular and actual sense, is that Hell should equal its adverse, Heaven. This translation, by becoming a narrower form of expression for what Mammon actually wishes, merely underscores the impossibility of his ambition. For, recall, after all, that by "adverses" is meant "absolutely diagonally adverse", and by these words, "nothing other than direct opposition, the most complete, is to be understood."(131) And so, how can Hell possibly become a Heaven? The impossibility of the physical transformation of Hell into a Heaven is, moreover, supported by the spiritual fact of the fallen angels, in that their Ethereal essence has irremediably and by its very nature been corrupted. This fact is best expressed by the chief fallen angel, Satan, who poses at one point an opinion which suggests the "control" he thinks he has over his situation in Hell, for "The mind is its own place, and in itself/ Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heav'n"(I,254-55); but we know the truth about this professed power of the mind, for Satan explicitly admits later that "myself am Hell"(IV,75), which indicates the change in his very nature, surely an irremediable state of his corrupt spirit.

As an extension of this line of discussion, it must be said that the quantified construct of Hell, as an equal to Heaven in the Cosmology of *Paradise Lost*, is nothing more than the external expression of the general opinion held by the fallen angels about the quantity of their potency — as with Moloch's belief, "with th'Eternal to be deem'd/ Equal in strength".(II,46-47) This wrong-headed opinion, undoubtedly, comes from the incorrect use of "Reason" when "Fancy" supersedes as chief (as explained by Adam in Bk. V). The reasoning power continues to operate; but programmed with false data by Fancy, it can only conclude "opinion". Herein, Moloch's Fancy works a self-deception in giving him the opinion, "now fiercer by despair"(II,45), that he is equal to God. Satan himself, as the leading representative of his fallen Host, most evidently exhibits this sort of malady of the "Reason". But he refuses to know that he suffers this malady, and therefore, continues to be quite "self-deluded". Abdiel, however, seems to be aware of this
sort of psychological phenomenon when Reason has lost its proper place -- for, in confrontation with Satan, Abdiel virtually calls him mad by telling him to stop his "impious rage". (V, 845) He asserts his own "reasoning well" by judging correctly of Satan's argument with these words (not at all unfamiliar to the language of logic): "O argument blasphemous, false and proud!" And then, the faithful angel rehearses Satan's own argument in a tone of certain contempt: "unjust thou say'st/ Flatly unjust, to bind with Laws the free,/ And equal over equals to let Reign." He finally judges of Satan: "I see thy fall/ Determin'd" (V, 877-78), and proceeds to abandon the rebellious Host. Abdiel proves quite right in his prediction of Satan's determined fall, when later, the Fiend is countered by Gabriel and still refuses to acknowledge the quantified inferiority of his power -- in plain view of the golden Scales which God "Hung forth in Heav'n". (V, 997)

* * *

So far, equals have been discussed in reference to "opinion", but what has been discussed in actuality, according to what Adam calls, "knowledge" (V, 106) is unequal. To discuss unequals in regard to good and evil, Heaven and Hell, Satan and God, is more in line with

39 Bk. V, 1. 809. The italics are mine.
40 Bk. V, 11. 877-78. The italics are mine.
the correct facts in the universe of Paradise Lost. Satan's pride may jeer at the idea, "And what I should be, all but 
Was on Thunder hath made greater?" Yet, he has merely made opinion
of that actual knowledge of existence, that God is greater than Satan--
and not by Thunder either, but plainly as an absolute fact of being.
But more correctly, in the absolute fact of being, God has not simply
greater potency than Satan -- He has omnipotence, which is the greatest
potency. This fact puts God unreachable out of Satan's class, though
Satan might have (like those angels who still retain their faith) ever
approached closer to God's essence and power through some sort of
eternal evolution.

However, to say that God has omnipotence is also to say that He
has a greater potency than anything else in the universe. This is found
true when this logical law is applied: "What is valid for the greater
thing is valid for the less."(177) Therefore, because of the
relative relationship between the things in the "argument", it is
quite correct to argue that God's omnipotence also argues His greater
power: As suggested by Raphael, all the faithful angels seem to
understand the theory behind this logical argument. This is specifically
exemplified in the argument involved in their praise for God's power
to create, in that "to create/ Is greater than created to destroy".(VIII,606-07)
Here, obviously is an argument which proceeds from the greater potency to
the less. What it says, in an expanded form, is that, "God's power created
'the Giant Angels' which argues a greater power than God needs for their
destruction." But the faithful angels give a better fullness to this
idea when, just previously, they sing, "Great are thy works, Jehovah,
infinite/ Thy power."(VII,602-03) Therefore, by a simple substitution,
what the angels really mean to say is: "God's omnipotence created 'the Giant
Angels' which argues a greater power than God needs for their destruction."
That the angels are saying this sort of thing in their praises is undeniable.
And in this manner, they express a knowledge of that argument from the

41 Bk. I, 11. 258-59. The italics are mine.
greater to the less, that "To say God has omnipotence, is also to say He has the greater power."

However, there is a difficulty which the faithful angels confess, concerning the expression of this very argument, for they admit of God's infinite power, "what thought can measure thee or tongue/ Relate thee." (VII,603-04) Therefore, they recognize that their own angelic efforts to praise The Most in terms of anything less -- to express (with an inescapable reference to themselves) the independent Omni-power in terms of "that" greater power -- still serves as a rather incomplete depiction of God. Although they are not restricted like mankind, they are still acquainted with only describing the power of God, not defining it. They cannot define God simply because definition defines the essence of a thing, and circumscribes it as though by its boundaries."(261)

The argument that God's omnipotence clearly also argues that He has the greater power -- the theory of which the angels seem to be conscious of in their praises -- is, of course, subject to the logical law: "What is valid for the greater thing is valid for the less." But this law only provides for the validity of the logical argument from the greater to the less; it does not provide for the definition of the parts of the argument. Therefore, it is clear that the law, as cited in Milton's Logic, does not necessitate that one even first grasp the definition of the greater thing, in the formulation of that very argument, that "To say God has omnipotence, is also to say He has the greater power." Simply, a descriptive knowledge will do. That is why the faithful angels know that God is infinite, for instance, but they do not know His Infinite Essence -- certainly not as His Son knows it.

In regard to this, moreover, we should observe that the description of God's power by the faithful angels seems to have undergone a change. For, now they have another "adjunct" to attribute to the power of God, in that His power, by fact, can not only vanquish rebellious angels, but

also create a whole new universe. Because of this proven fact, the faithful angels seem to have, first of all, undergone a change of "opinion" about the glory of God and the praises they feel He deserves. For, they consider Him, "greater now in thy return [from Creation]/ Than from the Giant Angels; thee that day/ Thy Thunders magnified." This change in opinion, therefore, is the very thing that argues an accompanying change in the way the angels would describe God through their praises before and after Creation.

