THE QUEBEC QUESTION AND THE PARTI QUÉBÉCOIS:
A CLASS PERSPECTIVE
THE QUEBEC QUESTION
AND THE PARTI QUEBECOIS:
A CLASS PERSPECTIVE

by
ROBERT JOHN WRIGHT, B.A.

A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Master of Arts
McMaster University
February 1982
MASTER OF ARTS (1932)  McMaster UNIVERSITY
(Political Science)  Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE:  The Quebec Question and the Parti Québécois: A Class Perspective

AUTHOR:  Robert John Wright, B.A. (McMaster University)

SUPERVISOR:  Dr. Michael B. Stein

PAGES:  v, 232
ABSTRACT

The initial objective of this thesis was to provide an understanding of the Quebec question. It begins by postulating that it is primarily a national question in that it involves the historical struggle of Quebecers towards achieving their own independent nation-state. It goes on to analyze the various social, political, economic, cultural and ideological forces which affect the Quebec case, from the perspective of class analysis.

The second major objective of the thesis was to provide an understanding of the nature of the Parti Québécois, and its role in the present conjuncture of relations in Quebec. On a theoretical level we addressed the "new petite bourgeoisie problematic" in neo-Marxist literature, asking: "What is the nature of the new petite bourgeoisie in contemporary capitalist society, and specifically in Quebec?"

We argued that the P.Q. is a party of the new petite bourgeoisie in Quebec and its program -- sovereignty-association -- is primarily designed to satisfy the interests of this class, and not the interests of the Quebec collectivity. The implication is that the significance of its programme can only be conjunctural. Sovereignty-association, if successfully achieved, would bring about an ephemeral, symbolic independence for the Quebec nation; at best an incomplete solution to the Quebec national question.

iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To begin, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Dr. Michael B. Stein, without whose undying patience this thesis could not have been completed. His helpful comments and criticisms, along with those of the other committee members -- Dr. Marshall Goldstein, and Dr. William Coleman -- were without question essential to the content of this thesis. Yet its faults are all my own.

Very special thanks must go out to fellow students in the Political Science Department at McMaster University who provided continual intellectual challenge and debate. Among them: Steve Dankowich, Tad Kawecki, Tom Baker, Teresa Rokas, Mike Adams, Geoff Bourne, Ed Reece. But most of all I would like to thank them for their friendship.

Similar thanks must also go to friends at Ryerson Polytechnical Institute who endured my moods through the latter stages of the thesis. Among them: Chris Hayes, Anne Mason-Apps, Ric Davey, Gary Michaluk, Jerry Davey (who was kind enough to lend me his typewriter).

But most of all I would like to express thanks to my closest friends who suffered most through the ups and downs of this thesis: Ilka Szachniewicz, Robert, Elizabeth, Kathryn, Christina, and Horton Wright.

Robert Wright
Toronto, Ontario
April, 1982.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT** ......................................................... iii

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** ............................................... iv

**TABLE OF CONTENTS** .............................................. v

**INTRODUCTION** .................................................... 1

References .......................................................... 15

**CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

(i) Class Analysis ................................................. 17

(ii) Nation and Nationalism ........................................ 31

References .......................................................... 36

**CHAPTER THREE: QUEBEC HISTORY (1534-1960)**

(i) Quebec History ............................................... 39

References .......................................................... 52

**CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND CLASS ANALYSIS OF QUEBEC (1960-1976)**

Introduction ....................................................... 58

(ii) Underdevelopment of Quebec and Canada ...................... 59

(iii) Class Analysis of Quebec:

(a) The Bourgeoisie .............................................. 68

(b) The New Petite Bourgeoisie ................................ 71

(c) The Working Class ............................................ 73

(iii) State-Class Relations ........................................ 79

References .......................................................... 92

Appendices .......................................................... 103

**CHAPTER FIVE: THE PARTI QUEBECOIS: FORMATION, COMPOSITION, HISTORY, PROGRAMME**

(i) Formation and Composition of the P.Q. ...................... 112


(iv) The P.Q.'s Programme: A Synopsis ......................... 144

References .......................................................... 148

**CHAPTER SIX: THE PARTI QUEBECOIS: A CLASS PERSPECTIVE**

(i) Class Analysis of the P.Q. .................................. 157

References .......................................................... 178

**CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION** ................................ 181

Conclusion .......................................................... 181

References .......................................................... 210

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** .................................................... 214
CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION
Over 400 years have passed since Jacques Cartier discovered Canada (1534), and it is almost four centuries ago that Champlain found Quebec (1608). Why then is there, today more than ever, a "Quebec question"? ... (It is) a question asked for such a long time that, paradoxically, it is flagrantly up to date ... 1

It is the objective of this thesis to present its author's perceptions of the "Quebec question" in both its historical and contemporary manifestations. In researching this thesis it was found that there are nearly as many interpretations of this question as there are authors studying it. Some argue that it is simply a conflict between French and English ethno-cultural-linguistic-religious groups that reside in Canada; a conflict made inevitable after the conquest of New France by Britain in 1760. Nationalism is seen as the inevitable result of this conflict. Others emphasize economic factors as the root of the problem -- i.e. Quebecers have an unequal share of Canada's economic distribution. Others say Quebec is a satellite of the Canadian imperialist metropolis, which is itself a satellite of the dominant U.S. metropolis; and this accounts for the crisis. Social (class) relations between and within Quebec and Canada are emphasized by others as the root cause -- i.e. the subordinate classes in Quebec are reacting against the domination of the bourgeoisie. Others see the problem as essentially
"political" in nature -- i.e. Quebec is subordinated politically within the Canadian federal system and Quebecers will not be satisfied until they are in control of their own sovereign nation-state. Finally, still others provide a synthesis of these approaches as an explanation of the question -- such as Rioux who argues that the coalescence of class consciousness and nationalist consciousness has forged an "ethnic class" identity among Quebecers, and the current conflict revolves around this. In studying this question only one thing becomes clear: that it is of immeasurable complexity and cannot be reduced to single-factor or one-dimensional interpretations. Each of the above interpretations are simultaneously correct, because each is a partial revelation of the reality of the Quebec question, and incorrect, because each is an insufficient explanation. Therefore, this thesis will neither attempt to write the definitive analysis of the "Quebec question", nor to demonstrate the validity of any one of these interpretations. We shall begin by postulating that the present manifestation of the Quebec question is primarily a national question. It involves the historical struggle of many Quebecers towards achieving national sovereignty for the Quebec nation. But it also involves those Quebecers, and outsiders, who have struggled against the achievement of an independent Quebec, as well as those who do neither, or
are indifferent. To understand the nature of the Quebec national question it is, therefore, necessary to understand the internal dynamics of the Quebec nation, as well as those external forces which influence this question. Thus we shall look at the relations between the various social, political, economic, cultural and ideological forces involved in the Quebec question. It is felt that the best approach available to deal with such relations is class analysis.

The contemporary use of class analysis, as the study of relations between definable groups within a social formation, falls largely within either one of two approaches. From the liberal, or Weberian approach, classes are seen as categories definable either by empirical indices, such as income level, or by abstract notions such as power, rank or status. The resultant conflict between classes is seen as one of many "problems" faced by society, for which there are "solutions" available. The assumption is that this conflict is not irreconcilable, but, rather, that it can be if not solved, then at least managed by reasonable compromise or agreement. Politics is seen as the arena where various groups or classes compete or bargain for their just rewards. Conflict is actually seen, in some circles, as positive. In Miliband's words: "(Some see conflict) as not only civilized, but also civilizing. It is not only a means of resolving problems in a peaceful way, but also of producing new ideas, ensuring
progress, achieving ever-greater harmony, and so on. Conflict is functional, a stabilizing rather than disruptive force.  

From the socialist, or Marxist, perspective class is seen as a highly disruptive and dynamic force; historically, as well as in modern society. Class is primarily, though not exclusively, defined by one's relationship to the means of production in a given social formation. Using a historical-materialist conception, Marx argued that in all class-divided societies the subordinate class will in time rise up and overthrow its oppressor -- the dominant class. Conflict is seen as a means of achieving a new order, not of preserving or managing the old one. Politics is viewed as the arena where the dominant class perpetuates its dominance, and where the subordinate class must mobilize to challenge this dominance in order to transcend its own subordination. Class divisions are seen as irreconcilable; harmony as tenuous, unstable and illusory.

It is primarily the latter approach to class analysis that we will be concerned with. But this approach is not without its problems. For one, Marxism, as it has evolved over the past century, often stresses a rigid materialist (economic) conception of class. From this view class is seen as determined solely by one's position in the production process. All other phenomena are viewed as but a reflection of the level of material (class) relations, which are determinant in all instances. Politics, culture and ideology are thereby reduced to a mere epiphenomenal existence. This
'economic determinism' has often been falsely attributed to Marx, but the fault lies primarily in his interpreters. As Carl Boggs said, "Such a crude materialist conception of Marx helps to explain why so few Marxist theorists have been sensitive to the political role of ideologies and consciousness. It is a debilitating legacy that continues to obstruct the Marxist left even today." The theoretical approach to the study of class used in this thesis will depart from this rigid materialist conception. Relations between classes and class fractions, as well as their relationship to the state, is a highly complex and dynamic one which cannot be understood by simple formulae. Although it is certain that in the long-term ("in the final instance") material relations do play a large role in historical developments, the interplay of an ever-changing complex of forces -- such as politics, ideology, culture -- is often determinant, especially in conjunctural periods of social change.

Another problem, which stems from this first one, has been termed the 'new petite bourgeoisie problematic.' Society is viewed from a dialectical perspective which emphasizes primarily the role of only two classes: the working class and the bourgeoisie. Thus, the petite bourgeoisie (or middle class, or intermediate strata) is seen as having no autonomous existence and, therefore, is of little or no long-term significance. But the persistence of a strata of individuals who can neither easily be called working class
or bourgeoisie in contemporary capitalist society makes this
dualistic conception of classes somewhat problematical. And,
more importantly, the very crucial role these individuals play
in the contemporary Quebec question makes their theoretical
understanding a necessity. Our own research has drawn on the
insights of Antonio Gramsci and several recent neo-Marxist
theorists such as Nicos Poulantzas, all of whom were concerned
with these very theoretical problems. The class analysis
used throughout this thesis focuses on ideological and
political relations between classes, and not simply their
economic or social relations. In this way ideological,
political, and cultural phenomena are not seen as simply
effects of the level of economic relations. From this departure
we will relax the 'orthodox' Marxist interpretation of classes
by viewing the state as somewhat autonomous and potentially
determinant in capitalist society. Also, we shall see the
petite bourgeoisie as a somewhat autonomous social category
which is also potentially determinant, especially in short-
term and conjunctural periods. (This will be elaborated in
Chapter two).

Another problem which has afflicted Marxist approaches
in the past is that of sterile dogmatism. From the historical
materialist perspective, the working class is seen as inevitably
rising up and overthrowing its oppressor, the bourgeoisie,
and establishing a classless society. The only question
that remains in the short-term then, from this perspective,
is "What means will best serve these ends?" But the question in most cases becomes, "How must this come about?" Several schools have evolved with their own "orthodox" Marxist (or Marxist-Leninist or the infinite variety of combinations derived from Stalinism, Trotskyism, Maoism, etc.) interpretation which, in most cases, offers a universal solution to the problem of bringing about socialism and excludes all or most other solutions. The problem is not whether these are valid or desirable means, but, rather, that they are offered as universal truths. It is felt here that socialism can come about through any number of means. Revolutionary transformation through class struggle, while likely, even imminent, cannot be considered inevitable. It is beyond the scope of any method to predict this unequivocably. The unfolding of such an eventuality, it is felt here, would demonstrate the strength and accuracy of prediction in the Marxian method, not its absolute truth. Furthermore, each situation has its own peculiar circumstances and idiosyncracies and must be understood in its own specificity. Dogma can only lead to the narrowing of alternatives, not to their expansion. Thus the approach used here will be essentially non-dogmatic and non-sectarian in nature.

Another theoretical problem which should be mentioned here is that theory is often used to replace the reality it is attempting to depict. Theoretical statements that can
neither be "proven" true nor false, are offered as universal truths. Then events are selectively chosen and squeezed into theoretical categories to "prove" their validity. To overcome this, we have chosen, constructed and applied a flexible theoretical approach which corresponds to the specificity of the Quebec case. It is not offered as a universally applicable approach. It is meant to be only a framework for the analysis of the historical and contemporary manifestations of the Quebec question. It will, hopefully, be capable of taking into account a wide variety of interpretations, but, also, of offering its own. There may be problems inherent in using such a flexible and eclectic approach, but it is felt here that given the immense complexity of the question, it is the only useful approach.

Chapter two will elucidate this approach by presenting a framework for the analysis of class, state, party, nation, and nationalism, and the relationship between these phenomena. From this starting point we will reveal, in Chapter three, the historical nature of the Quebec question by tracing and analyzing the roots and development of the problem. The 1760-1960 period will be analyzed with particular emphasis placed on the economic, political and ideological relations within Quebec and between Quebec and Canada. Emphasis will be placed on the trends emerging in the post-1945 period which were to have such a tremendous impact on the present conjuncture of relations.
Chapter four will examine the specific nature of these trends and their effects during the 1960-1976 period. It will begin by analyzing the underdeveloped character of the Quebec economy (vis-a-vis Ontario and the U.S. metropoles) and the effect this has on Quebecers and the Quebec nation. The implication is that certainly to some degree these economic factors must be seen as preconditions for the rise of a Quebec nationalist and independentist movement. This chapter will then analyze the various classes and class fractions operating in the contemporary Quebec situation and, specifically, their relationship to the Quebec state during the post-1960 period. The purpose is to illustrate the development of classes during this period, but, more specifically, the development of the new petite bourgeoisie, as well as its politicization and self-assertion as a class. The remaining chapters will focus specifically on the Parti Québécois and the role this party plays in the contemporary manifestation of the Quebec question.

Chapter five analyzes the class composition of the various elements which formed the party -- the RIN, the RN, and MSA -- to show their common 'new petit bourgeois' background and independentist goals, but also to underline the diversity of political and ideological positions taken by these elements. The chapter goes on to emphasize the MSA's control of the party's political/ideological direction
and of the Quebec nationalist movement. It analyzes the party's rise to power (1968-1976), focusing on the internal struggle between moderates (technocrats) and radicals to make clear that the Quebec national movement is not unified by a single monolithic ideology, and that the evolution of the party's programme and strategy is a result of the dynamic interaction of these elements. This period marked a gradual consolidation of the dominance of the moderates within the party. Part two of this chapter will look at the P.Q. in power (1976-1982) to show how the party attempted to implement its programme and achieve its objectives. The implication is that the party's 'orthodoxy' results both from the dominance of the moderate faction and from the structural constraints imposed by the North American political and economic environment -- manifested in threats or pressure from the most powerful elements operating in Quebec. The final section of Chapter five will examine the official programme of the P.Q. (as of 1980) as it appears in the party's two major policy documents -- Quebec-Canada: A New Deal, which outlines the specific nature of the desired sovereignty-association; and, Challenges for Quebec: A Statement on Economic Policy, which presents the party's long-term social, political, economic and cultural objectives, and calls for corporatism-cum-social democracy.

Chapter six will take the theorizations of class and party developed in Chapter two and apply them to the P.Q.
It will begin by looking briefly at the debate on the class specificity of the P.Q. We will try to show that the P.Q. is a party of the new petite bourgeoisie in Quebec, but that it is split into two factions — the moderates, who have a fundamentally bourgeois class position, and the radicals, who have a fundamentally working class position. Because the party has long been dominated by the former, its programme tends to favour the bourgeoisie. It will be argued that this is so because this faction's political/ideological position assumes the state is a neutral arbiter between competing groups and that through the state it (the P.Q.) can achieve harmony between these groups. This denial of, or at least underestimation of, the significance of class conflict and its irreconcilability, guarantees the perpetuation of bourgeois dominance, but in a disguised form, through the dominance of petite bourgeois ideology. The argument that will be made is that such a solution can only be conjunctural. Sovereignty-association, if successfully achieved, would bring about a partial independence for the Quebec nation; at best an incomplete solution to the historical Quebec national question. And that, in reality, the technocratic faction of the P.Q. articulates such an ideology centered around nationalism because it is primarily designed to serve its own class interests, rather than the interests of the Quebec collectivity.

In the conclusion we shall address ourselves to the debate among left-wing academics in Quebec over whether the
P.Q. (and sovereignty-association) is supportable or not. We will look critically at the various positions offered and take our own position in this debate. First, we will look at the "Determinist-Marxist" position of Fournier, Bourque and others. This position generally implies an outright rejection of the P.Q. and sovereignty-association as "bourgeois" in nature. We will argue that this position is unacceptable because it begins with a determinist conception of class relations. This leads to the faulty assumption that the bourgeoisie's dominance at the economic level necessarily entails its dominance at the political level. Since the P.Q. is, at present, the politically/ideologically dominant force in Quebec politics, it is of necessity, according to this view, an expression of bourgeois dominance at the economic level. This sterile and dogmatic position is fundamentally reductionist in nature and offers little insight into an analysis of the P.Q. and its role in the contemporary manifestation of the Quebec question.

We will then look at the "Anarchist" critique of the P.Q. and sovereignty-association, contained in the works of Roussopoulos, Vallières and others. Their analysis of the P.Q. is essentially identical to our own as presented in Chapter six below, but it goes on to reject the P.Q. and sovereignty-association as reformist because it does not call for revolution. We will argue that this approach is
unacceptable because it fails to recognize the advantages inherent in the successful achievement of sovereignty-association, namely that: it would remove Quebec from political subordination to the Canadian state; it would advance the political/ideological position of Quebec's popular classes by enabling them to transcend their narrow nationalist ('anglophobic') ideology and focus specifically on the deeper cause of their national subordination -- capitalist relations of production and the political structures (the state) which perpetuate these relations; it would enable the P.Q.'s self-proclaimed neutrality and its ideology based on the 'neutral state' thesis, to be de-mystified; political/ideological discourse in a legally independent Quebec would likely be shifted substantially to the left, whereby a polarization of parties along class lines would be entirely possible. This advancement of the working class's ideological position would lead it to a level of consciousness whereby it could become an effective political force. In fact, it will be argued that the working class's appearance as an autonomous force struggling on the political level against class subordination precisely depends upon its reaching such a level of consciousness. And, only then can a strategy to solve the historical "Quebec question" be formulated. It is therefore argued that the best position the working class and socialists can take in the present conjuncture of relations in Quebec, is a "tactical support" of the P.Q.'s sovereignty-
association project. This is consistent, in its recommendation, with the position of Rioux, Milner, the Centre Formation Populaire (CFP), and others, but has been arrived at, generally, through a different set of premises. In conclusion, it is argued that the P.Q.'s sovereignty-association project is not the ultimate answer to the Quebec question but it is a step in the right direction, towards national liberation.
REFERENCES

1Marcel Rioux, Quebec in Question,(Toronto: 1978), p. 3.

2The ethno-cultural interpretation is used by a number of English Canadian historians and political scientists such as P.B. Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation, 1864-1867, A.R.M. Lower, Colony to Nation: A History of Canada, F.H. Underhill, The Image of Confederation, Ramsay Cook (ed), French-Canadian Nationalism: An Anthology, and Donald Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the Seventies. The economic interpretation is best expressed by Mason Wade, The French Canadians, 1760-1967, Garth Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union, and Milner and Milner, The Decolonization of Quebec. Most left-wing sectarian groups, such as the Workers Communist Party, October, focus primarily on class relations as the fundamental problem. The Parti Quebecois, as expressed in its party documents and the statements and writings of its major ideologists, sees the conflict as essentially political in nature. For this see Lévesque, An Option for Quebec, and Claude Morin, Quebec versus Ottawa: The Struggle for Self-Government. Marcel Rioux argues the ethnic-class thesis in several books including, French-Canadian Society and Quebec in Question.


5By conjunctural we mean a temporal period (usually short-term) where changes are brought about "within the system" which, though not revolutionary, are nevertheless significant and which often cause a disruption in the relationship between various elements operating within the social formation. Examples might be the rise of the welfare state in Western Capitalist societies in the post-WWII period, or even, though maybe arguably not, the rise of fascism in Europe in the 1920's and 1930's. The point is that these changes have impact in the short-term, but do not have long-term implications which threaten the fundamental interests in society.
The debate as to whether Quebec constitutes a nation or not will not be taken up at any length in this thesis. Instead, we will make the theoretically derived assumption that Quebec does constitute a nation (See Chapter two below) and refer those who are interested in pursuing the debate to Stanley Ryerson, "Quebec: Concepts of Class and Nation", in Gary Teeple (ed), Capitalism and the National Question in Canada.
CHAPTER TWO:

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
(i) Class Analysis

Though Marx himself never formulated an explicit 'theory of class', class analysis forms the foundation of and permeates most of his writing. He began by defining a class as an aggregate of individuals with a common relationship to the means of production. In capitalist society there exists two principal classes. The first, the bourgeoisie or capitalist class, owns the means of production, and generally operates on the political and ideological level towards preserving the existing economic and political structures in order to maintain its own dominance. The second class, the proletariat or working class, owns the labour power by which to work the means of production, and generally, when mobilized, works on the ideological and political level towards transforming existing economic and political relations in order to end its subordinate condition. Thus of course the interests of the two classes are antagonistic and largely irreconcilable. Marx recognized the existence of other classes, such as 'intermediate strata', but felt that in advanced capitalist society the principal classes would polarize and that the intermediate strata would inevitably disappear or become absorbed by one of the main classes. Therefore, he did not give this class
much long-term significance. Although, as we have seen some fractions of this intermediate strata (such as the so-called 'traditional petite bourgeoisie' -- independent commodity producers, craftsmen, artisans, shopkeepers, etc.) are in the process of dissolution, the ascendency of new intermediate strata (variously called the 'new petite bourgeoisie' or 'new middle class' and made up primarily of workers in non-manual, intellectual, or technical occupations) has also been observed. This 'new petite bourgeoisie problematic' poses several difficulties for traditional Marxism and is the centre of much debate among neo-Marxist academics. Since the new petite bourgeoisie is so central to the Quebec case, it is necessary to provide a theoretical understanding of this class.

Poulantzas attempts a re-theorization of class which, when modified, is useful for our purposes. He begins by distinguishing between an individual's class place and class position. Class place is one's relationship to the means of production (economic), while class position is determined by one's political and ideological relations. Thus it is the totality of economic, ideological and political relations that determines class. In agreement with Marx, Poulantzas states that in capitalist society there are two principal classes, but he adds that no social formation involves only two classes. Between these two principal classes lies a series of class
fractions which roughly fall into two categories: the traditional petite bourgeoisie and the new petite bourgeoisie. The traditional petite bourgeoisie (small scale producers and owners⁴) is a remnant from the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism and is consequently in a state of perpetual decline. The new petite bourgeoisie emerges largely as a result of the proliferation of a series of new functions related to production and administration which arise in the phase of advanced or monopoly capitalism. It engages largely in managerial, intellectual, supervisory or technical occupations, and is in a state of expansion both in numbers and in importance. Although the class place of these fractions is petit bourgeois, their class position is determined by their political and ideological relationship to the two principal classes. Therefore, it is usually polarized either towards a working class or bourgeois class position. The political/ideological position of the fractions of the petite bourgeoisie is a manifestation of the influence of bourgeois and working class political and ideological positions, which it adapts or deflects according to its own aspirations, in combination with those elements peculiar to its existence. Therefore, the political/ideological positions of the petite bourgeoisie are diverse, different from fraction to fraction, and in correspondence with the specific conditions of their existence. Although the petite bourgeoisie does not have an "autonomous class position"⁵
within the capitalist mode of production, at specific conjunctures
the petite bourgeoisie can intervene at the political level
as an authentic social force (i.e. the formation of a petit
bourgeois political party). If the new petite bourgeoisie
'captures' state power through a political party, its ideology
can actually supplant the dominant ideology, yet because it
is an ensemble of elements adapted from both working class
and bourgeois class positions, it is unlikely to work solely
to the long-term advantage of the petite bourgeoisie. In
the short-term the petite bourgeoisie often tries to find an
'equilibrium' between classes, and this is reflected in its
constant oscillations between a bourgeois and working class
position, according to the moment. But, in the final analysis
if the new petite bourgeoisie does not question the underlying
economic (capitalist relations of production) and political
(the state) structures of capitalist society, and instead
chooses to defend these, it (often unwittingly) defends and
ensures the dominance of the bourgeoisie, whose existence
depends upon these structures. As Poulantzas notes, "Bourgeois
ideology thus perpetuates its hold, but in indirect or disguised
form ... via the direct dominance of "petit bourgeois ideology."6

Poulantzas postulates several typical features of the
petite bourgeoisie's "ideological sub-ensemble" which are
theoretically relevant to the Quebec case: 1) **Status-quo
anti-capitalism** -- "The petite bourgeoisie wants change without
Declarations are made against "big money" and "great fortunes" but it fears the radical transformation of society. This results in the expression of a desire for "equal opportunity", "social justice", and other indefinite abstractions.  

2) **Statism** -- The notion that the state is a natural expression of popular will is offered. Therefore the state is seen as a neutral arbiter above classes. The new petite bourgeoisie "identifies with the State, whose neutrality it supposes to be akin to its own, since it sees itself as a 'neutral' class between the bourgeoisie and the working class, and therefore a pillar of the State - 'its' State."  

3) **Power Fetishism** -- It therefore desires to take control of state power. Through the state it seeks to 'rearrange' relations of society in a variety of ways: by extending the participation of popular classes, by rationalizing the economy through various forms of technocratic administration (i.e. "social democracy" or "corporatism"), by "humanizing" production, and by ascribing to itself the role of arbitrating class relations, the significance of which it generally denies or underestimates.  

4) **Nationalism** -- In conditions of economic domination by a foreign bourgeoisie and/or political domination by a 'foreign' state, nationalism becomes the ideological force through which the petite bourgeoisie attempts to unify all classes and establish popular support for its 'national' project. It is through the nation that the "petite bourgeoisie
tries to deny class struggle, and of which it considers itself the pillar, the 'natural' mediator of the forces operating."^9

It is important to note that relations between classes in a social formation do not operate in a vacuum. Nor does the social formation itself. To provide context for both the formation and class relations operating within it, it is useful to view these from a political economy perspective which takes into account the various aspects of the international setting (political, economic, ideological, etc.). Poulantzas did this by postulating the major features of the transition from feudalism through the sub-stages of capitalism: 1) competitive capitalism; 2) transition to monopoly capitalism; 3) consolidation of monopoly capitalism; 4) present stage of monopoly capitalism. These features are: a) a great increase in the size of production units (involving the concentration and centralization of capital and merger of bank and industrial capital to form finance capital); b) an increasingly 'international' scope which replaces the national character of corporations; c) an increasing domination of key (especially profitable) sectors of the economy by monopoly capital; d) an increasing bureaucratization of corporations; e) an increasing economic role of the state (i.e. subsidization, regulation, fiscal and monetary policy, improvement of material infrastructure, unproductive state consumption in military, etc.). He argues that the capitalist mode of production is characterized by the internationalization
of capitalist relations of production, which has a two-fold
tendency: "to reproduce itself within the social formation
in which it takes root and establishes its dominance, and to
expand outside of this formation ... simultaneously." The
current phase of monopoly capitalism is characterized by the
international dominance of capitalist relations of production.
As multi-national corporations penetrate deeper and deeper
into unexplored regions and consolidate new markets, the world
economy becomes increasingly integrated and interdependent.
The underdevelopment of many regions is one results of this.
This is explained in terms of how the colonies of the 19th
century became integrated into the world economy by advanced
capitalist nations and were relegated to the status of suppliers
of raw materials, resources and labour power, and the buyers
of manufactured products. The internationalization of capital
has perpetuated underdevelopment and dependence by creating a
whole chain of metropoles and satellites at the international,
as well as national levels. For these reasons classes and
their relations must be analyzed in the context of the inter-
nationalization of capitalist relations which characterize
the current phase.

From this we can proceed with an analysis of the
bourgeoisie. An analysis of the contemporary bourgeoisie
must take into account the various fractions and internal
contradictions which compose its ranks. First, contradictions
between the national (or indigenous) bourgeoisie and foreign capital must be acknowledged. As well, we must point out the various competing regional fractions of the bourgeoisie. This is relevant in the Canadian case where the presence of foreign capital (particularly U.S.) and the competition between regional bourgeoisies is prevalent. Secondly, the traditional division of capital into productive (industrial) capital, banking (money) capital, and commercial capital needs elaboration. These divisions arise in the 'competitive stage' of capitalism and at alternative times different segments have formed the hegemonic fraction of the bourgeoisie. As capitalism proceeds, the merger of productive and banking capital units, forming 'finance capital', begins to occur. The effect of this simultaneous 'concentration' and 'centralization' of capital has been to give birth to monopoly capital units. Thus, a division between monopoly and non-monopoly capital becomes apparent, though a precise boundary between the two is entirely relative. Also, it must be mentioned that the merger of banking and industrial capital has not removed conflict between them.

What is also significant about the transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism is the changing character of the bourgeoisie. In the competitive stage, ownership ("the ability to assign the means of production and to allocate resources and profits to this or that use") and possession ("direction and relative control of a certain
labour process"14) were in the hands of the individual capitalist. Production units were individual enterprises and the entrepreneur exercised a plurality of powers derived from ownership. As capitalism proceeded, mergers occurred, firms expanded and diversified, and there was a relative separation or 'dissociation' of ownership and possession. The individual capitalist began to lose his powers derived from ownership as he became absorbed by the larger monopoly corporation. The possession or control functions were increasingly taken over by high-level managers, professionals and specialists. The problem thus arises of determining the class membership of these individuals. Poulantzas argues that the "agents who directly exercise these powers and who fulfill the 'functions of capital' occupy the place of capital, and thus belong to the bourgeois class even if they do not hold formal legal ownership."15 Furthermore, on the political/ideological level they clearly take a bourgeois class position.

Although these are the most obvious fractional divisions which make for conflicts or differences within the capitalist class, all individual capitalists compete over the distribution of the total surplus value, and thus are divided on that level. Obversely, all capitalists work towards the preservation of the political and economic structures which enable them to retain their status. Nevertheless, the above are the critical divisions in the bourgeoisie.
To fully understand the political and ideological relations between classes we must analyze the state, and its relationship to the various class and class fractions in society. To Marx, economic and social domination necessarily entailed political domination. Indeed, it is easy to see that, given the time period of his writing -- the 19th century when only property owners had full political rights -- Marx would conceive of the state as a "committee for managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie", and the function of elections as "deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament." Although, as Bottomore pointed out, in modern capitalist societies individuals from the capitalist class "still predominate so remarkably in government and administration ... (and this class) still occupies the vital positions of power ... which enables it to defend successfully its most important economic interests," the study of the role of the state must go beyond a discussion of its members' family background or social ties. Nevertheless, these formulations of the nature of the state in capitalist society more closely approximate reality than do the pluralist and social democratic conceptions of the state as a neutral and autonomous arbiter between competing groups or classes. Marx did not present a 'theory of the state' and only recently has this been done with any degree of success in Marxist circles. Although there has been progress made in this area
by people such as Lenin, Gramsci, Poulantzas, Miliband and O'Connor, the result is often sketchy, incomplete, and difficult to operationalize. Leo Panitch argued that a theory of the state in capitalist society must meet at least three basic requirements:

It must clearly delimit the complex of institutions that go to make up the state. It must demonstrate concretely, rather than just define abstractly, the linkages between the state and the system of class inequality in the society, particularly its ties to the dominant social class. And it must specify as far as possible the functions of the state under the capitalist mode of production. In

In the *State in Capitalist Society*, Ralph Miliband delimits the institutions of the state as the government, bureaucracy (including the civil service, public corporations, central banks, regulatory commissions, etc.), the coercive apparatuses (the police and military), the judiciary, representative assemblies (Parliament), and the sub-central levels of government (such as provincial executives, legislatures and bureaucracies, as well as municipal governmental institutions). For this case study it is important to note that in many federal nations the most important institutions of the national state are reproduced at the sub-national (provincial or regional) level. In some cases these sub-national levels must be viewed as states in their own right. It is this which led Garth Stevenson to distinguish between the "state at the provincial level" and the "state at the central level" and
argue that the Canadian case illustrates the phenomenon of a completely self-contained provincial state system. Stevenson also observed that contrary to the U.S. experience (towards centralization and the erosion of local power) Canadian federalism demonstrates a trend towards decentralization (a weakening of the central state apparatuses in relation to the provincial state) and intense competition between federal and provincial states. He explains this by arguing that regional fractions of the bourgeoisie have increasingly begun to "rely on their provincial states to promote their specific interests and to speak on their behalf in federal-provincial or even, in some cases, international negotiations." The growth of the provincial state system has begun to challenge the legitimacy of the federal state. Henry Milner and Larry Pratt, focusing on Quebec and Alberta respectively, came to similar conclusions and argued that the expansion of sub-national state activities has fostered province (or nation-) building aspirations and has given rise to demands for regional autonomy, and, in some cases, independence, by provincial states.

To demonstrate the linkages between state and class Nicos Poulantzas began by saying that the role of the capitalist state is to "reproduce capitalist relations of production." To do this it must "maintain the unity and cohesion of a social formation divided into classes ... (and) to sanction and legitimize the interests of the dominant classes and fractions
as against the other classes of the formation, in a context of world class contradictions. To do this the state "takes responsibility for the interests of monopoly capital as a whole; it does not concretely identify itself with any one of its components ... but works rather by way of its various interventions to organize monopoly capital politically and give it political cohesion." Poulantzas saw the bourgeoisie as the dominant class and monopoly capital as the hegemonic fraction of the bourgeoisie. It is the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie in general, and specifically those of its hegemonic fraction, which the state serves. Instrumentalist and elite theory approaches are useful in that they provide concrete links between state personnel and the capitalist class. This is relevant to the Canadian situation where the early post-Confederation cabinets were filled with members of the industrial and financial bourgeoisie and where today Wallace Clement reports that a total of 39.4% of the current economic elite members either are themselves or have close kin in the state system. It should also be pointed out, in conclusion, that the state maintains a degree of autonomy in capitalist society. As we said earlier, political and ideological factors are often determinant, especially in conjunctural periods. This is not to suggest that the state is free from the influence of the dominant class but simply that in its relations with this class, which is divided into various fractions, the state maintains a degree
of autonomy from each of its individual fractions. In the final analysis we can say, to quote Panitch, that the state apparatuses act on "behalf" of, not at the "behest of the capitalist class."\textsuperscript{28}

Since subsequent chapters (five and six) involve a class analysis of the Parti Québécois, a few theoretical statements should be made about the role and nature of political parties. In general, the party serves the same functions as the state, but within a more limited context. It is the objective of a political party, says Bourque, to acquire the legitimate use of state power so as it can undertake the "promotion of specific, multiple and heterogeneous interests, but also (to undertake) the reproduction of the totality of the social formation."\textsuperscript{29} To do this it tries to build or organize a "social bloc, namely an alliance among various social forces capable of supporting and instituting its fundamental project."\textsuperscript{30} When it has done this to some degree the party will attempt to "create those political and ideological conditions which are the most favourable to the promotion of the economic interests it defends, whether or not these interests are dominant within the social formation."\textsuperscript{31} Because of the nature of party work, said Gramsci, "All members of a political party should be regarded as intellectuals ... (but) there are of course distinctions of level to be made."\textsuperscript{32} Therefore, the class place of party members, and especially those whose
social function is primarily served by being a party member (i.e. professional and full-time party workers) must be considered "petit bourgeois." Of course the class position of the party depends upon the political and ideological position (vis-a-vis the two principal classes) it takes. To determine this is a much more complex procedure. Because the party is a complex organization of individuals with diverse ideas and interests, it is rarely the case that it is "the unilateral, unequivocable instrument of just one class or class fragment." Within the party, groups of individuals emerge, in the form of wings or factions, and compete for hegemony (control of the party's ideological and political direction). By identifying the hegemonic faction one has not determined entirely the class nature of the party, nor have they identified the "only social force constituting that formation in its specificity." Thus to study and understand a political party one must not only look at its over-riding political/ideological position, but at the dynamic interaction of forces operating within the party.

(ii) Nation and Nationalism

The multiplicity of terms often associated with or used interchangeably with nation -- such as ethnicity, culture,
race, tribe, community, state, etc. -- present such an overwhelming semantic problem that an attempt to systematically distinguish these terms will not be undertaken here. To simplify matters we shall simply define and use the concept nation. First, the nation will be understood as a contemporary form of social organization. It typically involves a common and definable territory, a common economic system, common political institutions, common history, and some common cultural features such as language and religion. This is, however, often narrowly interpreted to mean simply those nations that exist as sovereign legal-juridical-constitutional entities (i.e. nation-states), and are recognized as such (for example, by the United Nations). Because this approach necessarily excludes those groups who desire to become "sovereign nations" but are not presently constituted as such, as well as those communities who have in the past existed as nations but by conquest do not exist as such at present, a broader interpretation of the concept nation will be used. Therefore, nation will be defined, in the words of Stanley Ryerson, as a "community of people, linked by a common cultural-linguistic historical experience of living and working together, whether or not in possession of their own state." In relating this to the prior discussion of class and political economy, a nation can exercise domination over, or experience subordination by, another nation -- economically, politically, culturally,
ideologically, or otherwise. But to be considered a nation, the community must have a "national consciousness." This is commonly, and often mistakenly, referred to as nationalism. To ameliorate this difficulty we shall introduce a distinction between passive and active nationalism. Passive nationalism is the subjective or "we" consciousness which evolves naturally in historically constituted communities. Active nationalism, alternatively, is nationalism with purpose. It arises most often as a result of individuals or groups (classes) which desire to mobilize a community of people into action. Quite often, as in the case of defending one's territory against foreign aggression, its use is positive. Equally often however its use is negative, such as in the case of a class mobilizing national consciousness and channeling it into an area which serves its own particular class interests or needs. In this case nationalism is a component of class ideology. Nationalism has been used historically, often in conjunction with other class doctrines, as a strategy by which dominant classes seek to preserve their dominance (i.e. as a dominant aspect of the dominant ideology). But as we said earlier, in capitalist society each class has broadly definable interests around which it formulates or constructs a corresponding ideology. Thus nationalism is not simply a "bourgeois manipulation." The working class or intermediate strata can interpolate nationalism into their ideology according to what they perceive
as their own needs. Thus, as Bourque and Frenette said, nationalist ideologies are class ideologies: "A nationalist ideology only makes sense through the class which becomes its propagandist." We will use a three-fold classification to distinguish the major historical and contemporary forms of nationalism in Quebec: 1) Conservative nationalism; 2) Liberal nationalism; 3) Left nationalism. The conservative variant is the oldest type of French Canadian nationalism. Traditionally it has defined French Canada as a cultural entity whose rights are preserved within the existing Canadian system. This ideology has been linked to and articulated by the seigneurs and high clergy from 1760 to 1840 and the rural petite bourgeoisie from 1840 to 1960. This traditional ruling class in Quebec preached an ideology of "submission and retreat" and emphasized the 'God-liness' of agrarian society. The second type, liberal nationalism, arose in the 1940's and 1950's and encouraged French Canadians to participate in capitalist society and acted as a reaction against the 'traditional ruling class' in Quebec. This nationalism, articulated through the Liberal Party (1960 to the present) was largely responsible for the 'Quiet Revolution' in Quebec, yet did not desire radical social change or independence. Another liberal French Canadian nationalism emerged as an outgrowth of the first type. This nationalism, which has as its objective the establishment of an independent Quebec, is articulated by the 'new petite bourgeoisie' which split-off from the Liberal
Party in 1966 and went on to form the Parti Québécois. The third type, left nationalism, seeks to remove all types of domination and is articulated by working class militants, by French Canadian intellectuals, and by some elements of the Parti Québécois. It is the least developed and commands the least support of the major nationalisms, but has been on the increase in popularity since the 1960's.

Thus, we can see no less than three major types of French Canadian nationalism in existence in Quebec. Each type is linked to, and articulated by members of specific classes or fractions in Quebec society. Therefore it is incorrect to speak of a nationalist ideology common to all classes in Quebec. In order to understand the nationalist character of an ideology, Bourque and Frenette suggest it is necessary to: 1) relate it to other elements in the ideological formation into which it fits; 2) pinpoint its specific effects in the area of class relations; and 3) relate the ideology to other instances in the social formation -- political and economic. The Quebec case will be analyzed with this in mind.
REFERENCES


2 Aside from the obvious problem that the ascendency of the new petite bourgeoisie was not anticipated, nor does it fit readily into the Marxist model, a precise definition of these fractions and groupings, referred to as the 'intermediate strata' is very difficult. These 'intermediate strata' cannot be placed in the same category as the two principal classes in the capitalist mode of production. Nor is it easy, given the diversity of fractions and groupings (i.e. lawyers, fishermen, executives), to simply put all those who do not fit into the two principal classes, into a 'middle class.' This will be dealt with at greater length later.


4 The traditional petite bourgeoisie makes use primarily of its own capital and labour.


6 Ibid., p. 252.

7 Ibid., p. 241.

8 Idem.

9 Ibid., p. 255.

See also Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, (London: 1969). This Gunder Frank thesis has been thoroughly criticized within academic circles but to some degree still operates as the springboard from which all authors writing on dependency and underdevelopment begin. Because of the basic simplicity of its categories and their explanatory power, and because this analysis is not central to this thesis, it will be used.

The centralization of capital is the amalgamation of several money capitals, under a single ownership. Similarly, concentration of capital is the amalgamation of several production units and productive capitals, under a single ownership. Finance or monopoly capital units are formed when there is a merger of money capitals and productive capitals, under a single ownership, such as in a holding company.


Idem.

Ibid., p. 180.


Ibid., p. 80-81.


Garth Stevenson, "Federalism and the Political Economy of the Canadian state", in Panitch, (ed.), *op.cit.*, p. 71.

Ibid., p. 79.


24 Ibid., p. 158.


27 Clement, op.cit., p. 346.

28 Panitch, op.cit., Panitch (ed.).


31 Bourque, op.cit., p. 130.


33 Bourque, op.cit., p. 131.

34 Idem.


CHAPTER THREE:

QUEBEC HISTORY (1534-1960)
The struggle for imperial dominance sent European powers, primarily France, Spain, and Britain, in conquest of the newly discovered America. Seventy-four years after Jacques Cartier discovered Canada (1534), Champlain founded Quebec City and the St. Lawrence Valley became part of the French empire. New France became a feudal trading society operated by a merchant monopoly -- the 'Company of 100 Associates.' Settlement was slow -- reaching only 2,500 by 1663. In contrast, British settlement, which began in the south in 1620, was much more intense.

Aware that France was losing her advantage, Colbert encouraged settlement in New France. French nobles were allotted vast areas of land which they divided amongst settlers. The Church of Canada and the Séminaire de Québec were created by Bishop Laval and a stable peasant-agrarian community centred around the church was established. By 1700, 15,000 persons lived in the seigneurial system of New France. The bishop, along with a governor and intendant, formed a ruling triumvirate with absolute control over the colony.

Political and economic rivalry, most notably, control over the fur trade monopoly, led France and Britain into a fierce struggle for colonial supremacy. Outnumbered by a factor of twenty, the French Canadians began a struggle to preserve their national existence; a struggle which has continued
almost without break to this day.

The conquest of New France by Britain in 1760, marks the ascendency of the British Empire to a position of international dominance. New France's political, military and mercantile classes were sent back to France by the military rule of Governor Murray, leaving only the clergy and 'les habitants.' Faced with the dilemma of how to administer this 'French' colony Britain responded with the Royal Proclamation Act of 1763, establishing civil government patterned on the British legal and political system. Assimilation was clearly the intention of this Act, which gave no recognition to French Canadian linguistic, cultural or religious rights. The Test Act banned French Canadians, as Catholics, from participating in the administration. Though modified and relaxed somewhat over the last two centuries, it is this policy of denying the full reality of the French Canadian nation which forms the basis of the current crisis in relations between Canada and Quebec. Whether by choice or by exclusion, French Canadians rarely participated in any activity except agriculture. At this crucial point, "Quebec was forced into a state of arrested development from which it has still to emerge economically." Of necessity, the French Canadian agrarian, church-oriented culture assumed an increasingly defensive, isolationist posture -- it withdrew into itself. The rural population increased from 76% to 88% of Quebec's population between 1760 and 1825. Assimilation
proved an impossible task.

With the fur trade now safely in the hands of the British mercantile class and the Canadian economy integrated into the British Imperial trading system, the assimilationist pressure was relaxed. The Quebec Act of 1774 allowed French Canadians into the administration, restored French civil law, and most importantly, gave protection to the Catholic Church -- consolidating the role of the Church as cultural center of Quebec. The Act gave the clergy power they never enjoyed under the French regime. As Guindon remarked, "thus was the triumph of the clerical conception of the proper social organization for French Canada achieved by the British military victory." The class configuration at that time was as follows: a small British mercantile class controlled the economy; a small British aristocracy controlled land and the administration; a large French Canadian agricultural class was engaged in peasant farming, and a small French Canadian clergy controlled the cultural development of the French Canadian community.

Immigration from Britain, along with a wave of loyalists (farmers, merchants and aristocrats) fleeing the American Revolution (1776) and settling in Canada, upset this order and necessitated the realignment of Canada. The 1791 Constitutional Act divided the colony into Upper and Lower Canada; giving each a representative assembly (elected by
propertied adult males), and an appointed legislative and executive council (appointed by the Governor who was responsible to Britain) with supreme powers. Although French Canadians were 94% of the population of Lower Canada, English-speaking Canadians dominated the executive and council, leaving only the weaker assembly to the French.6

A series of classical colleges -- petits seminaires -- were set up by the Church to prepare French Canadians for the priesthood and liberal professions (medicine, law, teaching). These institutes did not, however, prepare French Canadians for business and commerce as did many of the new English Canadian colleges. Thus at the turn of the 18th century we see the emergence of a French Canadian petite bourgeoisie, yet still few French Canadians participated in business or commerce. The dominant classes -- the English landed-aristocracy and merchant classes -- ensured their position by controlling the executive councils of both Upper and Lower Canada.7 The emerging French Canadian petite bourgeoisie gradually gathered political cohesion behind Louis Papineau and the Patriot party and came to dominate the Lower Canadian assembly, and eventually challenge the executive council; demanding responsible (self-) government and even independence for the French Canadian people. The increasing conflict between appointed and elected levels had both a class8 and a national9 dimension. The struggle intensified through the 1820's and 1830's and came to a head
with the rebellions of 1837-38 in Upper and Lower Canada. These rebellions, though brutally suppressed, signalled the need for a further reconstitution of Canada. Lord Durham, sent over by Britain to investigate, perceived both the class and national dimensions of the situation, saying,

... the great mass of French Canadians are doomed, in some measure, to occupy an inferior position, and to be dependent on the English for employment. The evils of poverty and dependence would merely be aggravated in a ten-fold degree, by a spirit of jealous and resentful nationality which should separate the working class of the community from the possessors of wealth and employers of labour...

For this 'hopeless' and 'destitute' nationality, with 'no history and no literature', Durham recommended assimilation. For Canada he suggested the Union of the two provinces and responsible government.

The Act of Union (1840), Britain's solution to the Canadian problems, created a legislative union of Upper and Lower Canada but retained an appointed executive. A number of assimilationist devices were entrenched in the Act but these, like the 1763 Act, inevitably failed or were overturned. English was to be the language of law and parliament, and the official language of the United Province of Canada. The granting of equal representation was a tactic, by the British, to dominate the French. It was felt by the Imperial authorities that the minority of English Canadians in Lower Canada would be represented in the legislature and, combined with the full contingent from Upper Canada, would render the French a permanent minority.
If not, the executive, retained by the 1840 Act, would certainly ensure their dominance. French Canadians, however, consistently voted in 'bloc' fashion in the assembly, while the English were constantly split by factionalism. As well, Lord Elgin read the speech from the throne in both French and English in 1849, giving, at least, symbolic recognition and official status to the French language. Finally, responsible government was granted in 1849, eliminating the executive body. On the success of the 1840 Act, Family Compact member Sir Allan MacNab stated, "Union has completely failed in its purpose. It was enacted with the sole motive of reducing the French Canadians under English domination and the contrary effect has resulted! Those that were to be crushed dominate!" Once again the national reality of the French Canadians was not only unrecognized, but was threatened by assimilation, as late as 1840.

The more significant political realignment, however, came about later with the granting of responsible government in 1849. To understand why responsible government was not granted in 1840 we must look at the relations within and between Canada and Britain at the time. In Britain, the industrial revolution was underway and the emerging industrial capitalist class pressed for reforms. The repeal of the Corn Laws (1846) and the passing of a series of reform laws in Britain were a victory for the new order (laissez faire industrial capitalism)
over the old order (mercantilism). The repeal of the Navigation acts changed the relationship between Britain and her colonies, ending Canada's preferential status within the Imperial trading system. Thus the aristocratic-mercantilist ruling alliance in Canada was threatened from the outside and eventually lost its position with the granting of responsible government in 1849. Some fractions of this class, however, were able to reproduce themselves and eventually came to orchestrate a new order in Canada. (See footnote 15)

The next 15 years of political deadlock (16 ministries failed between 1842 and 1864) is a reflection of the considerable changes taking place at the time. Different classes and class fractions were struggling for dominance in an attempt to find a new accommodation for themselves and the Canadian economy. An annexation movement, popular in some circles, which would have integrated Canada into the U.S., was one response to the problems. Meanwhile industrialization was changing the orientation of the Canadian economy from fur, timber and other staples (with canal transportation) to coal, steel, and the desire for a railroad transportation system.

The Macdonald-Cartier-Galt-Brown alliance which set out to create a union of British North American colonies, reflects the nation-building desires of an emerging capitalist class. 15 After putting together a package that would entice
Eastern financial and mercantile interests and, eventually, Western grain merchants, to join with the Montreal-Toronto group, the project was on its way. Cartier ensured that the new scheme would be acceptable to Quebec. The project was designed to usher in the emerging capitalist order. A strong central state would be created to organize and carry out the mechanics of the operation. A national market for commodities and labour was to be created for the goods produced by the Ontario-Quebec capitalists. The transcontinental railway would provide the necessary transportation. Arrangements were made with the Baring Brothers of Britain to finance the operation and on July 1, 1867, a Canadian nation was created, consisting of four provinces, Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. By 1873, Manitoba (1870), British Columbia (1871) and Prince Edward Island (1873) had joined. Though certainly not as assimilationist as its precursors, the BNA Act, Canada's constitution, once again did not fully recognize the French Canadian national reality. The federal principle adopted recognized Quebec, the province of the French Canadian nation, as one in four, soon seven, and now ten. Cultural rights were not to be protected by the federal government, but provincially by the provincial governments. Over the next century the rights of French Canadians within Quebec were protected but outside Quebec it was a different matter. Time after time the rights of French Canadians outside Quebec were encroached upon.
Other limited constitutional guarantees illustrate only a partial willingness of the "Fathers of Confederation" to accept the French Canadian national reality.

The BNA Act did create a strong central state through which the capitalist class would control its destiny. The Macdonald National Policy defined this more clearly and, subsequently, the role of the Canadian economy. A national market was created whereby this class could accumulate capital, with the protection of the state. The dominant fractions of the bourgeoisie profited by creating the infrastructure necessary for capitalism, using public funds derived from taxation. However, this did not stimulate independent capitalist development in Canada, as the dominant class chose instead to mediate between British, and later, American capital. A strong indigenous industrial bourgeoisie never developed in Canada, reflecting in part the dominance of banking fractions at the time of Confederation. This policy produced industry in Canada but little Canadian industry. Canada remained an appendage to British finance capital until World War One. With the decline of the British empire and the ascendancy of the United States, U.S. direct investment, encouraged by the Canadian tariff structure, poured in and took economic control of Canada. One of the long-term effects of this new phase of branch plant industrialism was that it enabled Canada's provincial governments, through their control of resources, to encourage, control and channel investments, and collect royalties on these investments.
Investment is thus clustered in certain areas, according to the requirements of the foreign investors. This has led to a stagnation and underdevelopment of many areas in Canada, and accounts in large part for the current Canadian economic and constitutional "crises." Naylor says, "Concentration of direct investment tends to fragment national markets and balkanize the state structure." One such area is Quebec. Montreal and Quebec City, the center of Canada's economic activity during the mercantile era with their shipbuilding and timber trade as well as their strategic trade location, began to lose their dominance. Coal and iron became the cherished resources in the new industrial epoch. Consequently there was a shift in economic activity (especially heavy industry and manufacturing) to southern Ontario. Quebec's economy became based on resource extraction and labour intensive industries such as textiles, shoe manufactures and saw mills; accounting in part for its present relative underdevelopment. With their cultural development still in the hands of the Church after Confederation, most French Canadians remained largely isolated from the surrounding developments. Even in Quebec where in 1871, 25% of its one million people were English Canadians, the two groups remained largely separate. Though French Canadians were mostly involved in subsistence farming at this time and lived in rural areas, gradually a greater number flocked to the cities. Many others emigrated to the United
States as work could not be found in Quebec. By the 1900's a fairly sizeable French Canadian urban proletariat was in existence. In Montreal and Quebec City where industry and trade were controlled by English Canadians, and much of the labour was provided by French Canadians, the divisions were mutually reinforcing. Ryerson remarks, "this opposition of class interests is compounded by the difference in nationality: the owners are "les anglais", the workers "les Canadiens." In 1921, says Rioux, "the French-speaking population of Canada reaches its lowest level, 27.9% of the total population. The urban population of Quebec reaches 51.8%, exceeding the rural population for the first time in history. Montreal has 618,506 inhabitants, of which 63.9% are French speaking." The emergence of capitalism also offered the ill-prepared and ill-equipped French Canadians a chance at business. In the long-run, few succeeded at entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, a small and medium size commercial and financial capitalist class emerged from the French Canadian community. The French Canadian professional petite bourgeoisie still populated the upper levels of government and increasingly became intermediaries for foreign capital. Quebec slowly but surely became part of the continental economic fabric. Its role was to provide raw materials and labour to meet U.S. needs. The French Canadian bourgeoisie soon succumbed to the onslaught of foreign (mostly U.S., but also English Canadian) capital and ceased to
be a factor. This class configuration remained, more or less, until the post-World War II period. A great number of changes were taking place internationally during and after 1945 that had an impact on the Canadian political economy. The role of the U.S., in the reconstruction of Europe, and in the internationalization of capitalist relations of production through the direct investment by multinational corporations worldwide (especially in Canada, Latin America, Africa, and Asia), ensured her post-war dominance internationally. As well, the increasing concentration and centralization of U.S. capital brought about a new phase of capitalism -- monopoly capitalism. In response to this, and to the massive depression of the 1930's the role of the traditionally laissez faire state in Western capitalist nations gradually changed to one of intervention. The present conjuncture of relations between and within Canada and Quebec resulted primarily from these changes. Although the present relations will be discussed in much greater depth in the next chapter it is useful to point out a few major trends which emerged after 1945: Internationalization of Capitalist Relations of Production -- The increasing penetration of capitalist relations of production into Quebec brought about the rapid industrialization and urbanization of this province, greatly increased the size of Quebec's working class, greatly reduced the agricultural-rural classes, and conditioned the emergence of a new petite bourgeoisie. According to Faucher and Lamontagne, between 1939 and 1950 the "output of manufacturing industries
rose by 92% in Quebec and by 88% in Canada, while new investment in manufacturing increased by 181% in this province and by only 154% in the whole country."²⁹ Also, the working class doubled in size between 1939 and 1950. This increase, in absolute terms, was equal to the growth witnessed during the whole century ending with 1939.³⁰ In manufacturing occupations alone the increase was from 79,000 to 237,000.³¹ The population in agriculture dropped from 252,000 to 188,000, and fishing and trapping also declined rapidly.³² **Rise of the New Petite Bourgeoisie** -- Composed of an array of fractions and variously known as the 'new middle class',³³ white collar proletariat, or intermediate strata, this class primarily engages in non-productive or non-manual/productive labour (i.e. in the sphere of circulation or in the tertiary sector -- both in private and public realms. **Decline of Clerico-Conservative Ideology** -- The clerico-conservative ideology of Quebec, dominant since at least 1760, though already on the wane since the fall of ultramontanism in the 1880's, began to decline rapidly after 1945. The 'priest-ridden' French Canadian culture of yesteryear had no place in the new scheme of things. **Rise of Liberal Ideology** -- The ideology of the new petite bourgeoisie was beginning to take shape throughout the 1950's and challenge the old clerical values. Through journals such as Cité libre, the new francophone intellectuals expressed their views. Gradually this new ideology found expression through the Quebec Liberal Party. The next chapter will discuss these trends in detail.
REFERENCES

1Thus began what Naylor called the first commercial empire of the St. Lawrence. To Naylor, "Canadian history since then reveals little more than a struggle between various imperial powers to determine whose dominion it shall be." The second empire (1760-1914) was dominated by Britain. The third and present empire is controlled by the U.S. A metropolis-hinterland methodology is used to explain this: "From the structure of the metropole, its dominant class, its stage of development and the structure of capital, and its external requirements, we can deduce the character of the imperial linkage." Tom Naylor, "The Rise and Fall of the Third Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence," in Gary Teeple (ed), Capitalism and the National Question in Canada, (Toronto: 1972), p. 2.


3Marcel Rioux, Quebec in Question, (Toronto: 1978), p. 34.

4Naylor says the mercantile class accumulated wealth through circulation, not production of goods. They were mediators in the flow of goods between the producer and consumers -- i.e. between Indian fur trappers (and 'coureurs du bois') and the commercial bourgeoisie in France, then Britain.


7Ryerson says of the 12 who sat on the 1830 legislative council, 7 were landed aristocrats and 3 were merchants. Stanley Ryerson, Unequal Union, (Toronto: 1973), p. 50. Naylor argues that these classes were essentially one and the same. When the mercantilists (fur traders) arrived in the 1760's they were given great tracts of land. As the
fur trade declined they became land speculators. The two largest land companies -- Canada Co. (founded by John Galt) and British American Land Co. (founded by Peter McGill and George Moffat) -- were founded in the 1820's by the old mercantile fur traders and were merged in 1844 (with A.T. Galt, son of John Galt, its commissioner). Said Naylor, "These land companies bore a special relationship to the colonial governments through the executive councils on which sat most of the commissioners who ran the land companies." (Naylor, op.cit., p. 5) Naylor argues that it was this class who created the first banks as well in Upper and Lower Canada (Bank of Montreal in 1817, and Bank of Upper Canada in 1818). The Chateau Clique in Lower Canada and the Family Compact in Upper Canada were the mechanisms through which these classes maintained their cohesion and dominance. It is important to note, as Clement has, that within the context of colonial rule "they were the most powerful indigenous force but their power was subservient to the wish of the colonizer." Wallace Clement, The Canadian Corporate Elite, (Toronto: 1975), p. 52.

8 This is reflected in the struggle between dominant economic classes controlling the executive and the new professional petite bourgeoisie in control of the assembly. The petite bourgeoisie wanted responsible government so it could replace the economic and political dominance of the British merchants and aristocrats of the executive, with its own brand of rule based on the ideology of liberal democracy (republicanism) and anti-clericalism. Of course the aristocracy, the church and the merchant class all favored the status quo. To answer why the mercantile class favored the status quo and not the more liberal position it might be said that this class was not historically-materially developed enough to assert its own independent class ideology at this pre-industrial revolution (hence pre-industrial capitalist) period and so it saw its interests best served as intermediaries within the British Imperial trading system. What is interesting to note about the Church in Lower Canada favoring the status quo and opposing the Patriotes' demands, is that it is indicative of its class position and relationship to the dominant anglophone political and economic classes.

9 This is reflected in the struggle between the French Canadian assembly and the English Canadian executive. Conflicts of a national nature were over: Education -- The executive favored state-controlled schools while the assembly favored Church-controlled schools. The creation of a state-run school system and the passing of the Jesuit Estates Act of 1801 (which transfered revenue normally used by Church-operated schools to State-operated ones) resulted in several major disputes.
Language -- The executive wanted English used exclusively in government while the assembly wanted to use French. This resulted in the exclusive use of English in executive and the equality of English and French in the assembly. French Canadians, recently conquered by the British, no doubt perceived the struggle on national lines and Papineau exploited this sentiment by mobilizing it into a mass movement culminating in the rebellions of 1837-38.