It is one thing to speak about a theory of logic, by which the angels are aware that the terms of their praises issue from a greater (God's omnipotence) and are expressed in a lesser (as "that" greater power which "even we" have difficulty in describing). It is quite another thing, however, to speak about the actual fact experienced by the faithful angels in their mental motion to have knowledge of God, for they properly argue (or "reason") -- as does man -- from the lesser to the greater. The process of arguing some truth about God from the lesser to the greater is not necessarily invalid, for, as Milton acknowledges: "[I]f in this way Aristotle is understood, in affirming one can rightly proceed from the lesser to the greater only." Thus both angel and man affirm that which is more proximate to them, i.e., an understanding of their own natures. And this established, they both intuit toward some kind of understanding of the "X" nature of God -- the angel, of course, deriving the better understanding because he not only starts out from a higher plane, but he also proceeds more intuitively than man (man complementing Intuitive Reason with Discursive Reason). In this way, valid reasoning from the lesser to the greater is quite clearly explained by the two great examples, angel and man, which are Milton's special and careful concerns in Paradise Lost.

43 Bk. VII, ll. 604-06. The italics are mine.
44 Milton Logic, p. 189. The italics are mine.
45 Recall Raphael's distinctions on "Reason" in Bk. V, ll. 486-90.
With the faithful angels having gone through such a correct process of reasoning, Abdiel can logically caution Satan: "Then who created thee lamenting learn, / When who can uncreate thee thou shalt know." (VI, 894-95) Apparently, Abdiel already knows, and as a matter of fact, so do the other faithful angels. That is why they go on in their praises of God with a kind of corollary to Abdiel's recognized truth: "but to create / Is greater than created to destroy." 46

This brings us again to the idea of "power", to which the topic of "lessers" can more specifically apply. What is to be significantly noted here is that Satan's power, in its original goodness, was lesser than God's -- a fact Abdiel and the other faithful angels recognize about themselves; however, now that Satan has fallen, Satan's power has become even less. This fact is best attested to by that excellent similitude which John Milton employs in saying that:

his form had yet not lost
All her Original brightness, nor appear'd
Less than Arch-Angel ruin'd, and th' excess
Of Glory obscur'd: As when the Sun new ris'n
Looks through the Horizontal misty Air
Shorn of his Beams ... (I, 591-96)

We must remember that the "similitude" is provided for by Milton under the topic (or "argument") of "likes". (197) This very fact again underscores the affinity between "quality" and "quantity", for Milton uses his "similitude" to argue something dealing with "greater" and "lessers".

However, to proceed correctly toward the analysis of this particular similitude, it is necessary to define, first of all, what a similitude is. Milton considers it as a "proportion" which involves four parts. 47 The form of a similitude occurs with the "signs", "just as ... so ...". (197) And finally, a similitude is either "disjunctive" or "continuous": it is disjunctive when there are four separate and distinct parts in the proportion, and it is continuous when there are only three distinct parts in the proportion, one of them being used twice. (197) With this knowledge, we may readily proceed to delineate the four parts in Milton's similitude.

---

46 Bk. VIII, 11. 606-07. The italics are mine. (These lines have been previously cited on p. 107 of my thesis.)
47 For Milton's full explanation of this, see his Logic, pp. 193-97.
of Satan as: "his form", "brightness", "Sun", and "Beams". These four parts assume a "proportion" when they occur with their proper "signs", so that "just as Satan's form emanates the diminished brightness of a ruined 'Arch-Angel', so the Sun emanates its diminished Beams through misty Air." Since "Beams" and "brightness" are so closely related, the single term, "brightness", could serve for both sections of the proportion, so that Milton's similitude must properly be considered a "continuous" one.

Milton's similitude in regard to "greaters" and "lessers" maintains a rather implicative significance. We are told that Satan appeared no less than an "Arch-Angel ruin'd", but through inference, we can claim that he surely appeared less than an "Arch-Angel" -- a quaint form of understatement which implies a rather concrete fact. And since Satan once was an "Arch-Angel", the similitude tells us, by further implication, that Satan was certainly greater before his Fall, than he is now.

Yet, Satan refuses to see the logical fact that he was and is (now more so) lesser than God. He caters to his own slanted "opinion". Furthermore, as Satan judges himself wrongly in comparison to God, he judges himself wrongly in comparison to Man. This argument proceeds from Beelzebub who is recognized among the fallen angels as, "Satan except, none higher". (II, 300) Beelzebub still bases his judgments on his own essence before the fact of his Fall. This is suggested by the words he uses in his opinion, "Of some new Race call'd Man, about this time/ To be created like to us, though less/ In power and excellence, but favor'd more/ Of him who rules above."48 Beelzebub may be correct in his opinion that the genus, "Man", has less power than the genus, "Angel" -- a probable concern of "quantity". However, he is incorrect in his opinion that man has less excellence than the species, "Fallen Angel" -- a definite concern of "quality". And in this, Beelzebub makes the very mistake Raphael cautions Adam against in: "consider first, that Great/ Or Bright infers not Excellence". (VIII, 90-91) That Satan would make the same mistake in judging mankind by maintaining an opinion identical to Beelzebub's is clearly argued by the empathetic affinity which Milton gives to these two fallen angels in his epic poem. When Beelzebub and Satan revive in Bk. I, they are depicted like close brothers in spirit; and in Bk. II, Beelzebub is seen to propose that same "choice" for action against God, which has been Satan's preconceived "choice" all along. From this affirmation of the lesser (Beelzebub), we may argue, that the greater (Satan)

48 Bk. II, ll. 348-51. The italics are mine.
would propose an opinion about mankind in the identical terms as the lesser has been cited as doing. And indeed, that Satan actually does hold such an opinion is later demonstrated by his reaction in Bk. IV, when he first sights mankind. (IV, 360-65)

A very significant similitude, which serves as a definite corrective to Beelzebub's (and also Satan's) presumptive comparison between angel and man, can be "invented" out of a combination of terms derived from Raphael's caution to Adam and John Milton's own similitude about Satan being like the Sun. First, in regard to Milton's similitude, we must posit the likelihood that Satan, himself, would consider that he is as bright as the Sun. But this would be taking himself as he was before his Fall. Satan would ignore that he is an angel "ruin'd", and that he merely shines as the hazy Sun through the misty Air. Here, it must be said that before formulating the full form of what shall be a "disjunctive" similitude, it is necessary to add to this reapplied form of Milton's similitude a more copious part of Raphael's caution to Adam:

consider first, that Great Or Bright infers not Excellence: the Earth
Though, in comparison of Heav'n, so small,
Nor glistening; may of solid good contain
More plenty than the Sun that barren shines,
Whose virue on itself works no effect,
But in the fruitful Earth.