10The Upper Canadian rebellion paralleled the one in Lower Canada as Papineau aligned himself with Upper Canadian reformers under William Lyon Mackenzie who were struggling for responsible government as well. Of course the Upper Canadian struggle did not have a national dimension.


12Ibid., p. 208.

13This was based on equal representation even though Lower Canada's population exceeded that of Upper Canada (650,000 to 456,000) in 1840. Wade, op.cit., 1964, p. 35.


15Among the many endeavors of these four individuals most responsible for the creation of Canada: Cartier -- A.G. for Canada East (Lower Canada), Solicitor for Grand Trunk Railway; Galt -- Director of GTR and Minister of Revenue; Macdonald -- A.G. Canada West (Upper Canada), Director of GTR, Kingston Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Manufacturers Life Assurance Co., etc.; Brown -- Member of Assembly, Owner of Toronto newspaper, the Globe. There is a debate about the precise composition of this class. Naylor calls it the mercantile class. He says the direct line of descent runs "from merchant capital, not to industrial capital but to banking and finance, railways, utilities, land speculation and so on -- activities dependent upon and closely connected with the state structure."(Naylor, op.cit., p. 16.) Alternatively, Ryerson says Confederation was the result of a drive by an emerging industrial capitalist class who wanted to harmonize tariffs among the various British American colonies (Ryerson, op.cit.,p. 242). And that there is a direct lineage between the old mercantile and the new industrial ruling class (p. 270). Thus somewhere between 1838 and 1866 the mercantile class transformed itself into the industrial capitalist class. To us this ambiguity represents the great changes during this
period (the transition to industrial capitalism). No doubt, the class behind the Confederation project was a variety of class fractions (some newly emerging, such as the industrial capitalists, and others having emerged earlier, such as the banking and commercial capitalists, and some, who had interests in banking, commerce, and industry). Naylor's use of the term mercantile to describe this class seems, at best, incomplete and possibly incorrect. Mercantilism describes a specific historical period during the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and out of which springs commercial, banking and later industrial capitals. The term mercantile capitalist (even though Naylor defines it as "intermediating the flow of goods between producers and consumers") is therefore historically specific and should not be used here. Since commercial and banking capitalists engage in circulation they seem to subsume the role of merchant. As to the Confederation class's role in production or industrial capital, I agree with Ryerson that there was some involvement, however, Ryerson cannot explain why a strong indigenous industrial bourgeoisie did not develop in Canada. Thus my use of the term "emerging capitalist class" is vague, and leaves its precise composition unclear. It subsumes banking, commercial and industrial fractions (as well as Naylor's mercantile class) who were fighting for hegemony at this point. In this way it is suitable, at least, for our purposes. That this class chose subsequently to become intermediaries in U.S. imperialism does not make it mercantilist. Nor does the fact that commercial and banking fractions eventually came to dominate the industrial fraction change the composition of this class at the time of Confederation.

16 Maritime delegates at the Charlottetown Conference in August 1864, were "unanimous" in their endorsement of Confederation, if certain "financial details could be worked out". P.B. Waite, The Charlottetown Conference, (Ottawa: 1970), p. 19.

17 Through his own stature as well as his relationship with the church, which supported him and opposed the Parti Rouge (Patriote). As Ed Smith said, "The political alliance of French Catholic clergy and imperial government which began in 1774 was to be transformed into an economic partnership between that same clergy and the new industrial capitalism." (Smith, op.cit., p. 22) As the Bishop of Rimouski said to Quebec Catholics, "You will respect this new constitution that is given you, as the expression of the supreme will of the legislator, of the legitimate authority, and consequently that of God himself." (Smith, op.cit., p. 23) The ultra-conservative ultramontanism doctrine dominated Quebec for the next 30 years.
For example: 1864 -- In Nova Scotia, French speaking Catholic Acadians are forbidden to have French schools. 1871 -- In New Brunswick, Catholic schools are closed down and teaching of French is forbidden in public schools. 1877 -- In Prince Edward Island, Catholic and French schools become outlawed. 1890 -- In Manitoba, Separate (Catholic) schools are banned and teaching of French is forbidden in secondary schools. 1892 -- In the Northwest Territories, French is outlawed in public schools and catholic schools are prohibited. 1905 -- In Alberta and Saskatchewan, French is outlawed in public schools and catholic schools are prohibited. 1915 -- In Ontario, French is outlawed. 1916 -- In Manitoba, French instruction is forbidden at all levels. 1930 -- In Saskatchewan, French instruction is again forbidden. As well, French Canadian historians are quick to point out the treatment given Louis Riel (execution) and the Métis (genocide), as well as to Quebecers who did not want to fight in Britain's Boer War, or World War I and II.

Such as the Senate as protector of regional identities. Historian P.B. Waite, commenting on the role of the Senate, said, "It is impossible to believe that Macdonald, and perhaps others, were not shrewd enough to see the gist of this point: that a responsible Cabinet would suck in, with silent, inexorable, vertiginous force, the whole regional character of the Senate and with it all the strength that lay in the Senate's regional identities..." P.B. Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation, (Toronto: 1967), p. 116. Section 93, though, restricted the rights of provinces to encroach on the privileges of Roman Catholic separate schools, and Section 133, gave equal status to French and English languages in Parliament.

That today the Canadian banking sector is predominantly Canadian whereas the industrial sector is American, resulted from that (banking) fraction exercising its hegemony at the time of Confederation, and since that time. Leo Panitch, however, criticizes this thesis arguing that it focuses simply on the structure and orientation of Canada's capitalist class and ignores the relations between classes within Canada. Panitch point to Canada's high wage proletariat as a major factor explaining why a strong indigenous bourgeoisie did not develop in Canada. Leo Panitch, "Dependency and Class in Canadian Political Economy", in Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review, (No. 6, Autumn, 1980).

British finance capital in Canada, in the form of portfolio investment, was three times greater than the level of U.S. investment at the end of World War I. (Naylor, op. cit., p. 26)
22 For a more detailed analysis of how U.S. investment aggravates the problem of regionalism by concentrating much of Canada's manufacturing in Southern Ontario, see Clement, "A Political Economy of Regionalism", in Glenday, et. al., Modernization and the Canadian State, (Toronto: 1978).

23 Naylor, op.cit., p. 32.


26 Rioux, op.cit., 1978, p. 63


28 By 1907, 150 U.S. branch-plants were established in Quebec. By the 1930's this reached 394. Wade, op.cit., 1968, pps. 608 and 864.


30 Idem.


32 Rioux, op.cit., 1978, p. 66

33 See anything by Hubert Guindon, for example, "Two Cultures: An essay on Nationalism, Class, and Ethnic Tension", in R.H. Leach (ed.), Contemporary Canada, (Toronto: 1968). This does not generally conflict with our use of the new petite bourgeoisie.
CHAPTER FOUR:

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND CLASS ANALYSIS OF QUEBEC (1960-1976)
This chapter will present a political economic analysis of Quebec in the post-1960 period. Its purpose is to provide a comprehensive background for the analysis of the crucial post-1976 period; the subject of the next chapters. As did the previous chapter, this one will emphasize both the national and class aspects of the current problem. The first section will focus on the economic condition of Quebec. It will show that Quebec's economy is externally controlled and that it exhibits many of the classic symptoms of underdevelopment -- large regional inequalities in economic development, high unemployment levels, an underdeveloped secondary manufacturing secondary, overdeveloped resource and tertiary sectors, etc. It will show that within Quebec, French Canadians are an underprivileged majority as they are underrepresented in most executive and managerial positions and overrepresented in manual and other subaltern positions. The second section will show the various classes and class fractions operating in contemporary Quebec, and their relationship to the Quebec state in the 1960-1976 period. It will emphasize the role of the new petite bourgeoisie during this time, as well as the role of the state in transforming class relations.
(i) Underdevelopment of Quebec and Canada

As the previous chapter demonstrated, the nature of the Canadian (and the Quebec) economy has changed historically, but its role has remained one of subordination to the interests of a foreign metropole. Before 1760, Canada was a fur trading colony founded by and operated in the interests of France. After 1760 the colony was taken over by Britain, but remained a fur trading colony, controlled and operated in the interests of the emerging mercantile-commercial bourgeoisie in England. Eventually some Canadian banks, commerce and early pre-industrial manufactures sprung-up, centered around Montreal, but Canada's economy remained a hinterland for the British metropolis. As industrialization emerged, and a Canadian bourgeoisie fulfilled its nation-building aspirations, the Canadian economy gradually shifted its dependence from Britain to United States. The economic center of the Canadian economy was to be in Southern Ontario, where industrial manufacturing was set-up, and, much of the rest of Canada became a resource extraction base for U.S. and Canadian (largely Ontario-based) secondary manufacturing industries. To a great degree then, the Quebec economy, an appendage of the Canadian economy, which is itself an appendage of the U.S. continental-international economy, exists to serve the interests of the Canadian and U.S. corporations that control it. Quebec's relative underdevelopment, vis-a-vis Southern
Ontario, is a result of the colonial pattern of development imposed by an external bourgeoisie in cooperation with the Canadian financial capitalist class, the Canadian state, the Quebec state (prior to 1960), and, to some degree, the Quebec clerical elites. ³

Since the 1960's a myriad of studies focusing on the political and economic relations between and within United States, Canada and Quebec have appeared. Major works by Canadian left nationalists and Marxists analyzed the relationship between Canada and United States ('Continentalism'), and concluded that Canada is dominated politically, culturally, socially and economically by the United States. ⁴ The major arguments are these: Canada has not followed a path of indigenous capitalist development, rather her economy has always and still is oriented towards serving the needs of an imperialist metropolis. This is brought about by direct investment of U.S. multinational corporations. Canada's raw materials are owned and exploited by U.S. firms which use them for the production of finished goods. These goods are then sold back to Canadians at a much increased price. U.S. branch plants use U.S. technology, ⁵ which discourages Canadian research and development, and exacerbates dependency and underdevelopment. Major economic decisions which affect all Canadians, are made outside Canada by boards of directors of U.S. corporations. Politically the Canadian government exercises little control
over the multinationals. The penetration of these corporations also has great cultural and social implications for all Canadians. But, Canada is also an imperialist nation, though of a second order, as our bourgeoisie had over $18.8 billion invested (especially in the West Indies, South Africa and Brazil) outside Canada in 1974, compared to the $60.2 billion of foreign investment in Canada.

These studies showed the character and extent of foreign control over the Canadian economy. United States' investment accounted for 53% of the total foreign direct investment in Canada in 1926, 74% by 1948, and 80% by the 1970's. In 1967, 43.7% of U.S. direct investment in Canada was in manufacturing, and 38.9% was in resources (8.1% in finance, 4.9% in trade, 1.9% in utilities, and 2.5% in others). Foreign control of Canadian manufacturing industries increased from 35% in 1926, to 60% in the 1960's. The figures for various sectors of the economy, mining and smelting (62%), petroleum and natural gas (74%), refining (100%), automobile manufacture (97%), etc., demonstrated this control. It was also shown that between 1960 and 1969 U.S. corporations took $2.6 billion more out of Canada than they brought in in investment. In fact, through some 7,400 subsidiaries, U.S. corporations controlled over $50 billion in capital in Canada. Furthermore, the number of takeovers of Canadian-owned firms by U.S. corporations was increasing, totalling over 1,000 in the 1960's.
The situation in Quebec is but a microcosm of Canada's plight. The tremendous growth in Quebec's economy after World War II -- GNP rose from $3 billion to $19 billion between 1946 and 1968 -- is largely attributable to the influx of U.S. direct investment, which increased from $850 million to over $3 billion during this period. Foreign ownership of Quebec's economy is essentially in resources and heavy industry. The output of these firms is designed for foreign markets. English Canadian capital controls much of the commercial and financial sector as well as a good percentage of manufacturing in Quebec. By contrast Quebec-based industries have typically been small or medium-sized light industries, located in the least productive and profitable sectors, and under continued threat of absorption or bankruptcy. A study by André Raynauld, for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism showed that in 1961, U.S. corporations controlled 41.8% of all value added in manufacturing production in Quebec, compared to 42.8% for Anglo-Canadian and 15.4% for French-Canadian enterprises. Using the number of employees as an indication of control over various manufacturing sectors of Quebec, Arnauld Sales found little change 13 years later, with control roughly evenly retained by English Canadian and American industries.

The underdeveloped condition of Quebec's economy can be shown by breaking it into primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. The primary sector in Quebec employs a diminishing
percentage of Quebec's labour force. Yet, these resources continue to account for a high percentage of Quebec's exports. As well, this sector has become increasingly capital intensive over time. Thus, while there is greater productivity per worker, there are fewer jobs available over time. Of Quebec's major natural resources -- asbestos, iron, pulp, copper, zinc, wood and hydro-electricity -- only the latter two are not controlled by foreign capital (although the Quebec government has recently taken over Asbestos Corporation, thereby lessening the control by U.S. firms). These resources are extracted primarily to supply heavy industry in the U.S. and Ontario. Asbestos, iron and zinc are almost entirely exported abroad for processing. Although wood pulp, newspaper, and copper are processed, to some degree, in Quebec, this is done by U.S. and Canadian corporations, and products are exported outside Quebec for consumption. Clearly resource extraction is set up according to the needs of the U.S. and Canadian metropoles.

About 30.3% of Quebec's labour force was employed in the secondary sector in 1967. This figure is revealing when compared to Ontario's secondary sector which employed 36.6% of Ontario's labour. In terms of production value the contrast is even more striking as Ontario's heavy manufacturing industries more than tripled Quebec's. As well, manufacturing industries in Ontario have been growing at a faster rate than those in Quebec. Also typifying Quebec's underdeveloped manufacturing sector is the fact that its light sector
predominates over its heavy sector.\textsuperscript{26}

The remaining 61\% of Quebec's work force was employed in the tertiary sector in 1967. Although American ownership is present (such as hotel chains and car rental agencies) most of this sector is owned by medium-sized English-Canadian and French-Canadian firms, as well as by the Quebec state. The increasing proportion of Quebec's labour force employed in this sector in the past 20 years has resulted from the greater bureaucratization of both state and private corporations in Quebec.

Another increasingly important aspect of the Quebec economy is the state (public) sector. Set up largely since 1960 this network of public corporations includes enterprises in the industrial sector,\textsuperscript{27} commercial sector,\textsuperscript{28} and banking sector.\textsuperscript{29} Similarly, the cooperative sector is a growing phenomenon in Quebec. It also includes enterprises in the industrial\textsuperscript{30} and commercial\textsuperscript{31} sectors, but clearly the most important segment of the cooperative movement is in the banking sector.\textsuperscript{32} These two, along with the small and medium-sized private manufacturing firms owned by French Canadians, constitute Quebec's potential for indigenous development. Though still not on a scale comparable to Canadian or U.S. ownership in Quebec, this source of Quebec capital is closing the gap somewhat.

There is a high degree of concentration of ownership in the Quebec economy as well. Louis Reboud estimated in 1966 that 3.5\% of the total number of Quebec companies (those with
200 or more employees) accounted for 60% of all industrial production. The pulp and paper industry, which employs over 60,000 workers directly and another 100,000 indirectly, and accounts for 18% of Quebec's total exports, is a case in point. No more than seven corporations controlled 90% of production and employed over two-thirds of workers in that sector. The existence of major holding companies reinforces this tendency. Through the holding company, Power Corporation, Paul Desmarais controls a complex network of financial, industrial and media interests with assets exceeding $6 billion.

Externally controlled development contributes to unequal and scattered growth and development, and regional inequalities. Regional income and unemployment statistics which compare Montreal, the commercial, financial and industrial metropolis of Quebec, with outlying regions such as Bas St. Laurent-Gaspé and Outaouais, show this clearly. Other analyses focus on more specific aspects of the relations between and within Quebec and Canada. Porter found that while nearly one-third of Canada's population were French Canadian in 1951, only 6.7% of Canada's economic elite were French Canadian. Using a similar methodology, Clement found that French Canadians were only 8.4% of Canada's economic elite in 1972, and that most of these were lawyers and ex-politicians rather than owners of corporations. Clement and Olsen found French Canadians better but still under-represented in the bureaucratic (23.2%) and political elite (24.7%) between 1961 and 1973.
André d'Allemagne found in 1966 that Quebec's standard of living was 25% lower than the Canadian average, and 50% lower than the U.S. average. Quebecers, comprising one-fourth of Canada's labour force in 1971, accounted for 40% of its unemployed. Quebec's unemployment levels are typically 20-50% higher than the Canadian average, and 50% higher than Ontario.

Inequality between French and English Canadians living in Quebec were also shown by statistics which focused on income distribution by ethnic group in 1961. These found that people of British origin earned over 50% higher income ($4,940 to 3,185) than French Canadians in Quebec. Milner attempted to account for this inequality and concluded in 1973 that as much as 40% of this disparity in income results from direct discrimination in the Anglo-controlled economy. Health care services, mortality rates, disease rates, welfare statistics, availability of housing, social mobility, access to education, occupation, and numerous other sociological indices further illustrate this inequality. Lysiane Gagnon, looking at the personnel of large corporations located outside Montreal, found that Francophones made up 82% of the lowest (5,000 to 6,499) salary group and only 23% of the highest (over $15,000); whereas Anglos constituted respectively 18% and 77%. This is especially significant because most Anglophones living in Quebec reside in Montreal.

Thus, all of these studies showing high unemployment,
regional inequalities, underdevelopment in secondary manufacturing, overdevelopment of tertiary and primary sectors, high concentration of foreign ownership, the drain of profits to the metropolis, the lack of indigenous capitalist development (and an indigenous capitalist class), lower standard of living, etc., are effects of Quebec's underdevelopment and subordination to Canadian and U.S. metropoles. Although many of these statistics are dated and some of the worst of these conditions have been alleviated, they are nevertheless indicative of the larger picture of relations between and within Quebec and Canada, and to a great extent form the foundation of the current crisis in relations. In summary, to quote Milner, "Quebec's economy is deeply trapped within the framework of international capitalist control and development and, while it does not suffer the worst ravages of that system, it is colonized nonetheless." The relationship between classes and class fractions, and the state, in Quebec and Canada will reveal more clearly the present conjuncture of relations.
(ii) Class Analysis of Quebec

(a) The Bourgeoisie

From the previous section we can see the extent of foreign control of Quebec's economy and the degree to which it is integrated into the international and, especially, the continental economic systems. Thus the first major fraction of the bourgeoisie that has a direct impact on relations in Quebec is the U.S. based (though internationally operative) bourgeoisie. In Quebec this industrial fraction dominates manufacturing (especially heavy) and resource extraction industries. Though its head offices are located elsewhere this class operates through branch plants located in Canada and Quebec. Since entering Quebec this class has exercised political clout through its close relationship with the Quebec state and through a Canadian comprador bourgeoisie which staffs the executive levels and boards of its branch plants. Its success also lies in its ability to integrate various intermediate strata into its corporate bureaucracies and satisfy Quebec workers with reasonably high wages.

The second major fraction which has an impact on relations in Quebec is the Canadian-based (though internationally operative) bourgeoisie. Although this Canadian bourgeoisie is divided into several fractions, its most important, according to Clement, are these:
(1) a dominant indigenous bourgeoisie in finance, transportation and utilities, with smaller representation in manufacturing and resources (primarily food and beverages and pulp and paper), which is both national and international in scope; (2) a middle range indigenous national bourgeoisie mainly in some manufacturing sectors and, (3) a dominant comprador bourgeoisie in manufacturing and resources, which is both national and international, and located in branch plants of foreign-controlled multinationals.

Each of these fractions operates in Quebec, though in varying degrees. Historically Montreal has been the location for most of Canada's largest financial institutions. Also medium and large-sized English Canadian firms still control a significant share of Quebec's secondary manufacturing production. Finally, the intermediary role of the Canadian comprador in U.S. manufacturing and resource firms is still operative.

The exact nature of the Quebec bourgeoisie is the subject of current debate among students of Quebec politics. This class, which emerged during the 19th century, has historically been very weak in relation to the U.S. and Canadian bourgeoisies, constantly facing extinction through bankruptcy and absorption. Prior to 1960, the Quebec state rarely promoted the development of an indigenous Quebec bourgeoisie. Since then, however, due primarily to the efforts of the Quebec state, the Quebec bourgeoisie has emerged as a force in Quebec politics and some fractions even see their interests as somewhat distinct from the Canadian and U.S. bourgeoisies. But generally, as Niosi says, the Quebec bourgeoisie is "nothing other than the French Canadian
section of the Canadian capitalist class. Its markets, its investments, its aims, all are trans-Canadian." This bourgeoisie, though weak and truncated, has improved its position since 1960. It is located primarily in small and medium-sized manufacturing and commercial enterprises but there are a few large Quebec based companies in industry (Bombardier Inc., York-Lambton, Quebecor Inc., Rolland Paper), banking (National Bank of Canada) and commerce (Provigo). In his study of the French-Canadian bourgeoisie Niosi found 46 companies with over $10 million in assets, and 16 with over $100 million. There is a distinction between the smaller and larger fractions of this class. Its largest fractions are either involved in or are interested in expansion into Canadian and international markets. Its orientation is therefore generally federalist, and though it welcomes aid from the Quebec state, it fears that, as Niosi says, "the separation of Quebec would truncate its principal market, force it to reorganize its companies and weaken its position on the Canadian and international scene." On the other hand, smaller companies are more dependent upon aid from the Quebec state and have a greater tendency to favor increased autonomy for the Quebec government and, in some cases, independence. In Fournier's study of the Quebec Chamber of Commerce, a business association made up mainly of Quebec-based businessmen and professionals, he found that the main source of friction was between the small and large companies. The Montreal branch of the
Chamber is indicative of the attitude of this smaller and somewhat more Quebec-oriented fraction. In a formal statement, the Montreal branch indicated its goal was to promote "the economic and social advancement of a nation, the French-Canadian nation." Though this Chamber could never be called a hotbed of Quebec nationalism.

(b) The New Petite Bourgeoisie

One of the major results of the post-war intensification of capitalist relations of production in Quebec was that it conditioned the emergence and rapid expansion of a new intermediate stratum, variously called the 'new middle class' or 'new petite bourgeoisie.' This class, initially an effect of the societal transformation taking place, eventually contributed to the further transformation through its participation in the bureaucracies of the state and private corporations. Its appearance, says Bourque and Frenette, "reveals the existence of new functions in the capitalist production process. These new functions correspond to different kinds of needs in the management, administration, organization, and planning of the production and consumption of material and symbolic goods." Employed as professionals, semi-professionals, managers, supervisors, legal and technical advisors, intellectuals, etc., this stratum includes what has become known as the technocracy. Clearly the most important fraction emerged in the post-war period to challenge the ideologies
and values (as well as those who articulated them) long-dominant in Quebec. The ideological positions of these new petite bourgeoisie elements differed somewhat from fraction to fraction. On one hand, there was Pierre Elliot Trudeau, and his colleagues at Cite Libre, who attacked the conservative ideology and argued that French Canadians should overcome their anti-statism and begin participating wholeheartedly in liberal democratic institutions. Others, centered around trade unions and universities such as Laval, agreed and added that the state should be used more vigorously in the economy to ease the strains of development. Others, such as University of Montreal historians Michel Brunet, Guy Fregault and Maurice Seguin, were somewhat more nationalistic, arguing that Quebecers could only ensure that their interests were being protected by using the Quebec state. They argued for the increased use of the state to aid the development of Quebec. The characteristics of this class are that it is predominantly young, well-educated, francophone, liberal, nationalist and situated primarily in the Quebec state (after 1960). This class rather abruptly replaced the traditional petite bourgeoisie as the intellectually and culturally dominant stratum within Quebec and in the early 1960's became politically potent as it orchestrated and carried out the reforms of the Quiet Revolution. Through the Liberal Party it articulated a nationalist-social democratic ideology dedicated to bringing about the economic liberation of Quebec from foreign domination. It was to do this
through the greater involvement of the state in the economy and the creation of an indigenous economic base for Quebec -- in both public and private sectors. It was temporarily successful but as time went on its attempts to press for greater reforms were frustrated by elements within the Liberal Party. 60 This fraction, though not politically idle for ten years (1966-1976), did lose its political and ideological strength. It has, however, resurfaced in the last few years; this time mobilized around the Parti Québécois.

Other fractions of the intermediate strata which were identifiable, but clearly of declining significance, were the traditional petite bourgeoisie which articulated its ideology through the Union Nationale Party effectively until 1960, and, the new petite bourgeoisie of anglophone heritage located in Canadian and U.S. private corporations, whose political import has been slipping since 1960 as well.

(c) The Working Class

Quebec's working class emerged primarily in the post-Confederation period and grew rapidly around the turn of the century with the increased penetration of capitalist development. Located predominantly in the timber, shipbuilding, and light manufacturing industries (clothing, tobacco, pulp and paper, textiles, furniture, footwear), the Quebec working class provided the dominant anglophone business class with cheap, docile and
trustworthy labour. Though unionization began in the 1800's, and by the early 1900's Quebec workers had won numerous improvements in working conditions, goals of militant reform were transformed with the emergence of Catholic unionism. The creation of the Confédération des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada (CTCC, now CNTU) in 1921, formed out of 88 existing unions with a membership of 26,000, put a substantial portion of Quebec's organized labour in the hands of the Church. 

The CTCC's view of industrial relations was based on the "inequality of social classes (and) the harmony of capital and labour." Even though the CTCC represented 75% of Quebec's organized labour in 1935, its unions were responsible for only 9 of 507 strikes in Quebec between 1915 and 1936. When the CTCC failed to keep Quebec's working class in line, the state, during the Taschereau, Duplessis and Godbout regimes, would step in and ensure labour's cooperation. Between 1917 and 1950 the state intervened frequently in labour disputes and interpreted its role as "simply the protector of employers' interests." Canadian unions (CCL and TLC), and their American affiliates, (CIO and AFL) began to make some headway in Quebec in the 1930's by counteracting the ultra-conservatism of the CTCC and other Quebec unions. This resulted in numerous violent confrontations between trade unions, splitting the working class almost irreparably.

The increased and intensified interventions by the Quebec state, legitimized by the enactment of a new Labour
Relations Act in 1944,\textsuperscript{67} encouraged a more militant posture by Quebec's labour unions. Soon even Catholic unions were mobilized, along with those affiliated to Canadian and American centrals, to struggle against the state's repressive tactics, and the poor wages and working conditions offered by the Canadian and American bourgeoisie. Under Duplessis (between 1944 and 1959) most strikes (such as at Asbestos, Louiseville, Murdochville, Valleyfield and Noranda) were transformed into major confrontations between workers and the state-bourgeoisie alliance, because of the state's partisan interventions. Herbert Quinn described the tactics of the Union Nationale under Duplessis, which were to,

> send a large number of provincial police into any town or area as soon as a strike broke out. On many occasions this action was taken, not at the request of the local municipal authorities, the only ones who legally had the right to ask for such assistance, but at the request of the company involved in the industrial dispute. More often than not, however, the police were used for the purpose of intimidating strikers, arresting their leaders, carrying strike breakers through picket lines, and doing everything possible to break the strike.\textsuperscript{68}

Greater collaboration between unions began and several 'common fronts' were established to put forth a unified working class voice. This was one of the first instances of a major class confrontation involving the working class in Quebec. Though, obviously, it did not lead to a full-scale class struggle, and was not entirely successful from the vantage point of the Quebec worker, it nevertheless represents a key moment in the development
of the ideology of the Quebec working class.

The post-war transformation of Quebec began to have its effect on the Quebec working class. In 1947, primary sector workers made up 24.2% of Quebec's work force. By 1965 this figure had dropped to 9.2%. Correspondingly, the number of tertiary sector workers increased from 44.5% to 58.1%. Secondary sector workers remained at around 30% over this period. These figures reflect the growing numbers of white collar (finance and commerce) and service sector employees, and the declining number of rural-agricultural workers. Through the 1960's this trend continued as the expansion of the public sector required workers in great quantities. This had a tremendous impact on the nature of organized labour in Quebec. Between 1960 and 1970, 175,000 new workers from public and para public sectors became unionized. By 1970, one third of organized labour were state employees.

The Confederation of National Trade Unions (CNTU) absorbed the greatest portion of these new public sector workers. Its membership increased from about 80,000 in 1960 to over 200,000 in 1970, of which 106,000 were employed by the state, 30,000 of those as civil servants. In 1960 three-fourths of its members were primary and secondary sector employees, whereas, in 1970 over 50% were employed by the state. The Quebec Teachers Corporation (CEQ) also benefited greatly from the superstructural modernization and expansion of public education. It emerged as one of the three major unions in
contemporary Quebec, boasting a membership of 60,000 in 1969 (up from 12,000 just ten years earlier).

The newly created Quebec Federation of Labour (QFL), composed almost exclusively of blue collar (productive) workers, was least affected by the expansion of the state sector. Though its membership did increase to more than 200,000 by the 1970's it remained predominantly composed of francophone workers from the monopolistic anglo-owned primary and secondary sectors.

Thus, the unionized section of Quebec's working class became transformed during the 1960's. The most important element undoubtedly became public sector employees, rather than productive labourers. Ideologically this fraction transformed and radicalized Quebec's working class, and brought it into conflict with the Quebec state on numerous occasions. The unionized fraction of Quebec labour has grown steadily during the 20th century: increasing from 10% in 1931 to over 39% in 1968. The percentage of unionized workers varies from sector to sector. In the capital intensive and U.S. dominated primary sector, 44% of employees were unionized in 1968. In the same year 47% of secondary sector workers and 35.3% of tertiary sector workers were unionized. A further breakdown by industry shows unionization highest in education (96.8%), tobacco (78.2%), and forestry (78.5%), and lowest in agriculture (0.8%), commerce (0.5%) and finance (2.4%). More than half of unionized secondary sector workers in Quebec were affiliated
with the QFL while more than one-third of unionized tertiary sector workers belonged to the CNTU in 1968.\textsuperscript{77} In 1976, the QFL was Quebec's largest union with over 285,000 members. After the defection of 60,000 of its members in 1972-1973 the CNTU's membership totalled 175,000.\textsuperscript{78}

Throughout the 1960's and early 1970's Quebec's three major unions gradually grew more united and radical. Discussions between labour leaders for the purposes of creating a united front began as early as 1968 and culminated in the creation of the 'Common Front' in 1972 for the purposes of negotiating a common contract for 210,000 Quebec public sector workers affiliated to the three major centrals. However, since this high-water mark in 1972 labour unity has broken down somewhat and since 1976, the major unions have adopted an uncertain attitude in their dealings with one another and the state, and an inconsistent attitude in the relations with the Parti Québécois.
(iii) State-Class Relations (1960-1976)

As we said earlier, the intensification of capitalist relations of production resulted in externally controlled development, which perpetuated uneven economic growth in Canada. Out of this emerged several regionally-based economies. The local bourgeoisie as well as the foreign bourgeoisie, which was interested in provincially controlled resources, began to look more and more to the provincial state to promote their interests. Eventually, during an era which demanded greater state involvement in the economy, the provincial states began to challenge the authority of the Canadian federal state. The resultant decentralization of the Canadian federal system is evidence of this tendency.79

The Quebec state was no exception. Its active involvement in the development of the Quebec economy began after 1945 but was accelerated after the election of the Liberal Party in 1960. The period between 1945 and 1960 was one of upheaval and transition in Quebec. Several new intellectual currents emerged to challenge the once sacrosanct values of Quebec society. The most vocal and, ultimately, the most successful current in Quebec was articulated by the young, educated middle classes. Its dynamic liberal nationalism increasingly came into conflict with the old defensive reactionary ideology of Duplessis. The latter was finally put to rest in 1960 with the
election of the Liberal Party. The Liberals rode the wave of this new sentiment to power, weaving nationalist rhetoric into its program of economic-social reform. During the early years of its term the Liberals successfully mobilized large segments of the Quebec population behind its nation-building project. Its first major move was the creation of the Quebec Economic Orientation Council (COEQ). With this body the government proceeded to unfold its strategy for economic reform which was to include the creation of a scientific research council, a centre for industrial research, and a series of regional economic councils (CER's) to unite and integrate various groups into participating in its project. Then it began to set up a network of state corporations that were designed to either aid private accumulation or to participate directly in the production process. The most important projects undertaken at this time were the creation of the Caisse de dépôt, the Société Générale de Financement, Sidbec and Hydro Quebec. The Société Générale de Financement (General Investment Corporation) was set up in 1962 to aid, reorganize or buy-out financially troubled Quebec companies. Eventually its role was expanded to include participating in the management and financing of medium and large-sized Quebec firms, creating industrial complexes, and promoting the amalgamation and merger of small and medium-sized firms. The Caisse de dépôt (Quebec Deposit and Investment Fund) was established in 1965 to manage funds collected by the Quebec pension plan and to provide
financial assistance to medium and large-sized Quebec firms in order to lessen their financial dependence on Canadian banks. It was also designed to make efforts to consolidate and reorganize Quebec capital (such as the creation of Provigo from three medium-sized Quebec companies). Hydro-Quebec was created in 1963 when the Quebec Liberal government nationalized the province's Canadian-owned hydro plants. Sidbec was established in 1964 (though it did not fully become a public corporation until 1968) to become involved in all aspects of steel production. In all over 20 public and para public institutions were set up by the Liberals during this period. Lesage, constantly in conflict with Ottawa over legislative jurisdiction and the administration of various programs, managed to expand the size of the Quebec state bureaucracy immensely. As a result, between 1961 and 1970 Quebec government revenues increased from $758 million to over $3.3 billion dollars. Expenditures over the same period increased by a similar amount to greater than $4 billion, surpassing the federal government's expenditure of $3 billion in Quebec. By 1970 the public sector accounted for 45.9% of all expenditures (up from 33% in 1961) and 43.4% (up from 30%) of all revenues in the province. Although the program aided all sections of the bourgeoisie to some extent, its orientation was in favour of aiding the growth of Quebec's indigenous development. As Fournier remarked, "the main avowed intention of the government in setting up state enterprises was to contribute to the
"economic liberation" of Quebec, in conformity with the Liberal election slogan 'maitres chez nous'. In effect, this meant that the Quebec government wanted to play an active role in creating an economic power base for the French Canadian element. The Quebec government considered that it was only through the use of the state that French Canadians could gain some participation in economic decision-making, which had heretofore been almost entirely in the hands of English Canadians or foreigners. Brunelle take this one step further, saying that the COEQ was in fact an organization specifically created by the Lesage government to articulate the demands of the francophone bourgeoisie. Though not immediately threatened, Canadian and U.S. bourgeoisies kept a close watch on the proceedings at this time.

To be successful the Liberals, however, had to integrate other elements into its project. Behind its nationalist ideology, the Liberals mobilized large sections of the industrial proletariat and new state sector workers. The major union centrals all moved to a position of informal collaboration and cooperation with the province-building aspirations of the Liberals, contributing to a relatively peaceful period of class relations. The newly reformed CNTU, under the leadership of Jean Marchand, operated, said Lipsig-Mumme, "as if it were the trade union arm of a one-party state." The CEQ also increasingly cooperated in the Liberal project after education was taken over and expanded by the state. The Liberal Party's
labour code (1964), which reversed the 1944 policy and gave public sector workers increased rights to strike, did much to enlist the further trust and cooperation of this group. As Lipsig-Mumme says, the new public sector workers became integrally involved as "state agents in the project of societal modernization." But maybe most important was the position of the new petite bourgeoisie. The ideology of the Liberals was perfectly suited to the interests of this stratum. The expansion of the bureaucracy provided increasing opportunities for young, educated French Canadians, and the overtly nationalist orientation of the program mobilized their full cooperation.

As time went on and the reforms of the Quiet Revolution lost momentum, the cooperation of these segments of Quebec society became tenuous. Bourque and Frenette argue that a split in the Liberal Party, between the technocratic fraction (behind Levesque), which wanted to accelerate the movement towards state capitalism and economic independence, and the "neo-capitalist" fraction (behind Lesage), which wanted to put more emphasis on the development of the private sector, beginning around 1964, caused irreparable damage and, inevitably, the downfall of the Liberals and the Quiet Revolution reforms.

The technocratic fraction, which represented the new state middle class, quickly became frustrated as its attempts to push ahead with greater reform met with deaf ears. The public sector workers also became disillusioned with the reform and
began to exercise their right to strike. The CNTU, pitted against the Liberal Party in strike after strike, was "torn between collaboration in the nationalist project and rejection of its implications for labour." It proved much easier for the Liberals to mobilize large segments of Quebec society behind its project than to maintain the allegiance of these elements. The loss of support of the working class, especially public sector workers, no doubt contributed to the election defeat of the Liberal Party in 1966. The expulsion of René Lévesque and his cohorts from the Liberal Party after its defeat marked the victory of the "neo-capitalist" fraction within the Liberal Party. Lévesque and other expelled members of the Liberal technocratic-wing seized the opportunity to mobilize the young nationalist petite bourgeoisie and created the Parti Québécois. The next few years proved to be a transition period for this class as it gradually changed its allegiance to the new party.

It also proved to be very much a transition for Quebec society at large. The Union Nationale which inherited this unstable equilibrium of class forces often did little more than try to find a working balance. Elected largely by protest vote (anti-Liberal), the Union Nationale continually oscillated from a position of radical independence to conservative federalism in its attempt to create an equilibrium. As Bourque and Frenette argued, it would be "false to say that the Union Nationale between 1966 and 1970 was (strictly speaking) the
representative of a class or class faction; politically, the Union Nationale reflected a balance between the conflicting forces." It did, however, transform class relations by modifying the basic thrust of the Quiet Revolution reforms. Much more emphasis was placed on the development of the private sector -- both Québécois and non-Québécois elements. As Daniel Johnson, leader of the Union Nationale Party, wrote in 1968, "The role of the state is not to substitute itself for private enterprise, but to help it, sustain it, orient it, surround it with a climate of confidence and stability, stimulate it ..." The U.N.'s creation of the Quebec Planning and Development Council (OPDQ) was an attempt to integrate various elements of society -- leaders from labour, business and government -- into its project. Yet, the potential usefulness of such a body seemed to be defeated quickly with the creation of the General Council of Industry. This body, composed of representatives from the major U.S. (Iron Ore, Texaco, Alcan, etc.), Canadian (Royal Bank, Bank of Montreal, Domtar, etc.), and Quebec (Bombardier, Rolland Paper, Dupuis Freres) corporations operating in Quebec, was designed to create a formal link between business and government. Its mandate, "to tighten the bonds between the Industry and Commerce Ministry and the Quebec business community with their colleagues from other provinces and foreign countries; to inform the Ministry about any changes in the opinions of business about Quebec and to suggest means of orienting and modifying these opinions; to
suggest economic policies and if necessary help direct these policies .... suggests an indication of the economic orientation of the UN at this time -- one that was clearly in favour of large corporations whether of Canadian, American or Quebec origin. A state corporation, Soquip (Quebec petroleum Operation Company) was also created at this time. It was designed to involve itself in all phases of the petroleum industry, in association with private capital. Its role, however, under the Union Nationale, was never more than that of a "sophisticated subsidy system or incentive program" for private industry, and its activities rarely went beyond assisting in exploration. Other measures by the Union Nationale -- legislation such as the Quebec Industrial Credit Bureau Act, Quebec Industrial Assistance Act, the setting up of a Financial Assistance Program for High Technology Industries -- show that its intention was to assist all fractions of capital, but especially its largest fractions. This policy frustrated the growth of the small and medium-sized Quebec bourgeoisie which received the attention of the Liberal Party in the early 1960's. The new petite bourgeoisie, which continued to push for increased state involvement in the economy, was also frustrated by the policies of the Union Nationale. However, in terms of electoral success its coercive approach in dealing with labour relations was disastrous as it quickly alienated the support of Quebec's organized working class. Bill 25,
the government's labour legislation, reversed the direction of the 1964 Act, and abrogated many of the acquired rights of the working class. For example, only one central was allowed to bargain for workers in a particular industry, even though in many cases an industrial sector was represented by two or more centrals. This set centrals in competition with each other for representation. Also, a standardized wage policy was enforced, inhibiting the mechanism of collective bargaining. The state, under the Union Nationale, once again assumed the right of intervening directly in labour disputes. Workers responded to this with one of the most intense periods of striking in North American labour history. The new state sector workers led the way as public employees were responsible for 60% of strikes between 1966 and 1972.93 This was also a period of intense grass-root organization and action, ranging from radical socialist and anarchist groups (PSQ, FLQ) to community action groups (MCM, FRAP), proving to be too much for the U.N. to handle with its lack of popular base. Its loss in the 1970 election, and its subsequent decline and virtual disappearance from Quebec politics by 1980,94 attests to this lack of foundation.

The Liberal Party which replaced the Union Nationale in 1970, inherited a similar disequilibrium of forces to that which it left in 1966. The party itself, however, was vastly different. As Milner said, "except for a small group of technocrats, including Claude Castonguay and some of the
experts he recruited while Minister of Social Affairs such as his successor Claude Forget, the link between the Liberals of the 1970's and the social groups most directly involved with the Quiet Revolution was effectively severed. 95 Bereft of its technocratic and nationalist elements, its ideology was also changed. It no longer saw the strengthening of the Quebec economy through the participation of the state but, rather, through an intensification of ties with Canadian and U.S. capital. Its commitment was no longer to 'maitres chez nous' but to 'profitable federalism', and the creation of 100,000 jobs through the stimulation of the private sector. In this way its program was not much different from the Union Nationale Party which preceded it in power. In 1971 the Liberals created the Société de développement Industriel du Quebec (Quebec Industrial Development Corporation) as an industrial bank oriented towards assisting high technology medium and large-sized industry. Various legislations, such as Bill 24 which gave a 30% tax credit on new investments of more than $50,000, were passed with the intention of encouraging investment from any and all sources. A good example of the orientation of the Liberal Party was shown when ITT-Rayonier (a subsidiary of the U.S. owned giant ITT) was given 51,000 square miles of forest rights for a period of 40 years, and was required to pay only fifty cents per cord (well below the normal $2.50 to $3.00) in royalties. ITT-Rayonier was also
provided with $57.3 million (including federal and provincial government aid) to set up a new mill at Port-Cartier, Quebec, which would create only 459 permanent and 1,330 seasonal jobs. In the field of labour relations the Liberal Party proved to be quite similar to the Union Nationale (of both pre-1960 and 1966-1970 periods) as well; using a coercive approach to intervene frequently and directly in strikes. Not happy with the way they were being treated the three major union centrals -- QFL, CNTU, CEQ -- began discussing the possibility of creating a common front to negotiate collective agreements. When several strikes were broken up and union leaders jailed or fined, the three major centrals began to take an increasingly unified and radical stance vis-a-vis the state, producing documents and manifestos which transcended economism and brought capitalist relations of production into question. In 1971, for example, a CNTU workpaper, 'Ne Comptons Que Sur Nos Propres Moyens', presents a leftist analysis of the political and economic conditions in Quebec and advocates the nationalization of industry and workers' control of production and distribution. The conflict between state workers and the state reached a peak in 1972 when 210,000 public sector workers, affiliated to the three major unions, formed a 'Common Front' to negotiate with the Quebec government. Included among these workers were blue collar, white collar as well as professional state employees. With their families they represented nearly one million Quebecers. The strike
assumed great importance for all elements of Quebec society. Much more was at stake than 210,000 public sector employees fighting for wage concessions from the state. As Fournier comments, "Business felt threatened because it knew that if the government gave in to the demand of the unions for a $100-a-week minimum, the result would be substantial union pressure on the private sector to pay the same wages. Thus, in many ways it was ... the overall wage structure and distribution of income in Quebec (that was at stake)." After negotiations with government broke down and a strike was called, the Liberals passed a back-to-work legislation (Bill 19) and within days several unionists, including the leaders of the three centrals, were jailed. Inevitably, the unprecedented radicalism and solidarity of the unions was crushed by the state, as the Liberals showed very clearly their class orientation.

An ideological polarization within the CNTU occurred shortly thereafter and resulted in the secession of 60,000 members and a number of leaders. About half of the defectors founded the Confederation of Democratic Trade Unions (CSD) and continued to collaborate with the Liberal Party. The other half, members of the Civil Servants Federation (SFPQ) simply disaffiliated. Relations between the QFL and the CNTU were also worsened by the events at this time. After 1973 the QFL moved to a position of closer collaboration with the Parti Québécois, not unlike the
the relationship between the CNTU and the Liberals of the 1960-1966 period.

Bourassa continued his coercive approach in dealing with labour throughout the next few years. In 1976, his last year in office, a short but intense period of labour activity began again. Workers in the construction, asbestos, metallurgical, hydro-electric and textile industries, as well as teachers, academics, nurses, etc., again formed a 'Common Front', and led widespread striking and civil disobedience right up until the November election. The result was the same as in 1972. Bourassa's approach to labour, as well as allegations of corruption in his government, have to be considered major reasons for his defeat in 1976. However, it is likely that equally importantly was the fact that the Liberals, after having alienated the new petite bourgeoisie, which was the intellectual force behind the nation-building reforms of the Quiet Revolution period, lost their claim to building the Quebec nation. As Milner said, "The ideological basis for nation-building thus fell essentially to the Parti Québécois."
REFERENCES


2 This has been referred to as Quebec's "double class structure" by Gilles Bourque and Nicole Laurin-Frenette in Gary Teeple, (ed.), Capitalism and the National Question in Canada, (Toronto: 1972).

3 For insight into the role played by Quebec's political and clerical elites see Pierre Trudeau, The Asbestos Strike, 1974.


7 Ian Lumsden, in D. Drache, op.cit., 1979, p. 21


11 Bennett, op.cit., p. 155. See appendix one.
Bennett, op. cit., p. 155


Raynauld showed that 60% of foreign owned production was exported out of Quebec, compared to 22% for Quebec-based and 49% of Canadian firms. Quebec firms accounted for only 5.58% of Quebec's exports to other provinces, and 2.27% to other countries. A. Raynauld, "La Propriete des Enterprises au Quebec", from the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Volume 3, p. 57.

Bennett, op. cit., p. 158-159. To explain more clearly what we mean by Quebec-based industry see footnote 50 below.

Value added was defined as the difference between the sale price of a product and the cost of raw materials used in its production. For the figures for selected sectors, taken from Raynauld, op. cit., see appendix two.


Figures adapted from Arnaud Sales, La Bourgeoisie Industrielle au Quebec, (Montreal: 1979), p. 183.
19 Primary sector refers to the extraction of raw materials and resources. Secondary sector refers to the transformation of primary products into production or consumption goods. Tertiary sector refers to the sphere of circulation of goods (commerce) and money (banking), as well as personal and public services (health, education, transportation, etc.).


22 With 40% of the world's asbestos and 83% of the Canadian total, Quebec supplies 85% of U.S.'s demand for asbestos. (Fournier, op.cit., p. 169). In the 1960's, Johns-Manville, the largest asbestos mining firm in Quebec had one manufacturing plant in Quebec and 46 in the U.S. Only 2% of asbestos was transformed into finished products in Quebec. Thus in 1971 Quebec and Canada were net importers of asbestos related products.

23 Bennett, op.cit., p. 166.

24 See appendix three. This table shows that Ontario's heavy manufacturing firms account for 52% of Ontario's production value, compared to only 31% for Quebec. It is taken from The Parti Québécois, Souveraineté et Économie, pps. 14-15, cited in Bennett, op.cit., p. 167.

25 See appendix four. This table is taken from J.P. Chateau, "Croissance et structure des Industries Manufacturières au Québec et en Ontario", Actualité Économique, cited in Bennett, op.cit., p. 166.

26 About 45% of Quebec's total manufacturing output
is in the light sector compared to 31% in heavy manufacturing. Ontario's corresponding figures are 18% in light, and 52% in heavy. Bennett, op.cit., p. 167.

27 Hydro-Quebec, Sidbec, Marin Industries Ltd., Forano, Volcano Inc., Donohue Inc., Cegelec Ent. Inc., La Salle Tricot, and Soquip are the major ones.

28 Société des alcools du Québec and Loto Québec.

29 Quebec Deposit and Investment Fund, Industrial Development Corporation, and General Investment Corporation are the main ones.

30 Cooperative Federee de Quebec, Agropur (previously Coop Agricole de Granby), and Cooperative Laitiere du Sud du Quebec are key.

31 Federation des magasins coop is the major one.

32 Mouvement Desjardins, Fédération des Caisses d'entraide Economique, Federation de Montréal des Caisses Populaires Desjardins, are the main institutions of the coop movement.


36 Average disposable income (direct taxes deducted) was $675 in the Bas St. Laurent-Gaspe area, compared to $1,444 in Montreal. Cited in Ryerson, "Quebec: Concepts of Class and Nation", in Teeple, Op.cit., p. 219. See also appendix six which shows unemployment in various regions of Quebec. It is taken from Bennett, op.cit., p. 174.


Milner and Milner, op.cit., p. 53.

Henry Milner, Politics in the New Quebec, (Toronto: 1978), p. 45. Milner showed that the average rates of unemployment between 1957 and 1976 were: Quebec 7.4%, Ontario 4.3%, Canada 5.6%.


Milner and Milner, op.cit., p. 63.


A study by Jac-André Boulet of the Economic Council of Canada showed that French speaking Quebecers have closed the income gap between them and English-speaking Quebecers between 1961 and 1977. In 1961 Anglos earned 51% more than Francos in Quebec. By 1970 this gap had narrowed to 32%, and by 1977 it was down to 15%. Statistics cited from The Globe and Mail, Tuesday, February 20, 1979, p. 8. Editorial by William Johnson.

Milner and Milner, op.cit., p. 82.

Although the U.S. bourgeoisie is itself subdivided into several fractions -- monopolistic finance bourgeoisie, non-monopolistic commercial bourgeoisie, etc. -- it is mainly
its monopolistic industrial fractions that operate with any political significance in Quebec. Other less significant fractions which operate in Quebec are its monopolistic and non-monopolistic commercial fractions.

49 Wallace Clement, in Saul and Heron, op.cit., p. 71. On which fraction of capital is dominant in Canada, it is felt that the work of Frank and Libbie Park provides a satisfactory answer. They say, "The point is not of course whether the banks dominate industry or industry the banks; it is that the same group of finance capitalists control both." Frank and Libbie Park, The Anatomy of Big Business, (Toronto: 1973), p. 74.

50 This is more commonly, but incorrectly, referred to as the francophone or French Canadian bourgeoisie. Niosi, for example, in referring to the "French Canadian bourgeoisie" includes all important firms with francophone owners. The problem with using ethnicity as the principle criterion for distinguishing fractions of the bourgeoisie is, as Fournier says, that it "ignores in particular the important superstructural factor ... that the Quebec state is in fact the main focal point of the (Quebec) bourgeoisie ..." (Pierre Fournier, "The New Parameters of the Quebec Bourgeoisie", in Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review, Number 3, Spring 1980, p. 68.) Of course, as Fournier adds, the Quebec bourgeoisie can have "pan-Canadian" or even international ambitions without losing their Quebec accumulation base and their links with the Quebec superstructure. (Fournier, op.cit., p. 69). It should also be pointed out that the Quebec bourgeoisie is not simply a wing of the Canadian bourgeoisie, or a comprador fraction of the Canadian or U.S. corporations in Quebec, although some of its fractions do perform these roles. Bourque provides a useful definition of this Quebec bourgeoisie, saying it is, "a class whose accumulation base is primarily Quebecois and which relies mainly on the provincial state to defend its interests ..." (Gilles Bourque, "Le Parti québécois dans les rapports de classe", Political Aujourd'hui, Number 7-8, 1978, p. 87, cited in Fournier, op.cit., 1980, p. 70). Thus, we will refer to the Canadian bourgeoisie and U.S. bourgeoisie with this same criteria in mind.

51 Fournier and Bourque, for example, include in their analysis of the Quebec bourgeoisie both owners of private corporations as well as executives and top-level management in state corporations and cooperatives. Niosi, on the other hand, limits his analysis to owners of private corporations.
It is felt here that managers of state corporations cannot be considered bourgeoisie because they are not direct owners of the means of production. Because they, at times, "occupy the place" and fulfill the functions of capital, they must be considered petite bourgeoisie with a bourgeois class position.


53 The Groupe de recherches sur les elites industrielles, for example, found that French Canadians had increased their ownership in transportation equipment by 29%, in metal products by 22%, and in chemicals by more than 15% since 1961. Fournier, op.cit., 1980, p. 85.

54 See appendix seven. This is a list of French-Canadian owned companies and their assets and control (1975). It is taken from J. Niosi, op.cit., 1979, pp. 152-154.


59 Between 1965 and 1969 only 12.7% of graduates from the University of Montreal remained in private sector occupations. "Virtually all other graduates were in the public sector." Postgate and McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, (Toronto: 1976), p. 133.

60 This will be dealt with at greater length in the next section.

61 This traditional petite bourgeoisie is distinguishable primarily by its ideological position. This position was based
on the values of the long-dominant conservative nationalism which viewed French Canadian society as agrarian and centered around the church. Business and liberal democratic political institutions such as the state were viewed as the place for Anglos not French Canadians. This ideological position of course contrasts sharply with the one taken by the new petite bourgeoisie which emerged in the 1940's and 1950's. But there is also evidence that the distinction in ideological positions between new and traditional petite bourgeois elements in Quebec had a material foundation. The traditional petite bourgeoisie of peasantry, small independent commodity producers, clerical elite, political and intellectual elite within the Union Nationale partitocratie, were more likely to articulate this conservative ideology than were the new petite bourgeoisie of technocrats, intellectuals, etc. But the distinction is best understood primarily by the political and ideological positions articulated by the different fractions.


63 Carla Lipsig-Mumme, "Quebec Unions and the State: Conflict and Dependence", in Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review, Number 3, Spring 1980. The structure of the CTCC was very hierarchical and authoritarian. Each local was run by a priest (aumonier) who carried out educational and ideological functions. Leftist ideas were denounced, private property and class distinctions were justified as part of the natural order, strikes and labour conflict were discouraged, conservative demands were made, and the worker was totally subordinate in the labour hierarchy. The church hierarchy, argues Bennett, cultivated an ignorance of social and economic realities in workers. Bennett, op.cit., p. 14-15.


66 Such as the Federation provinciale du travail which was even more conservative and closer to the government than was the CTCC. This union later merged with the Federation des unions industrielles du Quebec to form the QFL(FTQ).

67 This Act ensured the state's regulative role in controlling union formation and certification, as well as in its collective bargaining. It refused public sector workers
the right to strike, enforcing compulsory arbitration. It also allowed government the power to revoke the unions right to represent workers at any time.

68 Herbert Quinn, The Union Nationale, (Toronto: 1963) p. 94.

69 Lipsig-Mummé, op.cit., p. 132.

70 Ibid., p. 133. It should be noted that the unionization of the public sector came about as a result of the new labour code jointly worked out by the CNTU and the Liberal government and passed in 1964. Without this government intervention the growth would not have been so substantial.

71 In 1961 the CTCC was de-clericalized and became the CNTU (Confederation of National Trade Unions), reflecting the breakdown of the dominant ideology and the cultural dominance of the Church.


73 The QFL was created in 1957 as a Quebec branch of the CLC (newly formed out of a merger of the CCL and TLC) which was now affiliated to the U.S. union AFL-CIO.


76 Ibid., p. 211.

77 Idem.

78 Andre Leclerc, "Quebec's "Radical" Unionists", in Canadian Dimension, Volume 13, Number 1, 1978, pp. 34-36.

79 This is reflected in the spending of the two levels of government. Federal state expenditure increased from 17.5% of GNP in 1955 to 19.9% in 1974, while provincial expenditures went from 6.4% to 16%. Garth Stevenson, "Federalism and the
Political Economy of the Canadian State", in Leo Panitch, (ed.),
The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power,

80 The Centre des recherches industrielles du Quebec
was not actually created until 1969 and a research council
has never been formed.

81 These statistics are taken from B.R. Lemoine,
"The Growth of the Quebec State", in D. Roussopoulos,
(ed.), The Political Economy of the State, (Montreal: 1973),
which were originally from a publication by Kemal Wassef,
(ed.), of the CNTU research department, "La situation du
Gouvernement du Quebec dans les affaires Economiques de la
Province."

82 Fournier, op.cit., 1976, p. 179.

83 D. Brunelle, La désillusion tranquille, cited in
William Coleman, "The Class Bases of Language Policy in
Quebec, 1949-1975", in Studies in Political Economy: A
Socialist Review, Number 3, Spring 1980.

84 Lipsig-Mummé, op.cit., p. 133.

85 Ibid., p. 134.

86 Bourque and Frenette, in Teeple (ed.), op.cit.
In 1964, 401,710 work days were lost due to strikes in
Quebec. The figure was 1,926,890 in 1966, Milner, op.cit.,
1978.

87 Lipsig-Mummé, op.cit., p. 135.

88 As a 1966 Cité Libre article by André Rossinger
said, the Liberal Party "irritated and demoralized vast
sectors of the working class, student, civil servant and
professional classes, also some progressive elements of the
intelligentsia .. which in turn led to protest votes of
all types and shades." D. Roussopoulos, Quebec and Radical
Social Change, op.cit., article by B.R. Lemoine, "1966 Elections",
Lemoine agreed that the 1966 election victory by the U.N. was
successful because they channelled the protest votes resulting
from the dislocations caused by the Quiet Revolution policies.


94 The U.N. failed to win a seat in the 1981 election.

95 Milner, op.cit., 1978, p. 143.

96 See pps. 222-229 of Bennett, op.cit., for a discussion.

97 A CEQ paper in 1971 entitled "The Schools in Service to the Dominant Class", vigorously criticized capitalism. The QFL's 1972 manifesto, "The State is our Exploiter", is similar in nature to the other two. For these and other publications of the Quebec centrals see, Daniel Drache, (ed.), Quebec - Only the Beginning: The Manifestos of the Common Front, (Toronto: 1972).

98 Numerous regional common fronts were used successfully in the private sector between 1970 and 1972 -- La Presse workers, Asbestos Miners, Alcan employees, Dominion Textile Workers, etc. The Common Front strikers in 1972 were demanding a minimum wage of $100 weekly, equal pay for equal work, greater increases for those with lower wages, an equalization of fringe benefits and a general 8% cost of living allowance.


100 The ideological split was between a radical element which articulated the Marxist analysis of class relations in Quebec, led by President Marcel Pepin, and a more conservative element which rejected the radical overtones of the other and wanted to affiliate more closely with the Liberal Party.