Therefore, with a combination of terms from this last reference and Milton's similitude reapplied by me, a new similitude can be formulated, quite pertinent to the context of the epic poem. The four parts which are useful in developing a "proportion" are: the Sun (a term, of course, common to Raphael's caution to Adam and Milton's own similitude), Satan (a term explicitly used in Milton's similitude, but present in Raphael's words only by the power of implication), the Earth (a term derived solely from Raphael's words), and Man (again a term derived solely from Raphael's words). Hence, the similitude may expand into a rather full form in that: "The Sun is to Satan as the Earth is to Man, and as the Earth may be more excellent than the Sun, so Man may be more excellent than Satan -- though Satan be of angelic essence". This "fictitious similitude" (a type which Milton does provide for in his Logic on p. 203) finds a most concise form in this construction: "A barren Sun is to a worthless Satan, as a fruitful Earth is to a valuable Man". When the comparison is formulated in this way, so that the quantity, Sun and Earth, is meant to argue a relationship in

---

49 Bk. VIII, 11. 90-96. I have italicized the significant words.
the quality of the Fallen Angel and Man, Raphael's "logical proposition" ("consider first" etc.) becomes useful as an indicator of a "logical fact"—more precisely considered a true "logical axiom". This logical axiom, of course, states the truth that: "Satan — though more powerful and bright than man — is not in his essence at all greater than, or even equal to, but rather less than Man". Here, it must be recognized that our "fictitious similitude" becomes very useful in suggesting the truth of this "logical axiom" with the very evident force peculiar to the similitude.

The fallen angels must be said to have a mental vision which is quite out of focus — as demonstrated of their leading representatives, Beelzebub and Satan, in regard to their opinionative comparison between their own nature and that of man. This particular example involving Beelzebub and Satan's regard of man and all the other examples evident in the epic poem of the wrong-headedness of the fallen angels quite convincingly ensures the fact that their Fall remains "determin'd", and that they will forever carry Hell within them. And even in their eternal damnation, the corrupt spirits are destined for a humbling lower yet than they ever experienced in their defeat in Heaven, for they are transformed into serpents in Hell, against their will, to taste the ashy fruit repeatedly each year. And this humbling experience is not merely evident of the lessers, but indeed, of the greater (or greatest) in Hell, i.e., of Satan himself, for "a greater power/ Now rul'd him", as must be observed, even in the domain he considered especially his own.

However, man — despite his Fall — is destined by God for better things: "To leave this Paradise, but shalt possess/. A paradise within thee, happier far". (XII,586-87) And finally, with the steady work of grace (or "Heaven") within man, he shall be exalted, and dwell in the realm of Light. Through these things, man shall realize both a greater quantity and a better quality of bliss than he had ever realized before — and moreover, than Satan and his corrupted angels shall ever realize again.

Man, though not as great as Satan's false dazzle, or his misused potency, makes up for his lack of quantified power by concentrating the quality of a "closer-to-God-likeness" into his small humanity. Admittedly, Satan can dilate himself into an exaggerated magnitude, so that "His stature reacht the Sky"(IV,988) in that instance when he confronts Gabriel. But

---

50 Bk. X, 11. 515-16. The italics are mine.
his bloated ego really is devoid of anything substantial, as shown in that he finally fled from Gabriel, "Murmuring, and with him fled the shades of night". (IV,1015) Compared to man, Satan measures up somewhat better -- but not in that which is to be considered of true and lasting value. Satan's power may be greater than man's, but not his excellence. Quantified magnitude, therefore, does not necessarily always function as a co-relative of quality.

Since man is definitely more excellent than Satan before the Original Sin, God sends Raphael to man, in order to preserve man's connection with God. The angel follows his mission through by means of a logical move provided for by Milton under that topic which concerns us here: "Feigned greaters are of the same value either in refuting or in proving their consequences." (177) Here, we come again to Raphael's "invention" of comparing Heaven to earthly things, the greater with the lesser -- the idea is an essential one to the proper understanding of Paradise Lost, and therefore, it bears occasional reiteration. The argument involved in Raphael's comparison follows the same direction as that argument in which Adam intuits that there is a God (VIII,278), and even as does that argument in which the faithful angels try to describe the glory of God in their praises. (VII,602-07) All three arguments move from the lesser to the greater -- a valid line of arguing, provided that the lesser term is first "affirmed" by a correct understanding of it -- which it plainly is in each case. In Raphael's comparative argument, however, the depiction of Heaven is not to be "affirmed" in any sense of "actuality". Therein, Raphael has taken a sort of poetic licence -- as indeed his poetic author, Milton, does when he addresses himself, as it were, outside the poetic decorum and asks a sort of leave for the use of one of his comparisons: "So, if great things to small may be compar'd ... etc." (X,306) What is meant to be "affirmed" then, in Raphael's argument by comparison, is merely the essential concepts involved in the comparison. And of course, the whole point of this inventive comparison, in describing Satan's disobedience in terms which
Adam can understand, is to draw out a parallel for the "potential" disobedience of man. Raphael's communion with Adam becomes, therefore, a situation in which Adam must strain his Reason, use Logic, in order to separate the "wheat" from the "chaff". Recall that Adam did not do this correctly in one particular instance when he asked an irrelevant question and had to be corrected: "Solicit not thy thoughts with matters hid,/ Leave them to God above, him serve and fear". (VIII,167-69)

What has been stressed about Raphael's inventive comparison is that it involves a "feigned greater". We must observe that this "feigned greater", in itself, involves a clever sort of invention, by which is meant, the presence of cannons in (of all places) Heaven. This ploy by Milton is useful in adding to the dramatic quality of the epic poem. Milton's seventeenth-century audience would especially appreciate the suggestion of resonating cannon-fire in the gigantic war between angels. Milton, in this dramatic "invention", exhibits a sort of -- as it were -- diabolical wile; and in this ironic sense, it is not impertinent to say that these words attributed to Satan, must more properly belong to John Milton: "Th'invention all admir'd". (VI,498)

As an expansion of this, it must be observed that a form of the word, "invention", does not merely by accident come up four times in this particular scene about the cannons. These several related variations of the word, "invention", generate what is called by Milton in his Logic, a "nominal argument". (213) But more precisely, the species of nominal argument which concerns us here is that of "conjugates" which are "words variously derived from the same root, as justice, just, justly". (215) This type of argument is always useful for arguing relevant connections or relationships between things. What is to be argued then, of this particular scene in the epic poem, is that the presence of the word, "invention", itself, and the incidence of variations, plainly underscores the pertinent connection between Satan's "invention" of the cannons, and Milton's own strategical "invention", "of Satan inventing

51 These four occurrences are:
"He who therefore can invent." (VI,464)
"Not uninvented that, which thou aright/ Believ'est so main to our success I bring." (470-71)
"Th'invention all admir'd." (498)
"each, how hee/ To be th'inventor miss'd." (498-99)
The specific presence of the one argues the conceptual (and hidden) presence of the other. Therefore, it becomes valid to speak about this particular scene in terms of "Milton's invention".