101 Milner, in Saul and Heron, 1977, op.cit., p. 151.
APPENDIX ONE

Direct U.S. Investment in Canada
Balance of the 1960's (in million $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>New American Capital Brought into Canada</th>
<th>Dividends and Interest repatriated to U.S.</th>
<th>Fees and exclusive rights repatriated</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>- 264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>- 276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>- 224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>- 498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>+ 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1153</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>+ 186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>- 625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>- 487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>- 511</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total $5,497 $6,252 $1,770 - $2,625

### APPENDIX TWO

Size of Manufacturing establishments owned by Francophone Canadians, Anglophone Canadians, and foreign interests, measured by value added --- Quebec, 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Francos</th>
<th>Anglos</th>
<th>Foreign</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverage</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco products</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knitting mills</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Products</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and Steel</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-ferrous metal</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal fabrication</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-metal mineral</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum, coal</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical, medical</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precision instrum.</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Industries</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX THREE

BREAKDOWN OF THE PRODUCTION VALUE OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1964 ($,000,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Ontario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Industries related to natural resources.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood paper and related ind.</td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>1,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Metals</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>1,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-metallic minerals</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,131</td>
<td>3,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(24%)</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Light industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Beverages</td>
<td>1,629</td>
<td>2,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles, Leather Clothing</td>
<td>1,652</td>
<td>959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,917</td>
<td>4,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(45%)</td>
<td>(28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Heavy Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical products</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>1,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal products</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>1,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum derivatives</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport industry</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>2,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical equipment</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>1,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,716</td>
<td>8,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(31%)</td>
<td>(52%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX FOUR

GROWTH OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN QUEBEC AND ONTARIO - (1949-1963) (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Total Growth Quebec</th>
<th>Total Growth Ontario</th>
<th>Avg. rate-growth Quebec</th>
<th>Avg. rate-growth Ontario</th>
<th>Difference (Que-Ont.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food and Beverages</td>
<td>150.8</td>
<td>131.6</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>+ 0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco and related</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>448.1</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>12.86</td>
<td>- 8.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber products</td>
<td>134.4</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>+ 2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather products</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>+ 0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>- 0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing, hosiery</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>+ 1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood products</td>
<td>114.6</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>+ 1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper products</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>109.9</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>- 0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing, publish.</td>
<td>180.0</td>
<td>158.8</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>6.82</td>
<td>+ 0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary metal</td>
<td>111.0</td>
<td>142.0</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>- 1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>158.8</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>- 2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc. electrical</td>
<td>162.4</td>
<td>192.7</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>7.23</td>
<td>- 1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-metal mineral</td>
<td>251.0</td>
<td>175.9</td>
<td>8.97</td>
<td>8.08</td>
<td>+ 0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals, related</td>
<td>195.7</td>
<td>222.3</td>
<td>8.37</td>
<td>8.61</td>
<td>- 0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>117.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>141.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.76</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.75</strong></td>
<td><strong>- 0.99</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX FIVE

THE POWER CORPORATION GROUP

Gelco Enterprises Ltd. → 53%

Power Corp. of Canada

↓

100%

Canada Steamship Lines

Ge1co P. Desmarais

↓ 51.2%

Imperial Life Assurance

↓ 57.9%

Laurentide Corporation

↓

Investors Group

↓

Great West Life Insurance Co.

Montreal Trust

Consolidated Bathurst

Dominion Glass

APPENDIX SIX

QUEBEC'S REGIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT LEVELS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% of pop. on unemployment insurance</th>
<th>% of pop. on U.I.C. for over 12 months</th>
<th>% of pop. in each region</th>
<th>level of unemployment 1955 - 1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower St. Lawrence and Gaspesie</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saguenay and Lac St. Jean</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Rivers</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Townships</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montréal</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outaouais</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Shore</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Québec</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# APPENDIX SEVEN

## French-Canadian Companies
Assets and Control, Dec. 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Finance</th>
<th>Assets (Mills.)</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.1 Banks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Canadian National</td>
<td>4,872</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Bank of Canada</td>
<td>3,059</td>
<td>Mouvement Desjardins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings Bank</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.2 Trust Companies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal Trust</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>Power Corp., via Investors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Trust of Canada</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>J.L. Lévesque, Simard family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings and Investment Trust</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Savings and Invest. Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherbrooke Trust</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>General Trust of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Trust</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West Trust Co.</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>Allarco Fin. Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.3 Insurance Companies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great West Life Ins. Co.</td>
<td>2,349</td>
<td>Power Corp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperial Life Assurance Co.</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>Power Corp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Solidarité</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Reinsurance Co.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Gerard and Robert Parizeau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Provinces Assurance Co.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Private (Major family?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Union</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L'Unique</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Private (Bélanger family?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.4 Mutual Funds</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investors Group</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>Power Corp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings and Investment Mutual</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Savings and Investment Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beabran Corp.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Beabien family?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canagex Ltd.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Bank Canadian National</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(cont'd)
1.5 Holding Companies

- Power Corp. 579
- Corporation d'Expansion Fin. 51
- York Lambton Corp. 50
- F-I-C Fund 39

Paul Desmarais
York Lambton Corp.
Wellington Corp.
J-L Lévesque

1.6 Finance Companies

Laurentide Financial Corp. 429

Power Corp.

1.7 Mortgage Companies

Imnat Ltd. 29

Bank Canadian National

2. Industry

- Alfred Lambert Inc. 10
- Bombardier Ltd. 145
- Consolidated Bathurst 662
- Melchers Distilleries 22
- Dominion Glass 107
- East Sullivan Mines 47
- Normick Perron 40
- Québecor 34
- Rolland Paper Co. 62
- Télé Capitale 11
- Télé Métropole 37
- Simard Beaudry Inc. 23
- Vachon Inc. 27

F-I-C Fund
Bombardier family
Power Corp.
Paul Disruisseaux, S. Marchard
Consolidated Bathurst Corp.
Beauchemin family
Normand, Michel, Jean Perron
Pierre Péladeau and family
L.G. Rolland and family
H. Baribeau, J. Pouliot
J.A. De Sève Heritage
Corporation d'Expansion Fin.
Mouvement Desj, Vachon family

3. Commerce

- Cassidy's 24
- Dupuis Freres 21
- Provigo 77
- U.A.P. Inc. 43

Cont. Man., Brodeaur family
Marc Carriere
A. Turmel, J. Lamontagne, etc.
Prefontaine family

(continuation)
4. Transportation and Service

Canada Steamship Lines 394  Power Corp.
Le Vérendrye Management 21  Board of Directors
Logistec Corp. 21  P. Gourdeau, R. Paquin, etc.

5. Real-Estate Development

Allarco Development 101  Dr. Charles Allard
Campeau Corp. 402  Robert Campeau

CHAPTER FIVE:

THE PARTI QUÉBÉCOIS:
FORMATION, COMPOSITION, HISTORY, PROGRAMME
The period following the rapid social, cultural and economic transformation of Quebec society (1945-1960) and its political offshoot -- the Quiet Revolution (1960-1966) -- was marked by a tremendous upheaval of popular movements motivated by nationalist and socialist sentiments. Though diverse and often spontaneous and undirected, the various movements -- including students' movements, citizens' movements, community action groups, labour movements (Common Fronts, wildcats), municipal coalitions (FRAP), women's groups, socialist and nationalist groups (RN, RIN, FLP, FLQ, PSQ, MSA) and journals (Parti Pris, Socialisme, Le Quartier Latin, Le Carabin, Cogne), environmental groups -- emerged to express their disaffection with the existing conditions in Quebec and Canada. It was these conditions that gave birth to the Parti Québécois.

The P.Q. was formed through the merger of several of these groupings in 1968. The most important groupings were the Rassemblement pour l'Indépendence Nationale (RIN), Ralliement Nationale (RN), and the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association (MSA). The RIN was created in 1960 by some 30 Quebec separatists, including Marcel Chaput, a former federal employee who was fired because of his separatist views, and...
college professor André D'Allemagne. Composed primarily of the young, educated, nationalistic, urban middle-class French Canadians who were continually rejected by the Anglo-dominated private sector, the party and its programme were typical of the specific conditions faced by this group. Initially the party was ideologically diverse and dedicated to the complete independence of Quebec from Canada, but after its right-wing split-off in 1964, it moved towards the left of the political spectrum, advocating socialism for Quebec. The party gradually gathered grass-roots support and in 1966 attracted 5.6% of the vote in the 1966 Quebec provincial elections. The RN was formed after the right-wing of the RIN, led by Dr. René Jutras, left the party to form the Regroupement Nationale in 1964. Merging with a group of Social Creditors in 1966 the party became the RN and won 3.2% of the electoral votes the same year. Composed primarily of traditional and new petit bourgeois elements the party carried on a "neo-créditiste discourse typical of those social strata threatened by proletarianization." However, the most important element and the one most responsible for the creation and subsequent direction of the P.Q. was the MSA. This group was formed after René Lévesque left the Liberal Party when his efforts to have sovereignty-association adopted as party policy were rejected. Lévesque along with the technocratic faction of the Liberal Party which followed him, and several members of the state
bureaucracy, founded MSA in 1967. Once again the ideological position of this group, composed primarily of the technocratic fraction of the new petite bourgeoisie which emerged as a result of the expansion of the Quebec state in the early 1960's, corresponded quite closely to the conditions of its existence. The driving force behind the MSA was clearly Levesque. In 1967 Levesque unveiled his ideas for an independent Quebec in An Option For Quebec. In it he perceived Quebec's difficulties largely in political terms. Quebec has long been straddled by the inherent "paralysis" of Canadian federalism and will never be satisfied until it has achieved independence. Levesque proposed as a solution, sovereignty-association. The first aspect of the plan, sovereignty, would be achieved only when the Quebec state assumed "the complete mastery of every last area of basic collective decision-making." Once achieved, Quebec would be free to negotiate with Canada, on the basis of equality, "whatever permanent consultation and flexible adjustment would best serve our common economic interests." Though the nature of association was left vague, Levesque stated that his preference was for a "monetary union, common tariffs, postal union, (joint) administration of the national debt, coordination of policies, etc." Once Quebec achieved the status of nationhood, the Quebec state would be the mechanism through which Quebec could ensure her cultural, social, political and economic integrity. The programme was vaguely
social democratic in nature though it did not question the underlying structures of North American capitalism. Problems arising in the capitalist economy were to be dealt with by a competent and efficient technocratic administration.

At the initiative of Lévesque, the MSA, RN, and RIN began to negotiate a merger in 1967. The initial merger took place in 1968 when the RN and MSA formed the P.Q., but shortly thereafter, the RIN voted to dissolve and, at the advice of its leadership, some 14,000 members joined the P.Q. Though ideologically diverse, the common goal of independence united the membership.

The Parti Québécois was overwhelmingly composed of middle-class (new and traditional petite-bourgeois) elements. A few years after its formation data was collected by the party which showed the occupational background of its 87,791 members: liberal professions (teachers and administrators) -- 37.2%; white collar -- 22.1%; blue collar -- 12.6%; students -- 14.6%; and housewives -- 8.9%. Its leadership was even more markedly 'middle-class' in orientation. Of the P.Q. members who ran in the 1970 and 1973 Quebec elections, 53.2% were, according to Vera Murray, 'new middle class', while 39.0% were 'traditional petite bourgeoisie' and 3.2% were workers. What is most crucial about the origins of the P.Q. is the role played by Levesque and other technocrats. By ousting the former leaders of the RIN and RN -- Bourgault, Bertrand-Ferretti and Grégoire --
Lévesque assumed the dominant role in the party. By successfully having sovereignty-association accepted as the foundation of the P.Q.'s political programme the technocrats hegemonized the party's direction. The socialism of the RIN and the Créditisme of the RN, as well as the hard-line independentism of both, were replaced by the softer sovereignty-association strategy of the MSA. A central feature not only of the origin of the P.Q., but also of its 13-year existence, has been the continued dominance of the Lévesque faction, and the subordination of other elements. Over time the right-wing, whether by dissolution, defection (to the Union Nationale), or by absorption into the Lévesque faction, has ceased to be a major factor, and most analyses of the P.Q. focus on the internal division between left-wing and moderate elements.

Vera Murray, in her book, Le Parti Quebecois, analyzes historically the structure and programme of the P.Q. and emphasizes the ideological division between what she calls the 'technocrats' and the 'participationists'. The technocrats, of course, correspond closely to the Levesque faction which founded the MSA. This group, according to Milner, is "cautious, middle-class oriented, respectful of parliamentary traditions and bureaucratic structures, and more interested in using the Quebec state to make capitalism work smoothly and equitably than in challenging or transforming it." The participationists correspond closely to the left-wing whose origin was in the RIN.
This group seeks to "use the P.Q. to serve the needs of the working people of Quebec by emphasizing the part to be played by the rank and file in the party's structures, which complements their vision of a democratized and decentralized administrative system as well as their leftist social policies." The latter primarily reside in the lower and middle levels of the party while the executive and leadership positions are dominated by technocrats. Murray argues that the participationists have consistently challenged and occasionally modified the position of the technocrats, but have failed to overcome the latter's hegemony within the party. The internal dynamics in the party between 1968 and 1976 illustrate this quite clearly.

(ii) The Parti Québécois' Rise to Power (1968-1976)

The period between the formation of the P.Q. and its election victory in 1976 is interesting in several ways. First it illustrates the conflicting tendencies operating within the party. The first six years (1968-1974) show an increasing influence of left-wing elements within the rank and file of the P.Q. and their challenge to the hegemony of the technocrats, as well as their influence on party programmes. However, the final two years before the party's election in 1976 show a reassertion of the hegemony of the technocratic faction. The external manifestations of these internal dynamics is seen clearly in the shifting strategies
and ideology of the party over these years. In the first period the party adopted a 'radical posture' and its strategies were geared towards mobilizing the discontented mass of Quebecers, though the desires of the party's left-wing to establish closer links with Quebec's labour unions were frustrated. It was the strategy of the technocrats to attract diverse elements of Quebec society behind its project. It saw the need to establish a coalition of all classes of Quebecers in order to carry out its aims. It was their perception that the struggle was a national one, not a class one, and that its solution -- sovereignty-association -- was sufficient to satisfy Quebecers of all classes.

By late 1968 the P.Q. had attracted an estimated 25,000 members. Gallup polls indicated, though, that only some 11% of Quebecers supported separatism. Within the very tense social climate of the time, the P.Q. embarked on a campaign to channel the frustrations of Quebecers in the direction of achieving the goals of sovereignty-association. Almost immediately the youth of Quebec, frustrated by the economic and social conditions of Quebec, rallied behind the P.Q.'s radical posture. The addition of Jacques Parizeau, former financial advisor to both Liberal and UN Cabinets, no doubt gave the P.Q. increased credibility in the eyes of the middle classes, who were reluctant to support the party at first. The party conference of October 1969 was a chance
for the Lévesque-wing to consolidate its dominance in the party. Lévesque managed to convince the more than 1,000 delegates not to elect the ex-RIN leader Pierre Bourgault to the executive committee but rather to support Parizeau and others of a more moderate persuasion. The resolutions dealing with economic questions that were passed -- a state directed economy which was to include a mixture of public and private (including foreign) ownership -- reflect a victory of the technocrats over the leftists who preferred complete nationalization and workers' control of the means of production. With this support from party delegates Lévesque and his group tried desperately to remove the pervasive fear in Quebec about independence by selling the softened version -- sovereignty-association.

The dominance of the Lévesque-wing, however, was soon challenged after the events of 1970 -- the April election and the October Crisis. While the left-wing of the party wanted to move closer to the Quebec working class and the discontented, Lévesque wanted to maintain a neutral posture for the party, and was concerned with desensitizing Quebecers to the idea of independence. He constantly assured them that the idea would not lead to economic disaster. The campaign was designed to drum into the heads of the electorate that the destiny of Quebec and the P.Q. were one and the same by enticing Quebecers' national consciousness with nationalist
slogans and rhetoric. This approach of the P.Q. was proving to be very successful as Le Devoir publisher Claude Ryan commented: "This party has channelled countless sources of energy which would otherwise have been drawn into disgust, indifference, complete abstainment (sic), or anarchy into democratic involvement. The party has acted as a voice for thousands of citizens drawn not solely from the ranks of those who favour self-determination, but also from the even larger bank of those who feel the need for fundamental political renewal." Though the Liberals swept back into power in 1970, the P.Q. showed remarkable success in attracting 23% of the electorate and 28.7% of the French Canadian vote (which translated into only 7 seats). However, shortly thereafter, the P.Q. suffered a setback with the events of October 1970. Enemies of the P.Q. took special care to mention the common separatist objectives of the P.Q. and the FLQ and within a year the party's membership had fallen from 80,000 to 30,000. This led to further conflicts within the party.

As labour relations worsened and the unions radicalized, the debates within the party over strategy raged. The left-wing faction favoured an unequivocably pro-labour stand (with organic ties to the various labour unions), while Lévesque hesitated, fearing that he would further alienate middle class and moderate trade union support, not to mention
the support of the Quebec bourgeoisie which he desired to acquire. It was the technocrats' desire to maintain a distance from all of Quebec's pressure groups, and especially the most powerful ones -- "business" and "labour". Only in this way, it was reasoned, could the P.Q. be the true representatives of "all Quebeckers." The struggle reached a head when the party executive voted 6 to 5 not to participate in support of the workers in the La Presse demonstration.

Executive member Robert Burns was disgusted at the decision because he chose not to vote, indicating that he would participate regardless of the party's decision. One of the leaders of the party's left-wing, Burns was to comment, "We must ask ourselves whether the Parti Québécois is not simply a slightly more advanced wing of the Liberal Party or other comparable old parties." Dissention between the two factions continued as criticisms of the party executive and especially René Lévesque, began to appear frequently from the members. Lévesque lashed back at that "doctrinaire platoon of the far left that never marches but to the fascism of that extreme", during a meeting of the 150 member national council, and urged moderation and gradualism in the approach of péquistes: "The point is to make as few false steps as possible as we advance along a road that is mined by the two extremisms, that of the regime, and that, equally aggressive, of the adventurers ... (We) have done our best since the beginning
to maintain an image that is as much decency and perseverance as it is daring and renewal." Re-emphasizing the electoralist strategy Lévesque said, "We will only reach our goal, however, if every time it seems possible that we might be forgetting it, we go back to our commitment to develop and lead to victory a popular party." He continued, "We must try to reach all our people in all classes and regions, avoiding doctrinaire and artificial factionalism that will only weaken us." 

In late 1972 the party's left-wing illustrated its increasing strength as a new platform was offered which advocated the widespread nationalization as well as workers' participation in the orientation and management of a new system in an independent Quebec. Though the position was not entrenched into the party's programme at that point, the 1973 party conference was to be the testing ground for the left-wing's strength. This conference, however, featured a new recruit, Claude Morin, the long-time Quebec civil servant and expert on federal-provincial and constitutional matters. This provided the party and its technocratic faction with timely respectability. The technocrats, appealing to gradualism and party unity, defeated the radicals and several of the positions laid-out in the 1972 manifesto were removed and replaced in the new official platform, "Un gouvernement du Parti Québécois s'engage."

The party was successfully rebounding from the 1970 events and its membership grew to over 60,000 by the spring of 1973.
Its popularity was reflected in the October 1973 election as it increased its share of the popular vote to over 30%. However, in only winning six seats it seems that the P.Q.'s positions on whether independence would follow from election, and on the economic feasibility of independence, were still ambiguous in the eyes of the electorate. Of course, another major reason why 30% of the vote translated into only 6 seats lies in the electoral system of Quebec. The Liberal's programme, however, which emphasized cultural sovereignty, profitable federalism and the disastrous consequences of separatism, was more successful, as they swept 102 of 110 seats.

In the post-election period the struggle between the major factions within the party continued. Criticism of the leadership and calls for the resignation of Lévesque were heard from the party's paper, Le Jour, and radical-wing leader Robert Burns. Lévesque once again struck-back at his critics and warned that factionalism and inter-party squabbling would result in the decline of the P.Q. as well as the independence movement -- a decline which Lévesque indicated he would not be part of. Lévesque argued that the fear of independence would have to be removed if it was ever to be realized, and that this would require a unified party. The November 1974 party congress reflected this as Lévesque and Claude Morin successfully pushed through a compromise position which provided for independence in stages (étapism). The technocrats reasoned
that by assuring Quebecers that the election of the P.Q. would not result in a declaration of independence, and that the electorate would be consulted in a referendum before any change would take place, the P.Q. could build a larger base of support for its aims. It was also reasoned that the prior elections were lost because voters feared the unknown, and that if the party was elected it could use the advantageous ideological position available to a government to familiarize the population with and mobilize large segments of it behind sovereignty-association, which polls showed was still only supported by about 28% of the population. The referendum motion carried (630-353) at the November congress and the technocrats' electoralist strategy became dominant within the party. To ex-RIN leader Pierre Bourgault, the party's paper Le Jour, and others on the left, the "primacy of power over principle" which reigned in the party was abhorrent. Nevertheless, almost immediately, the party's support shot-up as poll after poll indicated that the P.Q. was edging ahead of the increasingly troubled Liberals. Throughout 1975 and 1976 the party's goal of sovereignty-association was rarely heard as the technocrats' strategy concentrated primarily on discrediting the provincial Liberals. The crowning glory for the technocrats came when the P.Q. national council voted to withdraw support for the increasingly critical and radical party paper Le Jour. Parizeau commented, "Infiltration, agitation and suicidal
radicalism killed Le Jour ..." No doubt the paper's continual left-wing critique of the technocrats who dominated the P.Q., was the major reason for its demise. Only the calling of an election for November 1976 prevented a major break within the party. With the increasing revelations of corruption in the Bourassa government and intensified labour conflicts, among other things, the P.Q. was in a good position to unseat the Liberals. Bourassa's appeal -- Stop Separatism! Only Bourassa can do it -- was no longer convincing, while Lévesque's message -- Get rid of Bourassa and the Liberals -- echoed all over the province. Although the P.Q. denounced Bourassa's labour policy and promised a new labour code, and the leaders of the CNTU, QFL, and CEQ were all openly péquiste throughout the campaign, the major unions chose not to proclaim formal support for the P.Q. Lévesque also promised assistance to farmers, small businesses, urban dwellers, and Quebecers in general (medicare, auto insurance, minimum wage increases, tax revisions, and a variety of local policies), but hardly a word was uttered about independence. As Lévesque said during the campaign, "We have already accepted a solemn undertaking to hold a referendum on the issue and that will be the time to talk about independence." The strategy was overwhelmingly successful, as the P.Q. swept into power with a majority government (71 of 110 seats) and 41.4% of the popular vote, yet only between 19 and 22% actually favored independence.
The P.Q. also managed to poll more than 50% of the working class vote, along with its traditional support from various middle class elements in Quebec. Although it could not be interpreted as a victory for independence, it was nevertheless a major psychological step in that direction. For the moment at least, a rupture within the party was avoided, as the P.Q. prepared to govern a Quebec within Canada.

(iii) The Parti Québécois in Power (1976-1982)

The Parti Québécois came to power in 1976 amidst an atmosphere polarized by rising popular expectations on the one hand, and forecasts of doom on the other. Finding a workable equilibrium became one of the party's most immediate and crucial tasks. As the majority government of Quebec, the P.Q. was finally in a position where it could concentrate all its efforts on carrying out its programme and achieving its long-term objectives. Faced with the structural realities of a Quebec subordinated politically within the Canadian federal system, and economically within the U.S. dominant continental economy, the P.Q. could no longer rely on rhetoric and discourse to carry the day. Gradualism and moderation was to be the approach, illustrating once again the hegemonic position of technocrats within the government. Internal dissent was still present, but this was now manifested in
conflicts between the government, which was dominated by the technocratic faction, and the party, which still had strong left-wing tendencies, especially at the lower and middle levels of organization. As time went on, the left-wing would come to have less and less influence over the government. In relation to the myriad of economic, social and political difficulties facing the government, internal party dissent became of secondary importance. The most distinctive feature about the P.Q.'s first term in office was that it showed a marked tendency to retreat (in full or in part) from long-stated party policies. A pattern emerges early where a policy is introduced and after a period of intense criticism from certain segments of society, it is withdrawn and reintroduced in a fashion more closely in line with the interests of these segments. On other occasions projects are either not attempted or abandoned in mid-stream, usually due to the technocrats' desire to reassure the most powerful elements in Quebec of its orthodoxy. On the other hand there was also a concerted effort made by the party to mobilize diverse elements of Quebec around its project of sovereignty-association by providing a variety of social reforms. As time went on, however, popular measures began to take a back-seat to the abstract notion of national interest. The first three years of the P.Q.'s term illustrate these tendencies clearly, while the fourth and fifth years were spent mostly on preparations for the referendum and for the April 13, 1981 provincial election.
The selection of the P.Q. cabinet illustrated early the direction the new government would take. It was dominated, especially in key positions, by moderate technocrats such as Parizeau (Finance and Revenue), Rodrigue Tremblay (Industry and Commerce), Bernard Landry (Economic Development), Claude Morin (Intergovernmental Affairs), and Jacques-Yvan Morin (Vice-Premier and Minister of Education). The radical was represented by Robert Burns, Claude Charron, Camille Laurin, and Pierre Marois. Jean Garon and Marc Andre Bedard were the only ex-RIN members chosen to the cabinet.

Upon taking office the P.Q. immediately reaffirmed its full intention to cooperate within Canada at least until after a referendum was held, and showed it was true to its word in December (1976), by participating in a First Ministers' Conference. At the same time several steps were taken towards achieving sovereignty-association through a referendum. Using the advantageous position available to a governing party, the P.Q. began to formulate a White Paper on Referenda, approved a $1.2 million fund raising drive, set up a referendum campaign committee, dispatched 20 experienced campaigners to each Quebec riding to train and organize grass-roots representation, undertook mass media campaigns as Levesque began monthly television chats to "counter the campaign of fear" and convince Quebecers of the desirability of sovereignty-association, hired researchers (civil servants, academics, and consultants) to prepare studies showing the inequalities of the Canadian federal system and the benefits of independence.
The opposition of federalist forces rose just as rapidly to counter the "separatist threat", and by mid-1977 the national unity debate was in full swing.27

The government's first important legislation was an effort to settle the language feud which had been raging in Quebec since the 1960's. Promising to make Quebec a unilingual province, Bill 1 was introduced on April 28. It recognized French as the official language of the province, of the legislature, the courts, civil service, work, labour relations, commerce and business, and education. Just as had been the case with the Bourassa government's Bill 22, there was vigorous opposition voiced by the business community (French Canadian, American and English Canadian) and the English Canadian community at large.28 Bill 1 was soon withdrawn and replaced by Bill 101 (introduced on July 12 and passed on August 26, 1977) which relaxed the stringent restrictions on the language of business, making it more suitable to the needs of the bourgeoisie (especially U.S. and Canadian fractions). According to the law, the Office de la Langue Française, under certain specified conditions, could allow any company to overlook any of the act's provisions. In its final form, once again parallelling Bill 22, we can see that the act serves to legitimize the major political and economic institutions of Quebec, by giving them a more "French Appearance", yet it managed to avoid much of the polarization and reaction which plagued Bill 22, by
simultaneously satisfying the nationalist demands of the Quebec working and middle classes, and by not intruding too much upon the interests of the bourgeoisie. As Fournier notes, "In the final analysis, the main objective of Bill 101, at least as regards business, (was) to increase the upward mobility of French-speaking managers giving foreign monopolies a more French image, and not to modify the existing system of power." Over the following three years the restrictions on the use of English (notably in head offices) were relaxed on several occasions.

The P.Q.'s long-awaited labour legislation, which was to abolish scabs, guarantee reinstatement for strikers, provide for mandatory dues check-off, and simplify union-certification, was tabled in early 1977, much to the satisfaction of Quebec's unions. However, the legislation met with almost universal outrage from Quebec's business community, and was quickly withdrawn. After several sections of the bill were amended to the satisfaction of business (one section allowed employers the right to hire scabs during strikes to maintain essential services) it was reintroduced. The CNTU and CEQ opposed the revised bill but it was passed quickly without further revision (Bill 45). The government then proceeded to pass a barrage of social reforms -- free medication for people over 65, free dental care to children under 16, a ban on advertising aimed at children, guarantees of the rights of
the handicapped, the establishment of a partially public
system of auto insurance, income supplements for the working
poor, abolition of taxes on clothing, furniture and shoes,
legislation designed to aid farmers by protecting agricultural
land from speculation and increasing the role of Sogquia, the
indexing of minimum wages on a semi-annual basis, and
the abolition of anti-inflation controls -- which were designed
to attract a wide basis of support, while at the same time
not challenging the leading economic powers operating in the
province. The P.Q.'s strategy of integrating all segments of
Quebec society behind its project was seen further when it
organized a series of economic summits and invited leading
representatives from business, labour and the cooperatives.
Bernard Landry, the P.Q.'s Minister of State for Economic
Development, said that the summits were a "mechanism which
could prove essential to the future of our collectivity ... I am speaking here of consensus and collaboration ... The
objective is to begin to shed old ideas and eliminate old
struggles in order to establish a climate of social peace
in Quebec." During the meetings Lévesque continually
appealed to the spirit of cooperation which he said was
necessary to solve problems 'common to all Quebecers' -- as
if the problems of business and labour were one and the same.

The Parti Québécois' economic policies, which most
observers of Quebec politics awaited with eager anticipation,
followed a similar pattern. Party programmes had always emphasized that the state would be used to emancipate the Quebec economy from foreigners and to improve the collective condition of Quebecers. As Jacques Parizeau had stated earlier, "In Quebec, the state must intervene. It is inevitable. It is what gives people the impression that we are more to the left. If we had, in Quebec, 25 companies like Bombardier, and if we had important banks, the situation might be different. We have no large institutions, so we must create them." Images of widespread nationalization abounded after the P.Q.'s election, yet an analysis of the P.Q.'s first term in office reveals little visible success in that direction. In the early period the P.Q. announced several steps towards strengthening the role of a number of state corporations. Sidbec was given an additional $126 million to carry out its mining operations at Fire Lake while Soquem and Soquia had their share capital increased substantially. Soquem, Hydro Québec and other public corporations had their charter modified (and subsequently their autonomy narrowed) to bring their operations more in line with the P.Q.'s long-term objectives. In early 1977 the P.Q. announced its intention to buy Asbestos Corporation from the U.S. giant General Dynamics, and created a public corporation -- la Société nationale de l'amiante -- to handle the operation. It was an impressive start but when the value of Quebec stocks and bonds began to drop, and threats of capital flights were made, Lévesque put on the brakes.
His first move was to rush to New York and address the prestigious Economic Club (which has a membership of 1,700 of the most important businessmen in U.S.) and assure them of the P.Q.'s economic orthodoxy. He told the U.S. capitalists that the P.Q. desired only a political change with a minimum of economic disruption, that they accepted the values, economic structures and political institutions of the North American environment, and that they would likely go no further than the Asbestos takeover. 35 Speaking about the trip to New York, Lévesque said later, "I was able to give all the assurances necessary to those who might have thought that Quebec was heading for, to some extent, a "Cuban" experience." 36 In the months following, Lévesque repeated his government's position on several occasions, and these assurances proved successful as Quebec maintained its AA-rating on New York money markets, enabling Sidbec to successfully float a $500 million bond issue.

In the private sphere the P.Q.'s efforts were hardly more extensive. The P.Q. initially strengthened the operations of the state institutions, whose primary roles were to bolster the Quebec-based private sector bourgeoisie -- Caisse de dépôt, 37 the Société Générale de financement, and the Société de développement industriel (SDI). The Société de développement de l'entreprise was created to provide financial aid to small and medium-sized firms. A preferential buying scheme designed to use the purchasing power of the Quebec state to favour the expansion of Quebec firms, and an "industrial recovery fund"
to provide support to small and medium-sized Quebec firms were also undertaken. However, the P.Q. also made it clear that it was not hostile in the least to foreign investors, when it awarded a $92 million contract for the construction of buses to General Motors, the world's largest corporation, rather than to the Quebec-based Bombardier-MLW. This new P.Q. approach was rationalized by Lévesque in a statement he made at this time:

Even if it is a multinational, General Motors nevertheless has an important establishment at Saint-Therese, to which it has just added $36 million in new investments. Especially in this period of economic sluggishness, the purchasing policy does not allow us therefore to consider General Motors as an external competitor, unless one establishes a criterion of pure "cultural" preference, which would soon lead us to the creation of a genuine economic ghetto.\(^{38}\)

Lévesque continued this policy of enticing foreign investment and in his speech to open the 1979 National Assembly he made it a high priority item of the government. In the field of cooperatives, another area which the P.Q. has had a long-standing commitment to develop, the government created the Société de développement coopératif. But it gave the new organization a yearly budget of only $1.4 million, hardly sufficient to fulfill the body's charter.

Underscoring its orthodoxy, the government's first two budgets, which reflected austerity, were well received by the business community. Quebec Chamber of Commerce Vice-President Jean-Paul Letourneau commented at this time, "We are very happy
with the orthodoxy of the Parti Québécois' spending estimates ... especially because of the fact that the brakes have been put on state expenditures ..."39 In fact, the rate of increase in public expenditure by 1978-1979 (11.1%) had actually fallen below the level of increase in 1974-1975 (24%), under the Bourassa regime.40 Furthermore, the expenditures of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce actually declined in 1979-1980 by 2.6%.41 Although, in the final analysis, the P.Q. was attempting to stimulate the growth of indigenous Quebec development in cooperatives, as well as state and private corporations, it was certainly not as vigorous an effort as most had anticipated. In fact, it was no more vigorous than the efforts of previous governments. It should, however, be offered in defence of the P.Q. that it was unable to carry out its full economic project as it had not yet achieved its political prerequisite -- sovereignty. However, an even more convincing explanation for the timidity of the Lévesque government in economic matters would be that the structural realities of the Quebec economy (dominance by Canadian and U.S. capital) did not and would not allow the P.Q. to bring about the 'economic emancipation and repatriation' it so frequently refers to. During its first term the P.Q. was often heard acknowledging the constraints of the North American environment on bringing its programs into fruition. The Asbestos Corporation takeover is an interesting case in point.
After years of boardroom battles and legal wrangling, the P.Q. is only now (1981) in a position to take the company over. This illustrates the extreme difficulties that a government, within an economy dominated by private capital, and a legal system founded on the sanctity of private property, has in carrying out a program of social democratic reform. Lévesque commented recently that, "It is inconceivable that we can make reforms within a few months that others failed to make in ten years of effort ... we can certainly not instantly lay a veneer of foreign solutions on our society, which would be to risk almost certain failure." On the other hand, the P.Q.'s economic orthodoxy was not so reassuring to the Canadian bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie depends on the continued integration of both the continental economy and the Canadian political system. Its interests are protected by the Canadian state and the separation of Quebec would be disastrous both politically and economically, for this group. That is why the Canadian bourgeoisie has been most virulent in its condemnation of the Parti Québécois since its creation. Threats of economic blackmail, such as capital flights and the moving of head offices out of Quebec, began in the late 1960's and have continued throughout the P.Q.'s term in office. Even with the relaxation of Bill 101's language restrictions, the constant reassurances that the P.Q. will not act before holding a popular referendum, the promises of continued economic integration,
and the P.Q.'s economic and political orthodoxy, Sun Life Assurance Company and several other large Canadian companies (such as Bank of Montreal, Royal Trust) announced their intention to move their head offices from Montreal to Toronto. Numerous others have threatened to move out if Quebec becomes independent. It is clearly one of their intentions to destabilize the Quebec economy, and thereby, destabilize the P.Q. government, delegitimize the independence movement, and ultimately, maintain the present integration of North American capitalism and Canadian federalism. Through organizations such as the Pro-Canada Foundation, and the Council for Canadian Unity, the Canadian bourgeoisie fought directly against the objectives of the P.Q.

Throughout 1978-1980 the debate between federalists and independentists intensified as the highly influential ex-publisher of Le Devoir and newly appointed Liberal-leader Claude Ryan proved a formidable opponent for Lévesque. The Quebec-Canadian unity movement grew to over 100,000 members and was being financed directly by the federal government, as well as by private corporations. Countless studies were released by the federal government's Canadian Unity Information Office showing that sovereignty would be economically disastrous. Numerous polls were also released showing that the support for sovereignty-association was on the increase, but no date had as yet been set for the referendum. It seems that the
P.Q.'s strategy of desensitizing Quebecers to the idea of sovereignty-association was working. But it remained for the P.Q. to give sovereignty-association substance, as most Quebecers were still unaware of what it meant. Individual MNA's, Cabinet Ministers, and party members would give their own interpretation of what this meant. Divisions were once again manifesting themselves within the party, or, more specifically, between the government and the party. As Saywell comments, "The militant wing watched with dismay as the government seemed continually to dilute the sovereignty in sovereignty-association, and led by a number of Montreal riding associations, it demanded that the party be consulted on the wording and nature of the referendum."50 Lévesque spoke openly of maintaining the 'Canadian economic space' through a customs union and common monetary authority, yet, this had not been agreed upon as party policy and many radicals looked upon it as another retreat by the technocrats. A meeting of the executive council on November 10-11, 1978, produced a 67-page document detailing the proposed association, which, as Saywell writes, "was placed before the council and rammed through by the leadership in the face of opposition from rank-and-file militants."51 During this council meeting Lévesque had to take the floor several times to silence the membership, saying, "the government doesn't have the right to operate exclusively as though it were an emanation of the party."52
The P.Q.'s 'orthodoxy' became all the more clear during the last years of its first term in office. The P.Q. was facing an increasingly difficult situation as inflation, unemployment and the government's deficit were becoming unmanageable. The party had lost 7 -- and eventually 11 -- consecutive byelections and its popularity, for the first time, had slipped below that of the Liberals. Two key Cabinet Ministers -- Robert Burns and Rodrigue Tremblay, both resigned and internal party dissent was again high. Finally, when labour relations worsened and Quebec's unions began to exercise their right-to-strike, the P.Q. resorted to the tactics of its predecessors. During a five-month period (November 1979 to March 1980) the P.Q. government ended three strikes by passing back-to-work legislation, destroying forever the myth that it was a labour party.

The P.Q. spent its final year in office preparing for the impending referendum. First it released the long-awaited specifics of the sovereignty-association program by publishing Québec-Canada: A New Deal (to be analyzed in the next section). This program put into practise the most recent retreat by the moderate faction and added a new one by providing for an extended sequence of stages: First a referendum would ask Quebecers for a mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association, and (if this first stage is successful), secondly, the P.Q. would enter into negotiations with the federal government (at an expected length
of two years), and prepare agreements which, in a third stage, would be ratified by Quebecers in a second referendum. As the referendum (dated for May 20, 1980) approached, the federalist (NON) and sovereigniste (OUI) campaigns were in full swing and polls began to show that the support for sovereignty-association was increasing. Quebec's major unions (QFL and CNTU) took tactical positions in favour of sovereignty-association. On the one hand they supported the struggle against national oppression, but on the other, they opposed the P.Q. as against the interests of the Quebec working class. Nevertheless, the popular support was not enough to carry the OUI forces to a victory in the referendum, as they were defeated 59.5 to 40.5%. However, it is estimated that close to 50% of French Canadians voted in favour of giving the P.Q. a mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association.

In the aftermath of the referendum the P.Q. reaffirmed its intentions to cooperate fully within the Canadian federation and almost immediately participated in a series of federal-provincial constitutional conferences. Lévesque quickly established himself as a vigorous advocate of provincial autonomy, and came to play a leading role in the creation of a common front of six (and eventually eight) provincial premiers to oppose the federal government's threat of patriating Canada's constitution unilaterally. Ruptures once again appeared within the P.Q., as 30 prominent P.Q. members (including
Marcel Chaput) met to discuss setting up a pressure group to keep the government on a course towards independence. A spokesman for the group said much of the membership was "demoralized by what they perceived as a trend within the P.Q. to water down the concept of independence."57 Lévesque then had to delay the reconvening of the National Assembly by a month due to "internal problems created by the referendum defeat."58 On September 2, 1980, two additional P.Q. cabinet ministers -- Guy Joron and Jacques Couture -- resigned from the government. Early in 1981 Lévesque called a provincial election for April 13, 1981. In his platform he promised to continue to fight for provincial autonomy, to continue to provide 'good government', and most importantly, not to have another referendum if elected to a second term. Once again this strategy of retreat proved successful as the P.Q. swept to an even greater majority (80 of 120 seats and 49% of the popular vote), while the Liberals won the remaining seats, polarizing Quebec politics completely.

Several events during the early months of the P.Q.'s second term in office marked a continuation of the trend set in its first term. Lévesque's 1981 Cabinet hinted at a slight shift to the right.59 Lévesque once again reiterated the objectives of the government and held true by continuing to fight, along with the other seven premiers opposed to Trudeau's
constitutional initiatives, against the threatened federal unilateral patriation. Later on, under pressure from New York financial markets, who were in the process of reassessing Quebec's AA-rating, Parizeau passed a supplementary budget which was the most clearly 'orthodox' action yet taken by the P.Q. Instead of lowering income taxes, as was promised earlier, the mini-budget added taxes on alcohol and gasoline (7¢ per litre) to try and decrease the government's mounting deficit. Then things went from bad to worse as Trudeau's compromise position in the constitutional debate was accepted by nine premiers in Canada -- isolating Quebec as the lone dissenter. At present the constitutional package is being reviewed in Britain and is expected to be promulgated early in 1982.

These events -- the loss of the referendum; the P.Q.'s constant drift to the right; its continual retreat from independence; the failure in the constitutional debate -- must be seen as preconditions for the events which took place late in 1981. During the P.Q.'s 8th biennial party convention in December, the party's radical-wing rose up, or so it appears, for the first time in the party's 13-year existence and took control of the proceedings. This was reflected in the positions adopted by the 2,100 party delegates, against the advice of Lévesque and other moderates. The resolutions were: that sovereignty, and not sovereignty-association, would now be the principal goal of the party; that the next Quebec election
would be fought on the issue of sovereignty; and that a majority of seats won would be considered a mandate for sovereignty. Although the convention was to concern itself with questions of economic and social policy as well, debate never went beyond the above questions. These other questions were put off until the convention is resumed in February, 1982. The new policy direction has led several moderates to threaten their resignation from the party and the government. Claude Morin, the architect of the P.Q.'s strategies since 1974, resigned in January, 1982, while Lévesque has vowed to quit if these policies are not overturned by the convention after conducting a referendum of the party's 300,000 members. Although such a referendum is a violation of the party's normal procedure, it appears that it will be held to satisfy Lévesque and other moderates within the party. Only in February will we know what the implications of these recent events will be, and what the nature of this departure was. But there is every indication that it could be the expression of the party's radical wing. The February convention is also interesting because of the direction the government has taken in labour relations. The back to work legislation in its first term was vigorously opposed by the party's radical-wing but unity was maintained because the referendum was approaching. But when the government ordered Montreal transit workers back to their jobs in January, 1982, and threatened to decertify the union, several radicals spoke up. With contract negotiations for some
250,000 public sector workers due in fall, 1982, the party's left-wing will no doubt be vocal about the direction to be taken.

(iv) The Parti Québécois' Programme (1979): A Synopsis

In 1979 the Parti Québécois released two important documents which contained the long-awaited details of its programme. The first -- Québec-Canada: A New Deal -- outlined the specific nature of sovereignty-association. Sovereignty was defined as the "power to make decisions autonomously, without being subject in law to any superior or exterior power ..."60 This sovereignty was to reside "entirely in the State of Quebec,"61 and any powers exercise jointly would be delegated in a free and reciprocal fashion by both Quebec and Canada. Association, which is contingent upon attaining sovereignty, was defined as the "space formed by sovereign states within which goods, people and capital can flow freely, this zone being linked to the rest of the world by a single tariff and trade policy."62 Although the P.Q. outlined a variety of associations possible for Quebec/Canada, it stated its preference for the fullest possible integration of the two nations (Common Market, Customs Union, Monetary Union). In this way, the P.Q. claimed, "Canada can be preserved intact as an economic entity, while Quebec can assume all the powers it needs as a nation to ensure
its full development. Replacing federalism by association will, in effect, maintain economic exchange, but the nature of political and legal relations between Quebec and Canada will be changed. The precise nature of association though, of course, would have to be negotiated between Quebec and Canada. The program also called for the creation of four "common institutions" which would be necessary for the administration of association: 1) A Community Council; 2) A Commission of Experts; 3) A Court of Justice; and, 4) A Monetary Authority. These would be administered jointly by an equal number of representatives from both Quebec and Canada. Once again, the specific nature of these institutions would have to be defined in negotiations with Canada. Various aspects of the P.Q.'s political and economic policies were outlined within this document, but these were more clearly and elaborately discussed in the party's second major 1979 publication: Challenges for Québec. After analyzing the major structural problems facing Quebec (economic -- foreign ownership and control; political -- the Canadian state) and their effects (regionalism, underdevelopment of manufacturing, lack of indigenous management, unemployment, disequilibrium between imports and exports), this programme proceeds to offer a 'new social contract' based on "integrated development" as a solution. The Quebec state is seen as an "active agent for development" whose role it must be to encourage the coordination
of activities of Quebec's major economic agents (business, government, workers and consumers). The state, through its power to produce, administer, provide services, employment consumption, will attempt to "instill in our economic agents a national awareness and a sustained desire to work towards common goals." This will be done by increasing contact and discussion at the Quebec level (among different sectors -- financial, commercial, industrial -- among foreign and domestic firms, among large and small businesses) and at the level of the firm (among workers and management). Economic summits and the creation of a Conseil économique et social (CES) are to be the primary mechanisms for this integrated approach to development. Yet, since the "Quebec government believes that responsibility for ensuring ample and sustained development rests largely on the private sector as prime economic agent" the primary role of the state is to "create and maintain conditions favouring the development and vigour of private initiative, without sacrificing its objectives of social justice and its role as guardian of community interests." Thus the programme outlines the specific types of government aid it intends to make available to the private sector -- including investment assistance, technical and financial help, aid in marketing, research, exporting, management, vocational training and labour mobility, the setting up of infrastructures, the provision of energy supplies, helping small and medium sized companies to grow (through merger) and become competitive, etc.
Foreign ownership is accepted and will be encouraged in most sectors where it currently resides, so the P.Q. plans to focus on those sectors where Quebec already has a competitive advantage -- such as in protecting the agriculture and food industries, expanding maritime fisheries, increasing processing of, and modernizing the forestry and pulp and paper industry, increasing Quebec's participation in the exploration and processing of mineral resources (such as Asbestos Corporation), expanding Quebec's role in electricity, encouraging tourism, and developing Quebec's human, technical and cultural advantages. Also, the programme plans to aid the development of industries which are important but where Quebec has little comparative advantage (such as in iron, steel, non-ferrous metals, petro-chemicals, and service industries) as well as aiding Quebec's less competitive and most vulnerable industries (clothing, textiles, footwear, etc.).
REFERENCES

1 A study for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, entitled "Les Idees Politiques des Canadiens-Francais - Four Nationalist Movements", by G. Barker, et.al., found RIN members to be young, well-educated, urban middle-class French Canadians. Cited in Milner, Politics in the New Quebec, (Toronto: 1978), p. 175.

2 Gilles Bourque, "Class, Nation and the Parti Quebecois," Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review, (no. 2, Autumn 1979), p. 134. With the intensification of capitalist relations of production in the post-war period, the traditional petite bourgeoisie of small independent commodity producers, peasants, small businessmen, were threatened by absorption into the logic of increasing concentration. Thus many elements responded with a conservative (Creditiste) position which they hoped would save them from the onslaught of monopoly capitalism and ensure their continued survival. Several new petit bourgeois elements, frustrated by their inability to find a place in the Anglo-dominated corporate world, and unable to fully articulate their own ideological position, followed the lead of the traditional petite bourgeois elements which led the RN. The study by Barker, et.al. (above footnote), showed that RN members were typically lawyers, doctors, small business-owners, teachers, etc. See Milner, op.cit., pps. 149-150. For a short but succinct discussion of the RN see M. Stein, The Dynamics of Right-Wing Protest: A Political Analysis of Social Credit in Quebec, (Toronto: 1973), pps. 99-103.

3 Among the over 100 who left the Liberal Party along with Levesque were Roch Banville, Rosaire Beale, Gerard Belanger, Jean R. Boivin, Marc Briere, Pothier Ferland, Maurice Jobin, Monique Marchand, Guy Pelletier, and Reginald Savoie.


5 Ibid., p. 29.

6 Ibid., p. 29.

9 Milner, op. cit., 1978, p. 155. But this distinction between technocrats and participationists is not meant to be taken to mean the existence of formal and definable groupings within the party. As Milner says, "Neither wing has anything resembling a formal structure but is rather made up of numerous individuals who share a similar perspective on the program and organization of the party ... it is of course impossible to be precise ... or test it in any other than an impressionistic manner, and, of course, a certain number will stand out as exceptions. Even to place well-known party figures into one or the other camp is not necessarily an easy task." (P. 161).

10 It must be pointed out that the P.Q. had to counter an unprecedented campaign against it and its independence project by the media, business, and other politicians (federal and provincial), who were armed with forecasts of economic collapse, threats of blackmail, and other tactics which were used to scare voters away from the P.Q.


12 Ibid., p. 66.

13 Ibid., p. 61.

14 Ibid., p. 62.

15 Ibid., p. 64.

16 Ibid., p. 64.

17 Ibid., p. 65.

18 Saywell recalls an interesting happening at the February conference. While Lévesque and other executive leaders were out talking to the press, the left-wing group "secured the passage of a resolution by the plenary session compelling industry in an independent Quebec to turn over power to workers' Soviets." Saywell continues, "An embarrassed Lévesque persuaded the convention to rescind the motion, to the annoyance of at least one party member who ripped up his card in protest." Ibid., p. 75.
La Presse published the results of a major poll on November 14, 1974, which showed that 28% favoured independence, 57.5% were opposed, while 14.5% did not answer. A further breakdown showed that 31% of francophones were in favour and 52.5% opposed, and 36% of Quebec city residents favoured independence. Though up from previous years, independentist support alone could not carry the P.Q. to victory in an election. Cited in Saywell, op.cit., p. 115.

Ibid., p. 144.

Ibid., p. 146.

Though numerous polls were taken at this time and results were not always identical, they generally ranged between 19-22% in favour, and 61-70% opposed to independence. See p. 50 of Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs - 1977, (Toronto: 1979), for a summary of the polls taken at this time.


Parizeau is a typical P.Q. technocrat. He was educated outside of Canada (advanced studies at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Paris, receiving his doctorate in economics from the London School of Economics) and worked as a top-level advisor to both Liberal (1960-66) and U.N. (1966-70) cabinets before joining the P.Q. Tremblay, also with a doctorate in economics (Stanford), has worked as an economic advisor to the United Nations, the federal government, the Bank of Canada, and as a professor (and department chairman) at the University of Montreal. Landry did advanced studies in law and economics at the University of Montreal and Paris, and was an economic and technical advisor to the Liberal (1960-66) cabinet, and has practised law. Claude Morin also did advanced studies in economics (Laval and Columbia), as well as having been an economic advisor to two Quebec cabinets and a university professor. Jacques-Yvan Morin studied at University of Montreal, McGill, Harvard and Cambridge (law) and has taught international and constitutional law at various levels. This information was taken from, "Portrait of the P.Q. Cabinet", appendix 2, pps. 129-136, in Pierre Dupont, How Lévesque Won, (Toronto: 1977).
25 Burns was a labour relations lawyer who worked as a technical advisor and director of legal services for the CNTU until 1970. Maroïs, also a lawyer, was a union representative for the CNTU and worked with the cooperative movement until 1976. Idem.


27 Mouvement Quebec-Canada, an umbrella unity group which united several groups including the Council for Canadian Unity (composed of representatives of from 150 to 300 of Canada's largest corporations), was formed. Canada Steamship Lines President Louis Desmarais left this position to lead the new unity group. The Council for Canadian Unity sponsored a symposium of all federalist forces in Quebec, in attempt to unite their opposition to the P.Q. Quebec Liberals and the U.N. sought ways to counter the P.Q. without appearing to support the status quo. Trudeau created a new Federal-Provincial Ministry (headed by Marc Lalonde) and a special civil task force group (headed by Paul Tellier) to monitor activities in Quebec and to respond to "Lévesque's propaganda", with its own pro-Canada arguments, and a Task Force on National Unity to make recommendations towards solving the Canadian crisis.

28 See William D. Coleman, "The Class Bases of Language Policy in Quebec, 1949-1975", in Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review, Spring 1980, for an analysis of Bill 22. Coleman argues that the initial introduction of Bill 22, led to a polarization along class lines. In its initial form Bill 22 can be seen as reflecting the wants of the francophone petite bourgeoisie. On the other hand the "francophone bourgeoisie was close to the position of the dominant bourgeois fractions than that of the petty bourgeoisie .. The issues related to language helped foster a political unity among fractions of the bourgeoisie." (p. 110) In its final form the legislation was substantially modified to suit the needs of the bourgeoisie operating in Quebec. In the final analysis, then, the legislation can be seen as significant for the legitimation of the dominant economic (capitalist) and political (state) structures and institutions in Quebec, and for the 'francization' of the foreign anglophone bourgeoisie.

30 For example on July 19, 1978, the P.Q. decided that if one-half of a company's revenues were generated outside Quebec, then its executives could continue to work in English. Canadian News Facts, July 19, 1978.

31 Soquia (Société québécoise d'initiative agro-alimentaire) is a state corporation which participates in the food industry. Its major investment to date has been the purchase of 38.6% of Culinar's shares for $11 million.


34 Fournier argues that since the P.Q. came to office there has been a "pronounced tightening of control over public companies ... the P.Q. is profoundly transforming not only each state corporation but also the links between them and the state, with the avowed goal of making the economic objectives of Quebec and the action of the state corporations more compatible. Several state corporations, including Hydro Quebec, have had their charter modified. The government will have an important role henceforth in appointing management and members of the board. It will have more control over budgets, and will itself rule on the important projects envisaged by the corporations. It is noteworthy that several major changes have occurred in the top-level management of the corporations since Nov. 1976." Pierre Fournier, "The New Parameters of the Quebec Bourgeoisie", Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review, No. 3, Spring 1980, p. 75.

35 Throughout its term the P.Q. announced no other major nationalization plans. Its decision to nationalize only Asbestos Corporation was a major retreat in itself, as Lévesque had earlier promised to take majority control of the Quebec asbestos industry, of which Asbestos Corporation is only a part. See Malcom Reid, "Certain things that happened at Kresge's the morning after Lévesque's speech in New York", Canadian Forum, June-July, No. 672, 1977, pps. 7-9. See also, Robert Armstrong, "Nationalizing Asbestos: Takeover in Perspective", in Canadian Forum, August, No. 691, 1979.

36 René Lévesque, My Quebec, (Toronto: 1979), p. 35.
In early 1977, the Caisse aided Provigo, a commercial company jointly owned by the Caisse and private capitalists, in taking-over Loeb, a large English Canadian company.


Idem., p. 17.


In the first six months of 1978 alone, the federal and provincial (Quebec) governments jointly announced the creation of seven new spending programs at a cost of over $500 million to stimulate economic activity in less developed regions of Quebec. McRoberts, op.cit., p. 223.

The Conseil du Patronat released a study showing that 15% of Montreal's head offices had decided to move all or part of their activities outside Quebec, while another 30% were thinking about doing so. Since the threats of 1976 and 1978, Sun Life has moved part of its operations (head offices) out of Quebec.

La Presse, Dec. 14, 1978, "CP, CN and Air Canada to move out if Quebec becomes independent".

The organization was set-up directly and financed by such Canadian giants as Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Alcan, Royal Bank, Canadian Pacific, Bell Canada, CN, Molson Breweries, Imperial Oil, Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Steinberg, etc. Its President, Pierre Cote, was also the President of the Quebec Employers Council, an organization of 126 employers' associations, and 300 company heads, who together employ over half of Quebec's labour force. It was set up to fight against the sovereignty-association referendum.
This organization was founded by several Montreal businessmen in 1964. Most of its 200 member board of directors are company heads, such as President Robert C. Dowsett, who is President of Crown Life Insurance, while others are politicians or academics. Financed by the federal government and private enterprise, the CCU collected over $2 million in 1979 for its NON campaign in the referendum.

One study, entitled, "Trade Realities in Canada and the issue of Sovereignty-association", showed among other things that 140,000 jobs would be lost in an independent Quebec. However, Tim Hazeldine of the Economic Council of Canada disagreed, arguing that only 21,500 would be lost, and that these losses could be offset by currency devaluation. Canadian Annual Review of Political and Public Affairs - 1978 pp. 95.

A Gallup poll showed that 36% of Quebecers favored sovereignty-association while other polls showed between 30 and 40% would give the P.Q. a mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association.

A Common Front (QFL, CNTU and CEQ) representing 200,000 public sector workers was in negotiation for months with the Quebec government with little progress when the P.Q. passed emergency legislation (Nov. 12, 1979) suspending the right to strike until Nov. 30, (and provided fines for members found in violation). Negotiators then called for membership to defy the legislation, and urged them to walk out until a settlement was reached. Close to 75,000 workers defied the law but after several arrests were made and fines imposed, the strikers returned to work and the unity of the Common Front was lost. See Canadian News Facts, 1979, November, p. 2226, and Our Generation, Fall, 1979, Editorial Statement. Similarly, 11,000 striking Quebec hydro workers were legislated
back to work on Dec. 19, 1979, ending a three week old strike. Finally, a 41-day strike of Montreal municipal blue collar workers was ended by a similar back-to-work law in early 1980.

Several interpretations are available as to why the P.Q. sovereignty-association referendum was defeated. Stanley Ryerson argues that it was the high-powered rallying by the Canadian bourgeoisie and Canadian state around the NON banner which worked its will on the minds of Quebecers: "Federal power, its multifarious agencies, and the business-dominated Liberal Party machine, operated in happy symbiosis with the private corporate sector ... (and) brandished the threat of ruin for a Quebec economy should its people dare to assert the right to a footing of equality with English Canada," Stanley Ryerson, "After the Quebec Referendum: A Comment", Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review, No. 4, Autumn 1980, pps. 139-146. McRoberts mentioned the "effective appearances" of Trudeau during the referendum campaign, the federalist threat campaign, and the rallying of Quebec women behind NON after the provocation by Lise Payette which implied Quebec women were like "Yvettes" -- a television character who blindly and passively accepted her husbands every wish. But McRoberts adds that many Quebecers must simply not have viewed sovereignty-association as a credible option because English Canada would never agree to an association. Also, that the P.Q.'s own "good government" provided the present political order in Canada with much more credibility. "In short, a host of factors can be cited to explain the referendum defeat." McRoberts, op.cit., 1980, p. 280.

This is updated later.


Ibid., p. 2370.

Gouvernement du Québec, Quebec-Canada: A New Deal (Quebec: Service des publications officielles, 1979), p. 50.


Gouvernement du Québec, op.cit., p. 51.

Ibid., p. 52.

Ibid., p. 53-54.

Ibid., p. 31.

Ibid., p. 43.

Ibid., p. 43.
CHAPTER SIX:

THE PARTI QUÉBÉCOIS:
A CLASS PERSPECTIVE
From the analysis of the formation and the composition of the Parti Québécois we can see that it is a party dominated both at the lower levels and, especially, in the leadership positions by the new petite bourgeoisie. This numerical preponderance of the new petite bourgeoisie does not, in and of itself, make the P.Q. a "petit bourgeois party", contrary to what Niosi and Milner have claimed. Bourque correctly points out, "We must never confuse the interests defended by a party in the final analysis with the class (determination) of its average political executives, its elected members or its favourite supporters." However, it is equally insufficient to say, as Fournier does, that the P.Q. is a "bourgeois party" because the "essential goal of its program is the expansion of the Quebec bourgeoisie at the expense of the Canadian bourgeoisie." No doubt this is one aspect of the P.Q.'s programme, but it is hardly the only or "essential goal" of its existence. Fournier's narrow conception of the P.Q.'s class nature derives from his unwillingness to recognize the new petite bourgeoisie as having any autonomous significance of existence separate from the bourgeoisie. This is shown when Fournier criticizes Niosi's claim that the P.Q. is a petit bourgeois party: "Not content with claiming that it is possible for a government of a capitalist country not to be bourgeois, Niosi discovers in the "wordsmiths" (P.Q. leaders)
a new social class." Both arguments, as they are presented are fundamentally reductionist in nature, and underscore the very essence of the 'new petite bourgeoisie problematic' within Marxist literature (This debate will be taken up more fully in the Conclusion chapter below).

A theoretical understanding of the new petite bourgeoisie, which is essential if one is to come to grips with the new petite bourgeoisie in Quebec, the P.Q., and the role this class and party play in the contemporary Quebec question, was presented in Chapter two. Summarized briefly the argument is as follows:

In capitalist society, between the two principal classes there lies a series of class fractions which roughly fall into two categories: the traditional petite bourgeoisie and the new petite bourgeoisie. Although the class place (relation to the means of production) of these fractions is petit bourgeois, their class position (involving their political and ideological relationship to the two principal classes), is usually polarized either towards a working class or bourgeois class position. The political/ideological position of the fractions of the petite bourgeoisie is a manifestation of the influence of bourgeois and working class political and ideological positions, which it adapts or deflects according to its own aspirations, in combination with those elements peculiar to its own existence. Therefore, the political/ideological position of the petite bourgeoisie is diverse, different from fraction to fraction,
and in correspondence with the specific conditions of their existence. Poulantzas postulates several features characteristics of the ideology of the new petite bourgeoisie which are relevant to the Quebec case: 1) Status-quo anti-capitalism; 2) Statism; 3) Power Fetishism; and 4) Nationalism. 