* * *

In the comparisons of quality, "the things compared are said to be of a certain sort."(193) The distribution of sorts of things can be either into "likes" or "unlikes". John Milton defines them in this way: "Like things are those that have the same quality"(193), and "Unlikes are comparatives the quality of which is diverse".(205) However, in our concern with "likes" first, this very important recognition must be made: "There is, it is true, great affinity of equals with likes".(193) This is the reason the treatment of equals in this thesis has overlapped necessarily into occasional references to likes, but more than that, this is the reason that greaters and lessers, as composites of quantity, have been considered mere quantified "indicators" of quality. However, Milton continues in his important recognition about the affinity between "equals and likes": "yet as may be seen from their definitions they differ especially in that equals do not admit superiority or inferiority, but likes admit it, for even the things most alike can be greater or lesser, but equals cannot."(193) With this, we have the key recognition needed to focus a correct view upon the sorts of Beings in the hierarchy of existence -- not only in regard to their likeness and unlikeness, but their superiority and inferiority as well.
What Milton maintains in this very important comment about "equals and likes" is, of course, to be recognized as quite relevant to the similar constructs of Heaven and Hell. I have adequately shown in this thesis that Hell is plainly meant to be a "farce equal" of Heaven. This has been expressed not only by the obvious parallel in topography, but also, by the implication that Hell attempts to imitate the architecture of Heaven. However, there is yet something in addition to these sorts of parallels, for the very actions, between Hell in Bk. II and Heaven in Bk. III, generate like situations. We have only to recall the Council held by Satan and his rebellious Party which becomes later paralleled in the Council held by God and his faithful Host. When Satan asked for a volunteer to go to Earth for the mission of damming man; the reaction was unenthusiastic, as "all sat mute"(II,420), because of the fear to break the Gates of Hell. When God asked for a volunteer to go to Earth for the mission of salvation, the reaction of the good angels was similar, as "all the Heav'nly Choir stood mute"(III,217), because there was none "that durst upon his own head draw/ The deadly forfeiture, and ransom set".(III,220-21) And so, through these like situations between Heaven and Hell, John Milton achieves a clever correlation in regard to their equal constructs. This particular example of logical agreement is an excellent "affirmation" of Milton's excellent poetic strategy, and it argues, quite well, that everything else in the poem will be logically "fitting".

The like situations with which Milton graces his poetic masterpiece may, according to logical terminology, be called, "similars".(193) Some particular similar can involve that very important distinction Milton has made about equals and likes. He has observed about them that "they differ especially in that equals do not admit superiority or inferiority, but likes admit it, for even the things most alike can be greater or less, but equals cannot."(193) This plainly is to say that, when equals only are discussed, we cannot properly discuss their superiority or inferiority; however, when likes are discussed, we can discuss superiority or inferiority. Therefore, it is a logical fact that superiority or
inferiority can be discussed under "simple similars", which concern only likes. Beelzebub gives us this specific example when, in Bk. II, he judges that there is a certain likeness between angel and man in terms of "power" and "excellence", although man's likeness in regard to angelic "power" and "excellence" seems to be "less":

There is a place .

Of some new Race call'd Man, about this time
To be created like to us, though less
In power and excellence .

However, in order to proceed properly, it must first be noted that John Milton says that similars can possess "[s]hort signs of likeness which are comprised in one word", which stand for "properties of similar things".(195) This correctly applies in the "simple similar" used as an example here, for Beelzebub delineates two similar properties in the separate and single words, "power", and "excellence". Beelzebub, moreover, seems to adhere to what Milton has very significantly said in his comment on the affinity and distinction between "equals and likes". Due to this, the fallen angel employs the term, "less", in order to "quantify" both terms, "power" and "excellence". We must, in addition, remember here that Milton has included the term, "less", in a series of words "signifying inferiority".(181)

Considering these things, then, we must admit that Beelzebub is quite right in the application of his various terms. It is correct to say that man is a similar of an angel, specifically here, in regard to the two major properties of "power" and "excellence". It is further correct to qualify this likeness by attributing "inferiority" to both properties. Herein, Milton's claim, that "even the things most alike can be greater or less"(193), becomes applicable -- though obviously not in its full force, for things merely alike can be greater or less. This fact is valid as an argument from the greater to the less.

52 In order to facilitate my discussion in this complicated area, I have taken the liberty to superimpose my own terminology upon Milton's: hence, "simple similars", here, and "duplex similars" on p. 119 of my thesis.
53 Bk. II, 11. 345-50. The italics are mine.
54 A proper term in modern logic which simply means, "to gather together under, or to subsume".
These things should sufficiently illustrate that Beelzebub seems to know enough to restrict his speech of superiority or inferiority correctly to *likes*. But he overlooks the plain fact of the matter (wherein his proper application of terms becomes rather useless), that he has voiced a *similar* about two things which "at that same moment", and "in the same respects", are most *unsimilar*. This, once more, is due to his continued conception of himself as he was before his Fall. Man may be inferior to Beelzebub in "power", but in "excellence", man must, especially at that moment, be considered superior. Therefore Beelzebub, a corrupted angel, proves quite clearly wrong in drawing this *similar* with man, still unfallen in Paradise.

The most general and copious "*similar*" which applies to Milton's comment about the affinity and distinction involved with "*equals and likes*" is that of "Heaven and Hell". In regard to this *similar*, however, a corollary must be added to the logical truths already elicited from Milton's significant comment. By this, it must be acknowledged that: Not only is it a logical fact that superiority or inferiority can only be discussed under the *simple similar* which concerns only *likes*, but they can also be discussed under, what is best termed, the *duplex similar*, wherein both, "*equals in quantity*" and "*likes in quality*", apply. Taking the analogue between Heaven and Hell as the example, we must say that it certainly admits of equals, as has been established, in terms of topography and architecture. That these equals are more than "*feigned equals*" (as provided for in Milton's *Logic*), but indeed, "false equals", does not invalidate what can be logically said about a "*duplex similar*", should its equals truly be equal. For, its added complement of "*likes*" provides for the validity in discussing that similar in terms of what is greater or what is less. This is to say that an "*analogue*"(193) which is comprised of both *equals* and *likes* admits discussion in terms of superiority or inferiority. Therefore, Hell may be discussed in terms of certain equals with Heaven in a quantified sense of size, weight, or

---

55 I have already acknowledged on p. 118 of my thesis that this term has been "invented" by me, with the useful aids of Milton's own terminology.
measure; and Hell may also be discussed in terms of certain likes with Heaven in a qualified sense of superiority or inferiority.