Although the petite bourgeoisie does not have an "autonomous class position" within the capitalist mode of production, at specific conjunctures the petite bourgeoisie can intervene at the political level as an authentic social force (i.e. the formation of a petit bourgeois political party). If the new petite bourgeoisie 'captures' state power through a political party, its ideology can actually replace the dominant ideology, yet because it is an ensemble of elements adapted from both working class and bourgeois class positions, it is unlikely to work solely to the long-term advantage of the petite bourgeoisie. In the final analysis, if the new petite bourgeoisie does not question the underlying economic (capitalist relations of production) and political (the state) structures of capitalist society, and instead chooses to defend these, it (often unwittingly) defends and ensures the dominance of the bourgeoisie, whose existence depends on these structures. As Poulantzas notes, "Bourgeois ideology thus perpetuates its hold, but in indirect or disguised form ... via the direct dominance of "petit bourgeois ideology". It is from this perspective that we shall analyze the Quebec case.
First it is necessary to briefly review the specific conditions of the new petite bourgeoisie's existence in Quebec. This class emerged very gradually after World War II with the intensification of capitalist development. Yet its emergence was constrained somewhat as it met with continual rejection in the Anglo-dominant corporate world of Quebec. Its frustrations were expressed through the intellectual currents of the 1950's and 1960's which increasingly questioned the dominance of the Anglophone business world in Quebec and the clerical ideology which had legitimated this dominance for two centuries. The ideological positions were diverse in nature and resulted from the heterogeneity of conditions the various fractions faced. But a common element in most positions was the expression of Quebec nationalism. The expansion of the Quebec state, beginning slowly in the 1950's, gave this new francophone petite bourgeoisie a vehicle to express its own class interests. Its dominant fractions argued that the only way Quebec could emancipate itself from Anglo-dominance was through the use of the Quebec state. Its more extreme elements were already calling for Quebec independence from Canada. The 'Quiet Revolution' reforms of the early 1960's, which resulted in the rapid expansion of the Quebec state, and a proliferation of class places for the new petite bourgeoisie, must be seen as an attempt by the Quebec Liberals to satisfy the needs of the new francophone petite bourgeoisie as well as the Quebec bourgeoisie, both of whom desired an increased role for the Quebec state, but for largely
different reasons. As time went on a split arose in the Liberal Party between those who favoured an increasing role for the Quebec state but began to realize the impossibility of this within the constraints of Canadian federalism, and those who desired a more traditional balance between state and private sectors, and desired to remain within Canadian federalism. The former faction grew increasingly nationalist and when its attempt to have independence adopted into the Liberal Party's programme failed, Levesque led this faction away from the Liberals to form the MSA. At the same time other nationalist factions of the petite bourgeoisie which had been espousing independence since the late 1950's through such parties as the RN, RIN, and PSQ, were becoming increasingly popular. The crystallization of the new petite bourgeoisie as an autonomous social force mobilized to intervene at the political level, came in 1968 when the major nationalist-independentist parties united to form the P.Q. Its acquisition of power in 1976 must be seen as a conjunctural intervention by the new petite bourgeoisie at the political level. Thus, the specific conditions surrounding the existence of the new petite bourgeoisie in Quebec were its inability to enter the Anglo-dominant corporate world, and its inability to effect changes that it felt were necessary for the fulfillment of Quebec as a nation, because of the subordinate position of the Quebec state. In short, it reacted against the economic
dominance of a 'foreign' bourgeoisie and the political dominance of a 'foreign' state. The peculiar class interests that the new petite bourgeoisie expressed through the P.Q. were varied but its dominant faction, which desired sovereignty-association, saw its class interests served in becoming the politically/ideologically dominant class in a Quebec free of political subordination to Ottawa. Not unsimilar to the depiction of the Duplessis-led U.N. as a 'Partitocratie', this fraction wants to become the technical and managerial stratum (or 'political ruling class') in a sovereign Quebec. But of course this was not the sole ideological position expressed by the new petite bourgeoisie through the P.Q. But because of the common 'independentist' goals of these fractions, their ideological differences were and are, to some extent overlooked. Hence, nationalism-independentism became both the rallying point for several fractions of the new petite bourgeoisie, and the dominant aspect of their political/ideological position.

Before continuing with the analysis of the P.Q. a few preliminary remarks are in order. First, the P.Q. is the major political instrument for several fractions of the petite bourgeoisie in Quebec, but by no means, necessarily the only instrument of this class and its fractions, nor is it the instrument for all fractions of the petite bourgeoisie. The reasoning for this is simple. As we said earlier the elements of the new petite bourgeoisie face a variety of often peculiar
conditions. These conditions necessarily shape their understanding of the world and their role in it, and, subsequently, their strategies and ideologies. Thus their political/ideological positions are diverse. Many have mobilized around the P.Q. because of common 'independentist' goals. Others, however, though the number is much smaller, may view their class interests as best served by participating in the provincial or even federal Liberal parties. These differences cannot be accounted for purely by a difference in class but, rather are precisely distinguishable by the different political and ideological positions taken by the various fractions. In the case of the Quebec petite bourgeoisie, most elements rally around the P.Q. and independence but others, because of their different nationalist ideology, rally round other parties or organizations. Secondly, analyzing the political and ideological position of the petite bourgeoisie (expressed through the P.Q.) is a very complex procedure because of the presence within the P.Q. of two distinct political/ideological positions -- that of the technocrats and that of the participationists or left-wing. Therefore, of course, the P.Q. does not always express a unified, monolithic, or even consistent ideological position. Its programme and discourse must be seen in terms of the dynamics of these two elements, though as we showed earlier, the tendency has been that the technocratic faction of the party and its political/ideological position have remained dominant.
To return to the prior discussion, the first and major component of the ideological position of the new petite bourgeoisie expressed through the P.Q. is nationalism. Since its inception, the P.Q. has always explained the "Quebec question" in terms of "We vs. they", "Québécois vs. les anglais", or "Québec vs. Canada." The Party's major pre-referendum publication, Québec-Canada: A New Deal, stated that in 1867, Confederation "sanctioned, and favoured as well, the supremacy of English Canada. It was natural that in such a regime the interests and aspirations of Quebecers and Francophones in other provinces should take second place." French Canadians were treated as "at best an important linguistic minority with no collective rights or particular powers, one that must sooner or later melt into the Canadian whole, as English Canada long believed." But in the post-war period Quebecers (or so they were told by the P.Q.) experienced a new sense of vitality and common destiny which was continually frustrated by the paralyzing centralism of the Canadian federation. Thus, realizing the impossibility of preserving their "national existence" within Canada, Quebecers sought independentist solutions. Lévesque often speaks as if the Parti Québécois was a direct outgrowth or inevitable emanation of the collective aspirations of the Quebec nation: "Inevitably this metamorphosis owed itself to create an instrument for its political expression and to try to conduct it to its logical conclusion. This instrument
is the Parti Québécois. We were just a few hundred, then a few thousand, to bring it into being in 1967-68, with two objectives which have remained coupled since then: sovereignty and association. In "A Call to the Quebec People", Lévesque concludes,

The Quebec nation is a family that will soon be four hundred years old ... History has delayed our emancipation for a long time ... We Quebecers are a nation, the most firmly anchored nation on this continent. Over the vast expanses of our land, our deep rooted memories and our vital presence are constant reminders that the Quebec people is at home here, in this - its ancestral home ... It is now vitally important that from now on this home be completely ours. The time has come to be our own masters ... The new deal we are offering means, first of all, an end to all those shackles. An end to those narrow roles to which so many individuals--and our entire people--have been confined. An end to manipulation and exploitation from outside.

Yet, the specific solution the P.Q. has in mind for the Quebec nation -- sovereignty-association -- offers only emancipation from one of the two dominations suffered by Quebecers. Although within the party certain elements would prefer a more complete independence (reflected in the decisions of the Dec. 1981 party convention), the P.Q. remains committed to only ending the political dominance of the Canadian state. This reflects the perception that the technocratic leadership of the Party has of its own situation. Once again, it sees that by 'repatriating' the main levers of decision-making from Ottawa, it can become the technical and managerial stratum of a new Quebec nation.
Nationalism as the dominant aspect in the ideology of this class has several effects. The most important is that it attempts to steer the class vision of society which was becoming increasingly popular within the union movement in the 1970's, towards a national vision by asking Quebecers to pledge allegiance to this larger, more 'natural' and deeply-rooted historical entity -- the Quebec nation -- and to abandon their narrow class allegiances. Although as Bourque and Frenette argue, "A nationalist ideology in and of itself, cannot mask the class consciousness of dominated classes," it can obscure class consciousness in a specific way. No doubt the class consciousness of the Quebec working class has been shaped by the ideological hegemony exercised by the new petite bourgeoisie over the national movement, but it cannot be said, as Roussopoulos and others have, that the P.Q. has had "disastrous" consequences on the ideology of the working class in Quebec by "robbing" the national movement of its "left-wing and autonomist potential". There is evidence that working class and socialist elements within the party are still very strong, and that the major unions are aware of the party's "class nature", as evidenced by the tactical positions offered by the unions in support of the OUI forces in the referendum. The use by the P.Q. of nationalism is not so much the result of a conscious effort to obscure class consciousness, but from a genuine belief in the nation as the proper form of social organization and in the belief that
class is an ancient allegiance which is no longer applicable in "modern society." This denial of the relevance of class results in part from the influence of bourgeois ideology but also from the peculiar situation of the new petite bourgeoisie (somewhat detached from the struggle between the working class and the bourgeoisie) which inhibits it from an appreciation of the reality of class domination.

The next major aspect of the ideology of the new petite bourgeoisie as expressed through the Parti Québécois is Statism. The state is revered as the natural expression of the nation's will. With its legal-juridical constitution and its foundation based on democratic principles, the state cannot be but the neutral expression of the will of the people. Thus, the fundamental aspect of the P.Q.'s political project is the creation of a sovereign state for the Quebec nation. As Halary remarks, "The P.Q. attempt to set up an independent State officially asserts that the State is neutral; there is no "class struggle" in a Quebec on the road to independence. For the P.Q. the problem is technical and thus the responsibility of the technocracy, of social rationality, and thus of Reason."14 The P.Q. has always insisted upon its own neutrality. Its efforts to maintain a distance from both the bourgeoisie and the working class by avoiding financial contributions from and direct links to either, can been seen as an attempt to maintain a neutral appearance. As Levesque wrote recently,
We have (an) unprecedented advantage... We owe not a cent, not a dollar, to the employers, or to the unions, nor to any of these pressure groups which are legitimate, but too often prone to exaggerate when they get a chance. We have no organic ties, which means that we can be the government of all the people without being a puppet to any one sector.\footnote{15}

Thus, by equating the state with the nation, and by identifying itself with both, the new petite bourgeoisie of the P.Q. writes for itself an important historic role. In this way the ideology of power fetishism becomes clearer. This new petite bourgeoisie, due to conditions peculiar to its own existence (its position in the state sector), desires to become the political/ideological ruling class of the new Quebec, free of intervention by a foreign state. The P.Q.'s strategies of electoralism, etapism, gradualism, good government, etc., are indications of the ultimate desires of the new petite bourgeoisie to assume 'state control', but sovereignty is the ultimate expression of this. As Bourque writes:

Underlying the temporality of the P.Q. is a curious paradox: there is a continual stalling for time in the realization of a forever postponed project. Forever towards independence, forever towards social democracy, from stage to stage, until the final non-event. While independence and social democracy are merely profiled, the pequiste state is being built. And this is the real function of the constant temporization.\footnote{16}

However, it is the economic and social aspects of the P.Q.'s programme which are most illustrative of the ideological position of the new petite bourgeoisie, and of its likely significance as an autonomous social force in the
long-term. It should be stated that some of the objectives of the P.Q.'s programme, according to the Party, are contingent upon attaining sovereignty for the Quebec state, though it is not always clear which objectives the P.Q. is referring to. Nevertheless, the P.Q. project revolves around the use of the state to carry out a very important role in economic and social fields. As the 1977 Official Program of the P.Q. states, it is the "responsibility of the Quebec state to take charge of economic development." It2 But to what extent the state will actually "take charge" remained vague. P.Q. discourse, typical of the new petite bourgeoisie, has always answered this question in an ambiguous ("status quo anti-capitalism") fashion18 reflecting both the internal contradictions in the party and a desire to attract popular support. On the one hand we have Lévesque attacking the "wealthy, influential anglophones ... who don't want to let go of their privileges"19 during a press conference, and on the other hand Lévesque assuring foreign investors that they need not fear a "Cuban experience."20 This ambiguity is cleared up somewhat in the 1979 programme which sees the state as an "active agent for development" whose role it is to coordinate the activities of Quebec's major economic agents -- business, government, workers and consumers. But in the end, the state desired by the P.Q. is little different from the present one, except that Quebecers (or rather the Quebec new petite bourgeoisie) will be in control.
The P.Q.'s programme, due to the nationalist position of the new petite bourgeoisie, has always made clear its desire to strengthen, through the state, the Quebec economy's indigenous potential in certain sectors but the experience thus far has shown the P.Q. to be little different than previous governments in economic matters. The most important (and essentially the only major economic) change suggested by sovereignty-association is that Quebecers could be in a position to take control of their financial sector. But even this is a somewhat dubious possibility as a Quebec/Canada association entailing a common currency and common monetary authority would likely preclude this possibility. Nevertheless, sovereignty for Quebec has fearful implications for the Canadian financial bourgeoisie, accounting for the leadership role this fraction has played in the anti-P.Q. campaign going on in Quebec since 1969. The P.Q. has also mentioned from time to time its desire to nationalize certain sectors of Quebec's economy. But in actuality the P.Q. fears a radical transformation of society and opts instead for a reformist path: "Between the revolution for new soviets and the "gradualism" of those who, deep down, want to change nothing of importance, there is room for radicalism doubled with realism." In the final analysis the P.Q. backs down from any challenge with the foreign bourgeoisie: "Foreign companies need not fear that we will present them with an
intransigent "nationalist" policy." By accepting the dominance of the foreign bourgeoisie we can see the influence that bourgeois ideology has on the political/ideological position of the new petite bourgeoisie, in Quebec. Underscoring the precise "conjunctural" nature of a petit bourgeois project which does not challenge bourgeois dominance, Lévesque says, "On a continent which is still the capitalist Mecca of the world ... We cannot, whatever happens, break with the American context and American thinking." Therefore, the P.Q. moves "gradually" towards a "Scandinavian-type social democracy (which is the maximum "progressivism" possible for a serious left-wing group in the North American context)." Accepting the constraints of the North American economic environment, the P.Q.'s project for economic emancipation inevitably fails before it begins, as its major result will be to perpetuate the dominance of the bourgeoisie, though in a disguised (maybe 'francized') fashion. The only implications it has for the long-term autonomous significance of the petite bourgeoisie is to give it the role of "state manager" of the capitalist economy; a role which (give or take a little) is played by every state in Western capitalist society. This becomes very clear for the first time only in the 1979 economic programme when the state is given a 'coordinating' role vis-a-vis other economic agents, but the primary responsibility for economic development is given to the private sector, not the state.
Once again, this desire to become the technical and managerial stratum (political ruling class) reflects the class place of most of the P.Q. leadership. The technocratic faction of the P.Q. (and fraction of the new petite bourgeoisie) has been involved in technical and managerial occupations in the Quebec state since 1960 (though not in a controlling position vis-a-vis society). Inevitably, devoid of comprehensive economic reform, the P.Q.'s project of sovereignty-association remains essentially political in nature. The major implication of a successful sovereignty-association project is that Quebec would no longer be tied politically to the Canadian state. Though, of course, this alone is seen as a great achievement by many Quebec nationalists.

However, while tacitly submitting to the dominance of the bourgeoisie, the P.Q. reaffirms its neutrality and its commitment to a variety of social reforms, which due to their vagueness, amount often only to empty promises, ones that can be compromised at any given moment by the abstract notion of national interest. Among its social objectives the P.Q. desires "first and foremost, equality of opportunity for everyone", "decentralization", a "reduction in income disparities", "a wider based democracy in the internal structure of business", and an increased "participation of the citizen ... which implies in consequence the right of workers to participate in decisions concerning their business life and their working
conditions." On the latter, the Parti Québécois encourages "democratic forms of management so that the workers exercise partial or complete jurisdiction over the functioning of their enterprise." This is to be done through "workers' councils or enterprise committees, elected by the general assembly of the workers." Yet, as Halary notes, "management rights attached to private property are incompatible with social democratisation supported by workers' councils. At a certain point one must win over the other; a so-called equilibrium can only be transitory, unstable and ephemeral." Although the desire to bring about social reform is commendable, it is once again simply an expression of the new petite bourgeoisie's denial of, or at least underestimation of, the reality of class conflict. Not fully appreciating the fundamentally irreconcilable nature of the interests of the two major classes leads to efforts by the new petite bourgeoisie (consistent with its own self-proclaimed neutrality) at establishing corporatist forms of organization. On the economic summits organized by the government, which involved leaders from private business, the cooperatives and labour, P.Q. Minister Bernard Landry said, "We are going to set up a mechanism which could prove essential to the future of our collectivity ... I am speaking here of consensus and collaboration ... The objective is to begin to shed old ideas and eliminate old struggles in order to establish
a climate of social peace in Quebec." Lévesque similarly commented, "We are searching for these basic common interests and we will continue to search patiently, because these ditches are old and deep and the habit of dialogue somewhat lost." Once again, the "state as neutral arbiter above social classes" theme reappears. In denying the class divisions which are omnipresent in Quebec, as elsewhere, the new petite bourgeoisie of the P.Q. actually serves to perpetuate these class divisions. Assuming classes can forget these 'ancient struggles' and work together for the benefit of the 'national collective' is illusory. Yet, as Halary notes, "the Parti Québécois' programme makes this illusion the very foundation of an independent Quebec. As recent history demonstrates, the class solidarity of a dominated bourgeoisie with foreign capitalist interests is infinitely more binding than national solidarity." In its effort to remain a neutral class and direct a neutral state above class divisions, the new petite bourgeoisie of the P.Q. has taken a bourgeois class position and by doing so, assured the dominance of the bourgeoisie and especially its most powerful fractions, in an independent Quebec.

The P.Q.'s first term in office illustrates several of the arguments made by Poulantzas on the new petite bourgeoisie in power. In the initial period its attempt was clearly to find this "equilibrium" between classes in Quebec through the summits and several pieces of social legislation which were
designed to aid all Quebeckers and reinforce the party's image of neutrality and its commitment to 'good government.' Although these social measures were progressive, especially in comparison to the policies of prior Quebec governments, they were not designed to have any major long-term consequences favouring the working class in its relationship to the bourgeoisie.

Several other actions taken by the P.Q. illustrate its 'oscillating' class position, such as legislation designed to favour workers (Bill 45) and other legislation favouring the most important economic interests in Quebec (various programs of aid to private capital, cooperatives and state corporations). Yet these programs were characterized by a marked tendency to retreat from original objectives and in each case the reason was because of 'pressure' brought to bear on the P.Q. from the bourgeoisie in Quebec (Bill 45, Bill 101, the Asbestos nationalization, the various economic measures designed to emancipate the Quebec economy from foreigners which were anticipated but were never even tabled). In the final analysis unable even to maintain its appearance of neutrality, the P.Q. forced strikers back to work on several occasions late in its term. Stymied by the 'constraints of the North American environment' the P.Q.'s resultant orthodoxy was, in effect, the new petite bourgeoisie taking an increasingly bourgeois class position. Furthermore during the first months of its second term, the party's "swing to the right" was uninterrupted
until the events of the biennial convention in Dec. 1981. As we said before, only time will tell whether the convention witnessed the rise of the radical wing, and whether this wing can become the ideologically dominant force within the party. If so, the analysis of the P.Q. would then have to focus on the political/ideological position of this radical faction.

Thus, to conclude, the P.Q. is at present a party dominated by the technocratic fraction of the new francophone bourgeoisie whose political/ideological position is generally polarized in favour of the bourgeoisie. Its position, an ensemble of elements adapted from bourgeois (most notably its economic programme) and working class (especially its social programs) positions, combined with elements peculiar to its own situation and aspirations (which are essentially political -- i.e. statism -- in nature), ensures only one thing -- the continued dominance of the bourgeoisie in Quebec. As Bourque states, "The objective goal of the P.Q. project is the reproduction of the whole complex of the relations of capitalist forces in Quebec." By not seeking to transform the very structures which are the foundation of the bourgeoisie's dominance (capitalist relations of production), the new petite bourgeoisie's long-term ability to express its own class interest, as an autonomous social force at the political level, is seriously questioned. Only by seeking to transform
these structures could the new petite bourgeoisie of the P.Q. hope to have any long-term significance as a class autonomous from others. Clearly if the P.Q. was led by a fraction of the new petite bourgeoisie which called for complete independence from Canada and immediate transformation of Quebec's economy towards socialism, there would be tremendous obstacles standing in its way. For one, economic sabotage by the U.S. and Canadian bourgeoisie would set back Quebec's potential for economic development and undermine the legitimacy of such a project. But, even moreso, the project would not likely get to that stage because economic and political threats would be brought to bear on the P.Q. and armed insurrection and violent struggle would be the likely consequence. The chance of victory for Quebec's popular classes in such an eventuality, would be as small as that of Poland's popular classes at present. Although it is certainly presumptuous to state unequivocably that a long-term trend has been set, or even moreso, to predict long-term events, the tendencies inherent in the current situation tend to favour this interpretation. This would be avoided if the party itself undergoes a transformation, and its left-wing element, which favours a political/ideological position much closer to the Quebec working class, either comes to the fore or breaks-off to form another party. This is a possibility which is not entirely unlikely given recent events.
REFERENCES


4 Ibid., p. 87.

5 These are from Nicos Poulantzas, Fascism and Dictatorship, (London: 1977). Refer back to Chapter two for a more complete presentation of these concepts.

6 Poulantzas, op.cit., p. 287.

7 Ibid., p. 252.

8 Gouvernement du Québec, Québec-Canada: A New Deal, (Québec: 1979), p. 10.

9 Ibid., p. 10.


15 Levesque, op.cit., 1979, p. 45.


18 Refer back to Chapter two.


20 Levesque, op.cit., 1979, p. 27.

21 Ibid., p. 133.

22 Ibid., pps. 81-82.

23 Ibid., p. 135.

24 Ibid., p. 36.

25 In order, these come from pages 133, 134, 134, 134 and 134, in Levesque, op.cit., 1979.


27 Idem.

28 Idem.

30 Lévesque, _op.cit._, 1979, p. 47.

31 Halary, _op.cit._, 1978, p. 12. As an example of this, Coleman showed that the debates over Bill 101 in Quebec were marked by "cooperation among the various fractions of the bourgeoisie (monopoly capital, non-monopoly capital, francophone capital, and non-monopoly, non-francophone capital) and did not lead to any coalition between the francophone employer class and the francophone new petite bourgeoisie." William Coleman, _op.cit._, 1980, p. 95.

32 Bourque, _op.cit._, 1979, p. 148.
CHAPTER SEVEN:

CONCLUSION
To recapitulate, this thesis has attempted to show that an understanding of the Quebec national question must involve a thorough and systematic analysis of class relations within Quebec (taking account the international setting) and all of the resultant political, economic, cultural, ideological and social manifestations of these relations. Chapter two presented a theoretical framework for the analysis of class, state, party, nation, and nationalism, and the relationship between these phenomena. Chapter three attempted to show the historical nature of the Quebec question by tracing and analyzing the roots and development of the problem. The 1760-1960 period was analyzed with particular emphasis placed on economic, political and ideological relations between and within Quebec and Canada. We outlined the various attempts by Canadian political elites at 'managing' or 'accommodating' the 'French fact' and the results of these efforts. Emphasis was placed on the trends emerging in the post-1945 period -- such as the intensification of capitalist relations of production in Quebec, the corresponding rise of the new petite bourgeoisie, and its challenge to the two-century old ideological dominance of the Church -- which were to have such a tremendous impact on the present conjuncture of relations. Chapter four examined the specific nature of these trends and their effect on political, social, economic and cultural happenings during the 1960-1976
period. It began by analyzing the underdeveloped character of the Quebec economy (vis-a-vis Ontario and the U.S. metropoles) and the effect this has on Quebecers and the Quebec nation. The implication is that certainly to some degree these economic factors must be seen as pre-conditions for the rise of a Quebec nationalist and independence movement. The chapter then analyzed the various classes and class fractions operating in contemporary Quebec and, specifically, their relationship to the Quebec state during the post-1960 period. The purpose was to illustrate the development of the new petite bourgeoisie, as well as its politicization and assertion as a class. As well, we traced the growth of the Quebec bourgeoisie and working class, and their political and ideological development. We also described the approaches used by the various Quebec governments to deal with the dynamic and occasionally explosive interplay of class forces during that period. Chapter five outlined the social and political climate in Quebec in the 1960's that led to the creation of the Parti Québécois. Then it analyzed the class composition of the various elements which formed the party -- the RIN, the RN, and MSA -- to illustrate their common 'new petit bourgeois' background and independentist goals, but also to show the diversity of political and ideological positions taken by these elements. The chapter went on to emphasize the MSA's control of the
party's political/ideological direction and of the Quebec nationalist/independentist movement. It analyzed the party's rise to power (1968-1976), focusing on the internal struggle between moderates and radicals to make clear that the Quebec national movement is not unified by a single monolithic ideology, and that the evolution of the party's programme and strategy is a result of the dynamic interaction of these elements. This period marked a gradual consolidation of the dominance of the moderates within the party. Part two of this chapter looked at the P.Q. in power (1976-1982) to show how the party attempted to implement its programme and achieve its objectives. It showed the extensive efforts by the party to build a wide base from which it could carry out its long-term goals of sovereignty and association. We emphasized the cautious and gradualist approach of the party -- reflected in the party's continual retreat from long-standing commitments and goals -- to show the continued dominance of the moderates within the party, as well as the nature of that dominance. The implication was that the party's 'orthodoxy' resulted both from the dominance of the moderate faction and from structural constraints imposed by the North American political and economic environment -- manifested in threats or pressure from the most powerful elements operating in Quebec. We showed that towards the end of the P.Q.'s first term in office, and in the early part of its second, its orthodoxy became all the
more clear -- illustrated in successive back-to-work laws, austerity budgets, cut-backs in state social expenditure, and by placing the burden of the province's deficit on the shoulders of the Quebec consumer. Once again the implication is that the North American economic and political environment brought about this response. We also showed that during the P.Q.'s 8th biennial congress its radical wing apparently rose up, for the first time in the 13-year existence of the party, and took control of the proceedings. We indicated that it is not yet certain what the implications of this will be but it could indicate a radical departure in the future for the party. The final section of chapter five examined the official programme of the P.Q. (as of 1981) as it appeared in the party's two major policy documents -- Québec-Canada: A New Deal, which outlines the specific nature of the desired sovereignty-association; and, Challenges for Québec: A Statement on Economic Policy, which presents the party's long-term social, political, economic and cultural objectives, and calls for corporatism-cum-social democracy. Chapter six took the theorizations of class and party developed in Chapter two and applied them to the P.Q. It began by looking briefly at the debate on the class specificity of the P.Q. We argued that the P.Q. is a party of the new petite bourgeoisie in Quebec, but is split into two factions -- the moderates, who have a fundamentally bourgeois class position, and the radicals, who have a fundamentally
working class position. Because the party has long been
dominated by the former, its programme tends to favour the
bourgeoisie. It is so because this faction's political/
ideological position assumes the state is a neutral arbiter
between competing groups and that through the state it (the P.Q.)
can achieve harmony between these groups. This denial of or
at least underestimation of the significance of class struggle
and its irreconcilability, guarantees the perpetuation of
bourgeois dominance, but in a disguised form, through the
dominance of petit bourgeois ideology. The implication is
that such a solution can only be conjunctural. Sovereignty­
association, if successfully achieved, would bring about an
ephemeral, symbolic independence for the Quebec nation; at
best an incomplete solution to the historical Quebec national
question. And that, in reality, the technocratic faction of
the P.Q. articulates such an ideology centered around nationalism,
because it is primarily designed to serve its own class interests,
rather than the interests of the Quebec collectivity. Once
again, it is pointed out that it is not yet known what the
significance of recent events will be in the long-term.

This, however, leaves several important questions
unanswered. Among those that we are concerned with: Is the
PQ. a progressive party? Should sovereignty-association be
supported or rejected? Is a partial solution to the Quebec
national question better than no solution? What position
Should socialists and popular classes take in relation to the nationalist project of the Parti Québécois? Such questions have invited vitriolic debate from all sectors of Quebec society. Within leftist academic circles the debate is no less virulent. It began shortly after the events of October 1970 when Pierre Vallières terminated his relationship with the FLQ and adopted a pro-P.Q. position, expressed in *Le Devoir*. Long-time FLQ comrade Charles Gagnon then responded with a scathing critique of both Vallières and the P.Q., also on the pages of *Le Devoir*. Since then, of course, Vallières has re-adopted an anti-P.Q. (but not pro-FLQ) stance, but the debate goes on. On one hand we have those who support the P.Q. -- such as Milner, Ryerson, Rioux, Le Centre de Formation Populaire (CFP) -- and argue that the P.Q.'s project will solve the national question and bring the class question more clearly into focus. On the other hand we have those who dismiss this as naive and undialectical -- such as Bourque, Fournier, Vallières, and Roussopoulos -- and argue that supporting the P.Q. is supporting an alliance of Quebec's bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie. This latter analysis is dismissed as "sterile dogmatism" by those who find the P.Q. supportable.

Our own analysis of the P.Q. is somewhat critical of the party because: it is led by the moderate faction of the new petite bourgeoisie whose class position is generally bourgeois; its project is designed primarily to aid Quebecers of all
classes but its result would, if successful, merely lead to a new role for the new petite bourgeoisie (political ruling class in a quasi-independent Quebec) and perpetuate the dominance of the bourgeoisie; its project would only achieve a partial or symbolic independence -- i.e. it would remove Quebec from the political dominance of the Canadian federal state but would not question the dominance on the economic level of the bourgeoisie (U.S., Canadian and Quebec). To take a final position on whether the P.Q. is supportable or not, it is necessary to examine in greater detail the various positions of Quebec Marxist academics. First we will look at the anti-P.Q. arguments. These fall largely within two camps which we shall call the "Determinist-Marxist" position and the "Anarchist" position.