* * *

However, let us place this discussion into a different plane, concerning more directly the "Precincts of light". God from this context resides at the pinnacle of existence. He is appropriately remote, so that He is the only figure in Paradise Lost who is consistently invisible, and therefore, difficult to describe: "Fountain of Light, thyself invisible/ Amidst the glorious brightness where thou sit'st/ Thron'd inaccessible". (III,375-77) At most, only his "bright skirts" radiate through (barely visible because of their dazzle) when a cloud is allowed to shade His Throne. Therein issues His "mystery". The Son, however, seems to assume visibility at some moments: "In whose conspicuous count'nance, without cloud/ Made visible, th'Almighty Father shines". (III,385-86) At other moments, he seems to be invisible: "The Filial Power arriv'd, and sat him down/ With his great Father, for he also went/ Invisible, yet stay'd (such privilege/ Hath Omnipresence)". (VII,587-90) One need not really inquire into the wonder of this, for it is taken as fact -- ex hypothesi -- "such privilege/ Hath Omnipresence". This brings us to the next special concern in this thesis, for, despite God's constant invisibility, there exists that miraculous "adjunct" to some selected beings in the universe, called a "God-likeness". The closest connection, of course, that we have with this in the epic poem is between the Father and the Son: "Effulgence of my Glory, Son belov'd,/ Son in whose face invisible is beheld/ Visibly, what by Deity I am". (VI,681-83) This plainly refers to some divine (and incomprehensible) projection of the Father's likeness through the Son -- a miraculous relationship which is best described through the metaphor of "facial image".

A logical problem, however, resides in the relationship between the Father and the Son, for the question comes forward: "Are these
two likes, completely equal, or is one superior?" Quite plainly, God, the Father, is greater than the Son, and they are not (indeed cannot be) equal. This certainly adheres to a necessary logic, for there cannot be "two equals" of the "greatest thing there is". Ross C. Brackney briefly touches upon this point in his Ph.D. dissertation. He cites a concurrence with A.S.P. Woodhouse and Milton himself, in his De Doctrina, that the Son is not co-eternal and equal to the Father, but the first of all created things. The clear support for this from the epic poem itself are these two citations: "This day I have begot whom I declare/ My only Son"(V,603-04), and "Thee next they sang of all Creation first,/ Begotten Son, Divine Similitude"(III,383-84)

The idea that the "Filial Godhead" is equal to the Father comes from a stress on his high place next to the Father -- after all, in the hierarchy of things that proceed from the Father, he is the highest and worthiest. The Almighty realizes this: "By Merit more than Birthright Son of God,/ Found worthiest to be so by being Good,/ Far more than Great or High"(III,309-11), and therefore, He acknowledges the fact by actually placing his Son on the Throne beside Him: "Thron'd in highest bliss Equal to God, and equally enjoying/ God-like fruition".(III,305-06)

But although the Son now enjoys an equal placement beside the Father, this does not mean he is in fact equal and co-eternal with Him. Moreover, that the Father bestows this honour, in the first place, argues for His tacit superiority. And as a final point of logic, that the Son receives a mixed nature as opposed to retaining his pure one would normally argue the transpiration of what the Father is conscious of in the words: "Nor shalt thou by descending to assume/ Man's nature, lessen or degrade thine own".(III,303-04) However -- again ex hypothesi -- God wills to retain the highest honours for the first of created things because of "Merit". Herein, the Father makes a special exception of the Son.

56 Brackney'n dissertation, op. cit. For full footnote reference, see my "introduction" to this thesis, fn. 12, p. 6. Brackney makes his point about the inequality between the Father and the Son on pp. 91-92 of his dissertation. I have previously expressed it in terms of "relatives"; see p. 92 of my thesis.
Further down the Chain of Being, however, are other "sorts" of Beings which are "alike" — for, Raphael admits of existences in general, that they differ "but in degree, of kind the same". (V,490) Satan, in one of his private moments, acknowledges this fact of mankind: "So lively shine/ In them Divine resemblance" (IV,363-64), and again, "Creatures of other mould . . . Not Spirits, yet to heav'nly Spirits bright/ Little inferior". (IV,360-62) Through this brief reflection, Satan reveals some basic logical concepts: 1) Milton refers in his Logic to a series of "signs" which adhere to "likes" — one quite typical sign being "image". (195) Satan's reference to man's "resemblance" to what is "Divine" is obviously synonymous with the references to the "image" or "similitude" of God. (VII,519-20) There are a score of such references in the epic poem. 2) The usual indicators of "like" or "sort" are "habit", or disposition, or natural potency or impotency, or finally figure or exterior form". (193) Satan is immediately impressed with the latter of these, "figure" or "exterior form", as expressed by the term, "mould". From this first observation, he will proceed to a discovery of "habit, or disposition, or natural potency or impotency", which concern themselves properly with the likeness between man and angel. 3) And finally, all these indicators sketch out man's value for Satan so that he knows wherein man is "superior" or "inferior".

The final "likeness" in this hierarchy is the object of what Raphael means when he says to Adam: "warn/ Thy weaker". (VI,909-10) Eve was created from Adam's rib, and moulded to his image -- as indicated by the voice that tells Eve about "hee/ Whose image thou art". (IV,473) This underscores Eve's inferiority, for by being "proximately" Adam's image, she is only God's image second-hand, and therefore, holds a more "remote" relation to the Almighty.

Through man and woman the miracle of "likeness" finds perpetuation in progeny: as Adam himself recounts to Raphael about what God had revealed to him, in that "Man by number is to manifest/ His single imperfection, and beget/ Like of his like, his Image multipli'd". (VIII,423-25)
God did not establish a stagnant system in the universe by assigning each existence to its proper "sphere". Raphael tells us that each sphere is "active". Therefore, the system which God has made is a mobile system -- possibly downward, but intended for an upward evolution. We must recall Raphael's admission about such a two-way possibility in a mobile universe, when he comments to Adam and Eve that "Your bodies may at last turn all to spirit" (V,478), and then again in the same speech, when he warns Adam: "God made thee perfect, not immutable; / And good he made thee, but to persevere / He left it in thy power" (V,524-26). Yet, the stricture of place does exist because development upward is intended to be slow, "Improv'd by tract of time" (V,499). Hence, man should be "lowly wise" -- advice the fallen angels should have followed too.

The fallen angels claimed to know that they were "self-begot", and therefore, equal to God. Mankind attempted to break from his proper "sphere" by the aspiration to know good and evil, thereby, also being equal to or "as Gods" (IX,709). What permeates both these abuses of what should have been "lowly wisdom" is Satan. This emphasizes the fact that the Fall of Mankind is in some way similar to the Fall of the Angels. Satan is the common term in both; hence, just as he is to the Fall of the Angels, so he is to the Fall of Mankind. He is in both cases the great Tempter, tempting with a similar appeal to attaining an instant Godhood; and he is in both cases the "instrumental cause".

Moreover, what applies to Satan in his mutation, also applies to Mankind -- for, as Michael comments:

> Therefore so abject is thir punishment,  
> Disfiguring not God's likeness, but thir own,  
> Or if his likeness, by themselves defac't  
> While they pervert pure Nature's healthful rules  
> To loathsome sickness, worthily, since they  
> God's Image did not reverence in themselves. (XI,521-25)

In this, we readily may assert that man, like Satan before him, merely has succeeded in harming himself by an improper attempt to move out of his "sphere" of existence. Satan did not come near (as it were) to scratching the surface of God's Being, and man, most certainly, did not even come near to touching the Essence Divine, in a hope of being as a God. When
Satan fell, a sort of inverse "pathetic fallacy" occurred which was expressed through the internal metamorphosis Satan experienced, as in his own recognition that "myself am Hell". (IV, 75) This fact of spiritual change was an internal expression which correlated fittingly with the physical torment Satan was experiencing in the outside context. When man fell, there was evident a rather direct "pathetic fallacy", expressed through a change in his external surroundings wherein "Nature's healthful rules" now were afflicted by a "loathsome sickness". This external change, of course, correlated fittingly with the sin and consequent suffering with which man had stained his internal nature. And in all this, "God's likeness" (the proper end which man and angel improperly sought after) remained in fact, both absolute and untouched.

When man still used his "lowly wisdom" correctly, he argued logically by "likes" and "equals" -- most forcefully as exemplified by Adam before the creation of Eve. Adam points out "these inferior" to God, and argues: "Among unequal what society/ Can sort, what harmony or true delight?" (VIII, 383-84) Adam speaks of "disparity" and says, in essence, that he receives no comfort out of continually associating with beasts. There is no logic to such a one-sided association on behalf of man, for. "So fitly them in pairs thou [God] hast combin'd;/ Much less can Bird with Beast; or Fish with Fowl/ So well converse." (VIII, 394-96) This plainly asserts that, according to logic ("Reason"), one cannot mix the species. And that is why a logical God, in a logical universe, "bifurcationalizes", as it were, the image of Adam.

When mankind abuses his "lowly wisdom", he commits the opposite of good reason -- which is illogic. The best expression of this occurs, of course, in the temptation scene with Eve when Satan uses these words: "I of brute human, yee of human Gods". (IX, 712) We know very well that it is illogical to mix the species. Association, as even with "adverses" in the same "subject", "universe", is alright; mixture, in regard to what Satan offers, in the very nature of something, is quite fanciful. The
reason for the illogic in such a mixture is simply because it is impossible for one species to assume a combined essence with another. The only exception, of course, rests in the power of God -- *ex hypothesi* -- which indeed is given effect when the Son does become a "human God". But for the rest, it is an impossibility and an illogic. This becomes dramatically expressed in *Paradise Lost* by the introduction of "Discord", "Daughter of Sin, among th'irrational; / [which] Death introduc'd through fierce antipathy". (X,708-10) What happens, as representative of Adam and Eve's illogic is a Cosmic illogic in which "like" wars with "like" (when logically they should be empathetic): "Beast now with Beast gan war, and Fowl with Fowl,/ And Fish with Fish; to graze the Herb all leaving,/ Devour'd each other". (X,710-12)

* * *

Yet, there is some logic preserved in the universe. This applies even to the evil forces, as with them, "like" is drawn to "like". Recall that at one point Sin acknowledges:

```
. . . whatever draws me on
Or sympathy, or some connatural force
Powerful at greatest distance to unite
With secret amity the things of like kind
By secretest conveyance . . .
```

(IX,245-49)

Therefore, Sin and Death are still ruled by logical laws preserved by God, but they do not realize this fact as they are hampered in their "Reason" by an "ignorance of causes".

As it is, after man's Fall, the evil forces follow a circumscribed pattern, and are perpetually restricted (and damned) in the most inferior of "spheres" of being, by the will of God. This ensures the preservation upon the Earth of those good influences still not completely annihilated within the soul of mankind. What, moreover, is evidenced in the context preserved for Adam and Eve is obviously that here too logical laws still apply -- despite the effort to have breached the boundaries set up by logic. For, as Adam decides to eat the forbidden fruit, he makes an
acknowledgement parallel to Sin's acknowledgement of the logical law governing "likes": "I feel/ The Bond of Nature draw me to my own,/ My own in thee, for what thou art is mine" (IX, 955-57) And so, man, also, still follows logical laws despite his sin in intent to fall with Eve. However, unlike the restricted pattern the evil forces follow in conjunction with logical laws, man is allowed mobility and not denied hope for that upward movement through the "spheres" of being, so that he may become finally "superior".

* * *

* * *
Up to this point has been treated the definite connection between the "invention" of arguments and Paradise Lost. This connection has been demonstrated with a specific care for detail. What follows now is the second part of logic, the "disposition" of arguments and its connection to Paradise Lost. "Disposition" in Milton's Logic is only about three-quarters as long as "invention". My own treatment of it, however, is clearly not intended to reflect the space which Milton devotes in his Logic to this second part of logic. The reason for this is, of course, that my thesis is already so extended with the detail involved in my treatment of the first part of logic. A detailed study of "disposition" alone and its connection to Paradise Lost could generate a thesis -- and up to this time, no one has exploited the opportunity for such a study.

John Milton explains disposition by means of a similitude, suggesting that just as the first part of grammar deals with single words, the second
part with their syntax, so the first part of logic has dealt with the finding of arguments (single terms for things), and the second part is concerned with their organization into some coherent form: "disposition is thus the syntax as it were of the arguments". Milton goes on to assert that there is a distinction between "disposition" and "judgment" — which is contrary to Ramus' belief and basically means that the organization of terms into an ordered sequence of words readily apprehendable by a literate Reason precedes the judgment of the value of that band of words. Thus, that Milton composed a connected series of bands of words, called Paradise Lost, precedes our judgment of their individual, as well as total, value. However, let us proceed to scratch a bit of that detailed surface which comprises disposition, i.e., by dealing with "axiom", "syllogism", and "method".

* * *

Milton comments that "An axiom is a disposition of one argument with another, by which something is shown to be or not to be." He describes it in greater detail by saying that its structure is comprised of two parts: the first part, the "antecedent", is commonly called the "minor term" or the "subject"; the second part, the "consequent", is commonly called the "major term" or the "predicate" since it contains what is predicated or said of the "subject". To illustrate these things by an example, let us take the basic logical axiom we formulated in the previous chapter: "Satan is in essence not at all greater than, or even equal to, but less than man." The two arguments involved here are, of course, the "essence of Satan" and the "essence of man". The disposition of the one with the other generates this statement I have labeled as an "axiom". In addition, since "An axiom is true when it speaks as the thing is; false when it does the opposite", we can judge this particular axiom as being a "true logical axiom". It is also a "compound" true logical axiom because "A compound axiom is that the band whereof is a conjunction." It is called "compound", moreover, because "the statement is multiplex, for it can be resolved into several simple statements." Therefore, our "compound true logical axiom"

1 Refer to Chapter III, p. 113 of my thesis.
can be resolved into the form: Satan is in essence not at all greater than man and Satan is in essence not even equal to man, but instead Satan is in essence less than man.

John Milton continues that a true axiom is either "contingent" or "necessary": contingent when it can be false sometimes and necessary when it is true all the time. Therefore, it is contingent (conditional) that "Satan is in essence not at all greater than, nor even equal to, but less than man." The contingency of the statement rests upon the double condition that, "If indeed it is the case that Satan fell, and if indeed God gives man saving grace -- despite man's Fall -- then the axiom is true." Since we know that Satan fell, and since we know that God reserves a special grace for man, it is true that Satan is in essence less than man.