The clearest enunciation of the "Determinist-Marxist" critique comes from Pierre Fournier. He argues that the sovereignty-association project "is essentially an attempt by the local bourgeoisie to give itself an even stronger state to improve its relative position, largely at the expense of the Canadian bourgeoisie ... (It) is the logical culmination of (their) economic and political ambitions." This stems from his class analysis of the P.Q. which states, "The P.Q. is, in fact, a bourgeois party ... the essential goal of its program is the expansion of the Quebec bourgeoisie ..." While acknowledging the involvement of the new petite bourgeoisie.
in the P.Q., Gilles Bourque offers essentially the same argument. Bourque sees the P.Q. as led by the state fraction of the Quebec bourgeoisie who desire to strengthen themselves vis-a-vis the Canadian bourgeoisie by the use of state intervention. The P.Q.'s essential goal, says Bourque, is "to make the Quebec bourgeoisie a hegemonic political fraction." He adds:

the P.Q. is a multi-class party (petite bourgeoisie and regional bourgeoisie). It is placed under the hegemony of individuals who seek to reinforce Quebec capitalism. Their political project, hegemonic within the national movement, is to create the maximum of conditions favourable to the development of Quebec regional capitalism. ... In the process ... the P.Q. project seeks to reserve the largest possible economic-social space for regional Quebec capitalism and, secondarily, for the new petite bourgeoisie. Change in the relations among the elements of this complex is envisaged in a significant way only between the Canadian bourgeoisie and the Quebec bourgeoisie.

But because of its weakness, adds Bourque, the Quebec bourgeoisie promotes an "ambiguous project which can only lead to the reproduction of the Canadian state ... (therefore) the national question will remain unsolved. In the same way, independence will not be achieved." A somewhat more vulgar and yet less obscured expression of this same argument is made by the various Marxist-Leninist sects in Quebec. The Workers Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) is the clearest example. Once again, the Quebec bourgeoisie is placed at the center of the P.Q. independence project: "(The P.Q.) wants the Quebecois
bourgeoisie to have its own sovereign state (with or without an association) to control the territory, the taxes, the market and the people of Quebec."\(^6\) Because it is a bourgeois movement, the P.Q. project will lead to the development of "bourgeois nationalist ideas among Quebec workers, rather than working class, internationalist ideas."\(^7\) This will slow down the development of class consciousness of the Quebec working class and leave the leadership of the national liberation struggle in the hands of the Quebec bourgeoisie. Furthermore, it will split the Canadian working class along national lines and "hinder rather than serve its revolutionary strategy."\(^8\) Of course, the Quebec nation's quest for sovereignty should be rejected on these grounds.

There are numerous problems with this approach. Yet most problems result from the 'economic determinism' inherent in such analyses.\(^9\) From this perspective, material-economic relations are seen as determinant in all cases. The significance of ideological and political factors is generally underestimated. Thus, the state is seen as a reflection of or a mere manifestation of relations at the economic level. The class analysis which stems from this approach focuses almost exclusively on the bourgeoisie and the working class. Little or no significance is given to the petite bourgeoisie (new or traditional) in the short or long-term. Thus, this leads to a narrow and generally
faulty analysis of class relations in Quebec. These analyses insist on placing the Quebec bourgeoisie behind the Quebec independence movement, and behind the P.Q. itself, because they cannot admit to any autonomous existence (political, ideological or otherwise) for the Quebec petite bourgeoisie, or for the Quebec state. Not being able to argue convincingly that the Quebec private sector bourgeoisie has the strength to carry out such a project (because it is so weak), Fournier, Bourque and others, extend the definition of the Quebec bourgeoisie to include the leaders of state corporations and cooperatives, to "prove" that the Quebec bourgeoisie is behind the project. This obscures the analytical distinction between the bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie as well as the relationship between state and class. It is felt here that Niosi's argument that the heads of state corporations and cooperatives are separate and autonomous from the Quebec bourgeoisie, and that they must be considered petit bourgeois, is more accurate. The only real fraction of the Quebec capitalist class, the private sector bourgeoisie, is not only too weak to be 'behind' the P.Q.'s independence project, but it does not, by and large even support Quebec independence. As Niosi says, the Quebec bourgeoisie is a small and weak group and "the separation of Quebec would truncate its principal market, force it to reorganize its companies and weaken its position on the Canadian and international scene ... In reality
this francophone bourgeoisie is nothing other than the French-Canadian section section of the Canadian capitalist class. Its markets, its investments, its aims, all are trans-Canadian. It may lean on the Quebec state (which it has helped to build), but it has no interest in the separation of Quebec.13

This "determinist" position sees the P.Q. as a mere manifestation of the level of economic relations. Thus, it sees that the bourgeoisie's dominance at the economic level necessarily entails its political dominance. Since the P.Q. is, at present, the politically/ideologically dominant force in Quebec politics, it is, of necessity, an expression of bourgeois dominance at the economic level. As Fournier remarked, the P.Q.'s election is a "manifestation of political divisions within the Francophone bourgeoisie in Quebec."14 Thus, from this position, the conflict between the Canadian and Quebec states is seen as a mere reflection or expression of the conflict between the Canadian and Quebec bourgeoisies. As it was mentioned earlier, the state must be seen as somewhat autonomous from the dominant class and potentially determinant, especially in the short-run. Similarly, the petite bourgeoisie must be seen as somewhat autonomous from the bourgeoisie and working class, and potentially determinant especially in the short-term. Only when analyses of class are devoid of such determinism can they offer a contribution to the sociology of knowledge, as well as insight into specific case studies.
But, even if we assumed that the Quebec bourgeoisie was strong enough on its own to lead the national movement, one must ask, "Why would it choose sovereignty-association as the means to this end?" Would it not be more likely to support a more complete independence which would enable it to take complete control of the Quebec economy? Or is it rather, as Niosi claims, that its existence depends on the continued integration of Quebec and Canada, which the P.Q.'s project threatens? Thus, although it is possible the Quebec bourgeoisie would support the P.Q.'s economic (association) plans, it would not likely support its political (sovereignty) plans. Furthermore, if sovereignty-association was a project of the Quebec state bourgeoisie, as Bourque says, why would it desire to strengthen the private sector? Rather, it would seem, they would simply want to strengthen the state. And why during the P.Q.'s first term in office would the party make little or no headway in strengthening either the Quebec-based private or public sector corporations? This determinist position simply does not conform to the reality of the situation. Thus, it might be said that the P.Q. is attempting to rally the Quebec bourgeoisie. But it is also attempting to rally the working class and the fractions of the petite bourgeoisie. After all it is this approach of attracting Quebecers of all "groups" to support its project which convinces the new petite bourgeoisie of the P.Q. that it and 'its state' are truly neutral. Thus, the Marxist determinist position is fundamentally reductionist
in nature and offers little insight into an analysis of the P.Q. in Quebec politics.

The second anti-P.Q. position is that of the "Anarchists." The analysis of the P.Q., by anarchists such as Dimitrios Roussopoulos and Pierre Vallières, is essentially the same as the one contained in Chapter six below -- namely, that the P.Q. is led by a fraction of the new petite bourgeoisie which desires to become the political ruling class in an independent Quebec that is fully integrated into North American capitalism. But Roussopoulos argues that the P.Q.'s project is seriously flawed by class collaboration and a "statist fixation." He sees the P.Q. as having transformed the national movement and "robbed it of its left-wing and autonomist potential." The P.Q. project envisages a society "little different from the one we already know." In fact, it will simply "strengthen capitalism at the expense of the working class ... What we are being asked to support is the building of a full-blown modern nation-state." This, says Roussopoulos, is "antithetical to the self-determination of people, to the repossession of social selfhood and cultural identity." Vallières rejects sovereignty-association as "in no way contribut(ing) to the emancipation of the Québécois." He adds: "In that it refuses to contest the North American economic system, refuses to extricate itself from the "standard of living" and consumption which that system engendered,
the P.Q. is leading the project of independence to its doom."²¹

Sovereignty-association is, for Vallières, a "pseudo objective" because it cannot achieve that which it is striving towards: "There is no "middle road" between satellization and independence. By rejecting a revolution requiring a long and hard struggle from all, the Lévesque government has rejected independence."²²

There are several problems with this approach as well. Although the analysis of the P.Q. is consistent with the one contained in this thesis, the outright rejection of the sovereignty-association project as a "do-nothing" or diversionary scheme must be looked at more closely. It has long been a tendency of leftists and particularly anarchists to reject everything short of a total revolutionary transformation of society. Short-term and incremental gains by the working class are viewed as either irrelevant, or as a bourgeois ploy to obscure class consciousness. As Roussopoulos says, in criticism of leftists who support the P.Q.: "This view is reformist. It is reformist because it argues that people should take seriously minor adjustments in the system as it is ... this sustains the idea that fundamental changes are simply an accumulation of trivial ones, and that all expenditures of energy are equally valid."²³ Since the P.Q.'s sovereignty-association project does not call for a working class revolution, it is asserted, it must be rejected. This approach is totally unacceptable. It is, of course, true that the P.Q. project does
not call for the revolutionary transformation of Quebec society. Nor does it call into question the dominance of the Canadian or U.S. bourgeoisie in Quebec. But sovereignty-association does entail freeing the Quebec state from the dominance (or at least legal-juridical dominance) of the Canadian state. This alone must be seen as progressive and, therefore, worth supporting. Solving political subordination will not solve entirely the national question, which also entails economic subordination, but it does advance the Quebec nation's struggle for emancipation. A Quebec free of the political dominance of Ottawa would then be able to address other aspects of its national subordination. As well, and maybe more importantly, it would focus the class question in an independent Quebec. Historically Quebecers have been led by the various ideologically and politically dominant forces in Quebec to believe that their enemy has been "les anglais", and their representatives in Ottawa. Thus, Quebecers developed a strong sense of national consciousness (or an anti-anglo consciousness) which obscured, or at least shaped the nature of, class consciousness somewhat. In a legally sovereign Quebec, "les anglais" could no longer be so easily scapegoated, and Ottawa could no longer be blamed for all of Quebec's problems. As Marcel Rioux argues in Quebec in Question:

When this burden of subordination is lifted, the workers of Quebec will find it all the easier to conquer the State, given the rickety character of our national bourgeoisie ...
Class relationships become more nakedly obvious as the veil concealing the nation's domination is torn away... We cannot transform our political and economic life as long as it is controlled by foreigners, nor can we develop new values and a new culture if they collide with the political and economic values of the surrounding imperialistic powers...

In a legally independent Quebec, which Roussopoulos correctly said would be "little different from the one we already know", Quebecers could then focus on the deeper causes of their national subordination. Only then could Quebecers see that the root of their national subordination lies not in "les anglais" as such, but, rather, primarily in capitalist relations of production (which imposes class inequalities and disparate conditions on many Quebecers) and the political structures (the state) which perpetuate them. It is also possible that the unity forged by the national consciousness articulated by the new petite bourgeoisie of the P.Q., could be used as a foundation for the development of socialist consciousness. On one level, the grosser aspects of class inequality would be laid bare, and on the other, the new petite bourgeoisie's "neutral state" thesis and the P.Q.'s self-proclaimed "neutrality" would both be de-mystified, thus advancing the consciousness and ideological position of Quebec's popular classes. The working class's appearance as an effective autonomous force struggling on the political level against class subordination precisely depends (and this cannot be emphasized enough here)
upon it achieving such a level of consciousness. Most certainly, sitting back detached from day to day struggles, engaging in endless polemical and ideological diatribe which criticizes and rejects everything that does not immediately call for the total transformation of society, and theorizing (often seemingly in another language) about the spontaneous revolution of a suddenly class conscious proletariat and the blissful and mystical unfolding of a new classless society, does not aid the development of socialist consciousness among popular classes. In fact discouraging short-term gains, as the Anarchists do, actually impedes progress towards that which the popular classes are striving. Yet the Anarchists reject as "reformist" the raising of working class consciousness and the advancement of their political and ideological position, inherent in the P.Q.'s project. They assume rather that this will come about spontaneously within the confines of the Canadian federal system. But this consciousness can only come about through the day to day ideological and political struggles or, to use Gramsci's notion, by fighting "the war of position." 25 Only then can the working class challenge the dominant forces in society, and hope to win the "war of manoeuvre." 26 The P.Q. project must be seen as advancing the political/ideological struggle of Quebecers against foreign domination. Only when they have achieved the level of consciousness required to challenge the dominant forces operating in Quebec
society, can Quebec truly achieve national sovereignty and solve the historical "Quebec question." Furthermore, at the present conjuncture, the P.Q. is the only vehicle which can seriously advance the Quebec nation towards its sovereignty.

On a less theoretical level, rejecting as reformist everything that falls short of revolutionary transformation, is a seemingly foolish contention to make whether by Marxists or Anarchists. It denies the substantial gains the popular classes have made through struggle in the last century, such as: increased unionization; social welfare legislation; certain freedoms of expression, thought and action which, though limited, are nevertheless substantial.

Furthermore, though the P.Q. has always been dominated by its technocratic faction, there is evidence that the radical-wing would, if it took control of the party, bring the interests of Quebec workers into the political realm in Quebec. And recent events give rise to greater optimism for Quebec's popular classes. If the radical-wing manages to influence the social and economic programme of the P.Q. as it has apparently done to the political program (sovereignty) then the working class could use a new radical P.Q. as its vehicle in the political sphere. There is evidence that the radical-wing of the P.Q. (which, briefly stated, was defined below as the fraction of the new petite bourgeoisie in Quebec with a fundamentally working class political/ideological position,
combined with working class elements within the party) would forge organic ties with Quebec's unions. Although in the long-term the Quebec working class no doubt may decide a radical P.Q. is not in their interests, in the short-term such eventualities would advance the expression of the working class's interests and aid in the development of their consciousness.

Another possibility lies in a similar set of circumstances. If the P.Q. (led by its moderate faction) successfully achieves sovereignty-association (or sovereignty), the radical-wing of the party would have little desire to stay within the party. For this wing, which is ideologically opposed to the moderates but has always maintained an allegiance to the party because of a common commitment to independence, the party's raison d'être would no longer exist. Thus, it would quite likely break-off and form a party which would articulate the interests of the working class in an independent Quebec. Within this scenario it would seem likely that the federalist Quebec Liberal Party would cease to be a major factor and that politics in an independent Quebec would be polarized between the "establishment" P.Q. and a workers' party formed of ex-Pequistes. This, once again, would advance the "war of position" in Quebec and, thus, advance the ideological and political position of the Quebec working class. This same scenario would of course also hold true if a P.Q. dominated by radicals achieved sovereignty and its moderate faction
split-off in an independent Quebec. But of course we are a few steps removed from either scenario, nevertheless both are within the realm of possibility.

It should also be mentioned that during the referendum campaign in 1980 the major Quebec unions (QFL, CNTU, CEQ) all adopted positions pledging qualified support for sovereignty-association. The reasoning was that sovereignty-association is a step in the right direction towards the establishment of an independent Quebec nation, but that the P.Q. as a party is not in the interests of Quebec workers. Thus in doing so it would seem that on the ideological level the Quebec working class has an understanding of the class dimension of the P.Q. and its sovereignty-association project. This shows that the P.Q. has not "seduced" the Quebec working class and that, contrary to Roussopoulos' claim, it has not "robbed the national movement entirely of its left-wing or autonomist potential." Furthermore, it shows that the Quebec working class's support for the P.Q. may be tenuous; and that in an independent Quebec its support would certainly not be guaranteed. This, to repeat, would open the way for the creation of a workers' party and a chance to shift the spectrum of political/ideological discourse in Quebec society to the left.

It is therefore felt that the best position the working and socialists in Quebec could take in the present conjuncture of relations, is a "tactical support" of the P.Q.'s
sovereignty-association project. This is similar to the position recommended by the CFP, except that it has been arrived at through a different set of premises. The CFP position begins with an analysis of the P.Q. which is similar to the one used by Bourque and Fournier: the P.Q. is an alliance of bourgeois and petit bourgeois fractions who desire to "increase their influence on and involvement in North American capitalism while harmonizing the interests of the North American bourgeoisie (American, Canadian and Quebec) within a stabilized political system." But the CFP concludes: "The best strategy for labour seems to be asserting its political autonomy in the present situation, specifying its fundamental objectives (socialism) and its political strategy (independence), and affirming its tactical support for the (P.Q.) so as to continue the Canadian political crisis while increasing pressure on the P.Q.'s constituency." Although our reasoning for favouring "tactical support" of the P.Q. is to advance the political ideological position of Quebec's popular classes, rather than to "deepen the inter-bourgeois political crisis," the conclusions are fundamentally compatible.

In short, whether the ultimate solution of the Quebec question lies in a revolutionary struggle led by a vanguard party, or in the establishment of a workers' party which struggles through parliamentary means, the Quebec question cannot be solved from within the Canadian political context.
The P.Q.'s sovereignty-association project is not the ultimate answer. It is but a stage in the struggle of Quebecers to control their own destiny. And is this not what national liberation is all about?

The major objective for adopting the approach used in this thesis was to provide a theoretical framework that could be used for the analysis and understanding of historical and contemporary events relating to the "Quebec question." Since it was felt that this would require an understanding of several aspects of the problem -- political, social, economic, cultural, ideological -- a class perspective was chosen. Because, as indicated in Chapter one, it is felt the Weberian or pluralist perspective -- which sees classes as categories (upper, middle and lower) definable by income or other empirical data, and sees the state as a neutral arbiter between groups in society -- is of little analytical utility, a Marxist perspective was chosen. But there were several problems acknowledged in using such an approach. To repeat briefly, one problem is that of rigid economic determinism. The economic level (or base, or "civil society") is seen as determinant in all cases. Thus the political and ideological level (superstructure, "the state") is seen as a mirror image of the economic level, i.e. the bourgeoisie's dominance at the economic level necessarily entails its political and ideological dominance. Other factors,
including culture, are seen as effects or epiphenomena. Another major problem in Marxist class analysis has been called the 'new petite bourgeoisie problematic.' Society is often viewed in a purely dialectical fashion. From this perspective only two classes fit into the formula. Therefore, the petite bourgeoisie (or middle class or intermediate strata) is not seen as having an autonomous existence, therefore, of little or no long-term significance. Also, Marxism has typically been afflicted by sterile dogmatism. Society, once again, is viewed dialectically from a historical materialist perspective. From this perspective, the working class will inevitably rise up in revolution and overthrow its oppressor, the bourgeoisie, and establish a classless society -- "the final denouement." Thus the question becomes, "What means will best serve these ends?" Some Marxist schools insist on the spontaneous uprising of the working class. Others insist on the use of a vanguard party. These are valid means, but cannot be accepted as universal truths. If socialism is the desired end, and it is from this author's perspective, it can come about through any number of means. Each situation has its own peculiar circumstances and idiosyncrasies and must be understood in its own specificity. As history has taught us, dogma has led to the creation of degenerate and highly bureaucratized state socialist systems in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe -- systems where the all-powerful and omnipresent
Communist Party (supposedly the vanguard of the working class) rejects the genuine demands of Poland's working class for democratic reforms and a share in decision-making, and imposes martial law to suppress these demands. On the other hand, we have seen successful progress towards socialism through parliamentary means, such as the current experiments in France and Greece. Clearly a systematic analysis of the relative merits and demerits of the various methods of bringing about socialism cannot be undertaken here, but it should be pointed out that dogma can only lead to the narrowing of alternatives, not their expansion.

Another problem with Marxist analysis is that theory often replaces the reality of that which it is trying to depict. Theoretical statements that can neither be proven true nor false are offered as universal truths. This is, of course, also an inherent weakness of theory in the social sciences. It can never achieve a high level of abstraction, it is unable to consistently make cross-cultural generalizations and it is unable to offer absolute predictions, as in the case of theory in the physical sciences -- chemistry, physics, biology. Marxist categories have shown to be of little value in understanding certain phenomena (such as religion or nationalism) in certain areas of the world (such as in Asia). Thus, theory must be constructed and applied in each case study according to its own specificity. Events should not selectively be
chosen and squeezed into theoretical categories to prove their validity. Of course this is also a problem of theory, and its application. But theory should follow from the study of situations rather than the reverse. This is never entirely possible because one always begins with theoretical preconceptions, even if these are simply in the form of subconscious values that manifest themselves in the way in which we perceive the world. But the problems resulting from this can be minimized by keeping an open and flexible approach to the study of phenomena.

To overcome these problems this thesis has from the outset insisted on a rejection of dogma and on using a flexible approach in dealing with the Quebec question. But because it is the objective of theses to offer insight into a particular case by providing theoretically derived generalizations, this thesis, in its own way becomes somewhat dogmatic by providing its author's own interpretation of the events in Quebec. This, of course, is unavoidable. To overcome the problems of determinism and the 'new petite bourgeoisie problematic' this thesis briefly explored the insights of Antonio Gramsci and several recent neo-Marxists such as Nico Poulantzas, all of whom were concerned with these very theoretical problems. Thus the class analysis used here includes an understanding of ideological and political relations, as well as economic and social relations. The state is seen as somewhat autonomous and potentially determinant in capitalist society. The petite bourgeoisie is also seen as a somewhat autonomous social category which is
also potentially determinant, especially in short-term and conjunctural periods. Most importantly, ideological, political, and cultural phenomena are not seen as simply effects of the level of economic relations.

As to the success of this thesis in achieving its objectives, one can view it on several levels. On one hand, this flexible approach enabled us to go beyond determinism and view ideological, political and cultural factors in Quebec as autonomous and important in their own way. Thus the P.Q. was not analyzed with the preconceived notion that it is a "bourgeois party." And we did not have to alter the basic Marxist definition of the bourgeoisie to prove that this class is behind the project and independence. Instead, by viewing the new petite bourgeoisie as a distinct social category which emerged in the postWWII period and is today somewhat autonomous from the bourgeoisie in Quebec, we were able to understand it as the driving force behind the P.Q. and the nationalist movement. By viewing the state as autonomous we were able to provide evidence, rather than make abstract theoretical statements, to show that it is not simply dominated by the Quebec bourgeoisie. Not seeing the state as a static entity enabled us to see that its orientation can change, albeit usually marginally, according to which party is in power. This allowed us to see more clearly the role the P.Q. plays in the contemporary Quebec.
By including political and ideological factors in the definition of class, we were able to see that the petite bourgeoisie is not unified by a monolithic ideology, and that its fractions are precisely distinguishable by the various ideological positions they take. Thus, we can account for why some fractions can take a position closer to the bourgeoisie, while others are closer to the working class. Translating this analysis to the P.Q. we were able to explain the existence of ideological differences among factions within the party. As well, by seeing nationalism as an ideological force we were able to link it to the class which interpolates it, thus understanding better the nature of that class and its ideology. In light of this we were able to see nationalism as the dominant aspect of the new petite bourgeoisie's ideology as expressed through the P.Q., and thereby better understand the nature of the party.

Furthermore, the non-dogmatic, non-sectarian approach enabled us to suggest "tactical support" for the P.Q. and sovereignty-association, because it would increase the political/ideological understanding of the popular classes in Quebec and advance the Quebec nation towards its emancipation.

But the thesis and the approach used also contain several weaknesses that should also be pointed out. First, including political and ideological relations in the definition of class makes the operationalization of class difficult.
Ideology and consciousness are subjective phenomena and cannot be readily measured empirically. Thus, to define a class or class fraction's political/ideological position is extremely difficult. This thesis often relied on statements made by spokespersons for the various classes and class fractions in Quebec as evidence of their class position. Chapter six, which was a class analysis of the P.Q., occasionally used statements made by P.Q. officials such as Levesque and Landry, to show the political/ideological position of the technocratic faction within the P.Q. On other occasions official statements by union leaders -- such as the CNTU's 1971 manifesto or the unions' formal statements during the referendum -- and business leaders -- such as the declarations of business association leaders or Pro-Canada groups -- were used to show the consciousness of the working class and bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the existence of two factions -- radicals and moderates -- within the P.Q. is not easily provable on an empirical level as it is based on subjective and ideological differences. Thus, while it was indicated earlier that these categories were not meant to be taken as rigid and well defined groups within the P.Q., their existence remains somewhat hypothetical. Since exhaustive empirical studies have not, as yet, been done, to the best of our knowledge, and it was beyond the scope of this thesis to do so, we were unable to demonstrate some of our conclusions with empirical data.
Therefore, of course we are not claiming that they are truths. Furthermore, while the approach was eclectic and flexible, designed to suit the specificity of the Quebec case, it remains simplistic in its basic categories of analysis. The relationship between classes, class fractions and the state, is an immensely complex one; therefore, the study of this should attempt to take into account all the idiosyncracies and nuances of the situation. With the limited time available to this author (a lifetime would no doubt not fully suffice) and the somewhat vast parameters defined by this thesis, this was not possible.

Finally, the weakness that, in the final analysis, stands as the major one, is this author's strictly limited ability to read or converse in French. The laborious process of consulting a dictionary for the translation of all but the most basic words, prevented this author from reading all but the most crucial French sources. This weakness is alleviated somewhat by the fortunate availability of translations of important French works in progressive English journals such as Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review and Our Generation. Black Rose Books has also made translations available of several important French books such as Quebec Labour (introduction by Bennett) and The Quebec Establishment (Fournier). But this weakness still stands as the thesis' most crucial shortcoming.
REFERENCES


7 Ibid., p. 83.

8 Ibid., p. 79.

9 For a more detailed discussion of this see Chapter two.

10 Fournier says the state corporations are "an integral part of the local bourgeoisie, identify with its interests, and participate in its financial circuits." (page 74) He also sees that the "cooperative sector is an integral part of the Quebec bourgeoisie ... (some are) not only capitalist, but also monopolistic." (page 72) He sees the Quebec private sector bourgeoisie as the "weak link in the chain for the Quebec bourgeoisie". (page 84), Fournier, op.cit., 1980.
There are several similarities in the behaviour of those fractions which Fournier distinguishes as the Quebec state bourgeoisie and the Quebec private sector bourgeoisie. But, it is felt here that the differences are so significant that the former cannot even be called "bourgeois", rather, only the latter can. For one, the bourgeoisie holds legal ownership of corporations (in the form of private property) through the investment of their own capital, and derives personal gain in the form of profits. Though as we stated in Chapter two, this role has changed somewhat over the last several years, the heads of state corporations, alternatively, never hold direct ownership of these corporations, nor do they (legally) derive personal gain from profits. By virtue of their position in the top levels of state and private corporations, these people must be considered new petit bourgeois with a bourgeois class position. Another difference which supports this interpretation is that private corporations operate purely on the search for profit. There is only one concern when deciding whether to invest or not, and that is profitability. Alternatively, state corporations invest within the geographical boundaries of the nation in order to aid economic development within. Qualitatively the behaviour of the state executives and the private sector bourgeoisie is therefore different because profitability is not the only concern of state corporations. Areas where economic development is very slow will often receive public investment to ease the problems of regional underdevelopment. Private corporations have never been known to express such good will.

There are exceptions such as Pierre Péladeau, head of Québecor, Raymond Boisvert, Fernand Paré, head of La Solidarité Insurance Co., Michel Bélanger, head of the Quebec businessmen's association - Conseil des Gens d'Affaires du Québec (CGAQ), Marcel Brulotte, co-owner and vice-president of Marquis-Métivier rubber products, and Gilles Roy, co-owner of Atlas Van Lines. Some have even pointed to the private holdings of P.Q. minister Jacques Parizeau and ex-minister Guy Joron, as proof that the P.Q. is a bourgeois party. See October, op.cit., pps. 129-147.


The "statist fixation" simply means that the project plans to maintain a strong state within a new order, rather than to transcend the state or diffuse its powers. This is of course objectionable to all anarchists.

17 Ibid., p. 10.

18 Ibid., pps. 10, 11.

19 Ibid., p. 12.


21 Ibid., p. 16.

22 Ibid., p. 18.


26 Ibid., p. 114.

27 Milner offers a similar analysis for an independent Quebec: "Quebec politics would enter a new state with on one side, the technocratic wing of the P.Q. working more closely with some Liberals and other establishment elements oriented toward the newly attained status quo, and, on the other, "participationist" elements within the P.Q. joining forces with various (non M-L) left groups in the trade unions, at the municipal level, in citizens' groups, and the like. This latter formation would take the form of an electoral alliance or perhaps some other form of association to carry the struggle to the next stage - a stage that will more directly pose the social question: who is to control the material existence of the working people of Quebec, they themselves, or a small dominant class ... The very notion of stages of political developments offends many socialists in Canada and Quebec who prefer to merely allude to a far-off revolution and in the meantime simply to denounce the reformist tendencies around them, thus effectively sidestepping the hard strategic question of just what is possible in the present context ... The long term cost of building a strategy upon distortion can only be negative." Milner, Politics in the New Quebec, (Toronto: 1978), pps. 252-3.
It is of course problematic to refer to the statements of the major unions in Quebec as an expression of the political/ideological position of the Quebec working class. These statements were formulated by the leadership of the unions and were merely ratified by the membership. Nevertheless, there are few other ways one can gauge the ideological position of the working class without employing systematic and laborious empirical study methods (which would be preferable but impossible under the conditions faced here).


Ibid., p. 27.

Ibid., p. 27.

This means that the fractions of the new petite bourgeoisie are not entirely distinguishable or definable by their relationship to the means of production, but that the critical divisions (i.e. between the moderate and radical wings of the P.Q.) are definable by their ideological and political positions.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


-----------------------------


-----------------------------


-----------------------------


-----------------------------


-----------------------------


-----------------------------


-----------------------------


Articles


Saul and Heron, Imperialism, Nationalism and Canada. (Toronto: 1977).


Roussopoulos, Quebec and Radical Social Change, (Montreal: 1974).


This Magazine Editors, "The Quebec Election and the Failure of Imagination in English Canada." This Magazine, January-February 1977.


Government Documents

Quebec.


Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, Quebec's Traditional Stands on the Division of Powers, 1978.


Canada


Serials