The judgment of this contingent truth is called "settled opinion". In the context of past and present things, settled opinion is certain -- as it plainly applies to our axiom. However, this does not remove the possibility (contingency) that it might have been otherwise. John Milton proceeds to say that although human judgment of past and present things is indeed called "settled opinion", yet it is not "knowledge", "for knowledge comes from arguments that have an immutable affect." Adam knows the very distinctions made in this kind of theory of judgment, and he quite appropriately applies them to an explanation of the dream which Eve had in Bk. V:

[Fancy] forms Imaginations, Aery shapes,
Which Reason joining or disjoining, frames
All what we affirm or what deny, and call
Our knowledge or opinion . . .

Here, the contingency of what Eve thought she saw in her dream does not rest upon the possibilities involved in a span of time, but rather the possibilities involved in the mutability of sense perception. Milton's theory of judgment can logically apply to both contexts.

That "God is the greatest thing of anything there is", is a true logical axiom which both Adam in *Paradise Lost* and Milton himself in

---

2 See Milton's *Logic*, p. 311, for a fuller explanation.
3 Bk. V, 11. 103-06. The italics are mine.
Milton's discussion on "syllogism", wherein he first of all comments: "It is dianoia; therefore it is a discursive process of the mind and reason" (365), and then again, "Such gathering up or deduction has arisen from the weakness of the human intellect, which because it is not able by the first intuition (noetic) to see the truth and falsity of things, in the axiom, turns to the syllogism in order to judge of their consequence and lack of consequence by its means."

What Milton has said here is quite important. Man can reach truth through the discursive process but it is clearly a more difficult process which bespeaks a human weakness. When this theory is applied to that most elaborate context in which strings of axioms are used, the Council in Hell, we see very evidently that the fallen angels are going about things with muddled heads. They were once and still should be of the "intuitive" kind, yet, they employ the "discursive" process in their arguments, which bespeaks their weakness (or "inferiority"). Although the discursive process can still be fashioned into the straight-edged form of logic, the fallen angels frill it with verbal ornamentation, and so fashion it into the loose form of rhetoric. Milton alludes to this when he pictures Belial in the Council, "cloth'd in reason's garb" (II, 226), and more definitely when he pictures the fallen angels after their "decision" in the Council, "In discourse more sweet/ (For Eloquence the Soul, Song charms the Sense)." (II, 555-56) And we know, of course, that inflated sophistry is the hated bane of logicians.

Milton appends to his treatment of correct syllogism the faults of incorrect syllogistic argumentation. This offers much in the study of the "reasoning" employed in that Council in Hell. The area is too copious for me to handle in this thesis: "The matter of the syllogism is faulty as often as part of the antecedent, either one or the other, is false; this can happen in as many modes as there are kinds of arguments." (381)

Harry Frissell touches upon some of the misuses of the syllogism, specifically involving the "dilemma" used in Mammon's speech in Hell, the "hypothetical

---

6 Milton's Logic, p. 367. The italics are mine.
his Logic would consider "knowledge" -- ex hypothesi. This, of course, means that it is a necessarily true axiom. Milton feels that even of necessary things, "if we are ignorant of their cause, we evidently have opinion about them also." (311) Satan refuses to know that "God is the greatest thing there is", and he goes so far as actually to deny this axiom in various ways, preferring to be "self-begot". Yet, as hard as Satan would try, a "self-deluded" opinion on this necessary axiom can never make the axiom itself into opinion.

* * *

"Dianoetic disposition" occurs in a method of reasoning in which "one axiom is deduced from another". (365) It involves either "syllogism", which refers to argumentation, or "method", which refers to organization. Syllogism involves, of course, "discursive reason" which complements, only as a second-best method, "intuitive reason". Harry Frissell commented some twenty years ago in his thesis: "But no one has explored the full potentialities of the distinction between discursive and intuitive reason."  

Frissell himself certainly has not fully explored their distinction in any regard to Paradise Lost; he merely sketches it for us in about one page, using as an example those celebrated lines by Raphael:

... and reason is her [the Soul's] being, Discursive, or Intuitive; discourse Is oftest yours, the latter most is ours, Differing but in degree, of kind the same.  

Unfortunately to this day, "the full potentialities" of discursive and intuitive reason have yet to be explored in detail. No one has even specifically pointed out that the obvious source of Raphael's distinction comes from

5 Bk. V, 11. 487-90. The italics are mine.
syllogism" used by Satan in an attempt to deceive Eve, and the "sorites" in Satan's address to the forbidden fruit of the Tree in Eve's dream. However, Frissell does not investigate these things to any depth or treat them in any systematic order according to the Art of Logic.

My addition to all this concerns the most common mistake in syllogism which is known as a "vicious argument". This occurs when an antecedent is somehow brought forward into the conclusion, the most general example of which resides in Bk. II. Satan begins his speech before the Council with a great insistence upon "free choice"(II,19), as a saving grace in what has so far befallen the rebels. This seems to be meant for the fallen angels to keep in mind during their Council on "deciding" what move to make next against God. But the way in which Satan frames the question before the Council suggests a predetermined "choice": "and by what best way, whether of open war or covert guile, we now debate". This suggests first of all that there shall be some move against God, and secondly that one of these moves "might be", "covert guile". This is an indicator that Satan throughout the debate keeps this "choice" like an ace up his sleeve which he will play most effectively when the other angels have to their own self-deluded satisfaction gone through their empty protocol of empty debate.

Throughout the process of the debate, Milton disposes the order of the arguments quite logically. First, Moloch comes strongly with a vote for "open war"(II,51); then Belial and Mammon both weaken this argument by following with a vote for non-war -- the two votes for inaction logically must combine to cancel out the more evident force behind a vote for action. And lastly, Beelzebub ends the string of arguments with a final appealing "alternative": "What if we find/ Some easier enterprise?"(II,344-45) Beelzebub's final words clearly rehearse Satan's initial words, for he similarly speaks about a "choice" of action: "how

---

7 Frissell, op. cit., "dilemma" p. 201; "hypothetical syllogism" p. 203; and "sorites" p. 207.
8 Milton makes two references to the "vicious argument" in his Logic, p. 371 and p. 403.
9 Bk. II, ll. 40-42. The italics are mine.
attempted best/ By force or subtlety".10 And these words remain most convincingly in the mind since they are the closest in the memory. In this way, then, the "question proposed"(371) is demonstrated as entering the conclusion, so that the argument becomes "vicious". Milton deliberately acknowledges that the whole Council generates a general vicious argument when he inserts this comment into his epic poem: "Thus Beelzebub/ Plead his devilish Counsel, first devis'd/ By Satan, and in part propos'd".(II,378-80)

As a last note along these lines, it seems that the whole purpose of the Council involves a call to decide on some definite action. The "choice" was either for "open War" or "covert guile". Two of the fallen angels preferred a third, non-action in Hell. What the Council comes up with is "covert guile" which resides somewhere between "open War" and "non-action". This sort of "action" surely is action only second-best; it indeed bespeaks the propensity of the fallen angels for inaction! Instead of deciding on a clear vote for war or no-war with Heaven, they deviate the question and "decide" on an indirection by using guile upon the Earth.-- thus not meeting the problem directly, but backstabbing (as it were) from another quarter.

* * *

Most simply put, "method", in Milton's mind is the same as "order" -- which according to Aristotle is "among the greatest goods".(471) This order of things ought to be of such an arrangement that "what is clearer in itself should precede, what is more obscure should follow."(473) The method in Milton's Logic is, of course, a disposition "of various homogeneous axioms, that is, of those which pertain to the same thing, and are referred to the same end."(471) Methodological disposition in poetry simply applies to the entire series of statements comprising the poem. All the statements made in all the lines of Paradise Lost, therefore, in one long continuous strain ("band") are intended to reflect the one great Argument to "justify the ways of God to men".(I,26)

There are several ways of ordering things. One of them is by time, so that "whatever is before in consecutiveness of existing"(473) comes first. Milton adheres to this in the general structure of his epic poem.

10 Bk. II, 11. 357-58. The italics are mine.
The sphere of the angels who were first created concerns us mainly in the first six books; then the sphere of man in his creation and his own Fall concerns us in the last six. That Milton had a precisely ordered structure in mind for *Paradise Lost* (which involved a "bifurcational" division pattern) is plainly indicated at the beginning of Bk. VII when he prays to his Muse not to let his poetry wander too far "unrein'd" because, "Half yet remains unsung."  

Harry Frissell briefly demonstrates that the epic poem can be partitioned yet into smaller sections according to the bifurcational pattern: "It is therefore striking to note that every book of *Paradise Lost* consists of two distinct sections."  

Method also "continually progresses from universals, as those which contain causes, to particulars."  

That *Paradise Lost* progresses logically is plainly demonstrated by the order various contextual and topical concerns take. Milton has spread the "contextual concerns" through his poem, so that in the order of time we are exposed to the spiritual context, first, of the fallen angels, next of God and the faithful angels, and then of the corporeal order to which Adam and Eve belong. The "topical concerns" to which we are exposed are, first the story of the Fall of the angels, and then the story of the creation and finally the Fall of mankind. Therefore a general pattern is discernible, although it is admittedly not absolutely adhered to everywhere (to allow for the versatility of the poetic art); and that general pattern proceeds logically from the greater to the smaller reference, from Heaven usually to the concern on Earth. And this pattern is repeatedly reflected in the order of the analyses in this thesis, i.e., commonly from the general causes of things, to the logical particulars of those things, which means a discussion from God to the Angels, and then to Mankind.  

It must be observed, however, that the continual progress of the whole of *Paradise Lost* is quite lengthy. Therefore Milton suggests, "bands of transition, for this restores and refreshes the hearer."  

A transition can be either "perfect" or "imperfect": the perfect one recapitulates briefly what has gone before and indicates what will follow. The example Milton uses (which also applies to the transition I previously used in this thesis) is: "Up to this point has been treated the first part of the art of logic" etc.; the imperfect transition either recapitulates what has been said or indicates...
what will follow. In *Paradise Lost*, Milton employs twelve bands of "imperfect" transitions. They are placed at the beginning of each Book, and briefly they summarize in prose what will transpire in the poetic account. The imperfect transition is required simply for brevity's sake, as the speediest way of leading into the next lengthy band of poetry. Thus Milton breaks the immense progress of his epic poem up into more assimilable form.

John Milton has wanted to teach something "easily and perspicuously"(481), which applied to *Paradise Lost* refers to general precepts of faith taught in a clear and pleasing way. He continues that "poets, orators, and all writers of every sort"(481), in order to teach with facility, follow a clear method, "though they do not always move in it and insist on it."(481) From this, Milton proceeds in his *Logic* to analyse the organization of various works by Vergil, Ovid, and Cicero. This, of course, is exactly what I have done in this last chapter regarding Milton's logical method and his own work of poetry. Milton ends his treatment of method with this final acknowledgment of the special method of the poets and orators: "But when the auditor is to be allured with pleasure or some stronger impulse by an orator or a poet -- a crypsis of method will usually be employed."(483-85) This involves for example "digressions", "lingerings", and "inversions" -- gambits in the poetic method which are traceable in *Paradise Lost*. However, this begins to border upon that other discipline, "rhetoric", for as Milton concludes: "But their own doctrine of method is to be turned over to the orators and poets."(485) Yet, we must remember that logic is involved even in rhetoric, since logic permeates all the arts and is that fundamental basis upon which the other arts should be built, if they are to have order and if they are to make sense.

* * *

**PART 2**

"Conclusion"

I have approached this thesis with the idea of generating it into a "logical demonstration" that there is a direct connection between the *Art of Logic* and *Paradise Lost*. This logical demonstration works on the
basis that all the proper elements of Milton's Logic are present in his epic poem. Certainly there are natural processes of the mind which can make anybody's poetry "logical" -- that is simply how a good mind works -- but I have shown that the elements of Milton's Logic are present in his epic poem in directly related terminology.

My conclusion needs no long rehearsal of what I have already demonstrated at length in the body of this thesis. Briefly, what was shown with rather careful detail is that the basic elements of "invention" are evident in Paradise Lost: first of all, the primitive artificial arguments of cause, effect, subject, adjunct, contrast, and comparison; then to a less detailed degree, the derived artificial arguments of etymology, distribution, and definition; and finally, the inartificial argument of testimony. What was then shown more generally, but hopefully with as much power for convincing, was that the elements of "disposition" are also evident in Paradise Lost -- which involves, of course, axiom, syllogism, and method.

My thesis may rightly be considered as an extended hypothetical syllogism. It posits the conditional proposition: "If all the elements that comprise Milton's Logic are clearly demonstrated as evident in his epic poem, then Milton applied his own theory of logic to his epic poem". The thesis itself forms a demonstration that all the elements of Milton's Logic are present in the epic poem -- as shown in detail of "invention", and generally of "disposition". Therefore, the thesis proposition is logically true and becomes not a mere "opinion", but a "settled opinion", the truth about which one can be "certain". And so, it must finally be recognized that John Milton did not merely generate an "epic" poem in Paradise Lost, but he generated a "logical" poem, definitely related to the principles of logic to which he, himself, prescribes as avowed by the very fact of his own Art of Logic.

* * *
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources:


"Peter Ramus of Vermandois, the King's Professor, his Dialectica in two booke." "Not onely translated into English, but also digested into questions and answers for the more facility of understanding", by Robert Fage, Gentleman. London: Printed by W. J., 1632.

Secondary Materials:


